

## Chapter 1 : Europe and the American Civil War

*Why Did Western Europe Dominate the Globe? Although Europe represents only about 8 percent of the planet's landmass, from to , Europeans conquered or colonized more than 80 percent of the entire world.*

He picked out three factors that he thought were critical: For all his many failings Ribbentrop was closer to the truth than he might have realised. Italy and Japan never posed the same kind of threat as the European superpower they fought alongside. Their defeat, costly though it was, became irresistible. The Allies had to mobilise and utilise their large resources effectively on the battlefield and in the air. This outcome could not be taken for granted. British forces were close to defeat everywhere in The American economy was a peacetime economy, apparently unprepared for the colossal demands of total war. The Soviet system was all but shattered in , two-thirds of its heavy industrial capacity captured and its vast air and tank armies destroyed. Soviet resistance was in some ways the most surprising outcome. The evidence of how poorly the Red Army fought in confirmed these expectations. More than five million Soviet soldiers were captured or killed in six months; they fought with astonishing bravery, but at every level of combat were out-classed by troops that were better armed, better trained and better led. This situation seemed beyond remedy. Yet within a year Soviet factories were out-producing their richly-endowed German counterparts - the Red Army had embarked on a thorough transformation of the technical and organisational base of Soviet forces, and a stiffening of morale, from Stalin downwards, produced the first serious reverse for the German armed forces when Operation Uranus in November led to the encirclement of Stalingrad and the loss of the German Sixth Army. In the first place the Red Army learned a great deal from German practice and from their own mistakes. The air and tank armies were reorganised to mimic the German Panzer divisions and air fleets; communication and intelligence were vastly improved helped by a huge supply of American and British telephone equipment and cable ; training for officers and men was designed to encourage greater initiative; and the technology available was hastily modernised to match German. Not until the later stages of the war did Stalin begin to reimpose control, when victory was at last in sight. Two other changes proved vital to allow the army to profit from the reform of operational practice. First, Soviet industry and workforce proved remarkable adaptable for a command economy long regarded as inherently inefficient and inflexible. The pre-war experience of economic planning and mobilisation helped the regime to run a war economy on an emergency basis, while the vast exodus of workers an estimated 16 million and factories more than 2, major plants from in front of the advancing Germans allowed the USSR to reconstruct its armaments economy in central and eastern Russia with great rapidity. The second factor lay with politics. Until the summer of Stalin and the Party closely controlled the Red Army. Political commissars worked directly alongside senior officers and reported straight back to the Kremlin. Stalin came to realise that political control was a dead hand on the army and cut it back sharply in the autumn of He created a deputy supreme commander under him, the talented Marshal Zhukov, and began to step back more from the day-to- day conduct of the war. Given the freedom to work out their own salvation, the Soviet General Staff demonstrated that they could match the Germans on the battlefield. The Soviet Union did not turn the tide on the Eastern Front on its own. Though for decades Soviet historians played down the role of American and British Lend-Lease aid, its real significance has now been acknowledged. From a flow of food and raw materials and engineering equipment sustained the Soviet war effort. There was enough food in the end to ensure a square meal for every Soviet soldier; most of the Soviet rail network was supplied with locomotives, wagons and rails made in the USA; one million miles of telephone wire, 14 million pairs of boots, , trucks, all helped to keep the Red Army fighting with growing efficiency. Yet the transition from peace to war was so rapid and effective that the USA was able to make up for the lag in building up effectively trained armed forces by exerting a massive material superiority. After a decade of recession the manufacturing community had a good deal of spare, unemployed capacity to absorb unlike Germany, where full employment was reached well before the outbreak of war, and gains in output could only really come from improvements in productivity. Even with these vast resources to hand, however, it took American forces considerable time before they could fight on equal terms with well-trained and

