

Chapter 1 : Battle of the Pusan Perimeter

The Battle of Pusan Perimeter was a large-scale battle between United Nations and North Korean forces lasting from August 4 to September 18,

In my opinion he was the American counterpart to Charles Whiting. Whiting was a prolific British military historian. Both men had a formidable work ethic and they relied heavily on other folks research which they then synthesized into very readable books. Hoyt would inject his own opinions into his books whereas Whiting opted for the distance of the professional histori Edwin Hoyt was a prolific writer of military history during his lifetime. Hoyt would inject his own opinions into his books whereas Whiting opted for the distance of the professional historian. At that time the Vietnam War veterans were beginning to experience a reconsideration and Korean War vets were feeling left out and overlooked. The war has been called "The Forgotten War" for good reason. Starting just five years after WWII it ended in a draw and for many Americans that was almost as bad as outright defeat. As a result Americans forgot about it more or less. At least not very much that was easily accessible to the general public. So Hoyt and a few other military historians set out to rectify that sad state of affairs. Right up front I have to warn you that this is a true nuts and bolts account of the first four months of the Korean War. Much of it consists of blow by blow accounts of small unit actions as well as infantry battalions and regiments. At times the lay reader i. I give Hoyt high-marks for being able to impart some drama to such dry accounts. Another thing that helps is he breaks up the unit maneuvers with chapters explaining how the situation in Korea came about and also reviewing what was going on within the political arena while the troops were fighting. Context and perspective is a good thing. There are a couple minor quibbles. They concern maps and photos. Fairly standard among readers of military history accounts. I read the paperback edition and the publisher reproduced the maps from the hardback edition. However they made them smaller! Well not without a magnifying glass. So lots of maps, but too damn small. In the end a fair account of the vicious fighting at the beginning of the Korean War. Nothing earth shaking, but it does move along and is full of information.

Chapter 2 : Battle of Pusan Perimeter order of battle - Wikipedia

Busan Perimeter. The Battle of Busan Perimeter took place in the fall of and was one of the first major conflicts of the Korean War. The North Korean army was invading South Korea and attacking the forces sent by the United Nations.

