

Chapter 1 : The Revolutionary Democracy of

*The Revolt of Democracy: [Alfred Russel Wallace] on blog.quintoapp.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Originally published in This volume from the Cornell University Library's print collections was scanned on an APT BookScan and converted to JPG format by Kirtas Technologies.*

Farhad Khosrokhavar 10 January The gap between power and society is also growing inexorably in Iran. The openMovements series invites leading social scientists to share their research results and perspectives on contemporary social struggles. Protests over high prices and the poor state of the economy under President Hassan Rouhani. Dorud, Lorestan Province, Iran, Dec. Iran is the illustration of this paradox: The country is going through a period of turbulence whose nature is very different from those of the past. Above all, they did not contest the regime head on. Most of the protests of the past two decades have been led by the new middle classes Most of the protests of the past two decades were led by the new middle classes, especially students, for the opening up of the political system. This has been the case with the presidential elections, which have become a challenge for the reformists against the hardcore partisans of the theocracy the "principalists": Khatami the reformist in and , Ahmadinejad the principalist in , Rohani in These movements had political issues much more than economic ones. The revolt of the deprived The current troubles have several new characteristics. Firstly, it is above all "the revolt of bread" in fact, eggs, whose price doubled after the lifting of subsidies , the economic dimension being very important and the political demand largely overdetermined by the social justice claim. Then, it is a revolt which affects almost simultaneously the big cities Mashhad, in the north-east of Iran, from where the movement left, Tehran then Isfahan and the small and medium-sized cities Abhar, Doroud, Khorramabad, Arak The protests of the last two decades were mainly in Tehran and some major cities; those of today touch a vast panoply of cities and towns, where people protest against living expenses and against a corrupt government. In addition, the revolt is much more that of the poor and indigents than of the middle classes: Moreover, it is a movement without a leader, all the more difficult to contain and repress; unlike in , when the leaders were Moussavi and Karroubi, nobody is at the head of this wave of protest likely to spread to the whole country. A general challenge Finally, ironically, the movement might have come and gone at the instigation of the hard wing of the regime, led by Ayatollah Alamolhoda, the Imam of Mashhad Friday, appointed by the Supreme Leader and head of the informal pressure group Ammariyoun: But soon, people came to join them and submerged them within their number. They were launching slogans against President Rohani; the crowd began to chant slogans against the regime, the Supreme Leader and aid abroad Syria, Lebanon and Hamas , stressing that the Iranians were in misery and that the state budget in favor of foreigners should first serve to relieve the most fragile people inside the country. One of the factors of the rapid expansion of the movement is the delegitimization of the regime by the sheer extent of its corruption and arbitrariness and its display on the Web. In addition to the general malfunction the burning down of a central building in Tehran in and the ineffective government attempt to extinguish it , the impunity of the leaders and their venality, with, in the background, more and more expensive living and unfulfilled promises of economic development " all have played a major role in the spread of the protest movement. The discrediting of power, patronage and place had no equivalent before , when corruption was sectoral. At present, the state apparatus is fully in the grip of corruption, and officials are doing it publicly in an economy where one can no longer live decently with one salary, or even two, and where baksheesh is needed for the survival of the small fry. Discredited actors to varying degrees The regime no longer has any legitimacy, even among the poor, who had been its major source of support against the middle classes in the populist promises of Ahmadinejad touched them. The latter have not been able to mobilize them to push for the reform of the regime. This has occurred on the cultural front, not politically: But theocratic power does not care. At least three types of actors are in place in the current power structure, discredited to varying degrees. First, the Army of the pasdarans. This is no longer a simple army: The private sector, battered, cannot compete with it, as they depends on its private ports, exempt from the tax system of the country for their imports, levers of power at the local level and a state of impunity for their malpractice. Paradoxically, the Pasdaran army is the least discredited

institution in the theocratic state: People willingly denounce its exorbitant privileges, but they do not perceive it as useless or harmful. Its undue privileges are deplored, but it is not entirely denied legitimacy due to its capacity to defend the country in a troubled regional environment. The judiciary, meanwhile, escapes the government. Its autonomy is not a guarantee of democracy, but rather the effect of an oligarchic system that acts against the government and which, by its corruption, completely discredits justice and prevents the implementation of reforms. No charismatic leader among Reformers The third pole of power, the most important, is the Supreme Leader and his parallel state apparatus, his "Deep State", his "Makhzen". It dominates and straddles the revolutionary foundations, arbitrarily handling colossal sums, and the pious foundation of Astan-e Qods, at Mashhad – one of the richest in the Muslim world. Ayatollah Khamenei has survived several crises since his appointment as Supreme Leader on the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in He is supposed to be ill, but he has managed to maintain his power through a balanced distribution of positions within of the Pasdaran army and the security apparatus of the regime. The reformists have not had a charismatic leader since the placing under house arrest of the candidates for the presidential elections, Moussavi and Karroubi. President Rohani provides the formal leadership, the moral leadership returning to Khatami, the former president, whose character is considered "soft" and not capable of facing down the hardline supporters of the regime. His attitude is similar to that of Khatami in , during the repression of the student movement. The regime has shown its limits on several occasions: It refuses to question its immovable theocratic structure, the only alternative being repression in its view. The present movement has no political direction; it is scattered among several cities and there is no link between the poor young people at the bottom of the social ladder and the middle classes, eager for political reform. An irredeemable regime The current crisis, if it spreads, is likely to take power, with unpredictable consequences. If it is defeated, the regime will come out of it unscathed for a limited period, because the causes of the revolt remain: Reformists are reduced to the role of accomplices, so thoroughly does political power escape them even the ministry of education was indirectly named by the Supreme Guide ; and, above all, the discrediting of power, in its theocratic structure, is total. The regime proved to be under lock and key, with the Supreme Leader undermining the reformist opposition and gradually reducing it to insignificance. The current movement, whether successful or failing in its ultimate goal of overthrowing the regime, is a wake-up call for a business as usual that is in total contradiction to the evolutionary trend of Iranian society. Where the latter demands economic justice, the regime sustains cronyism, which makes inequality even more intolerable and insulting. Where women and men of the new generations seek gender equality, the regime continues to act in a patriarchal manner. Where civil society intends to reconcile with the world, and particularly with the West, the government pursues a policy that provokes the distrust of western states. The blockage is total, and the regime relies on the weaknesses of Iranian civil society and the lack of leadership in the current protest movement, much more than on its ability to adapt to the new situation. This is also the swansong of the opposition between Reformists and Conservatives – carried away by the same disrepute within a structure of power that has reduced to nothing the room for manoeuvre of the former. Open Movements, 10 January. His latest book is Radicalisation Paris: Read On More from the openMovements partnership.