determined enemies. Even with these vast resources to hand, however, it took American forces considerable time before they could fight on equal terms. This gap in fighting effectiveness helps to explain the decision taken in Washington to focus a good deal of the American effort on the building up of a massive air power. Roosevelt saw air strategy as a key to future war and a way to reduce American casualties. At his encouragement the Army Air Forces were able to build up an air force that came to dwarf those of Germany and Japan. At the centre of the strategy was a commitment to strategic bombing, the long-range and independent assault on the economic and military infrastructure of the enemy state. In January the two states finally decided to pool their very large bomber forces in a Combined Offensive against the German economy. Yet its effect was to distort German strategy and economic capability decisively between and This was achieved in three distinct ways. Bombing provided the key difference between the western Allies and Germany. First, bombing forced the German Air Force to divert most of its fighter force to the defence of Germany, and to reduce sharply the proportion of bomber aircraft produced. The effect was to denude the German frontline of much needed bomber and fighter aircraft; by German air power was easily eroded around the periphery of German-controlled Europe, where pilot losses reached exceptionally high levels. Second, bombing placed a ceiling on the ability of the German-dominated European economy to produce armaments in quantities that matched the vast resource base of the occupied economies. This was achieved through direct destruction, the interruption of raw material, transport and energy supplies on a large scale, and the forced dispersal of German industry away from the most threatened centres. Third, bombing forced Hitler and the German leadership to think of radical ways to combat the threat it posed. A gigantic construction project for an underground economy was authorised by Hitler in Organised by Himmler, using camp labour under the most rigorous and deadly regime, millions of man-hours and billions of marks were spent trying to achieve the impossible. It played an important part in sustaining domestic morale in Britain and the USA, while its effects on German society produced social disruption on a vast scale by late 8 million Germans had fled from the cities to the safer villages and townships. The use of bombers and fighter-bombers at the frontline helped to ease the path of inexperienced armies that threatened to get bogged down in Normandy and Italy. The debilitating effects on German air power then reduced the contribution German aircraft could make on the Eastern Front, where Soviet air forces vastly outnumbered German. The success of air power in Europe persuaded the American military leaders to try to end the war with Japan the same way. City raids from May destroyed a vast area of urban Japan and paved the way for a surrender, completed with the dropping of the two atomic bombs in August Here, too, the American government and public was keen to avoid further heavy casualties. Air power provided a short-cut to victory in both theatres; British and American wartime losses were a fraction of those sustained by Germany, Japan and the USSR, and this in turn made it easier to persuade democratic populations to continue fighting even through periods of crisis and stalemate. Yet without Soviet resistance and reform, American rearmament and economic mobilisation, and western air power, the ability of the three major allies to wear down German and Japanese resistance would have been highly questionable. This still leaves open the question of German miscalculation. Military arrogance and political hubris put Germany on the path to a war she could have won only if these expectations had proved true.

**Chapter 2 : This Is How Europe Came to Dominate the World by the 20th Century | History News Network**

*World War II in Europe began when Hitler's Nazi Germany attacked Poland. Germany had allies such as Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. These European countries were part of the Axis Powers. The countries that fought against Germany and the Axis Powers in Europe were called the Allied Powers. The.*

Being dominated for centuries has led to lingering inequality and long-lasting effects in many formerly colonized countries, including poverty and slow economic growth. There are many possible explanations for why history played out this way, but few can explain why the West was so powerful for so long. Axline Professor of Business Economics and professor of history, has a new explanation: The Chinese invented gunpowder, but Hoffman, whose work applies economic theory to historical contexts, argues that certain political and economic circumstances allowed the Europeans to advance gunpowder technology at an unprecedented rate—allowing a relatively small number of people to quickly take over much of the rest of the globe. We spoke with him recently about his research interests and what led him to study this particular topic. You have been on the Caltech faculty for more than 30 years. Are there any overarching themes to your work? For example, how did states get the ability to impose heavy taxes? What were the politics and the political context of the economy that resulted in this ability to tax? What led you to investigate the global conquests of western Europe? A thousand years ago, no one would have ever expected that result, for at that point western Europe was hopelessly backward. It was politically weak, it was poor, and the major long-distance commerce was a slave trade led by Vikings. The political dominance of western Europe was an unexpected outcome and had really big consequences, so I thought: Many theories purport to explain how the West became dominant. For example, that Europe became industrialized more quickly and therefore became wealthier than the rest of the world. Or, that when Europeans began to travel the world, people in other countries did not have the immunity to fight off the diseases they brought with them. How is your theory different? Yes, there are lots of conventional explanations—industrialization, for example—but on closer inspection they all fall apart. Before, Europe had already taken over at least 35 percent of the world, but Britain was just beginning to industrialize. The Fates of Human Societies], is disease. What made you turn to the idea of gunpowder technology as an explanation? It started after I gave an undergraduate here a book to read about gunpowder technology, how it was invented in China and used in Japan and Southeast Asia, and how the Europeans got very good at using it, which fed into their successful conquests. That was a really great question and it got me interested. What was so special about gunpowder? Gunpowder was really important for conquering territory; it allows a small number of people to exercise a lot of influence. The technology grew to include more than just guns: So, I put together an economic model of how this technology has advanced to come up with what I think is the real reason why the West conquered almost everyone else. My idea incorporates the model of a contest or a tournament where your odds of winning are higher if you spend more resources on fighting. And the more that the political leaders spend, the better their chances of defeating other leaders and, in the long run, of dominating the other cultures. What kinds of factors are included in this model? In the very successful countries, the leaders could impose very heavy taxes and spend huge sums on war. The economic model then connected that spending to changes in military technology. The spending on war gave leaders a chance to try out new weapons, new armed ships, and new tactics, and to learn from mistakes on the battlefield. The more they spent, the more chances they had to improve their military technology through trial and error while fighting wars. So more spending would not only mean greater odds of victory over an enemy, but more rapid change in military technology. For example, if I am fighting you and you figure out a better way to build an armed ship, I can imitate you. For that to happen, the countries have to be small and close to one another. And all of this describes Europe. What does this mean in a modern context? One lesson the book teaches is that actions involving war, foreign policy, and military spending can have big, long-lasting consequences: Those improvements can help at times when wars are necessary—for instance, when we are fighting against enemies with whom we cannot negotiate. Such enemies existed in the past—they were fighting for glory on the battlefield or victory over an enemy of the faith—and one could argue that they pose a threat today as

well. Things are much better if the conflict concerns something that can be split up—such as money or land. Then you can bargain with your enemies to divvy up whatever you disagree about and you can have something like peace.

