

## Chapter 1 : EU: Turkey, Integration, EU Migrants - Migration News | Migration Dialogue

*Turkey and the European Union makes a scholarly contribution to the debate over Turkey's participation in the European integration process and the EU's future enlargement. It explores the recent history of EU-Turkish relations and looks at the prospects and challenges that Turkey's membership presents to both the EU and Turkey.*

Comment 0 Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan waves to supporters from a balcony at the AK Party headquarters in Ankara, on June 24 as they celebrate him winning five more years in office with sweeping new powers after a decisive election victory. They cannot possibly understand the mighty process of Eurasia reconfiguration. And that includes not being able to understand why Recep Tayipp Erdogan is so popular in Turkey. The doomsday interpretation spells out a toxic alliance between intolerant political Islam and fascistic extreme-right – both, of course, hardcore nationalist. Reality though is slightly more nuanced. Take it to the bridge Turkish politics used to be a yo-yo between the center-right and the center-left, but always with the secular military as puppet masters. The religious right was always contained – as the military were terrified of its popular appeal across Anatolia. When the AKP started its political winning streak in , they were frankly pro-Europe there was no subsequent reciprocity. The AKP also courted the Kurds, who in their absolute, rural, majority were religiously conservative. But once they solidified their electoral hold, the going got much tougher. The turning point may have been the repression of the Gezi Park movement in Party leaders were routinely thrown in jail. The actual scary part is yet to begin. The subsequent purge was devastating – hitting tens of thousands of people. Anybody, anywhere, from academia to journalism, criticizing Erdogan or the ongoing dirty war in eastern Anatolia, was silenced. The European dream may be over – for good. Relations with NATO are fractious. Neo-Ottomanism is a minefield. So Eurasian integration seems the sensible way to go. Relations with Iran are stable. Energy and military relations with Russia are paramount. Turkey can invest in economic projection across Central Asia.

## Chapter 2 : Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence | Crisis Group

*This book examines the important issue of Turkey's relationship with Europe. The authors uniquely present the Turkish view of integration within the broad context of the debates on Europeanisation and sovereignty, but with a specific focus on the.*

October , Volume 12, Number 4 EU: Turkey has been an associate member of what was then the European Economic Community since , and applied for full membership in April That application was rebuffed in , but Turkey was officially recognized as a EU candidate in December Austria almost prevented the opening of talks by insisting that Turkey be offered an alternative to full membership, but backed down after securing an agreement to open membership talks with Croatia. Turkey countered that it would not participate in talks that do not have full membership as their goal, although some Turkish commentators said that, when Turkey is deemed fit to join the EU, it would also be fit to remain outside the EU. Turkey, a country of 70 million, has made legal reforms and economic adjustments to prepare for accession. The question is whether to look at how far Turkey has come or how far it has to go. Turkey has abolished the death penalty and introduced new freedoms for the million strong Kurdish minority, but police are still quick to crack down on dissent and many Turkish industries may prove to be uncompetitive with increased competition. The Turkish talks raised questions about the future of the EU, which began as an effort to ensure peace among historic enemies France and Germany, and has since expanded to include ex-Communist Central Europe. Differences between the 25 member states are widening, as exemplified by very different national attitudes toward the American-led invasion of Iraq. Adding Turkey could make consensus among EU members even more difficult. The July 7, bombings in the London transport system prompted a debate over the dangers of second- and third-generation immigrants in Europe. Three of the four London bombers were born and raised in England, raising the specter of terrorists with European passports. Most European governments are rethinking the balance between civil rights and national security. Several countries proposed or enacted tighter immigration and asylum laws after the bombings, with a special focus on Muslims. Since the British bombings, Italian authorities deported eight extremist imams and France expelled two and plans to deport another eight. France wanted immigrants to adopt all things French, but allowed poverty to fester in the suburbs of major cities. Germany, whose three million Muslims are mostly from Turkey, made German citizenship automatic for children born in the country. Still, most Turks live in enclaves in German cities where unemployment is double the national average rate. Before the bombings, migrant advocates thought that the European Convention on Human Rights would prohibit deportations to countries where returnees face abuse, torture or the death penalty. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, says that Europeans "need to understand American assimilation" because "multiculturalism [in Europe] has been a failure. The 12 EU nations that restricted the movement of EU workers must review their restrictions by May 1, These EU nations are allowed to prevent EU freedom of movement for another three years, and then for a final two years, if they conclude that an upsurge of migrants would be disruptive. Vladimir Spidla, the Czech EU commissioner for employment, social affairs and equal opportunity, wants the EU that have restricted the freedom of Poles and other Eastern European workers to remove their restrictions. European Union Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini on September 1, announced proposals to harmonize rules aimed at preventing illegal migration and the return of failed asylum seekers. In , some , foreigners were ordered to leave the EU, but only a third did so. Frattini also proposed that each EU member country accept a certain number of refugees from camps outside the EU to discourage foreigners from traveling to Europe with the help of smugglers to seek asylum. Frattini wants to promote integration by having new immigrants "declare they will respect national law, EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, each Schengen member nation has some flexibility with visa-issuance rules, prompting the EU to promise a new version of the page EU consular instructions in aimed at standardizing procedures and discouraging "visa-shopping" among foreigners seeking to visit Schengen member states. Many universities in EU countries are trying to attract more fee-paying non-EU students. However, EU nationals must be treated as local students, who generally pay low or no fees. Union membership in Western Europe is declining rapidly.