Chapter 2 : Iran: the revolt of the deprived | openDemocracy

*The revolt of democracy [Alfred Russel Wallace] on blog.quintoapp.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This book was digitized and reprinted from the collections of the University of California Libraries.*

To me, this book loses its way and stops being about elites in revolt or not in the last section of the book. This is a pity, as I think the start was particularly interesting. Now, is a significantly long time ago, even if it does seem like yesterday, and yet a lot of what is said here could have, in fact, been written yesterday. The main thrust of the start of the book is that the growing inequality in our society is producing such a disconnection between those who rule and those who are ruled that they might as well live on separate planets. Nevertheless, growing inequality is an international phenomenon and it is having many of the same impacts across the globe as it is in the US. In the first half of the nineteenth century most people who gave any thought to the matter assumed that democracy had to rest on a broad distribution of property. They understood that extremes of wealth and poverty would be fatal to the democratic experiment. Ideas, like property, need to be distributed as widely as possible. In practice, diversity turns out to legitimize a new dogmatism, in which rival minorities take shelter behind a set of beliefs impervious to rational discussion. The physical segregation of the population in self-enclosed, racially homogeneous enclaves has its counterpart in the balkanization of opinion. Although hereditary advantages play an important part in the attainment of professional and managerial status, the new class has to maintain the fiction that its power rest on intelligence alone p39 Social mobility does not undermine the influence of elites; if anything, it helps to solidify their influence by supporting the illusion that it rests solely on merit. It merely strengthens the likelihood that elites will exercise power irresponsibly, precisely because they recognise so few obligations to their predecessors or to the communities they profess to lead. The teaching function would be concentrated in a class of professional specialists, whereas it ought to be diffused throughout the whole community. An educational establishment was just as dangerous as a priestly or military establishment. The more closely capitalism came to be identified with immediate gratification and planned obsolescence, the more relentlessly it wore away the moral foundations of family life. It has become strictly functional: We eat and drink on the run. Our fast-paced habits leave neither time nor "more important" places for good talk, even in cities the whole point of which, it might be argued, is to promote it p As neighbourhood hangouts give way to suburban shopping malls, or, on the other hand, to private cocktail parties, the essential political art of conversation is replaced by shoptalk or personal gossip. Increasingly, conversation literally has no place in American society. In its absence, how "or, better, where" can political habits be acquired and polished? Instead we find college graduates working in jobs for which they are vastly overqualified.

Chapter 3 : Christopher Lasch - Wikipedia

The Revolt of Democracy has 1 rating and 1 review. Matt said: Naturalist, geographer, sketch artist and poet: Alfred Russel Wallace is commonly known as.

In the Age of the Democratic Revolution the American Revolution was, after the disturbance at Geneva already recounted, the earliest successful assertion of the principle that public power must arise from those over whom it is exercised. It was the most important revolution of the eighteenth century, except for the French. Its effect on the area of Western Civilization came in part from the inspiration of its message which in time passed beyond the area of Western Civilization, and in part from the involvement of the American Revolution in the European War of American Independence, which aggravated the financial or political difficulties of England, Ireland, Holland, and France. There may have been only a war of independence against Great Britain. The British lid may have been removed from the American box, with the contents of the box remaining as before. Or there may have been a mechanical separation from England, without chemical change in America itself. Occupied more with European than with American history, I have been able only to sample this literature. It is apparent, however, that there is no agreement on what the American Revolution was. Differences reflect a different understanding of historical fact, a difference of feeling on the uniqueness, if it be unique, of the United States. Some have seen a kind of bourgeois revolution in America, in which merchants and planters made a few concessions to the lower classes, but then, at the Philadelphia convention of 1787, rallied to the defense of property in a kind of Thermidor. Still others, of conservative temperament, sympathizing with the American loyalists, have found the ruthlessness of a true revolution in the American upheaval. It must be admitted that, for the purposes of the present books, it would be convenient to present the American part of the story in this way, on the analogy of revolutions in Europe. But there is the contrary school that minimizes the revolutionary character of the American Revolution. Thus, it has recently been shown that, contrary to common impression, as many as ninety-five per cent of adult males had the right to vote in many parts of colonial Massachusetts. Others find the Revolution not very revolutionary because the country was still far from democratic when it became independent. They point to the maintenance of property qualifications for voting and office-holding, or the fact that estates confiscated from loyalists found their way into the hands of speculators or well-to-do people, not of poor farmers. Those who discount the revolutionary character of the American Revolution seem to be gaining ground. For example, thirty years ago, J. Jameson in his little book, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*, suggested a variety of social changes that he said took place, in landholding and land law, in the disestablishment of churches and democraticizing tendencies in an aristocratic society. The book won followers and inspired research. Whether one thinks there was really a revolution in America depends on what one thinks a revolution is. It depends, that is to say, not so much on specialized knowledge or on factual discovery, or even on hard thinking about a particular time and place, as on the use made of an abstract concept. No one in 1787, whether for it or against it, doubted that a revolution was being attempted in America. A little later the French Revolution gave a new dimension to the concept of revolution. It was the French Revolution that caused some to argue that the American Revolution had been no revolution at all. In Friedrich Gentz, in his *Historisches Journal* published at Berlin, wrote an essay comparing the French and American revolutions. He was an acute observer, whose account of the French Revolution did not suit all conservatives of the time, and would not suit them today; still, he made his living by writing against the French Revolution, and later became secretary to Metternich. He considered the French Revolution a bad thing, all the worse when compared to the American. He thought the American Revolution only a conservative defense of established rights against British encroachment. It served as a piece of high-toned campaign literature in the presidential election of that year, in which the elder Adams and the Federalist party were challenged by Jefferson and the somewhat Francophile democrats. My own view is that there was a real revolution in America, and that it was painful conflict, in which many were injured. I would suggest two quantitative and objective measures: It is possible to obtain rough but enlightening answers to these questions. There were about 2,000,000 people in America in 1787, of whom a fifth were