Kortegaard This site brings together in one place a small picture of the infantry weapons and history of the Korean War. But, 50 years removed from when I bounced around in a VP at Inchon , preparing the site has left me numbed at our generally abysmal performance. We should have crushed the Chinese as easily, if necessary. But then, we should only have crossed the 38th parallel far enough to establish better defensive positions for the South. No need to use nuclear weapons. As one consequence , our nation could not easily provide fighting forces who were adequately armed and psychologically prepared to fight. In the end, we were saved national humiliation by a small cadre of cynical professionals, and an uneven sprinkling of resolute units and proud individuals. Our capable few who are always prepared. Upon reflection, history shows this pattern is one we repeat over and over. The thing is, I had forgotten all that. Over Russian-supplied YAK ground-attack aircraft gave them total domination of the skies. The ROKs had eight divisions, but only four deployed along the 38th parallel, and they only partially. Much worse, they had no air force, only 2. At the same time, their infantry formations attacked in an inverted Y formation, sweeping around ROK opposition with the arms, encircling them, and finally crushing them. In the first week, more than 34, ROKs, a third of their army, were killed, captured, or missing. Although the ROKs had fought desperately, inflicting severe losses on the assault troops, this did not slow them down. By the third week, the NK were brushing aside our own unprepared 24th division. The North Koreans were pros. A third of them fought in the Chinese civil war, and whipped the rest into fighting shape before they crossed the 38th parallel. They wiped out 5 ROK divisions in as many weeks. Had they not paused to re-group, had they simply continued their violent assault until they either won all or lost all, they would probably have captured Pusan and all of South Korea before America had time to marshal enough force to stop them. But they did pause, shortly after meeting American troops. In fact, the NK easily won most of their initial battles with us. When this became generally known, the fighting spirit of other US units was sometimes hard to find. Exposing the flanks of adjacent regiments without warning offered the enemy access around our front lines, endangering all Eighth Army. Even more tragically shameful, when some of our best men in other regiments were wounded, they were abandoned by their comrades to the cruelties of the enemy. I realize these facts are politically incorrect, and many creative attempts are being made today to discount or deny them. Such revisions of history do injustice to those troops who did stand their ground and fight, and may do harm to those who must stand and fight in the future. In the case of the 24th, when it was finally integrated with other infantry units a year later the issue of race began gradually fading into military history. Not all the 24th ran. Although his whole battalion had fled, he manned his machine gun alone until he was killed. From the first six months of the Korean War one fundamental lesson was taught our nation yet again, and hopefully by now has been learned. The need to always keep our combat troops well armed, physically and psychologically prepared to fight, and to fight as teams, remains a vital lesson for us today, and forever. True understanding of the concept of "Team" and its vital importance in infantry combat is best gained by study of successful teams in Company or Battalion size. Although not part of Pusan Perimeter battles, little mentioned at the time but now recognized as a classic example of small unit team coordination in combat is the capture of Maryang San by the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Army. Going into Korea on July 1 with 16, men, the 24th Infantry Division was down to less than when they were relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division on July By helping cause the NK to re-group before continuing their onslaught, 24id and their 21st Infantry Regiment bought time to help save South Korea. Astonishingly, the US and UN used that time to act rapidly and resolutely. The NK used the time to consolidate their gains and stage to continue the attack. The NK seriously began an assault on the Pusan perimeter on August 4. For the next 6 weeks, the issue of whether or not we could hold that perimeter, or would be crushed within it, was in doubt. When they finally crossed the Naktong and began their violent assault along the entire Perimeter, simultaneously, only 98, NK were attacking about , US and ROK troops. We were well equipped, with main

battle tanks against only NK T34s, in excellent defensive positions, supported by far superior artillery, and we had overwhelming air superiority. Yet the NK came within a hair of wiping us out. The fighting during the first two weeks of this Second Battle of the Naktong was some of the most violent during the Korean War, with proportionately heavy casualties. For instance, about August 24, near Masan, NK with 25 tanks daringly attacked 20, US troops with tanks, and almost broke through for what would have been a cataclysmic bloodbath at Pusan. In part, this early NK success was owing to the Truman administration having reduced our Army from tough professional soldiers to poorly armed civilians in uniform, fit for garrison duty but completely unprepared for the savagery of combat. In part, it was because the NK were the reverse. Prepared, veteran, resolute and ferocious. From the outset, NK conscripted South Koreans into their army, giving the appearance of strength, but these forced recruits had not the years of experience at guerilla warfare possessed by the veteran NK, let alone the will to destroy their own country. This lack of correct military intelligence led to a great over-estimation by Far East Command of NK strength, and a lowered confidence in our front line forces. The NK continued to menace the perimeter in early September. When the 5th Marines, a proud regiment of our best fighting men, were withdrawn from his command, General Walker became less confident. The Marines had been consistently effective during the Naktong Bulge fighting. They usually had won their battles with the NK while Army units usually had not, and often about half of Army casualties were MIAs while the Marines usually had none. But by early September the Army had been able to bring in its better trained infantry units from Hawaii and elsewhere, and was steadily improving in overall combat efficiency. Other units such as our 1st Cavalry Division and 27th Infantry Regiment were also fighting with determination and effectiveness. Against our larger numbers, superior artillery and armor, and total air supremacy, although the NK were still confident and ferocious they were no longer nearly good enough to seriously threaten Eighth Army. Most of the units I mention are ones I culled from military records only because I remember them from those times. There were many more that fought gallantly in defense of the Perimeter, particularly small units and individuals. Unit for unit, Eighth Army was badly out-fought by the veteran NK, but any man who has faced fire and steel for his country and stood his ground deserves respect. More, in bravery and sacrifice many of our individual soldiers equalled the best fighting men of any army, anywhere, any time. Smith to push through such an astonishing order. Ultimately, it was decided to let the 5th Marine Regiment mount out with other Marine units at sea, to help formation of the 1st Marine Division and X Corps. On September 15, the 5th led the way when our brilliant General Douglas MacArthur, with strategic prescience and unflinching nerve, sent the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry divisions storming ashore at Inchon , miles behind NK lines, and soon there were no lines. Finally able to fight in the kind of fluid action they were trained for 1st Cavalry division led a breakout, and the Pusan Perimeter battle was soon over. The Road to the Yalu had opened. As with all Communist armies, the NK army had political leadership at all command levels. This leadership reflected the policies of the NK government, as well as Communist ideology. The NK government was, and remains today, brutal and ignorant. The war they began was brutal and merciless. Mostly on grounds they had opposed North Korea politically. Hundreds of US troops were murdered in this way during the war. One example was Hill Twenty-six mortarmen of H Co. Their hands were tied behind their backs with communication wire and cord. Two days later, on August 17 when 5th Cav units moved to retake the area, the NK murdered the helpless prisoners with submachine gun fire. The NK also often tortured and mutilated prisoners. As particularly gruesome examples, the NK 7th Division tied a few captured 25th Infantry Division prisoners, and cut off their feet before murdering them. They castrated and cut the tongues from still others. These atrocities were most frequently discovered in the confused fighting in the rear areas, while retaking ground which the NK had infiltrated. There is no public record that any of the murderers were identified, much less tried and executed. Civilians suffered heavy casualties during the actual fighting, as well. At the Naktong, for example, the 1st Cavalry division blew up scores of civilians, along with a bridge destroyed to deny the NK access. In this way began one of the most vicious and most misunderstood wars the United States has ever fought.