### Chapter 3 : BBC - History - World Wars: World War Two: How the Allies Won

*The Saylor Foundation 2 Europe with advantages that proved crucial in European imperial ventures in Africa and Asia. Superior weapons technology certainly did not forestall opposition, but it clearly.*

Germany had allies such as Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. These European countries were part of the Axis Powers. Later the United States would help in defeating Hitler. British Tank fighting in Europe Source: This treaty not only took land from Germany, but required that they pay huge amounts of money in reparations to countries they had fought. As a result, the German economy did very poorly. The citizens of Germany were not only humiliated that they had lost World War I, but they were also poor and struggling. It was during this time that Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came into power. Hitler promised he would bring Germany back to power. Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany in . Soon he had made himself dictator. Hitler said the country needed more land or "living space". First Hitler took over the country of Austria. Next, he took part of Czechoslovakia. Finally, when Germany invaded Poland in , the other countries knew he would not stop. German Troops Invade Poland Source: After Poland was defeated, the country was divided up between Germany and the Soviet Union. It was in April of when Germany went on the attack again. On April 9, Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. Soon after that, they invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. On June 22, Germany signed an agreement that gave them control of the Northern half of France. Up until this point in the war, the Soviet Union had been allied with Germany. However, on June 22, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union was on the side of the Allies. They tried to help out the Allies, but did not want to enter the fighting. The US became a major power within the Allies Alliance. Three Fronts By Germany had control over much of mainland Europe. They had tried to take over Great Britain in with the Battle of Britain, but failed. The Allies also took control of northern Africa and then launched an attack on Italy forcing southern Italy to surrender. At the same time, the Russians defeated the German army on the Eastern Front and started to push them back towards Germany. This day is often called D-Day or the Invasion of Normandy. The Allies defeated the Germans and pushed them out of France. Germany then counterattacked and a great battle, called the Battle of the Bulge, was fought. Hundreds of thousands of US troops held the Germans back and the German army was finally defeated. On May 7, Germany surrendered to the Western Allies. The next day the Allies celebrated victory. May 8th is called V-E day or "Victory in Europe" day. Adolf Hitler committed suicide in a bunker on April 30, when he realized that Germany would lose the war. United States General Dwight D. At one point he was in charge of over 5 million soldiers. Activities Take a ten question quiz about this page.

**Chapter 4 : Five reasons why Macron won the French election - BBC News**

*The European Union, which struggled for the past few years to keep afloat its members in financial straits, received a flash of recognition Friday when it won the Nobel Peace Prize.*

Share via Email Russian women carrying supplies to the troops at Stalingrad. Western Europe had been decisively conquered, and there were few signs of any serious resistance to German rule. German forces had overrun Greece, and subjugated Yugoslavia. Above all, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June had reaped stunning rewards, with Leningrad the present-day St Petersburg besieged by German and Finnish troops, Smolensk and Kiev taken, and millions of Red Army troops killed or captured in a series of vast encircling operations that brought the German armed forces within reach of Moscow. Surrounded by a girdle of allies, from Vichy France and Finland to Romania and Hungary, and with the more or less benevolent neutrality of countries such as Sweden and Switzerland posing no serious threat, the Greater German Reich seemed to be unstoppable in its drive for supremacy in Europe. Yet in retrospect this proved to be the high point of German success. The fundamental problem facing Hitler was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time. Leading economic managers such as Fritz Todt had already begun to realise this. Imbued with an unquestioning faith in Hitler and his will to win, Speer restructured and rationalised the arms production system, building on reforms already begun by Todt. His methods helped increase dramatically the number of planes and tanks manufactured in German plants, and boosted the supply of ammunition to the troops. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in early December, Hitler saw the opportunity to attack American convoys without inhibition, and declared war on the US in the belief that Roosevelt would be too preoccupied with countering the Japanese advance in the Pacific to trouble overmuch with events in Europe. Yet such was the economic might of the Americans that they could pour increasing resources into the conflict in both theatres of war. Germany produced 15, new combat aircraft in , 26, in , and 40, in In the US, the figures were 48,, 86, and , respectively. Added to these were the aircraft produced in the Soviet Union – 37, in , for example – and the UK: It was the same story with tanks, where 6, made in Germany each year had to face the same number produced annually in Britain and the Dominions, and three times as many in the Soviet Union. Above all, the Reich was short of fuel. In mid he captured the key seaport of Tobruk. But when he resumed his advance, he was met with massive defensive positions prepared by the meticulous British general Bernard Montgomery at El Alamein. Over 12 days he failed to break through the British lines and was forced into a headlong retreat across the desert. To complete the rout, the allies landed an expeditionary force further west, in Morocco and Algeria. A quarter of a million German and Italian troops surrendered in May Rommel had already returned to Germany on sick leave. But it was not to be. Battle of the Atlantic But from December , the British could decode German ciphers once more and steer their convoys away from the waiting wolf-packs of U-boats. By May the allies were building more ship tonnage than the Germans were sinking, while one U-boat was being sunk by allied warships and planes on average every day. The battle of the Atlantic was over. The most dramatic and most significant reversal of German fortunes came, however, on the eastern front. The sheer scale of the conflict between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army dwarfed anything seen anywhere else during the second world war. From 22 June , the day of the German invasion, there was never a point at which less than two-thirds of the German armed forces were engaged on the eastern front. Deaths on the eastern front numbered more than in all the other theatres of war put together, including the Pacific. But it did not. More than three million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately left to die of starvation and disease in makeshift camps. Civilians were drafted into forced labour, villages were burned to the ground, towns reduced to rubble. More than one million people died in the siege of Leningrad; but it did not fall. Soviet reserves of manpower and resources were seemingly inexhaustible. In a vast effort, major arms and munitions factories had been dismantled and transported to safety east of the Urals. Here they began to pour out increasing quantities of military hardware, including the terrifying "Stalin organ", the Katyusha rocket-launcher. Unprepared for a winter war, poorly clad, and exhausted from months of rapid advance and bitter fighting, the German forces had to abandon the idea of taking the Russian capital. A whole