slaves; let us count the whole 2., There were about 25., people in France at the time of the French Revolution. In both cases the revolutionary governments confiscated the property of counterrevolutionaries who emigrated. Its value cannot be known, but the sums paid in compensation lend themselves to tentative comparison. The difference, even allowing for margins of error, is less great than is commonly supposed. The French, to be sure, confiscated properties of the church and other public bodies in addition; but the present comparison suggests the losses of private persons. Assertion of the same principles therefore provoked less conflict in America than in France. It was, in truth, less revolutionary. The American Revolution was, indeed, a movement to conserve what already existed. John Adams was not much like Edmund Burke, even after he became alarmed by the French Revolution; and Alexander Hamilton never hoped to perpetuate an existing state of society, or to change it by gradual, cautious, and piously respectful methods. America was different from Europe, but it was not unique. The difference lay in the fact that certain ideas of the Age of Enlightenment, found on both sides of the Atlantic—ideas of constitutionalism, individual, or legal equality—were more fully incorporated and less disputed in America than in Europe. There was enough of a common civilization to make America very pointedly significant to Europeans. For a century after the American Revolution, as is well known, partisans of the revolutionary or liberal movements in Europe looked upon the United States generally with approval, and European conservatives viewed it with hostility or down-right contempt. It must always be remembered, also, that an important nucleus of conservatism was permanently lost to the United States. Americans have really forgotten the loyalists. Princeton University, for example, which invokes the memory of John Witherspoon and James Madison on all possible occasions, has been chided for burying the name of Jonathan Odell, of the class of , prominent as a physician, clergyman, and loyalist satirical writer during the Revolution, who died in New Brunswick, Canada, in . The sense in which there was no conflict in the American Revolution is the sense in which the loyalists are forgotten, from the national consciousness, as well as from the country, of a conce important and relatively numerous element of dissent. Ambivalence of the American Revolution pgs In conclusion, the American Revolution was really a revolution, in that certain Americans subverted their legitimate government, ousted the contrary-minded and confiscated their property, and set the example of a revolutionary program, through mechanisms by which the people was deemed to act as the constituent power. This much being said, it must be admitted that the Americans, when they constituted their new states, tended to reconstitute much of what they already had. They were as fortunate and satisfied a people as any the world has known. They thus offered both the best and the worst example, the most successful and the least pertinent precedent, for less fortunate or more dissatisfied peoples who in other parts of the world might hope to realize the same principles. Pennsylvania and Georgia gave themselves one-chamber legislatures, but both had had one-chamber legislatures before the Revolution. All states set up weak governors; they had been undermining the authority of royal governors for generations. South Carolina remained a planter oligarchy before and after independence, but even in South Carolina fifty-acre freeholders had a vote. New York set up one of the most conservative of the state constitutions, but this was the first constitution under which Jews received equality of civil rights—“not a very revolutionary departure, since Jews had been prospering in New York since . The Anglican Church was disestablished, but it had had few roots in the colonies anyway. In New England the sects obtained a little more recognition, but Congregationalism remained favored by law. The American revolutionaries made no change in the laws of indentured servitude. They deplored, but avoided, the matter of Negro slavery. Quitrents were generally abolished, but they had been nominal anyway, and a kind of manorial system remained long after the Revolution in New York. Laws favoring primogeniture and entail were done away with, but apparently they had been little used by landowners in any case. No general or statistical estimate is yet possible on the disposition of loyalist property. Some of the confiscated estates went to strengthen a new propertied class, some passed through the hands of speculators, and some either immediately or eventually came into the possession of small owners. There was enough change of ownership to create a material interest in the Revolution, but obviously no such upheaval in property relations as in France as . Even the apparently simple question of how many people received the right to vote because of the Revolution cannot be satisfactorily answered. There was some extension of democracy in this sense, but the more we examine colonial voting