The Invasion of Incheon distracted the invading North Korean armies, allowing the South Korean troops to break out of the Pusan Perimeter, and begin to push the North Koreans back into their own country, turning the tide of the Korean War.

Unfortunately for him, those hopes proved ephemeral during the brutal winter of 1950, as U. Instead of celebrating a solid victory in the late fall of 1950, U. After MacArthur slipped from the stage, relieved of command, the bitter, unpopular war he might have won in dragged on in a grinding stalemate until July 1950, with the face-saving but inconclusive armistice that remains in effect today. The White House and Pentagon remained focused on the immediate threat in South Korea and on marshaling sufficient resources to credibly combat North Korea. Little thought was given to larger strategic goals and objectives, other than a recognized desire to extricate American forces from Korea as quickly and completely as possible. Consequently, he was left to do the strategic thinking largely unimpeded, and his views “and will” prevailed. As far as the supreme commander was concerned, there would be an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Inchon to slice off, halt, isolate and destroy the NKPA, coordinated with a breakout from the Pusan Perimeter by its defenders. Seoul would be liberated and the South Korean government restored, followed by the invasion and occupation of North Korea. As the aggressor, North Korean premier Kim Il-Sung espoused war aims that were fairly simple and straightforward: Defeat the puppet Republic of Korea ROK forces before any tangible American combat power could be brought to bear, and occupy the entire Korean Peninsula in order to legitimize Communist political control. Attaining those goals depended on swift military success, followed by Soviet and Chinese political recognition and Western acquiescence. The military forces that the United States expected to take on and defeat North Korea in were numerically a fraction of their size in 1950, but they were organized in the same way, equipped with the same weapons and employed the same doctrine. On paper both U. Army and Marine divisions consisted of a core of three infantry regiments of three battalions each, with supporting artillery, armor, engineers and specialist troops. Massive coordinated firepower and mechanization remained the centerpieces of American tactical doctrine. Indeed, throughout the summer of 1950, as more American divisions were fed into the Pusan meat grinder, it was largely the brute force of artillery and air power that checked the North Koreans. The NKPA was purpose-built and bountifully equipped by the Soviet Union for the sole mission of presenting the West with a fait accompli. An armored shock attack was expected to quickly overwhelm the fledgling ROK army, followed by a drive to the southern tip of Korea. The NKPA was designed to carry out an inflexible plan with a limited objective and was generally successful until it lost the initiative outside Pusan. Never having planned to fight a protracted conflict, the NKPA was handicapped by a logistical tail that stretched all the way back to Manchuria, under regular U. General MacArthur conceived of a bold amphibious envelopment through the western coastal port of Inchon in the first days after the North Korean invasion “even while his staff and Washington gloomily confronted the prospect of defeat. From the beginning he visualized a Marine assault force with a follow-on Army division, and by early July he was requesting the specialized forces required from the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS in Washington. MacArthur remained intent on the concept, however, and on August 15 he directed newly arrived Maj. The date was determined by the prediction of acceptable tides at Inchon. As forces were identified to take part in the landing, they were hastily trained where possible. Marines assembling from around the world or engaged in combat in Pusan had little or no opportunity for specific training for the new operation. Marshaling capable forces, particularly amphibious assault elements, was perhaps the most challenging aspect of Chromite. At the time, the entire Marine Corps strength was only 74,000 men on duty around the world, and while there were officially two Marine divisions, it required a herculean effort for the corps to muster even a partial one for Chromite. The next day he requested 1,000 landing craft operators, and on the 5th he requested an engineer amphibious special brigade. During intense negotiations with Washington, MacArthur finally obtained commitments for the two regiments then available from the 1st Marine Division, with the addition of the 1st Marine Regiment and supporting arms. A full division was eventually authorized by stripping Marine security

