Chapter 1 : CiteSeerX â€" The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosop

The case study of the rise of compatibilism is also meant to illustrate the potential for doing a quite different kind of history of philosophy, by the numbers. 13 References Boyer, P. Cognitive Constraints on Cultural Representations: Natural Ontologies and Religious Ideas.

History[edit] Though, in early modern philosophy, natural philosophy was sometimes referred to as "experimental philosophy", [16] the field associated with the current sense of the term dates its origins around when a small number of students experimented with the idea of fusing philosophy to the experimental rigor of psychology. While the philosophical movement Experimental Philosophy began around though perhaps the earliest example of the approach is reported by Hewson, [17] , the use of empirical methods in philosophy far predates the emergence of the recent academic field. Current experimental philosophers claim that the movement is actually a return to the methodology used by many ancient philosophers. Experimental philosophers have approached this question by trying to get a better grasp on how exactly people ordinarily understand consciousness. For instance, work by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz suggests that people may have two different ways of understanding minds generally, and Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery have written about the proper methodology for studying folk intuitions about consciousness. Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno, and Hagop Sarkissian [19] have further argued that the way Westerners understand consciousness differs systematically from the way that East Asians understand consciousness, while Adam Arico [20] has offered some evidence for thinking that ordinary ascriptions of consciousness are sensitive to framing effects such as the presence or absence of contextual information. Some of this work has been featured in the Online Consciousness Conference. Other experimental philosophers have approached the topic of consciousness by trying to uncover the cognitive processes that guide everyday attributions of conscious states. Additionally, Bryce Huebner [22] has argued that ascriptions of mental states rely on two divergent strategies: Cultural diversity[edit] Following the work of Richard Nisbett , which showed that there were differences in a wide range of cognitive tasks between Westerners and East Asians, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich compared epistemic intuitions of Western college students and East Asian college students. The students were presented with a number of cases, including some Gettier cases , and asked to judge whether a person in the case really knew some fact or merely believed it. They found that the East Asian subjects were more likely to judge that the subjects really knew. Again, they found significant cultural differences. Each group of authors argued that these cultural variances undermined the philosophical project of using intuitions to create theories of knowledge or reference. The other side of the debate argues instead that people can be morally responsible for their immoral actions even when they could not have done otherwise. Then the person does something morally wrong, and people are asked if that person is morally responsible for what she or he did. For example, research on epistemic contextualism has proceeded by conducting experiments in which ordinary people are presented with vignettes that involve a knowledge ascription. The studies address contextualism by varying the context of the knowledge ascription for example, how important it is that the agent in the vignette has accurate knowledge. Data gathered thus far show no support for what contextualism says about ordinary use of the term "knows". Work by Joshua Knobe has especially been influential. Knobe a asked people to suppose that the CEO of a corporation is presented with a proposal that would, as a side effect, affect the environment. In one version of the scenario, the effect on the environment will be negative it will "harm" it , while in another version the effect on the environment will be positive it will "help" it. In both cases, the CEO opts to pursue the policy and the effect does occur the environment is harmed or helped by the policy. However, the CEO only adopts the program because he wants to raise profits ; he does not care about the effect that the action will have on the environment. Although all features of the scenarios are held constantâ€"except for whether the side effect on the environment will be positive or negativeâ€"a majority of people judge that the CEO intentionally hurt the environment in the one case, but did not intentionally help it