string of generals succumbed to heart attacks or nervous exhaustion, and were replaced; Hitler himself took over as commander-in-chief of the army. Hitler had already weakened the thrust towards Moscow by diverting forces to take the grainfields of the Ukraine and push on to the Crimea. For much of , this tactic seemed to be succeeding. German forces took the Crimea and advanced towards the oilfields of the Caucasus. But Soviet generals had begun to learn how to co-ordinate tanks, infantry and air power and to avoid encirclement by tactical withdrawals. The German forces were already dangerously short of reserves and supplies when they reached the city of Stalingrad on the river Volga, in August . Three months later, they had still not taken the city. Stalingrad became the object of a titanic struggle between the Germans and the Soviets, less because of its strategic importance than because of its name. Short of fuel and ammunition, the Germans under General Paulus were unable to break out. As one airfield after another was captured by the Red Army, supplies ran out and the German troops began to starve to death. Some , German and allied troops were captured; more than , had been killed. It was the turning point of the war. Last great counter-attack From this moment on, the German armies were more or less continuously in retreat on the eastern front. In early July came the last great German counter-attack, at Kursk. This was the greatest land battle in history, involving more than four million troops, 13, tanks and self-propelled guns, and 12, combat aircraft. Warned of the attack in advance, the Red Army had prepared defences in depth, which the Germans only managed partially to penetrate. The local party commissar, Nikita Khrushchev, covered up this disaster by persuading Stalin that they had been destroyed in a huge battle that had eliminated more than German tanks and won a heroic victory. The legend of "the greatest tank battle in history" was born. In fact it was nothing of the kind. So enormous were the Russian reserves that the loss of the tanks made little difference in the end, as fresh troops and armour were moved in to rescue the situation. More than one million soldiers, 3, tanks and self-propelled guns, and nearly 4, combat aircraft entered the fray on the Soviet side and began a series of successful counter-offensives. The Germans were forced to retreat. After the war, German generals claimed bitterly they could have won at Kursk had Hitler not stopped the action. And the tanks really were needed in Italy. Following their victory in north Africa, the allies had landed in Sicily on 10 July to be greeted in Palermo by Italian citizens waving white flags. On 3 September an armistice was signed, and allied forces landed on the Italian mainland. German troops had already invaded from the north, taking over the entire peninsula. German morale These events had a devastating effect on German morale at home. In particular the catastrophe of Stalingrad began to convince many Germans that the war could not be won. Worse was to come. Meeting at Casablanca in January , Churchill and Roosevelt decided on a sustained campaign of bombing German cities. A series of massive raids on the industrial area of the Ruhr followed, backed up by the destruction of key dams by the famous "bouncing bombs" on 16 May . Arms production was severely affected. And in late July and early August , the centre of Hamburg was almost completely destroyed in a firestorm created by intensive incendiary bombing that killed up to 40, people, injured a further , many of them seriously, and made , homeless. Refugees from the devastated city spread a sense of shock and foreboding all across Germany. German air defences were still able to inflict serious losses on allied bombing expeditions, but they were not strong enough to prevent the devastation continuing. By the end of , German forces were retreating all along the line in the east and in Italy. The spectacle of German defeat and the brutal requisitioning of millions of forced labourers from occupied countries fuelled the rise of resistance movements right across Europe. The Reich had lost command of the skies and the seas. Ordinary Germans knew by the end of that the war was lost. Terror began to replace commitment as a means of keeping people fighting on. More than 20, German troops were executed by courts-martial during the war for varieties of defeatism. At home, people faced a similar escalation of terror from the Nazi party and the SS. Retreating into their private and family worlds, they began to focus increasingly on simply staying alive and waiting for the end. Richard J Evans is regius professor of modern history at Cambridge University.