guards from American embassies and a battalion from the Mediterranean, and by calling up the entire Marine Reserves. The 2nd Infantry Division was later pegged for Chromite before it too was thrown into Pusan. That left only the theater reserve, the 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which itself was denuded of officers, NCOs and specialists to fill out understrength divisions in Korea. After August 1, however, all Army combat replacements arriving from the United States were ordered diverted to the 7th, and these included highly qualified training cadre from the infantry and artillery schools with significant World War II experience. As a measure of the desperate need for manpower in , though, MacArthur ordered on August 1 that the division be filled out with 8, untrained Koreans pressed into service from among thousands of refugees crowded into the Pusan Perimeter. Sealift was another significant hurdle. Navy had large numbers of specialized amphibious vessels left over from World War II, most were in mothballs, without crews and without the benefit of regular maintenance. Of the 47 LSTs landing ships, tank that departed Kobe, Japan, on September 10 to support the operation, 37 were manned by Japanese crews. On many of the invasion ships essential equipment and machinery had been stripped out, including radios, electrical systems, pumps, hydraulics and even galleys. Along with all the other deficiencies facing the Far East Command, no headquarters existed that was capable of commanding the landing force. On August 21, MacArthur requested and received permission to activate the X Corps from among existing assets in the theater. He selected his chief of staff, Maj. Almond, to command the corps and Maj. The X Corps staff was formed out of the Far East Command staff and proved notably competent once on the ground in Korea. While MacArthur was determined to execute the Inchon operation from early July , he faced considerable opposition and dissension in Washington and from among his own staff and commanders in Tokyo and Korea. While supporting the concept in principle, they pressed for a landing at Kunsan, much farther south on the west coast. The next day MacArthur confronted the unanimous objections of his Navy and Marine commanders, who were anxious about the extreme tides at Inchon, mudbanks along the approach, shipping inadequacies, the short timeline to train and prepare, the hazards of conducting an amphibious assault into an urban area and the paucity of personnel to conduct the assault. Matthew Ridgway, the Army deputy chief of staff for operations, and General Lauris Norstad, Air Force vice chief of staff, expressing further doubts from Washington. The next day Sherman met with Navy and Marine commanders to hear their continuing concerns. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. When MacArthur would not waiver, his Navy and Marine commanders fully committed themselves to the Inchon landing. On August 26, MacArthur assigned the name Chromite to the operation, and on the 28th he received JCS approval to proceed "or so he thought. On September 7, the JCS balked again in reaction to further deterioration in the situation around Pusan and the possible necessity to reinforce Walker. They reminded MacArthur that Chromite required all his reserves, that it would be another four months before recently activated National Guard divisions could arrive and that the dreaded Korean winter loomed. After a suspenseful night, Truman finally approved the operation on the 8th, and the JCS concurred. A major hurdle was the extraction of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade from combat in the front lines outside Pusan. The brigade had been diverted directly into Pusan on July 29 after initially setting sail to Japan to prepare for Inchon. Five weeks later the Marines remained in combat, and General Walker adamantly refused to release them for fear of creating a gap in his already weak defenses. Major General Oliver P. Finally, in a complex arrangement that put a regiment from the 7th Infantry Division aboard ships in Pusan Harbor as a floating reserve, Walker agreed to its release on September 6. On the 12th the troops finally sailed from Pusan to join their division off Inchon. The 1st Marine Regiment and the rest of 1st Marine Division sailed from Kobe on the 12th, while the 7th Division, minus the regiment floating off Pusan, sailed from Yokohama the same day. While the invasion fleet muddled its way through the remains of two tropical storms, naval air and gunfire support ships prepared the Inchon landing site on September As a deceptive tactic, the battleship USS Missouri bombarded likely invasion sites along the east coast before joining the main force off Inchon. The actual landing on September 15 seemed almost anticlimactic. As predicted by intelligence, Inchon proved only lightly defended. According to plan, at hours the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, accompanied by nine M Pershing tanks, assaulted the island of Wolmi-do, a preliminary objective in Inchon Harbor. By , the island had been secured. At that point, in a surreal intermission, the primary assault forces waited in their ships for the necessary high tides. Finally, at the