in the other. However, his exact views have changed in response to further research. Although there are notable limits, [35] philosophical intuitions and disagreements can be predicted by heritable Big Five personality traits and their facets. Because the Big Five Personality Traits are highly heritable, some have argued that many contemporary philosophical disputes are likely to persist through the generations. This may mean that some historical philosophical disputes are unlikely to be solved by purely rational, traditional philosophical methods and may require empirical data and experimental philosophy. Antti Kauppinen has argued that intuitions will not reflect the content of folk concepts unless they are intuitions of competent concept users who reflect in ideal circumstances and whose judgments reflect the semantics of their concepts rather than pragmatic considerations. Timothy Williamson has argued that we should not construe philosophical evidence as consisting of intuitions. Other experimental philosophers have noted that experimental philosophy often fails to meet basic standards of experimental social science. A great deal of the experiments fail to include enough female participants. Analysis of experimental data is often plagued by improper use of statistics, and reliance on data mining. Holtzman argues that a number of experimental philosophers are guilty of suppressing evidence. Some research in experimental philosophy is misleading because it examines averaged responses to surveys even though in almost all of the studies in experimental philosophy there have been substantial dissenting minorities. Ignoring individual differences may result in a distorted view of folk intuitions or concepts. This may lead to theoretical and strange fictions about everyday intuitions or concepts that experimental philosophy was designed to avoid akin to creating the fiction that the average human is not a man or a woman, but the average of a man and woman e. Problem of reproducibility[edit] In a series of studies published in [50] [51] [52] and later peer-reviewed, [53] [54] [55] Hamid Seyedsayamdost showed that some of the most famous results in experimental philosophy were not reproducible. This work gave rise to a focused attention on reproducibility in experimental philosophy. A parallel with experimental psychology is likely.

Chapter 2 : Libertarianism (metaphysics) - Wikipedia

SHAUN NICHOLS; Article first published online: 4 SEP NICHOLS, S. (), The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy.

Shaun Nichols The Rise of Compatibilism: Recently, this claim has come under unfavorable scrutiny from naturalistic philosophers who have surveyed philosophically uneducated undergraduates e. But there is a much older problem for the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive â€" if incompatibilism is intuitive, why is compatibilism so popular in the history of philosophy? In this paper I will try to answer this question by pursuing a rather different naturalistic methodology. But we look at the history of philosophy not by further close reading of the texts, but rather, by doing the numbers. The paper will first set out the basic philosophical background of interest and then give a general methodological account of how a quantitative history of philosophy might proceed. This methodology will then be invoked as a tool for answering the question, why did compatibilism catch on? The hypothesis about compatibilism will be familiar â€" that compatibilism thrived because it is motivationally attractive. The novelty will be in using quantitative history to support the hypothesis. Philosophical background Compatibilist accounts of free will have grown ever more sophisticated. The literature is impressive in both its subtlety and its volume. But we will be interested in the most 1 elemental claim shared by all compatibilists, viz. Free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. That is, even if determinism is true, it does not threaten free will or moral responsibility. Those of us who embrace incompatibilism deny the compatibility thesis, of course. We maintain that determinism does conflict with our ordinary notions of free will and responsibility. In contemporary discussion of free will, incompatibilists self identify as the underdog e. But we console ourselves with the idea that incompatibilism is the natural, intuitive view of free will and responsibility. The history of philosophy seems to have been unkind to our natural, intuitive notions. On one standard view, Hobbes was the first philosopher in the early modern period to articulate the compatibilist view clearly. But after Hobbes, compatibilism takes off. It might not be accurate to say that compatibilism becomes the dominant position in the early modern period, but it clearly enjoys an impressive members list. The enormous success of compatibilism is something of an embarrassment for those of us who think incompatibilism is the natural commonsense position. Incompatibilists are accordingly inclined to regard compatibilists as philosophically shallow. However, when compatibilism enjoys the support of Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz and Hume, the charge of philosophical superficiality starts to seem rather less plausible. Thus we are stuck with the question, If compatibilism violates commonsense, why is it such a hit? Many of us incompatibilists think we know the answer to this: Philosophers embrace compatibilism because they want it to be true. This view is, I think, common among incompatibilists. Philosophers embrace compatibilism despite its counterintuitiveness because compatibilism is motivationally attractive. But this might sound rather petulant and ad hominem. It would be nice to have at least a smattering of evidence for the charge. We need to devise a method to sharpen and evaluate our motivational hypothesis. Towards a quantitative history of philosophy Traditional history of philosophy proceeds by close readings of the texts, by using textual evidence and supplementary biographical materials to interpret the philosophical views of the great minds of the past. Here I want to advocate a more abstract approach that draws on traditional work in the history of philosophy. We can exploit traditional interpretations of historical philosophers to chart patterns of distribution of philosophers over philosophical positions. A related quantitative approach to literature has been championed by Franco Moretti For instance, Moretti argues that we can get a better understanding of the history of genre literature by tallying the number of books published annually in a given genre. It is an unabashedly radical way to think about literature. The guiding idea is that a more abstract, quantitative, approach can reveal patterns that get lost in the traditional project of close readings. In much empirical research, one tries to detect patterns through the noise of individual variation. Similarly, by doing quantitative history of philosophy, we might be able to find interesting generalizations