practices the smaller the change appears. The advance of political democracy, at the time of the Revolution, was most evident in the range of officers from whom voters could vote. In the South the voters generally voted only for members of the state legislatures; in Pennsylvania and New England they voted also for local officials, and in New England for governors as well. In , at the time for the revolution in Europe, and when the movement of Jeffersonian democracy was gathering strength in America, seven of the sixteen states then in the union had no property qualifications for voters in the choice of the lower legislative house, and half of them provided for popular election of governors, only the seaboard South, and New Jersey persisting in legislative designation of the executive. The best European historians underestimate the extent of political democracy in America at this time. They stress the restrictions on voting rights in America, as in the French constitution of . They do so because they have read the best American historians on the subject and have in particular followed the school of Charles Bears and others. It had been so, within limits, long before the revolutionary era began. Nor in broad political philosophy did the American Revolution require a violent break with customary ideas. For Englishmen it was impossible to maintain, in the eighteenth century or after, that the British constitution placed any limits on the powers of Parliament. Not so for Americans; they constantly appealed, to block the authority of Parliament or other agencies of the British government, to their rights as Englishmen under the British constitution. The idea of limited government, the habit of thinking in terms of two levels of law, of an ordinary law checked by a higher constitutional law, thus came out of the realities of colonial experience. The colonial Americans believed also, like Blackstone for that matter, that the rights of Englishmen were somehow the rights of all mankind. When the highest English authorities disagreed on what Americans claimed as English rights, and when the Americans ceased to be English by abjuring their King, they were obliged to find another and less ethnocentric or merely historical principle of justification. They now called their rights the rights of man. Apart from abstract assertions of natural liberty and equality, which were not so much new and alarming as conceptual statements as in the use to which they were applied, the rights claimed by Americans were the old rights of Englishmen—trial by jury, habeas corpus, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of elections, no taxation without representation. The content of rights was broadened, but the content changed less than the form, for the form now became universal. Rights were demanded for human beings as such. It was no necessary to be English, or even American, to have an ethical claim to them. The form also became more concrete, less speculative and metaphysical, more positive and merely legal. Natural rights were numbered, listed, written down, and embodied in or annexed to constitutions, in the foundations of the state itself. So the American Revolution remained ambivalent. If it was conservative, it was also revolutionary, and vice versa. It was conservative because colonial Americans had long been radical by general standards of Western Civilization. It was, or appeared, conservative because the deepest conservatives, those most attached to King and empire, conveniently left the scene. It was conservative because the colonies had never known oppression, excepting always for slavery—because, as human institutions go, America had always been free. It was revolutionary because the colonists took the risks of rebellion, because they could not avoid a conflict among themselves, and because they checkmated those Americans who, as the country developed, most admired the aristocratic society of England and Europe. Elites, for better or for worse, would henceforth be on the defensive against popular values. And, quite apart from its more distant repercussions, it was certainly revolutionary in its impact on the contemporary world across the Atlantic.

Chapter 4 : The Chomskyan revolution and the politics of linguistics | openDemocracy

'The Revolt of Democracy' is an essay on politics and social policy in regard to the welfare of the workers and the general populous. Alfred Russel Wallace was born on 8th January in the village of Llanbadoc, in Monmouthshire, Wales.

David Golumbia 25 September Chomsky is one of the few intellectuals to insist to this day that we can neatly untangle complex webs of state and non-state, private and public, military and civilian. I am a huge admirer of Decoding Chomsky, and appreciate the ongoing forum that openDemocracy has been running about it. To me this demonstrates that it was those intuitions, or commitments — often lacking much empirical grounding — that help to explain why Chomsky became so wildly influential. This intuition bridges any number of intellectual, political, and conceptual divides, including ones like individual vs social, rationalist vs empiricist, reductionist vs holist, on and up to a certain, albeit nonspecific, political orientation. For much of western history, especially in the twentieth century, most of the political theorists who insist strongly on the individual as the primary locus of rights have tended to recommend conservative political theories; most of those who focus on social groups tend to fall on the left. It is no accident that many of the most vitriolic right-wing thinkers today take individualism and rationalism, and even the view that the mind must be a computer, as home truths. It is how and why Chomsky took a discipline that had been profoundly committed to the social and political contexts and consequences of its subject, human language, and flipped it on its head, so that nearly everything relating to those aspects of language could be jettisoned, and only the individual was of much interest. Further, why a community of thinkers, largely not ones who had subscribed to existing paradigms quite a few of them not linguists at all, chose to rally around this new and decontextualized approach. Chomsky has never written much about this kind of work — the kind of work partly relied upon by the preceding guiding force in linguistics, Leonard Bloomfield, and which is better known through the work of anthropological linguistics prior to Bloomfield like Franz Boas and Edward Sapir, and through the kinds of sociolinguistics familiar from Dell Hymes and William Labov. To non-Chomskyan linguists, Bloomfield is known rather for the anthropological and empirical basis of his work: Fox, Cree, Menominee and Ojibwe. To Bloomfield, this contact with language as it is used was a large part of what made linguistics in part a scientific discipline. This makes him unique among the whole pantheon of world-renowned linguists, and it is notable that Chomsky gives the impression of having very little interest in such projects. It is very nearly the case, as Knight stresses, that Chomsky walked into the field of linguistics and said that its subject was no longer to be human language. Part of the mystery has to be how and why it is the case that people wanted to hear that, and who heard it, and who was pushed into the background because of that. Chomsky walked into the field of linguistics and said that its subject was no longer to be human language. Part of the mystery has to be how and why it is the case that people wanted to hear that Further, and this is something I talk about at some length in my book *The Cultural Logic of Computation*, it is very much the case that at the very moment the Chomskyan Revolution was happening, there was a great deal of clandestine pressure on the US academy to turn away from such anthropological and social approaches, precisely because they were seen as leading toward communism. Most of those doing anthropological or socially-focused linguistics prior to Chomsky had politics that tended in that direction. So did Chomsky, but the fact that his linguistics research tended to push such concerns aside, and that those who adopted the Chomskyan paradigm virtually never drew connections between language and politics writ large, are the cultural phenomena that strike me as central. Complex webs Prior to Chomsky, linguistics had been one of the most directly socially-engaged academic fields in the US, and its leading lights were found at universities that generally had many scholars with strong, direct social commitments. After Chomsky, linguistics in the US was headquartered at MIT, became highly technical and even algorithmic, and those whose social and academic commitments were front and center felt, in general, shoved aside. That Chomsky and his defenders need to show that his work is untainted by the military, when that can only be true in extremely narrow senses, suggests something about their broader conceptual commitments — ones that, in many ways, are not very much in step with most contemporary scientific, to say nothing of humanistic, research programs. Everyone in the academy is deeply imbricated in complex webs