**Chapter 5 : World War II History: WW2 in Europe for Kids**

*From to , the United States of America and Mexico fought the Mexican-American war. Many causes of the war, but the biggest reasons were Mexico's lingering resentment over the loss of Texas and the Americans' desire for Mexico's western lands, such as California and New Mexico.*

Each country was a monarchy, and a monarchy does not ordinarily like to see a rebellion succeed in any land. The example may prove contagious. Yet the war had not progressed very far before it was clear that the ruling classes in each of these two countries sympathized strongly with the Confederacy-so strongly that with just a little prodding they might be moved to intervene and bring about Southern independence by force of arms. The South was, after all, an aristocracy, and the fact that it had a broad democratic base was easily overlooked at a distance of three thousand miles. If the nation now broke into halves, proving that democracy did not contain the stuff of survival, the rulers of Europe would be well pleased. To be sure, the Southern nation was based on the institution of chattel slavery-a completely repugnant anachronism by the middle of the nineteenth century. Neither the British nor the French people would go along with any policy that involved fighting to preserve slavery. But up to the fall of slavery was not an issue in the war. The Federal government had explicitly declared that it was fighting solely to save the Union. If a Southern emissary wanted to convince Europeans that they could aid the South without thereby aiding slavery, he could prove his case by citing the words of the Federal President and Congress. As far as Europe was concerned, no moral issue was involved; the game of power politics could be played with a clear conscience. So it was played, and the threat of European intervention was real and immediate. Outright war with England nearly took place in the fall of 1861, when a hot-headed US. Jefferson Davis had named two distinguished Southerners, James M. Mason and John Slidell. They got out of Charleston, South Carolina, on a blockade-runner at the beginning of October and went via Nassau to Havana, where they took passage for England on the British mail steamer Trent. Precisely at this time U. S. San Jacinto was returning to the United States from a long tour of duty along the African coast.. She put in at a Cuban port, looking for news of Confederate commerce raiders which were reported to be active in that vicinity, and there her commander, Captain Wilkes, heard about Mason and Slidell. He now worked out a novel interpretation of international law. Mason and Slidell, Wilkes reasoned, were in effect Confederate dispatches, and he had a right to remove them. Wilkes was hailed as a national hero. Congress voted him its thanks, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, ordinarily a most cautious mortal, warmly commended him. But in England there was an uproar which almost brought on a war. The mere notion that Americans could halt a British ship on the high seas and remove lawful passengers was intolerable. Eleven thousand regular troops were sent to Canada, the British fleet was put on a war footing, and a sharp note was dispatched to the United States, demanding surrender of the prisoners and a prompt apology. If the general tempo of things had not been so feverish just then, experts on international law might have amused themselves by pointing out that the American and British governments had precisely reversed their traditional policies. In the Napoleonic wars British warships had exercised the right of search and seizure without restraint, stopping American merchant ships on the high seas to remove persons whom they suspected of being British subjects-doing, in fact, exactly what Wilkes had done with a slightly different object. The United States government had protested that this was improper and illegal, and the whole business had helped bring on the War of 1812. Now an American naval officer had done what British naval officers had done half a century earlier, and the British government was protesting in the same way the earlier American government had done. If anyone cared to make anything of it, the situation was somewhat ironic. It was touch and go for a while, because a good many brash Yankees were quite willing to fight the British, and the seizure of the Confederate commissioners had somehow seemed like a great victory. But Lincoln stuck to the policy of one war at a time, and after due deliberation the apology was made and the prisoners were released. The Trent incident was forgotten, and the final note was strangely anticlimactic. The transports bearing the British troops to Canada arrived off the American coast just after the release and apology. Secretary of State Seward offered, a little too graciously, to let the soldiers disembark on American soil for rapid transportation across Maine, but the British coldly rejected this unnecessary courtesy.