through the din of history. Whereas for Moretti, the unit of analysis is the book, for our project, the relevant unit will be the philosopher. And rather than sort philosophers into genres, we will place them into the space of philosophical positions. How will we determine which philosophers go into which slots? Oh well, my heroes have always been vilified. Although the application of quantitative history to literature is radical, within the field of history, quantitative history has been an established methodology for decades see e. Princeton University Press,]. For that will be a source for something like experimenter bias. Rather, the quantitative historian should rely on the work of others to determine where the philosophers lay in the philosophical geography. There is, however, an obvious problem with this method. Historians of philosophy notoriously disagree about how to interpret the philosophers. For doing quantitative history of philosophy, we want to avoid such controversies. Ideally, we will want to use the dominant interpretations among the experts in the area. The expectation is that if we get a good number of philosophers into our sample, it will not matter all that much if some of the standard interpretations we use are mistaken. Of course, if most standard interpretations are wrong, that spells real trouble for the quantitative history of philosophy. But if we are so bad at interpretation, this spells trouble for history of philosophy quite generally. Merely plotting philosophers into a table of philosophical positions is not very interesting. One needs hypotheses about the expected distributions to make the tables informative. And our hypotheses may come from many different sources since there are, in fact, many influences and constraints on the distribution and evolution of philosophical theories. In constructing hypotheses about the history of philosophy, we would do well not to focus exclusively on the constraints imposed by Truth and Rationality, but also to consider the influence of religion, politics, and culture. Philosophical inquiry is likely also shaped in ways that are illuminated by economic models. Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Oxford University Press, on economic models of scientific inquiry. To explain the history and rationality of science, Kitcher introduces the notion of a scientific entrepreneur who will pursue neglected lines of research purely out of self interest. Here too, there are very many psychological factors that might influence the distribution and evolution of philosophical theories. For instance, researchers in cultural evolution maintain that cultural evolution is shaped by innate modules dedicated to folk psychology, folk physics, and folk biology e. If they are right, it seems overwhelming plausible that these modules also shaped philosophical theorizing. Other work in cultural evolution indicates that emotion systems shaped the cultural evolution of norms Nichols Again, it seems likely that emotions are an important psychological factor in the evolution and distribution of philosophical theories. But for our purposes, we want to focus on yet another psychological factor: For the claim I want to defend is that motivational factors explain the rise of compatibilism. There are several general reasons to think that motivation has an effect on theory building. The social psychology literature reveals a number of biases that make us more likely to adopt and retain beliefs that are motivationally attractive. Consider just two important biases, motivated memory search and motivated belief construction. When we search for memories, at least in some cases, we search for memories that are motivationally attractive. For instance, in one experiment, subjects were induced to think either that being introverted was desirable or that being extraverted was desirable. Then subjects were asked to recount memories of past behaviors that indicated the extent to which they were introverted or extraverted. Subjects induced to find introversion desirable were more likely to recount introverted memories first and to produce more philosophy. We have philosophical economies, sets of theories that are in competition for attention and discussion, and we have philosophical entrepreneurs who want to make novel contributions to the field. Even Kant, revered for his philosophical purism, had an abiding, even passionate, desire to say something new see M. Empirical work has also indicated that motivation affects which beliefs people are likely to acquire from new information. In one experiment, two groups of subjects were given information indicating either that people in their group were more prosocial or that they were less prosocial than a different group. The information presented to all of these subjects was based on a small sample. However, the subjects who were presented with an undesirable conclusion that their group was less prosocial were significantly more likely to call into question the adequacy of the sample size than the subjects who were presented with the