of state and non-state, private and public, military and civilian, funding and power politics. Perhaps oddly, Chomsky is one of the few intellectuals to insist to this day that we can neatly untangle such webs. It is worth reflecting on whether this is part of what made him so influential, and continues to inform his reputation now. Software as Right-Wing Extremism University of Minnesota Press, and many articles on digital culture, language, and literary studies.

Chapter 5 : The Revolt of Democracy by Alfred Russel Wallace

To ask other readers questions about The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy It is symptomatic of my own political leanings, I suspect, that I started losing interest in this a.

I have also inserted links to the quotes whenever possible. I worked in the corner of CIA that studies global media. There, around the turn of the new millennium, my fellow analysts and I watched a tsunami of digital information swell and build and then crash over the landscape, leaving little untouched. At first we were mesmerized by the sheer volume of the thing. The sum of human information, which since the days of the cave paintings had grown in a stately, incremental manner, was now roughly doubling every year. But it was the effects of the tsunami that mattered. Human relations were being transformed: We could see fierce old dictatorships losing control over their own stories. A surprising number of them collapsed. Democratic governments became terrified of the public, and with good reason. The wave of information resembled an acid bath of negation. Information, it turned out, has authority in proportion to its scarcity – the more there is, the less people believe. That is the theme of my story today. For around years, authority resided in the great institutions of the industrial world: The elites who mediated between these institutions and the public were the keepers of truth and certainty. How was this possible? Well, first of all, no alternatives existed. Each institution held a semi-monopoly over the information in its own domain. Now, the human race has been organized hierarchically since we attained meaningful numbers. The industrial mind just made the pyramid bigger, steeper, and more efficient. Frederick Winslow Taylor was one of the great prophets of industrialism. Their authority is derived from esoteric knowledge that the public lacks. His ideal worker was a sort of robot programed from the top. Politics followed a parallel path. In the great mass movements and totalitarian dictatorships that arose after the First World War, the individual disappeared into the masses. Democratic governments became both more intrusive and more remote. Policy-making devolved to a class of experts with Taylorist pretensions and utopian ambitions. Politicians made, and make to this day, extraordinary claims of competence: The reality is that democratic governments have been pounding away at the same projects for over a century. They can build highway systems and they can eradicate contagious disease. Whenever they tried, they failed. Brasilia failed to deliver 50 years of progress in five. The wars against social conditions such as poverty and crime ended with the enemy standing pretty much where he had been when hostilities began. So long as the elites held the commanding heights of information and communication, they were the only authority in town. Once the tsunami fractured that monopoly, the elites as a class, their authority, and the institutions they managed, all lapsed into crisis. They represented the voice of the gifted amateur, of the articulate non-elites. In terms of institutional standing, the individuals responsible were often insignificant persons – people from nowhere. Shawn Fanning was 18, an unknown kid, when he released the first version of Napster in June. The shock of that beta release sent a mighty institution, the music industry, into a downward spiral from which it has yet to recover. Hossein Derakhshan, better known by his blogname, Hoder, was an ordinary Iranian twenty-something who, in September, succeeded in adapting blogging software to the requirements of Farsi script. The consequences were remarkable. Tens of thousands of Farsi-language blogs materialized in Iran. Many commented on political news, advocated feminism, criticized the corruption of regime officials. Over a million Facebook users viewed the invitation. Around, said they would attend. Ghonim was thrown in prison during the protests, then was released and negotiated with by government ministers who clearly believed he was an important revolutionary leader. Symbolically, that was true. He embodied the tsunami. But empirically he was a political nobody whose claim to fame was that he administered a Facebook page. What is the public, and why – if I may quote old Mel Brooks – is it revolting? The public was formed by the dissolution of the industrial masses and their migration away from the center toward vital communities that represented their true interests and obsessions all along. In many cases, the journey has led to distant islands of personal identity. Information has been the catalyst – the perturbing agent – in this process. The tsunami is really the public, asserting its opinions and tastes. Digital