The Trent affair had been symptomatic. The war had put a heavy strain on relations between the United States and Great Britain, and there would always be danger that some unexpected occurrence would bring on a war. Yet the two countries were fortunate in the character of their diplomats. The American Minister in London was Charles Francis Adams, and the British Minister in Washington was Lord Lyons, and these two had done all they could, in the absence of instructions from their governments, to keep the Trent business from getting out of hand. Much more serious was the situation that developed late in the summer of 1861. At that time, as far as any European could see, the Confederacy was beginning to look very much like a winner—a point which James Mason insistently pressed home with British officialdom. Minister Adams warned Seward that the British government might very soon offer to mediate the difficulty between North and South, which would be a polite but effective way of intimating that in the opinion of Great Britain the quarrel had gone on long enough and ought to be ended—by giving the South what it wanted. Adams knew what he was talking about. Earl Russell had given Mason no encouragement whatever, but after news of the Second Battle of Bull Run reached London, he and Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, agreed that along in late September or thereabouts there should be a cabinet meeting at which Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would ask approval of the mediation proposal. Implicit in all of this was the idea that if the Northern government should refuse to accept mediation, Britain would go ahead and recognize the Confederacy. If the Federals were beaten, then the proposal would go through; if Lee failed, then it might be well to wait a little longer before taking any action. Gladstone explained that he had simply been expressing his own opinion rather than that of the government, and when Earl Russell saw the speech, he wrote Gladstone that he "went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed. In all of this there was less of actual hostility toward the North than is usually supposed. Palmerston and Russell were prepared to accept an accomplished fact, when and if such a fact became visible; if the Confederacy was definitely going to win, the fact ought to be admitted and the war ought to be ended. But they were not prepared to go further than that. Even the business of the British-built cruisers and ironclad rams did not alter this situation. Legally, vessels like the *Alabama* were simply fast merchant ships, given arms and a warlike character only after they had left English waters, and the government had no legal ground to prevent their construction and delivery. The famous rams themselves were technically built for French purchasers, and even though it was an open secret that they would ultimately go into the Confederate navy, there was never anything solid for the British authorities to put their teeth into. When the British government finally halted the deal and forced the builders to sell the rams to the British navy, it actually stretched the law very substantially. That it did this under a plain threat of war from the United States did not alter the fact that in the end the Confederacy could not get what it desperately wanted from Great Britain. Nor was the United States without active friends in England. Such reformers as John Bright and Richard Cobden spoke up vigorously in support of the Lincoln government, and even when the cotton shortage threw thousands of textile workers out of employment, the British working class remained consistently opposed to the Confederacy. But the decisive factor, in the fall of and increasingly thereafter, was the Battle of Antietam and what grew out of it. The swift recession of the high Confederate tide was as visible in England as in America, and as the autumn wore away Palmerston and Russell concluded that it would not be advisable to bring the mediation-recognition program before the cabinet. Far more significant than Antietam, however, was the Emancipation Proclamation, which turned out to be one of the strangest and most important state papers ever issued by an American President. During the late spring and early summer of 1862 Lincoln had come to see that he must broaden the base of the war. Union itself was not enough; the undying vitality and drive of Northern antislavery men must be brought into full, vigorous support of the war effort, and to bring this about the Northern government must officially declare itself against slavery. Seward pointed out that to issue it on the heels of a string of Northern defeats would make it look as if the government were despairingly crying for help rather than making a statement of principle. Antietam gave Lincoln the victory he had to have, and on September 22 he issued the famous proclamation, the gist of which was that on January 1, 1863, all slaves held in a state or a part of a state which was in rebellion should be "then, thence-forward and forever free. It proclaimed freedom for all slaves in precisely those areas where the United States could not make its authority effective, and allowed slavery to continue in slave states which remained under Federal

control. Abolitionists felt that it did not go nearly far enough, and border-state people and many Northern Democrats felt that it went altogether too far. But in the end it changed the whole character of the war and, more than any other single thing, doomed the Confederacy to defeat. The Northern Government now was committed to a broader cause, with deep, mystic overtones; it was fighting for union and for human freedom as well, and the very nature of the Union for which it was fighting would be permanently deepened and enriched. And in Europe the American Civil War had become something in which no western government dared to intervene. The British cabinet was never asked to consider the proposition which Palmerston and Russell had been talking about, and after the chance that Great Britain would decide in favor of the Confederacy became smaller and smaller and presently vanished entirely. The Emancipation Proclamation had locked the Confederates in an anachronism which could not survive in the modern world. Along with this there went a much more prosaic material factor. Europe had had several years of short grain crops, and during the Civil War the North exported thousands of tons of grain-grain which could be produced in increasing quantities, despite the wartime manpower shortage, because the new reapers and binders were boosting farm productivity so sharply. Much as Great Britain needed American cotton, just now she needed American wheat even more. In a showdown she was not likely to do anything that would cut off that source of food. All of this did not mean that Secretary Seward had no more problems in his dealings with the world abroad. The recurring headache growing out of the British habit of building ships for the Confederate navy has already been noted. To Slidell the Emperor remarked that if the Northern government rejected this proposal, that might give good reason for recognition and perhaps even for active intervention. Neither Britain nor Russia would go along with him, but early in Napoleon had the French Minister at Washington suggest to Seward that there ought to be a meeting of Northern and Southern representatives to see whether the war might not be brought to a close. Seward politely but firmly rejected this suggestion, and the Congress, much less politely, formally resolved that any foreign government which made such proposals was thereby committing an unfriendly act. Whether Napoleon really expected anything to come of his suggestion is a question; probably he strongly wanted a Southern victory but was afraid to do anything definite without British support. His real interest was in Mexico, where he took advantage of the war to create a French puppet state, installing the Hapsburg Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Propped up by French troops, Maximilian managed to hang on to his shaky throne for several years, and if his control over the country had been firmer, Napoleon would probably have given the Confederacy, from that base, more active support. Shortly after Appomattox the Federal government sent Phil Sheridan and 50, veterans to the Mexican border in blunt warning, Seward filed a formal protest against the occupation, and Napoleon withdrew his soldiers. When the French troops left, the Mexicans regained control, and Maximilian was deposed and executed. Singularly enough, the one European country which showed a definite friendship for the Northern government was Czarist Russia. In the fall of two Russian fleets entered American waters, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. They put into New York and San Francisco harbors and spent the winter there, and the average Northerner expressed both surprise and delight over the visit, assuming that the Russian Czar was taking this means of warning England and France that if they made war in support of the South, he would help the North. Russia at the time was in some danger of getting into a war with England and France, for reasons totally unconnected with the Civil War in America; to avoid the risk of having his fleets icebound in Russian ports, the Czar simply had them winter in American harbors. If war should come, they would be admirably placed to raid British and French commerce. For many years most Americans believed that for some inexplicable reason of his own the Czar had sent the fleets simply to show his friendship for America. Considering the course of the war as a whole, it must be said that Northern diplomacy was highly successful and that Southern diplomacy was a flat failure. At the time, most Northerners bitterly resented what they considered the unfriendly attitude of Britain and France, but neither country did much that would give the South any real nourishment. The British commerce raiders were indeed expensive nuisances to the North, and the famous "Alabama claims" after the war were prosecuted with vigor; but cruisers like the Alabama might have ranged the seas for a generation without ever compelling the North to give up the struggle. The open recognition, the active aid, the material and financial support which the South needed so greatly were never

forthcoming. North and South were left to fight it out between themselves.