desirable conclusion Doosje et al. This itself is a small sample of the rich body of work suggesting that motivation plays a powerful role in theory construction. Of course, that alone does not guarantee that these forces would have historical influence. However, there is some historical evidence that motivation has indeed shaped the history of ideas, in particular, religious ideas. In the evolution of Abrahamic religions from Judaism through Christianity and Islam, the doctrines that get preserved are disproportionately those that are motivationally attractive Nichols The foregoing provides good reason to suspect that motivation plays an important role in the history of philosophical ideas as well. But it is easy to talk historicity. It will be more persuasive if we can marshal some historical evidence. Sharpening the hypothesis Now that we have a very general sketch of the methods, we need to focus more closely on the factors that will be important to our case study. Sometimes, a given view is motivationally attractive to virtually everyone. This is plausibly the case for religious doctrines of heaven and divine justice. However, in other cases, a doctrine will be motivationally attractive to one group but not another. Racist doctrines provide an obvious example. Racist doctrines will be less attractive to members of the denigrated 3 For a terrific review see Z. When a view has this kind of differential motivational attractiveness, this will give rise to differential predictions about the groups that will tend to adopt the view.

Chapter 3 : The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy * - CORE

*@MISC{Nichols_therise, author = {Shaun Nichols}, title = {The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy *}, year = {}} Incompatibilists about free will and responsibility often maintain that incompatibilism is the intuitive, commonsense position (e.g., Kane*

For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. What we need as a starting point is a malleable notion that focuses upon special features of persons as agents. As a theory-neutral point of departure, then, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility. Beyond this, she is accountable for her morally significant conduct. Hence, she is, when fitting, an apt target of moral praise or blame, as well as reward or punishment. And typically, free will is understood as a necessary condition of moral responsibility since it would seem unreasonable to say of a person that she deserves blame and punishment for her conduct if it turned out that she was not at any point in time in control of it. Similar things can be said about praise and reward. It is primarily, though not exclusively, because of the intimate connection between free will and moral responsibility that the free will problem is seen as an important one. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism as such is committed to the further claim that any human persons ever do, in fact, have free will. However, many but by no means all compatibilists do think that we are sometimes free. And though some incompatibilists remain agnostic as to whether persons have free will, most take a further stand regarding the reality or unreality of free will. These incompatibilists, who are known as libertarians, hold that at least some persons have free will and that, therefore, determinism is false. Other incompatibilists, hard determinists, have a less optimistic view, holding that determinism is true and that no persons have free will. In recent times, hard determinism has fallen out of fashion, largely because our best sciences suggest that determinism is probably false. But the spirit of the hard determinist position is sustained by hard incompatibilists, who hold that there is no free will if determinism is true, but also, that there is no free will if determinism is false. A salient element of the hard incompatibilist view is that the manner in which indeterminism is true for instance, due to quantum indeterminacies , if it is, poses just as much of a threat to the presumption of free will as determinism would. Unfortunately, just as there is no single notion of free will that unifies all of the work philosophers have devoted to it, there is no single specification of the free will problem. In fact, it might be more helpful to think in terms of a range of problems. Regardless, any formulation of the problem can be understood as arising from a troubling entanglement of our concepts, an entanglement that seems to lead to contradictions, and thus that cries out for disentangling. In this regard, the free will problem is a classic philosophical problem; we are, it seems, committed in our thought and talk to a set of concepts which, under scrutiny, appear to comprise a mutually inconsistent set. Formally, to settle the problem€"to disentangle the set€"we must either reject some concepts, or instead, we must demonstrate that the set is indeed consistent despite its appearance to the contrary. Just to illustrate, consider this set of propositions as an historically very well known but by no means uncontroversial way of formulating the free will problem. Call it the Classical Formulation: Some agent, at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did. Every event has a cause. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did. The Classical Formulation involves principles governing six different concepts: And 5 arises from a commonsense understanding of what it means to claim that an event is causally determined€"that, if it were, then given the antecedent causal conditions for the event, it was not possible for it not to have occurred. By looking at the Classical Formulation, we can see how different stances might emerge. For instance, within the framework of this Classical Formulation, compatibilists would deny 5.