platforms provide the public with its organizational form: Nothing within the bounds of human nature could be less like hierarchy. Digital networks are egalitarian to the brink of dysfunction. Online political communities were spawned by the traditional right and left, but are not interested in working out coherent ideologies. They care, passionately and obsessively, about their particular affair. Anti-globalists, for example, care about the tyranny of corporations. Anarchists and libertarians care about the tyranny of government. Neither imagines that they are espousing a system of ideas that might be opposed by a different system of ideas. They think that they know truth, and that their opponents must therefore be liars and cheats. These groups are born in negation – friction with the status quo brings them into being, and they exist to attack, condemn, repudiate. Negation binds a network and transforms it into a political force. You stand against Mubarak, for example, or Obama, or capitalism. If you asked an indignado or an Occupier or a Tea Partier what they stood against, you would get long, long lists of grievances. Digital networks resemble barbarian war bands that roam the political landscape looking to win honor and fame in heroic combat with the enemy. The weird dynamics of the web makes verbal violence – ritual rage – the only acceptable rhetorical posture. Every political controversy ends in personal abuse and death threats. Extreme actors on opposite sides rejoice in finding each other. They can engage in loud and vicious combat, attract attention, drown out moderate voices. It proves beyond reasonable doubt that they should not be allowed to exist. The public has bought into the exaggerated claims of competence of the politicians. This is very strange, very central to our predicament. Even as the public repudiates modern government, it imposes fantastic expectations on it. On the one hand, government is the instrument of self-serving elites. On the other, it must deliver not only social justice and freedom but personal fulfillment and even identity. Political failure – which, given the expectations, is inevitable – evokes intensely personal feelings of injury and anger. Mind you, the carriers of this anger rarely belong to marginalized groups. They tend to be young, university educated, highly articulate, owners of digital devices, masters of the information sphere. Their rage, in fact, is informational: Facebook and YouTube and Twitter torment them with a world full of unbearable things. The web exists in a state of nature. Things are said and done there just because they can be said and done. A great deal of hypocrisy is therefore baked into those political communities that are born online. The rage is mostly rhetorical. The death threats are mostly a grab for attention through outrageous behavior. The two nice-looking young men on the slide, between them, murdered innocent strangers and wounded and maimed many more. They represent the nihilist: The question has been posed at this conference whether we are witnessing the rise of authoritarian or fascist governments. Among the old democracies at least, I believe the opposite is closer to the truth. They know that heroic actions are expected of them, but also that every initiative will be savaged and every failure amplified. Their behavior is the opposite of authoritarian. Yes, there are Nazis among us. These people with their tikki torches look pretty amusing – but they are no joke. One of their number, all of 20 years of age, plowed his car into a crowd of counter-protesters, killing a woman and hurting many others. He acted on an impulse: I worry about that young man:

Chapter 6 : The Age of Democratic Revolution | Teaching American History

The Revolution The first part tells the story of the troubled birth of the world's first democracy, ancient Athens, through the life of an Athenian nobleman, Cleisthenes.

Biography[edit] Born on June 1, 1916, in Omaha, Nebraska, Christopher Lasch came from a highly political family rooted in the left. Louis he won a Pulitzer prize for editorials criticizing the Vietnam War. He taught at the University of Iowa and then was a professor of history at the University of Rochester from until his death from cancer in 1995. Lasch also took a conspicuous public role. Russell Jacoby acknowledged this in writing that "I do not think any other historian of his generation moved as forcefully into the public arena". Wright Mills but also in earlier independent voices such as Dwight Macdonald. At this point Lasch began to formulate what would become his signature style of social critique: Death[edit] After seemingly successful cancer surgery in 1988, Lasch was diagnosed with metastatic cancer in 1990. Upon learning that it was unlikely to significantly prolong his life, he refused chemotherapy, observing that it would rob him of the energy he needed to continue writing and teaching. To one persistent specialist, he wrote: His first major book, *The New Radicalism in America: A Social and Economic Critique*, which he first expressed in and explored for the rest of his career, was: When government was centralized and politics became national in scope, as they had to be to cope with the energies let loose by industrialism, and when public life became faceless and anonymous and society an amorphous democratic mass, the old system of paternalism in the home and out of it collapsed, even when its semblance survived intact. The patriarch, though he might still preside in splendor at the head of his board, had come to resemble an emissary from a government which had been silently overthrown. The mere theoretical recognition of his authority by his family could not alter the fact that the government which was the source of all his ambassadorial powers had ceased to exist. *American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations*, sought to relate the hegemony of modern-day capitalism to an encroachment of a "therapeutic" mindset into social and family life similar to that already theorized by Philip Rieff. Lasch posited that social developments in the 20th century e. He claimed, further, that this personality type conformed to structural changes in the world of work e. With those developments, he charged, inevitably there arose a certain therapeutic sensibility and thus dependence that, inadvertently or not, undermined older notions of self-help and individual initiative. By the s even pleas for "individualism" were desperate and essentially ineffectual cries which expressed a deeper lack of meaningful individuality. *The True and Only Heaven*[edit] Most explicitly in *The True and Only Heaven*, Lasch developed a critique of social change among the middle classes in the US, explaining and seeking to counteract the fall of elements of "populism". He sought to rehabilitate this populist or producerist alternative tradition: It is very radically democratic and in that sense it clearly belongs on the Left. But on the other hand it has a good deal more respect for tradition than is common on the Left, and for religion too. He wrote that A feminist movement that respected the achievements of women in the past would not disparage housework, motherhood or unpaid civic and neighborly services. It would not make a paycheck the only symbol of accomplishment. It would insist that people need self-respecting honorable callings, not glamorous careers that carry high salaries but take them away from their families. Lasch was not generally sympathetic to the cause of what was then known as the New Right, particularly those elements of libertarianism most evident in its platform; he detested the encroachment of the capitalist marketplace into all aspects of American life. Lasch rejected the dominant political constellation that emerged in the wake of the New Deal in which economic centralization and social tolerance formed the foundations of American liberal ideals, while also rebuking the diametrically opposed synthetic conservative ideology fashioned by William F. Lasch also was surprisingly critical and at times dismissive toward his closest contemporary kin in social philosophy, communitarianism as elaborated by Amitai Etzioni. He explained in one of his books *The Minimal Self*, [23] "it goes without saying that sexual equality in itself remains an eminently desirable objective In *Women and the Common Life*, [24] Lasch clarified that urging women to abandon the household and forcing them into a position of economic dependence, in the workplace, pointing out the importance of professional careers does not entail liberation, as long as these careers are