### Chapter 6 : Why Did the European Union Win the Nobel Peace Prize? | PBS NewsHour

*Best Answer: Europe won the first crusade so Im assuming you are only talking about the second and third ones. Well the second crusade was lost because Europe did not have enough money to buy them supplies and they did not have enough trained people so they lost.*

Why Medieval People went on Crusades – Ronan There are four main reasons why people in the medieval ages went on crusades: One, people went on Crusades because they wanted to take back Jerusalem by reason that they thought that it was rightfully theirs since it is there where Jesus died. Second, some people did it for honour, revenge or love. Third, the people wanted their sins to be forgiven, to go to heaven or to take back goods from the Holy Lands or because they had committed a crime and were forced by the church to go on a Crusade. And some people just went on Crusades for fun. Taking back Jerusalem was the main reason why Crusades occurred. The church thought that since Jesus had lived and died there that it was theirs. So the church had to make up a new rule saying to all the people that god told the Pope that it is alright to kill or even better, rewarded to kill anyone that does not believe in god for them it was the Muslims. This was actually not true, god had never told the Pope that they would be rewarded to kill a Muslim, and not rewarded for a Christian. The Pope had simply made it up so that the Christians could once again take over Jerusalem. This is why most peasants, lords, knights, kings, wives and even children went on Crusades. Your fellow Christians in the East desperately need help. The Saracens have attacked them and have pushed deep into Christian land. They are killing great numbers of Christians. They are destroying churches and land. In the name of God, I beg you all to etc. The second most important reason to go on Crusades was for honour, revenge and love. The Christians that went on Crusades for honour probably wanted to be known more by their village, to be more famous or maybe they went fighting for someone else. The people that went on Crusades for revenge went probably because a Muslim might have killed a relative or friend and they wanted to show how fierce they could fight and to avenge the relative or friend. And last, some people went on Crusades for love because their wife could have been killed or maybe a Christian and a Muslim were fighting for one woman. It breaks my heart to leave you, but I must go to the Holy Land. That is where I will win paradise and praise and your true love. They also went to be forgiven. Some people went on Crusades because they knew that if they killed a Muslim they would be allowed to take all his belongings, food and money. Some people were forced to go on crusades by the church because they had committed a crime. For this outrage you must join a crusade or pay a suitable soldier to go instead. He sees his own blood flow and feels his own teeth crack when his opponent hits him. He is thrown to the Ground and rises again twenty times. Then he is ready for war. It is also disloyal to be able to send someone to fight for you so that you can be forgiven. I think that if the Crusades had never existed than the peace between Christians and Muslims would have come much earlier. But it did advance all of Western and Eastern Europe to build much better castles, more foods, spices, new ideas on medicine and maths, luxuries like carpets, mirrors, perfumes, glass, and they changed their numerals from Roman numerals to Arab Numerals.

### Chapter 7 : UEFA Euro - Wikipedia

*"Why did Europe win?" In Teaching What Really Happened, Loewen goes beyond the usual textbook-dominated social studies course to illuminate a wealth of intriguing, often hidden facts about America's past.*

In general, the Allies won the war in both theaters largely because they had more industrial capacity and larger populations. They also won because of geographical advantages. Finally, they were helped by mistakes made by their opponents. The major way in which the Allies won the war was by having more resources both in terms of people and in I will answer questions 1 and 4 here because they are related to one another. The major way in which the Allies won the war was by having more resources both in terms of people and in terms of natural resources. This meant that the Allies had two countries with very large populations. Both but particularly the US had large industrial bases that could be used to make weapons and other things needed for the war. In the Pacific, the US was largely on its own, but it was only fighting Japan, which had a much smaller population and industrial base than the US did. Particularly in Europe, the Allies had a geographical advantage. The biggest advantage in both wars was that no enemy could have much of a chance of touching the mainland US. This meant that American industries could operate unmolested, cranking out huge amounts of materiel. Britain, by virtue of being an island and by virtue of its air and sea power, could not be invaded. It therefore was able to hold out and to serve as a staging point for Allied forces as they bombed and then invaded Europe. The Soviet Union was so big that it could simply place its industries in areas that Axis bombers could not reach. The Axis also helped the Allies by making a number of mistakes. The Italian invasion of North Africa, for example, caused the Germans to have to expend resources because the Italians failed. The Germans made a huge mistake by invading the Soviet Union. The Japanese might have been able to avoid defeat if they had accepted their gains of and not tried for more. When they tried to take Midway, they had a serious defeat inflicted on them. Thus, there were a variety of reasons why the Allies were able to win this war.