Incompatibilists, on the other hand, might move in a number of different directions. Consider the incompatibilist who remains agnostic about the free will problem. Her thesis is merely that free will and determinism are incompatible. Hence, given the Classical Formulation, she would be committed to the truth of 5. Yet she is not prepared to say whether determinism is true or whether instead any person has free will. Her view is simply that there is no world in which it is the case that a person acts with freedom of the will and determinism is true. This sort of agnostic incompatibilist might frame her position by appeal to a disjunction, such as: Either 1 is false or 4 is false. She might appeal to a different disjunction, such as: Either 1 is false or 3 is false. Now consider the incompatibilist who commits to the hard determinist thesis that no person has free will and that determinism is true. Clearly, the hard determinist will reject 1. Finally, consider the libertarianâ€"the incompatibilist who embraces free will and denies that determinism is true. She has a number of options. She might deny 3 , that every event is caused, thereby claiming that the universe is causally indeterministic. Or she might deny 4 , that if an event is caused, then it is causally determined. On this account, she might well agree that actions are events, and that every event is caused that is, she might accept 2 and 3 , but she will claim that human agents are the cause of freely willed actions, and that human agents are not themselves caused which would entail that they are not events. The Classical Formulation of the free will problem has fallen out of fashion. But it is meant to function here merely as an illustration of how different positions on the free will problem might emerge, and as an illustration of the ways that the differing positions might seek to disentangle the collection of concepts giving rise to the problem. To warn against settling exclusively on any single formulation of the free will problem, it might be instructive to show why this formulation is no longer helpful. Just to mention one problem with it, notice that the only proposition used to represent the freedom element of the notion of free will is 1. However, as will become apparent later in this entry, there are notions of free will that do not appeal to a proposition involving the claim that an agent could have acted otherwise. All the same, such notions of free will do seem to be at odds with the thesis of causal determinism. Hence, there are debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists regarding a notion of free will that is entirely independent of could have acted otherwise. These different formulations will involve different considerations pertinent to the sort of freedom that is at issue when theorizing about the conditions for moral responsibility. In the following section, two formulations will be presented in the form of two arguments for incompatibilism. Regardless of the specific form they take, what is central to a proper understanding of them is that they emerge from an apparent problematic entangling of concepts that are a deep part of our conceptual repertoire. These concepts will include some subset of the following: In each case, we can begin with the theory-neutral definition of free will set out in section one: This characterization of free will in terms of control can be developed in two ways. Incompatibilists have rightly exploited both. Each builds upon a different model of control, and each has instigated a different incompatibilist formulation of the free will problem. If a person is choosing between voting for Obama as opposed to Romney, it is plausible to assume that her freedom with regard to her voting consists, at least partially, in her ability to choose between these two alternatives. On this account, acting with free will requires alternative possibilities. Borrowing from the Argentine fabulist Borges, let us call this the Garden of Forking Paths model of control. The Garden of Forking Paths model of free will immediately invites the thought that determinism might be a threat. For determinism, understood in the strict sense characterized above, tells us that, at any time, given the facts of the past and the laws of nature, only one future is possible. But the Garden of Forking Paths model suggests that a freely willing agent could have acted other than she did and, hence, that more than one future is possible. Here is an incompatibilist argument that codifies the considerations set out above: If x has the ability to select among alternative courses of action to act a, then there are alternative courses of action to act a open to x i. If determinism is true, then only one future is possible given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature. If only one future is possible holding fixed the actual past and the laws of nature, then there are no alternative courses of action to any act open to any agent i. Therefore, if determinism is true, it is not the case that any agent, x, performs any act, a, of her own free will. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have