In , almost half of the workers in EU countries were union members; today, only about 25 percent are union members about 12 percent of US workers are union members. As union membership declines, unions are expected to fight back against what they consider to be US-style cost-cutting by businesses, prompting repeats of the August strikes that hobbled British Airways when the workers employed by its caterer went on strike.

### Chapter 3 : Turkey-EU Relations / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*The book is a collection of essays by Turkish and non-Turkish authors, regarding Turkey's integration into Europe. Many aspects of a prospective EU membership are looked at.*

Ankara Agreement was signed Effective date: Accession negotiations were launched 12 June At Turkey-EU Summit of 29 November , the European Commission stated its commitment to accelerate the preparatory work for the opening of abovementioned chapters. The EU ranks first as far as imports and exports of Turkey are concerned. In addition, two thirds of the foreign direct investment to Turkey currently originates from the EU. The CU, as it is, has remained incapable of meeting the expectations of both Parties. The European Commission asked for an advisory opinion from third parties regarding the problems emanating from the implementation of the CU. This Report constitutes the first building block of preparations for the revision process of the CU. The Parties agreed on a Document forming the negotiation framework on 12 May The European Commission asked the Council for a mandate to launch talks with Turkey with the aim of modernising the CU. Once the Commission is granted the mandate, the negotiations are expected to be launched. It was also decided to hold Political Dialogue meetings at the Ministerial level, the second meeting of the High Level Economic Dialogue Mechanism and the High Level Energy Dialogue meetings in the first quarter of The EU Commission pledged 3 billion Euros financial assistance for Syrians under temporary protection in our country. In order to deepen our cooperation with the EU in the struggle against irregular migration in the Aegean, a proposal was made by Turkey with humanitarian purposes in mind. We have three main objectives in our proposal: The main elements of the Statement are; - All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into five Greek islands as from 20 March will be returned to Turkey, - For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. The EU will mobilize additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion Euros up to the end of They welcomed the opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. Association Council The Turkey-EU Association Council was established in accordance with the Ankara Agreement, which entered into force on 1 December , and its first meeting was held on 1 December At the Turkey-EU Summit held on November 29, , it was agreed to arrange the next meeting in the first quarter of The second Ministerial level meeting was held in Istanbul on 28 January

**Chapter 4 : European integration - Wikipedia**

*Turkey's application to accede to the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union (EU), was made on 14 April. After the ten founding members, Turkey was one of the first countries to become a member of the Council of Europe in*

Current and recent research and papers on European integration and the EU. An important line of my research deals with the European Union (EU) and the process of European integration. A key theoretical concern of this work has been to develop a more actor-centric historical institutionalist theory of European integration, building on—and going beyond—the early work of Ernst Haas and other scholars in the theoretical tradition often labeled as "neofunctionalism." Empirically, I am especially interested in EU competition policy and the process by which the EU acquired real, supranational powers of antitrust enforcement, merger review, and less exclusively and effectively control over competition-distorting government subsidies to European companies. Other empirical work has focused on the process of EU enlargement, including public perceptions of European integration. Since then, the European Union as it is now known has become one of the most important institutions in the international political economy and world politics. What explains this phenomenal institutional change? How did this supranational actor come to acquire such power? I develop an actor-centric historical institutionalist theory of institutional change, which integrates elements of rational choice and social constructivism. I contrast the account of the evolution of merger control authority that follows from my actor-centric historical institutionalist theory with the impoverished and partly incorrect empirical account suggested by an inter-governmentalist understanding of the evolution of EU merger control. This paper builds on "Institutional Change in the European Union," in which I have argued that an actor-centric historical institutionalist theory of institutional change provides a compelling explanation for the evolution of merger control authority in the EU. Such a theory recognizes that institutional change may arise out of intergovernmental bargaining. The critical insight, however, is that institutional change can occur even when the member states oppose it, provided that sub-national actors, using the political opportunity structures of the supranational institutions, act jointly with supranational actors, each pursuing their own, selfish interests. This paper presents something of an "out-of-sample" test of the theory developed in my work on merger review, that is, a test of the ability of the theoretical model to help us understand or explain observations beyond those for which it was developed, though within its scope conditions. Specifically, I use it to analyze the evolution of EU antitrust enforcement, where the Commission attained supranational authority much earlier than in the realm of merger review, and control over state aid subsidies, which the Commission has attained later and less exclusively. I developed key ideas for the above papers initially as a re-statement of neofunctionalism, a terminology from which I have moved away in more recent work. *Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to How did this supranational actor come to acquire such power in this realm? An earlier version of this paper was awarded the prize for best paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association. The First 50 Years. Oxford University Press.* This chapter broadens the historical institutionalist analysis of the paper on merger review to the entire portfolio of EU competition policy. I briefly introduce my re-statement of neofunctionalism, understood as a historical institutionalist theory of institutional change, focusing on the hypothesized causal mechanisms that emphasize sub- and trans-national actors pushing for greater integration in pursuit of their own, selfish interests. I show that a slightly modified neofunctionalism can explain institutional change over time—better and more fully than alternative theoretical approaches—and it can explain the variation across the issue areas of competition policy. *Turkey in Comparative Perspective* In two recent papers, I examine the prospects of Turkish EU membership—as well as its likely consequences—in comparative perspective. The Turkish case is interesting because it appears to be an outlier that may yield insights into the nature and limits of European enlargement: Turkey has had an Association Agreement with the EU since and applied for full membership in April, little more than three years after its return to democracy in November. After initially declaring the Turkish application premature and unwelcome, the EU changed its position in the s. Even now, however, Turkish membership remains