landing craft carrying the 1st Marines and the rest of the 5th Marines crossed their lines of departure. At the 5th Marines assaulted the sea wall by charging up bamboo ladders hastily constructed by Japanese workers prior to their embarkation. By , all D-day objectives had been met. The remaining Ts were destroyed later that day by advancing Marine Pershings. By noon, the 1st Marine Division controlled all high ground east of the city, thus preventing North Korean artillery fire from reaching the beachhead area, and the first 7th Division elements arrived in the harbor. By , the 1st Marine Division tactical headquarters was established ashore and General Smith assumed command of operations from Rear Adm. Doyle, the amphibious group commander. By nightfall, the 5th Marines controlled the Seoul highway. At first light on the 17th, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, engaged and destroyed a further six Ts. By that evening the 5th Marines had seized the southern portion of Kimpo airfield, a major objective on the outskirts of Seoul. The next day, the third since landing, the 5th Marines secured Kimpo and advanced to the Han River, seizing Hill 99 on the way. That afternoon the first Marine Corsair landed at Kimpo to begin close support operations. By nightfall on the 19th, the 5th Marines had joined with ROK marines for an assault crossing of the Han to begin the attack on Seoul itself. Back in Inchon, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, 7th Division, was ashore and relieved the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, along the Seoul highway. The landing and breakout phase was effectively over. Next came the liberation of Seoul and the linkup with the Eighth Army, which had broken out of Pusan and driven pell-mell north up the peninsula. Operation Chromite was over: By , a single U. Army division defended all of Europe from more than Soviet divisions. The Marine Corps had to scour the world to come up with an ad hoc division for its primary mission, a strategic amphibious assault on a defended shore. Finally, as with most successful military endeavors, there was a great deal of luck involved. For the North Koreans, Inchon was emblematic of the weakness behind its whole scheme to unify Korea. All their hopes of quick success were dashed on the jury-rigged U. Inchon sealed their fate. Nonetheless, North Korea had nearly succeeded. It bargained on a lack of will, interest and capability on the part of the United States. Given the signals emanating from Washington, and considering the state of the U. But North Korea underestimated U. North Korea gambled and lost. Operation Chromite did not introduce any fundamentally new aspects to the art of war.