done otherwise A-C. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does D-E. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will F. Call this simplified argument the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. According to the argument, if determinism is true, no one has access to alternatives in the way required by the Garden of Forking Paths model of free will. In the latter cases, one recognizes events happening to one; in the former, one is the source and producer of that happening. Fixing just upon the Source model, how might determinism pose a threat to free will? If determinism is true, then for any person, what happened in the past prior to her birth that, when combined with the laws of nature, provides causally sufficient conditions for the production of her actions. But if this is so, then, while it might be true that an agent herself provides a source of her action, that source, the one provided by her, itself has a further source that originates outside of her. Hence, she, as an agent, is not the ultimate source of her actions. What is meant here by an ultimate source, and not just a source? When an agent is an ultimate source of her action, some condition necessary for her action originates with the agent herself. If an agent is not the ultimate source of her actions, then her actions do not originate in her, and if her actions are the outcomes of conditions guaranteeing them, how can she be said to control them? The conditions sufficient for their occurrence were already in place long before she even existed! Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a. If x is the ultimate source of a, then some condition, b, necessary for a, originates with x. If any condition, b, originates with x, then there are no conditions sufficient for b independent of x. If determinism is true, then the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. If, for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x that are sufficient for b, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. This follows from C and D. If determinism is true, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. This follows from E, F, and G. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent, x, performs any action, a, of her own free will. This follows from A, B, and H.

Chapter 4 : Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The rise of compatibilism: A case study in the quantitative history of philosophy. Shaun Nichols - - Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (2).

In particular, they argue that 1 philosophical convictions are structured by social group membership, and 2 the way such groups operate disfavors alternative philosophical commitments on free will. That is, I focus nearly entirely on points of disagreement. I will presume that the paradigmatic case of group identity for their purposes is disciplinaryâ€"e. For philosophers, at least, there is something telling about this remark and other ways of framing the issue they seek to explain. I mention this not to invite metaphysical dispute, but to cast doubt on whether we can explain academic debates without appeal to their content. In this, they are at odds with the core of scholarly work on free will in the past century. Why does any of this matter? They might well be correct to presume the falsity of compatibilism. However, if we simply assume incompatibilism and then approach disciplinary debates about free will, we are bound to radically misunderstand important strands of the very thing we seek to explainâ€"i. Philosophy is perhaps the most notorious case: Here is noted legal scholar Stephen Morse on the same issue: Lack of action, lack of rationality, and compulsion all excuse, but none of these conditions has anything to do with free will. There may be problems conceptualizing and evaluating the lack of rational capacity or compulsion. These are real problems for law and for forensic psychiatry and psychology, but they are not free will problems. Nevertheless, free will is doing no work whatsoever independent of these genuine excusing conditions and it thus threatens to confuse the issues. Roughly, beliefs are the convictions people have. Methodologies are the ways in which 4 people conduct their research or scholarship. Values are things like truth, originality, explanatory power, and those considerations in light of which we evaluate and accept research and theories. Others will have comparatively little convergence. If so, it seems especially puzzling why we should think scientists are committed to the thesis of determinism. After all, it was science, in the form of standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, that gave us reason to doubt that old models of determinism were true. So, why think scientists are indeed committed to determinism? However, Lee and 5 Harris also acknowledge that social reward may not exhaust the sources of motivation or loci of control in individuals ms If that is rightâ€"if social reward is one motivation among manyâ€"it is not clear why we should think social reward is doing the heavy lifting in explaining the free will debate in particular. Numerous academics have, in print, acknowledged a substantive change in their views about free will. Importantly, such changes have been diverse in their directionsâ€"sometimes towards free will skepticism, sometimes away, sometimes towards incompatibilism, sometimes away. Why not membership in the academy more generally? Why should my free will commitments as a psychologist trump my free will commitments as a Catholic, or Marxist, atheist, or even a moralizing parent? My identity as a philosopher is not obviously threatened by taking an unorthodox view. If so, these disciplinary norms will inhibit any pressures towards convergence when evidence and argument provide opportunity. Thus, if we take seriously their important proposal to appreciate the role of social forces in academic life, then it seems to me we should take seriously the role of academic forces in those social lives. Lee and Harris anticipate something like this reply. Moreover, it seems beside the point. The issue was never whether rewards were at stake in academic commitments, but whether the rewards had the particular social structure they describe. Here, it seems we do better to suppose that at least sometimes, truth can be its own reward. Harvard University Press, ; Bruno. Latour, and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: Sage Publications, ; Pascale. Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, in press.. Kevin Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, 2nd ed. The Basics New York: Rout- ledge, ; T. Continuum, ; John Martin Fischer, et al. Although the matter is complicated, experimental work on the convictions of laypersons suggests that philoso- phers and laypersons are fellow travelers in treating compatibilism as a viable position. See Eddy Nahmias, et al. Robert Kane New York: Oxford University Press, ; Robert L. Free Will and Moral Responsibility, ed. I know of no credible account on