governed by the requirements of corporate economy. *The Revolt of the Elites: And the Betrayal of Democracy* [edit] In his last months, he worked closely with his daughter Elisabeth to complete *The Revolt of the Elites*: For him, our epoch is determined by a social phenomenon: According to Lasch, the new elites, i. In this, they oppose the old bourgeoisie of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which was constrained by its spatial stability to a minimum of rooting and civic obligations. Globalization, according to the sociologist, has turned elites into tourists in their own countries. The de-nationalization of society tends to produce a class who see themselves as "world citizens, but without accepting Their ties to an international culture of work, leisure, information - make many of them deeply indifferent to the prospect of national decline. Instead of financing public services and the public treasury, new elites are investing their money in improving their voluntary ghettos: They have "withdrawn from common life". Composed of those who control the international flows of capital and information, who preside over philanthropic foundations and institutions of higher education, manage the instruments of cultural production and thus fix the terms of public debate. So, the political debate is limited mainly to the dominant classes and political ideologies lose all contact with the concerns of the ordinary citizen. The result of this is that no one has a likely solution to these problems and that there are furious ideological battles on related issues. However, they remain protected from the problems affecting the working classes: In addition, he finalized his intentions for the essays to be included in *Women and the Common Life: The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution*. *The New Radicalism in America* *The Intellectual As a Social Type*. *The Agony of the American Left*. *The World of Nations*. *Haven in a Heartless World: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times*. *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics*. *And the Betrayal of Democracy*, *W. Women and the Common Life: Love, Marriage, and Feminism*. *A Guide to Written English*. *Journal of Southern History*.

Chapter 7 : A Revolution of Democracy – Dandelion Salad

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Foundations of American Government Sea travel expanded the horizons of many European nations and created prosperity and the conditions for the Enlightenment. In turn, the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and justice helped to create the conditions for the American Revolution and the subsequent Constitution. Democracy was not created in a heartbeat. In a world where people were ruled by monarchs from above, the idea of self-government is entirely alien. Democracy takes practice and wisdom from experience. The American colonies began developing a democratic tradition during their earliest stages of development. Over years later, the colonists believed their experience was great enough to refuse to recognize the British king. The first decade was rocky. The American Revolution and the domestic instability that followed prompted a call for a new type of government with a constitution to guarantee liberty. The constitution drafted in the early days of the independent American republic has endured longer than any in human history. Where did this democratic tradition truly begin? But the Enlightenment of 17th-century Europe had the most immediate impact on the framers of the United States Constitution. The Philosophes Europeans of the 17th century no longer lived in the "darkness" of the Middle Ages. Ocean voyages had put them in touch with many world civilizations, and trade had created a prosperous middle class. The Protestant Reformation encouraged free thinkers to question the practices of the Catholic Church, and the printing press spread the new ideas relatively quickly and easily. The time was ripe for the philosophes, scholars who promoted democracy and justice through discussions of individual liberty and equality. The ideas of 18th-century philosophes inspired the Founding Fathers to revolt against what they perceived as unfair British taxation. Washington Crossing the Delaware is one of the most famous depictions of the American Revolution. One of the first philosophes was Thomas Hobbes, an Englishman who concluded in his famous book, Leviathan, that people are incapable of ruling themselves, primarily because humans are naturally self-centered and quarrelsome and need the iron fist of a strong leader. Later philosophes, like Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau were more optimistic about democracy. Their ideas encouraged the questioning of absolute monarchs, like the Bourbon family that ruled France. Montesquieu suggested a separation of powers into branches of government not unlike the system Americans would later adopt. They found eager students who later became the founders of the American government. John Locke The single most important influence that shaped the founding of the United States comes from John Locke, a 17th century Englishman who redefined the nature of government. Although he agreed with Hobbes regarding the self-interested nature of humans, he was much more optimistic about their ability to use reason to avoid tyranny. In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke identified the basis of a legitimate government. According to Locke, a ruler gains authority through the consent of the governed. The duty of that government is to protect the natural rights of the people, which Locke believed to include life, liberty, and property. If the government should fail to protect these rights, its citizens would have the right to overthrow that government. This idea deeply influenced Thomas Jefferson as he drafted the Declaration of Independence. Important English Documents Ironically, the English political system provided the grist for the revolt of its own American colonies. For many centuries English monarchs had allowed restrictions to be placed on their ultimate power. Although the document only forced King John to consult nobles before he made arbitrary decisions like passing taxes, the Magna Carta provided the basis for the later development of Parliament. Over the years, representative government led by a Prime Minister came to control and eventually replace the king as the real source of power in Britain. The ideas of the French Enlightenment philosophes strongly influenced the American revolutionaries. French intellectuals met in salons like this one to exchange ideas and define their ideals such as liberty, equality, and justice. The Petition of Right extended the rights of "commoners" to have a voice in the government. The English Bill of Rights guaranteed free elections and rights for citizens accused of crime. Although King George III still had some real power in , Britain was already well along on the path of democracy by that time. The foundations of American government lie squarely in the 17th and 18th century

European Enlightenment. The American founders were well versed in the writings of the philosophes, whose ideas influenced the shaping of the new country. Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, James Madison, and others took the brave steps of creating a government based on the Enlightenment values of liberty, equality, and a new form of justice. More than years later, that government is still intact.