**Chapter 8 : Why did the Allies win World War 2 EuropePacific**

*How Did the Allies Win World War II? The Allies secured victory in World War II when Germany was overwhelmed by the strength of the Soviet Red Army, aid from the United States and the strategy of the United States Air Force. The war ended with the surrender of Germany on May 7, The Soviet Red.*

The Red Army is practically invisible. The Red Army was caught flat-footed largely because Stalin would not believe his own intelligence reports which accurately warned of the German invasion. It was an open secret in Europe that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. Stalin seems to have been the only government leader not to believe it. US and British intelligence reckoned that the Red Army could not hold out for more than three or four weeks. That was the German estimate too. During the first six months of fighting the Red Army lost three million soldiers; divisions had to be written out of the Soviet order of battle. But instead of quitting after three or four weeks, as expected, the Red Army kept fighting through thick and thin, in spite of unimaginable catastrophes, the worst of which was the fall of Kiev in September. Women were stripped naked and forced to queue while waiting to be shot. Ukrainian and Baltic collaborators lent a hand. Hundreds of thousands, then millions of Soviet civilians died. Yet the war was no walk in the park for the Wehrmacht. This was a new experience for the Germans who until then had destroyed every adversary they faced with relatively little loss to themselves. Poland was essentially beaten in four days; France, in six. The British army was run out of Europe, first at Dunkirk, where it left all its arms, and then in Greece and Crete which were fresh British fiascos. There were also others later on in North Africa. The Wehrmacht was finally beaten at the battle of Moscow in December, long after British and US intelligence said the war in the east would be over. It was the first time the Wehrmacht had suffered a strategic defeat. Churchill only relented on this point after the battle of Moscow. Everyone knew that the Red Army was carrying the main burden of the war against Germany. In the autumn Soviet forces fought with their backs against the Volga in Stalingrad. Someone said Stalingrad was Hell. The Red Army won this ferocious battle, and the last German soldiers surrendered on 3 February, fifteen months before the Normandy landings in France. On that date there was not a single US or British division fighting on the ground in Europe, not one. In March the tally of German and Axis casualties was enormous: Many historians and contemporaries from clerks in the British Foreign Office to President Franklin Roosevelt in Washington thought that Stalingrad marked the turning of the tide of war against Hitler. A British study indicated that one bomber out of three came within kilometres of hitting its target. So the British and Americans started bombing cities and killing large numbers of civilians. In raids on Hamburg in , for example, they killed 40, people. Berlin was also hit with increasing loss to the civilian population. Well, I guess that was worth something in terms of Red Army morale. By mid, Red Army morale was just fine. In July the battle of Kursk marked the beginning of a great counter-offensive which led to the liberation of Kiev and further north Smolensk in the autumn of. The Red Army became an unstoppable juggernaut. What Stalin really wanted was a second front in France. The Americans and British made promises which they could not or would not keep. His idea was to invade Italy September, not France, move quickly north up the Italian boot, then pivot eastward to keep the Red Army out of the Balkans. It seemed like a great idea on paper, but in reality, it was a flop. Italy proved to be a drag on Allied resources, more than it did on the Wehrmacht. Stalin kept pressing for a real second front in France, the shortest route into the German heartland, and he finally got a real commitment for it at the Teheran conference in the autumn. This was Operation Overlord. Everyone in the west has heard of Operation Overlord, but just ask a class of university students, as I do, if they have ever heard of Operation Bagration which started two weeks later. While the western Allies were cooped up in the Normandy pocket, the Red Army smashed the centre of German lines in the east and advanced in a matter of weeks some kilometres to the west. It was the only way Germans could see the Soviet capital. This is true, though perhaps not in the sense that Burns intended. This was just the outcome that Churchill, for one, was determined to avoid. After Overlord and Bagration, it was only a matter of time before Nazi Germany collapsed, and everyone knew it. The stronger the certainty of victory over Nazism, the weaker became the Grand Alliance against it. Roosevelt died in April and within a fortnight US policy began to shift toward

anti-Soviet hostility. It was to be American and British forces, stiffened by German divisions presumably without Nazi insignia, which would confront the Red Army. Oh my, what boasting. The plan was half-baked, unworkable, and utterly reprehensible. Eventually, it was shelved. In the west most people think it was the Americans. This distortion of reality helps to assure the misgivings of some Eastern Europeans who appear to think that the war against Nazi Germany was a horrible mistake. If only Hitler had not been so unreasonable. In some ways, nothing has changed since. You can understand why the West pursues this strategy; the real history of the origins and conduct of World War II does not fit into the fairy story of the western lamb and the Soviet wolf. The victory of the Red Army and Soviet peoples over Nazi Germany is so remarkable and so inspiring that even the multifarious, well-funded efforts of three generations of western propagandists have been unable to efface it. And they never will.

### Chapter 9 : Why did the Brits vote for Brexit? - CNN

*This is a little more complex than it seems. I would have preferred a why, but since you asked how, I will answer how. About 7 European nations had been engaging in slave raiding of African nations starting around the 1500s aimed at raiding Africa.*