which absence of con- 8 trol by itself entails determinism, or on which all neurological events have been shown to be deterministic. Kevin Timpe has noted that the book Four Views on Free Will has the lamentable shortcoming of only discussing four views, and not the entire scope of active views in the free will debate. See Kevin Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. Even if we limit our attention to psychology, there is nothing in the experimental data to support de- terministic generalizations in any interesting way. Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, ed. See also Christof Koch, Consciousness, pp. How much it plays a role in these things seems like a matter that would be crucial for Lee and Harris if they want to convince us that their approach has the resources to be interestingly explanatory. Shaun Nichols has argued that a quantitative analysis of the historical record in philosophy suggests that people have held compatibilism to be true because they wanted it to be true. See Randall Collins, Sociology of Philosophies. Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment, p. Various scholars outside of philosophy have that there was something atypical about philosophers in their focus on logic, rationality, and argumentation, including Deanna. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, ed. Princeton University Press, Stanford University Press, The World Republic of Letters. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford University Press, Doris, John, and Murphy, Dominic. The Moral Psychology of Atrocity. Four Views on Free Will. Haidt, Jonathan, and Fredrik Bjorklund. Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist. The MIT Press, The Skills of Argument. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment. Markus, Hazel, and Wurf, Elissa. A Social Psychological Perspective. A Guide for the Perplexed. London ; New York: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self. A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, in press. Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.

Chapter 5 : Ted Honderich, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck - PhilPapers

The paper will first set out the basic philosophical background of interest and then give a general methodological account of how a quantitative history of philosophy might proceed.

Overview[edit] The first recorded use of the term "libertarianism" was in by William Belsham in a discussion of free will and in opposition to " necessitarian " or determinist views. Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances. Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, and consequently the world is not closed under physics. Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind , will, or soul overrides physical causality. Physical determinism, under the assumption of physicalism, implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. Some libertarian explanations involve invoking panpsychism , the theory that a quality of mind is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities. Other approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians. Free volition is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by Robert Kane , [9] where he hypothesises that, In each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposesâ€"a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which has to be overcome by effort. Although at the time quantum mechanics and physical indeterminism was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book Miracles: A preliminary study C. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow incompatibilist free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious volition map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, [11] and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the neuroscience of free will. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality. When a tree falls, it does so because of the force of the wind, its own structural weakness, and so on. However, when a person performs a free act, agent causation theorists say that the action was not caused by any other events or states of affairs, but rather was caused by the agent. Agent causation is ontologically separate from event causation. The action was not uncaused, because the agent caused it. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing â€" or no one â€" causes us to cause those events to happen. If a free action was not caused by any event, such as a change in the agent or an act of the will, then what is the difference between saying that an agent caused the event and simply saying that the event happened on its own? How can I have any permanent character that will stand still long enough for praise or blame to be awarded? If that is so, where does our belief in causality come from? According to Thomas Reid, "the conception of an efficient cause may very probably be derived from the experience we have had A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as deliberative indeterminism, centred accounts, and efforts of will theory. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it related to the problem of origination. A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over