controversial and uncertain. The first paper addresses this question broadly. Both papers analyze the Turkey in comparison with the Mediterranean countries that became member states in the s. Turkey started its accession negotiations with the EU in After four years, the outcome remains uncertain as the prospect of Turkish EU membership continues to cause controversy among EU governments as well as the general public. Documents and statements from the EU Commission, Council, and other sources assert that Turkey is "different" from all previous applicants. Often these differences are cited as reasons for opposing Turkish EU membership. We consider each of these concerns comparatively, focusing primarily on Spain and secondarily on Greece and Portugal as the most comparable prior candidates for accession. We find not only that virtually every argument put forth against Turkish accession has been made against one or more of the current Southern European EU members in the past, but also that Turkey is today, on most dimensions, very similar to those countries when they were candidates. The alleged differences, therefore, do not provide a credible basis for denying Turkey EU membership. At the same time, Turkey, like Spain, Portugal, and Greece before it, would benefit from full EU membership in areas such as democratic consolidation and minority rights. And the EU, too, would gain from Turkish membership. Lessons from the Spanish Experience. Yet, democracy is not just simply a prerequisite for EU membership. Indeed pro-democracy groups in Turkey have supported EU membership in part because they hope and expect it to contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. But are such hopes warranted? Would EU membership strengthen Turkish democracy? How exactly might EU membership have such an effect? How do citizens of current and potential future EU member states view the European Union and the process of European integration? Is the EU, in the eyes of citizen-voters just a free trade zone, a means for economic policy coordination, or a political institution? And can we understand public perceptions of the EU in terms of the broader theories of European integration? I have explored these questions in a series of papers, focusing empirically on the public debate and referendum over EU membership in Austria in This paper presents my initial exploration of public perceptions of EU membership theoretically and empirically, based on a content analysis of the public debate over whether or not to join the EU, in the run-up to the Austrian referendum of and a statistical analysis of district-level referendum results. The empirical analysis is documented here in far greater detail than in the later papers that draw on the Austrian referendum data. We specify this general model inductively for the Austrian referendum on EU membership in , based on a qualitative analysis of the public debate preceding the referendum. We then test the model quantitatively using several statistical techniques to analyze the referendum results: Consistent with the general model, we find that highly political considerations—especially the potential for transnational coalition building through EU institutions—were important determinants of the variation in support for EU membership within the country, along with aggregate and individual-level economic considerations. This paper goes beyond the working paper by offering a theoretical discussion that is more self-consciously grounded in the larger theoretical debates over European integration and by adding, thanks to cooperation with Mark Copelovitch and Will Phelan, an ecological inference analysis to the statistical section.