Chapter 4 : Stand or Die - Defense of Korea's Pusan Perimeter | HistoryNet

That victoryâ€™the defense of the Pusan Perimeter in the first months of the Korean Warâ€™gave United Nations forces time to muster the men, equipment and political will necessary to blunt the first communist military onslaught of the Cold War.

A retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history. Yet in , his skill as a combat commander enabled him to win one of the most brilliantly fought defensive battles in all of military history. That victoryâ€™the defense of the Pusan Perimeter in the first months of the Korean Warâ€™gave United Nations forces time to muster the men, equipment and political will necessary to blunt the first communist military onslaught of the Cold War. Eighth Army in postwar occupied Japan. During its time in Japan, the Eighth Army had degraded into a hollow force. Walker started an immediate rebuilding program to return his command to combat readiness, but he faced even greater challenges. The command architecture above Walker was no better. A joint command, FEC was supposed to incorporate subordinate commands from each of the services, each with its own reporting and support channels leading to the Pentagon. As an Army officer, MacArthur insisted on micromanaging all Army-specific issues in his theater. Unfortunately for Walker, MacArthur was an aloof and almost inaccessible commander. As a corps commander in World War II, Walker had enjoyed unrestricted access to his army commander, Patton, and frequent contact with the army group commander, General Omar Bradley. Walker even dealt with the theater commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, a personal friend. Truman decided to intervene, and the first contingent of combat troops from the 24th ID landed in Korea on July 2. Eleven days later Walker established the command post of Eighth U. The newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division 1st Cav. Initially, Walker had no choice but to fight a delaying action as he tried to build up sufficient force to mount an offensive. He also had to hold at all costs Pusan, the only deepwater port in South Korea. But by the end of July, Walker was running out of space. If he withdrew any farther, he would lack sufficient depth with which to maneuver the reserves necessary to block enemy thrusts and eventually mass for a counterattack and breakout. We are fighting a battle against time. There will be no more retreating, withdrawal or readjustment of the lines or any other term you choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat. We must fight until the end. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together. We are going to win. At the time Walker issued his bold order, the forces under his command included five badly mauled ROKA divisions and the still understrength U. Walker ordered his beleaguered forces to withdraw behind the natural barrier of the Naktong River. By August 1, the Pusan Perimeter comprised an approximate bymile rectangle in the southeast corner of Korea. To the west, the main line of resistance ran along the Naktong, from the mountain town of Naktong-ni some 80 miles south; at the confluence with the Nam River, the Naktong cut sharply east, but the defensive line continued 20 miles due south to the coast. The northern boundary of the perimeter ran through the mountains from Naktong-ni to the town of Yongdok, on the east coast. The sea bounded the eastern and southern sides of the perimeter, and Walker could rely on U. Walker made masterful use of his ability to operate on interior lines. Fifth Air Force maintained total air supremacy, which meant Walker could move forces within the perimeter during daylight hours without fear of detection. The port itself, on the Tsushima Strait, was capable of handling 30 oceangoing ships at a time. Although Pusan had a daily discharge capacity of up to 45, tons, personnel and transportation shortfalls during the battle limited the average daily tonnage to about 28, Walker initially positioned his three American divisions along the Naktong, from Waegwan south to the coast. The 24th ID held the center, with the 1st Cav. North of the 1st Cav. The North Koreans initially threw six infantry divisions against the western flank of the perimeter and four against the northern flank. Although the th was armed with the highly capable Soviet T tank, the unit had suffered heavy losses during its advance and was down to only about 40 operational tanks. But the North Koreans continued to send fresh forces down the peninsula, and by late August they were able to commit three additional relatively fresh divisions, two against the center of the Naktong line and one against the southern end near the coast. Although a standard element of U. A positional defense assumed a frontage of six to eight miles for each division. This line of strongpoints was so long and thinly spread that