that which is already present in a deterministic world. Deliberative indeterminism asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events â€" and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of Robert Kane , where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes â€" a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort. Free will in antiquity Epicurus , an ancient Greek philosopher, argued that as atoms moved through the void, there were occasions when they would "swerve" clinamen from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains. Epicurus argued that these swerves would allow us to be more responsible for our actions, something impossible if every action was deterministically caused. Epicurus did not say the swerve was directly involved in decisions. But following Aristotle , Epicurus thought human agents have the autonomous ability to transcend necessity and chance both of which destroy responsibility , so that praise and blame are appropriate. His tertium quid is agent autonomy, what is "up to us. Again, if all motion is always one long chain, and new motion arises out of the old in order invariable, and if the first-beginnings do not make by swerving a beginning of motion such as to break the decrees of fate, that cause may not follow cause from infinity, whence comes this freedom libera in living creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this will voluntas wrested from the fates by which we proceed whither pleasure leads each, swerving also our motions not at fixed times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken us? For undoubtedly it is his own will in each that begins these things, and from the will movements go rippling through the limbs. However, the interpretation of Greek philosophers is controversial. Just as a judge does not merely apply the law but to some degree makes it through judicial discretion, so too a person does not merely discover weights but assigns them; one not only weighs reasons but also weights them. Set in train is a process of building a framework for future decisions that we are tentatively committed to. The lifelong process of self-definition in this broader sense is construed indeterministically by Nozick. The weighting is "up to us" in the sense that it is undetermined by antecedent causal factors, even though subsequent action is fully caused by the reasons one has accepted. He compares assigning weights in this deterministic sense to "the currently orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics", following von Neumann in understanding a quantum mechanical system as in a superposition or probability mixture of states, which changes continuously in accordance with quantum mechanical equations of motion and discontinuously via measurement or observation that "collapses the wave packet" from a superposition to a particular state. Analogously, a person before decision has reasons without fixed weights: The process of decision reduces the superposition to a particular state that causes action. Robert Kane[edit] One particularly influential contemporary theory of libertarian free will is that of Robert Kane. Thus, AP is a necessary but insufficient criterion for free will. The control is found in "ultimate responsibility". Ultimate responsibility entails that agents must be the ultimate creators or originators and sustainers of their own ends and purposes. As Kane defines it, UR: These SFAs are the undetermined, regress-stopping voluntary actions or refraining in the life histories of agents that are required for UR. UR does not require that every act done of our own free will be undetermined and thus that, for every act or choice, we could have done otherwise; it requires only that certain of our choices and actions be undetermined and thus that we could have done otherwise , namely SFAs. These form our character or nature; they inform our future choices, reasons and motivations in action. If a person has had the opportunity to make a character-forming decision SFA , they are responsible for the actions that are a result of their character. This kind of freedom, says Clarke, is no different than the kind of freedom argued for

by compatibilists, who assert that even though our actions are determined, they are free because they are in accordance with our own wills, much like the outcome of an SFA. Galen Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. If it does not, the individual does not in fact have free will at all, according to Kane. Yet they will seem the same as anyone else. Dennett finds an essentially indetectable notion of free will to be incredible.

Chapter 6 : Eng | Project Gutenberg Self-Publishing - eBooks | Read eBooks online

But we look at the history of philosophy not by further close reading of the texts, but rather, by doing the numbers. The paper will first set out the basic philosophical background of interest and then give a general methodological account of how a quantitative history of philosophy might proceed.

Chapter 7 : Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem | Manuel R . Vargas - blog.quintoapp.com

The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy. Shaun Nichols - - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1) A Critique of Vihvelin's Three-Fold Classification.

Chapter 8 : Experimental philosophy - Wikipedia

by Shaun Nichols, Mark Timmons, and The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy more. by Shaun Nichols.

Chapter 9 : November | | The Mod Squad

/ Dana K. Nelkin --The rise of compatibilism: a case study in the quantitative history of philosophy / Shaun Nichols --Can moral obligations be empirically discovered?