**Chapter 5 : Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, 1st Edition (Hardback) - R**

*The EU is carrying the enlargement process along like a heavy burden. The main enlargement happened between and when the EU was hoping that institutional integration would bring stability to eastern and central European countries together with some new blood to the single consumer market.*

The main enlargement happened between and when the EU was hoping that institutional integration would bring stability to eastern and central European countries together with some new blood to the single consumer market. It is obvious that without EU membership the political situation would have turned very sour in those incoming member states. Even with the membership obligations, countries like Romania and Bulgaria remain far away from even the most basic EU standards. An old member like Greece has gone bankrupt amid biased and poor governance with maneuvers from all the different political parties. In its wake, Greek Cyprus has been going bankrupt due to mismanagement - it also became evident that its whole banking system was based on the financial transactions of Russian oligarchs. Hungary can hardly be seen as a democratic regime abiding by the essential principles of the EU. However, what really broke the dynamics of the enlargement was the economic crisis and the long and tedious period of stagnation that followed. The average European can hardly be convinced that the fifth enlargement was a success, so long as what changed in his or her daily life cannot be defined as "positive. Still, it was very difficult to keep Turkey at bay while all the other candidate countries were lining up to join the EU, so accession negotiations, after very difficult transactions, were officially started in . Just afterward in , the EU let Greek Cypriot authorities sabotage accession negotiations by suspending eight chapters and postponing the closure of all chapters until ports and airports in Turkey were opened to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes. Since then, the dynamics of enlargement have never recovered. Attempts have been made and new bypassing systems have been forged like the "positive agenda" system, launched in that would allow technical cooperation to continue while the chapters remain officially suspended. However, the accession negotiations period is a long and very peculiar process whereby the EU remains the judge, jury and prosecutor at once while the candidate country tries to overcome all technical difficulties to fulfill the conditions of membership. This extremely asymmetrical system delivers good results in general, due to the fact that there is normally a political will on both sides to come up with a probing result, which is membership. In the absence of political will on the part of the EU, there are not enough dynamics to encourage Turkey to continue and carry out all of the necessary and deep-rooted reforms. Ankara has repeatedly declared that EU reforms are necessary for the Turkish economic, social and political structure and that they would be continued even in the absence of the EU membership incentive. However, the structure of the EU does not allow a candidate country to stay out of the decision-making process and the EU budgetary system while still integrating fully. Institutionally and legally speaking it is not possible. The choice is merely to become a full member or to stay out of the EU, associated with looser free trade agreements. Turkey, in direct line with the system foreseen in the Ankara agreement, was completing a fully-fledged customs union almost 20 years ago. Together with Norway and Switzerland, this is a very peculiar non-member country so deeply integrated in the regulatory framework of the Single Market. Still, political relations remain at a sorry level. The last Regular Report prepared by the Commission and likely to be accepted by the Council has been defining Turkey in the following terms: However, there have also been grounds for serious concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and the protection of fundamental freedoms. Active and credible accession negotiations provide the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations. Opening negotiations on the relevant chapters on rule of law and fundamental rights would provide a roadmap for reforms in these key areas. This is a very serious warning sent to member states. The Turkish government reacted to the reports by declaring that they were "balanced and objective. The trouble remains with the Greek Cypriot administration. The report stipulates very clearly that "As long as these restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircraft that are registered in Cyprus, vessels of any nationality related to the Republic of Cyprus in terms of ownership or ship management, or whose last port of call was in Cyprus, Turkey will not be in position to fully implement the *acquis* relating to these eight chapters. In retaliation Turkey sent two navy vessels into the zone to oversee

the exploration, which stirred a harsh reaction on the part of the Greek Cypriot authorities who quit the negotiating table. This is the kind of political crisis nobody can afford at the present situation of the international juncture. Still, since , Greek Cypriot authorities have kept the same political azimuth, rejecting all possible arrangement for a two zone, two community Cyprus based on political equality between the two groups. They never had to regret their decisions so far, as even divided, their government representing the whole island sits at a membership chair in the EU. They probably do not see any incentive to change their attitude. In the absence of a major political step on both sides, membership negotiations are not likely to resume satisfactorily. This is an alternative that neither the EU nor Turkey can afford. It is likely that we will witness heavy diplomatic traffic over Cypriot negotiations in the coming days because the key to establishing stability and cooperation in this region bizarrely lies in the success of negotiations on Cyprus.

### Chapter 6 : Turkey's Transitions: Integration, Inclusion, Institutions

*Read "Turkey and European Integration Accession Prospects and Issues" by with Rakuten Kobo. This book examines the important issue of Turkey's relationship with Europe.*

### Chapter 7 : Accession of Turkey to the European Union - Wikipedia

*Turkey's involvement with European integration dates back to and includes the Ankara Association Agreement ( ) for the progressive establishment of a Customs Union (ultimately set up in ).*

### Chapter 8 : European Integration and European Union

*The Summit was a first in terms of a meeting with the participation of Turkey, 28 member countries of the EU as well as the President of the three EU Institutions (EU Council, European Commission and European Parliament).*

### Chapter 9 : Turkey's European dream may be over, is the Sultan ready for Eurasia? | Asia Times

*contractual ties between Turkey and the European integration project, the process has been in a co-matose state for the best part of the last decade*