Walker lacked sufficient troops to form the key large mobile reserve. Thus, he was forced to cobble together a series of ad hoc counterattack forces from troops in quiet sectors and newly arriving units, throwing them in whenever and wherever the NKPA penetrated his line. Still lacking subordinate corps headquarters, Walker was a one-man show. He continually moved by jeep and L Bird Dog light aircraft to each point on the line as a threat emerged, personally overseeing the counter-attacks. Walker did, however, have a secret weapon: Landrum had commanded the American forces that recaptured the Aleutian island of Attu from the Japanese in World War II and, as a major general, later led the 90th Infantry Division during the brutal hedgerow fighting in Normandy in July. Calm, unflappable, professional and a consummate team player, Landrum was an entirely different breed of officer from Almond, and Walker trusted him completely. His primary job was to keep track of all forces in Korea and conjure up the reserves to plug any holes. The poorly coordinated counterattack stopped the North Koreans, but otherwise produced limited results. After five days of indecisive fighting, Walker prudently suspended the operation. He faced more serious threats farther north. This double-pincer attack originated around Sangju and sought to envelop Taegu from both the north and south. The North Korean thrusts were poorly coordinated, allowing Walker to shift his reserves between the two. He brought the 1st Marine Bde. On August 24, Walker put the newly arrived 2nd ID into the center of the line and pulled the 24th ID back into reserve. While the North Koreans were attacking in the center and south, two NKPA divisions north of Taegu forced their way across the Naktong and collapsed the northwest corner of the perimeter. Walker shifted the 27th Inf. As the series of battles was raging along the Naktong, the NKPA on August 9 attempted to infiltrate and envelop the northern perimeter with three divisions. The North Korean push in early August had amounted to a massive frontal attack, but a piecemeal one. On August 27, the NKPA launched another series of attacks against the same objectives, but this time the attacks were well coordinated. Despite heavy initial losses, they were still able to field some 98,000 troops. By September 3, Walker was beating back simultaneous attacks in five locations. In the center, the North Koreans almost pushed the 1st Cav. Walker focused squarely on the security of Pusan as he continually shifted his reserves among danger points within the shrinking perimeter. He attached the 1st Marine Bde. The North Koreans were off balance and dangerously overextended, their lines of communication under relentless attack by U. S. forces. Thanks to the massive logistics infusion through Pusan, the Americans now had more than medium tanks in Korea, giving them a greater than 5-to-1 advantage in armor. While Walker was conducting his frantic holding actions along the perimeter, his EUSAK staff was working equally hard on the plans to break out, drive north and link up with the Inchon landing force, which was designated X Corps. X Corps landed at Inchon on September 15, and the Eighth Army launched its breakout the following day. The plan called for the 5th RCT and the 1st Cav. After nearly two months of brutal combat, they were exhausted, ammunition was short and they lacked the necessary river-crossing gear. The North Korean resistance finally broke on September 22 and started withdrawing the next day. Task Force Lynchâ€”centered on the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cav. The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter was over. Fourteen NKPA divisions had been all but annihilated. But the defenders also paid a high price. Between July 5 and September 16, Eighth Army casualties totaled 4,000 killed in action, 12,000 wounded, 2,000 missing and confirmed captured. The Korean War was far from over, of course. After the linkup, the Allies crossed into North Korea and pushed toward the Yalu. In late October, the Chinese intervened, crossing the river and pushing the Eighth Army back below the 38th parallel. The war then settled down into a bloody stalemate that dragged on until the July armistice. According to some military analysts, after the breakout Walker put too much emphasis on driving north to achieve a quick linkup and too little on destroying the NKPA forces deep inside South Korea. And, like all other Allied commanders, Walker was caught flatfooted by the Chinese intervention. X Corps continued to report directly to FEC. There was no precedent for such an arrangement in all of military history, and it was a fiasco. In his hands-on style, the Eighth Army commander had been racing his jeep over icy roads to inspect forward battlefield positions. Almond retired as a lieutenant general in after serving as commandant of the Army War College. But justice sometimes prevails. When Eugene Landrum retired from the Army in February, he was allowed to do so in his former rank of major general. At Pusan, Walker had proved that a mobile defense was doable and demonstrated how to do it. As a result, the Army finally included the concept in the edition of FM, its primary operations field manual.