Chapter 8 : The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy by Christopher Lasch

Democracy lacks true rivals as an ideology or system of government. That is not enough. There is a decadence in certain historical moments, an entropy of systems, that makes no demand for alternative ideals or structures before the onset of disintegration.

Writer, Dandelion Salad November 8, What do we do when we finally understand that the elections really are stolen? Or thrust out of our reach by the manipulations of rich and powerful people? How long does it take before we call the bluff? Another disappointing election cycle? How much more gerrymandering, corporate buying of elections, voter disenfranchisement, and outright fraud can we stand? When will we take seriously the necessity of change? This is not a democracy of, for, and by the people. We cannot, as many claim, vote our way into power when no aspect of the two party duopoly represents anything other than elite interests. The system is designed to empower rich people and their massive corporations, no one else. Over the years, it has been modified to allow different faces to represent it, but the agenda has stayed much the same. We must see the system in all its cruelty and injustice. We must be brave enough to surrender our false hopes and wistful ideals about it. The rest of us have struggled for freedom and power ever since. We, the people, are long overdue for a deep, revolutionary discussion about what sort of decision-making structures we want to see in our world. Democracy is not merely a form of government. It must be a way of life, a set of ethics and an ethos of a culture. For functional democracy to arise, it must be a widespread practice in our work, schools, homes, businesses, markets, religious institutions, and social clubs. We must strive to understand the spirit of the word, not merely the form of the word as embodied by the process of voting every few years for a representative. We must study democracy like a foreign language, learning processes like sentence structures, practicing our articulation, searching for the words to describe what we mean when we cry for democracy. We must also break free of the conditioning of disempowerment and dare to imagine what decision we might make "for good or for ill" if we, together, designed our society, politics, economics, and culture. Democracy in any format requires a revolutionary re-envisioning of our way of life. A nation of brow-beaten workers, automatons, consumers, or bosses will never succeed in functional democracy. A real democracy requires a broad spectrum of humanity to show up with all our varied talents, skills, and perspectives: In short, it takes us all to discover what will work for us all. It will take love; and the foundation of love, respect. We need to make vast changes in how we create media, entertainment, education, and public discourse to find the practices that better serve to foster understanding and conflict resolution. We need to increase the types of cultural experiences that move us toward loving and caring for our fellow citizens, rather than hating and fearing them. Real democracy requires levels of knowledge, compassion, and respect that we, as a nation, have never practiced before. Here, then lies the groundwork of our democratic revolution: For we are talking about a revolution. It might be nonviolent in nature, but its scope is a massive upheaval, not just in politics, but in society and culture as well. Even the overhaul of the injustices that burden the current political apparatus would require revolutionary changes. An effort that seeks not just minor adjustments, but a profound re-envisioning in the ways we make every decision in our lives is nothing short of a revolution. It should be treated and understood as such. We should prepare ourselves for the reality of demanding such change. We must gird ourselves for the struggle if we ever wish to see government of, by, and for the people, all of us, together. This article is one of a series written by The Man From the North, which are not included in the novel, but can be read here.

Chapter 9 : Democracy - Wikipedia

In Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government, CFR Fellow for Southeast Asia Joshua Kurlantzick identifies forces that threaten.

The Kouroukan Fouga divided the Mali Empire into ruling clans lineages that were represented at a great assembly called the Gbara. However, the charter made Mali more similar to a constitutional monarchy than a democratic republic. However, the power to call parliament remained at the pleasure of the monarch. The English Civil War “ was fought between the King and an oligarchic but elected Parliament, [51] [52] during which the idea of a political party took form with groups debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of After the Glorious Revolution of , the Bill of Rights was enacted in which codified certain rights and liberties, and is still in effect. The Bill set out the requirement for regular elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of Europe at the time, royal absolutism would not prevail. In North America, representative government began in Jamestown, Virginia , with the election of the House of Burgesses forerunner of the Virginia General Assembly in English Puritans who migrated from established colonies in New England whose local governance was democratic and which contributed to the democratic development of the United States ; [56] although these local assemblies had some small amounts of devolved power, the ultimate authority was held by the Crown and the English Parliament. The Puritans Pilgrim Fathers , Baptists , and Quakers who founded these colonies applied the democratic organisation of their congregations also to the administration of their communities in worldly matters. The taxed peasantry was represented in parliament, although with little influence, but commoners without taxed property had no suffrage. The creation of the short-lived Corsican Republic in marked the first nation in modern history to adopt a democratic constitution all men and women above age of 25 could vote [62]. This Corsican Constitution was the first based on Enlightenment principles and included female suffrage , something that was not granted in most other democracies until the 20th century. In the American colonial period before , and for some time after, often only adult white male property owners could vote; enslaved Africans, most free black people and most women were not extended the franchise. Athena has been used as an international symbol of freedom and democracy since at least the late eighteenth century. This was particularly the case in the United States , and especially in the last fifteen slave states that kept slavery legal in the American South until the Civil War. A variety of organisations were established advocating the movement of black people from the United States to locations where they would enjoy greater freedom and equality. Universal male suffrage was established in France in March in the wake of the French Revolution of Fascism and dictatorships flourished in Nazi Germany , Italy , Spain and Portugal , as well as non-democratic governments in the Baltics , the Balkans , Brazil , Cuba , China , and Japan , among others. The democratisation of the American, British, and French sectors of occupied Germany disputed [82] , Austria, Italy, and the occupied Japan served as a model for the later theory of government change. However, most of Eastern Europe , including the Soviet sector of Germany fell into the non-democratic Soviet bloc. The war was followed by decolonisation , and again most of the new independent states had nominally democratic constitutions.