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Despite being under a cloud at the time of his death, Walker was promoted posthumously to four-star rank in January. For additional reading, David Zabecki recommends:

Chapter 5 : Korean War: Operation Chromite | HistoryNet

The Battle of Pusan Perimeter was the first major conflict of the Korean War involving , UN troops from Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and of course, the United States. They were up against nearly , North Korean troops who had invaded the South Korean peninsula in late June of

Foolish Risk or Calculated Gamble? General Douglas MacArthur has been criticized for his decision, even though it succeeded, to make the invasion of Korea at the harbor of Inchon. This paper explores the legitimacy of that decision based on the principles of military power. A popular military aphorism is that victory has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan. The American invasion of Inchon during the Korean War must certainly be the exception to this. General Douglas MacArthur, loved by some, hated by others, rightfully deserves all of the credit for such a bold and audacious decision. In retrospect, his decision deserves perhaps a bit more circumspection. Was his decision soundly based in military principles, balanced by ends to means? These were the explicit aims. The strategic priorities will sound strikingly familiar to those familiar with strategic debate in this era of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Desert Storm: End the war as quickly as possible and keep U. Even in the s, there was a political drive to keep wars short and bloodless; to attain national ends without expending resources. Perhaps the national tendency to hope to attain something for nothing is a fundamental characteristic of America. For the North Koreans, the opposite was true. Since he could not accomplish this politically, he resorted to military means to gain a political end. Kim Il Sung may not have realized it, but he had two possible branches of strategic priorities. The first was to drive the Americans out of the Pusan Perimeter and back to Japan, thus allowing him time to consolidate his hold politically, socially and militarily on Korea. The second branch, far more subtle, would have been to keep the Americans bottled up at Pusan and continue to attrit American lives, while consolidating his hold and strengthening his long logistical tail. By killing Americans, North Korea could make victory appear extremely costly to the American government and perhaps wear down the political will to fight. The political will to fight would be backed up by how the American military would actually conduct the fight. American doctrine has historically been framed by the notion of preparing to fight the next war as the last one was fought. While this type of doctrinal thinking came back to haunt the U. American doctrine during the previous war was offensively oriented, relying primarily on the infantry to hold key terrain once the enemy had been pushed off. The attrition of enemy forces was secondary to seizing and defending ground. Tanks were regarded as the best weapon to kill another tank. The doctrinal use of artillery and close air support made great strides during World War Two. By the end of that war, the U. Army was very good at conducting offensive war, largely because they did not have to defend their own homeland as the German Army had been forced to do. However, American defensive doctrine was weaker. Reliance on fortified strongpoints made penetration of American lines easy, as the 1 st Armored Division discovered to its regret during the opening phase of the Kasserine Pass battles. A strongpoint defense with mobile armored counterattack forces might work against an attacking tank division, but it was ill-equipped to deal with an infiltrating infantry force which attacked at night, bypassing the strongpoint and raided logistical bases. During both of his previous experiences, he had relied on boldness, audacity and the offensive to gain and maintain the initiative over his opponents. Army force structure was centered on the pre-eminence of the infantry divisions, with integrated armor support. An infantry division had three regiments, with three battalions each, and four infantry companies per battalion. The division also had one tank battalion, parceling one company of Ms outgunned in comparison to the Russian made T which the North Koreans used to each regiment. During the drawdown which followed World War Two, the number of infantry battalions per regiment was reduced by one. However, the infantry had no truly effective anti-tank weapon. The standard issue 2. The three division artillery battalions one per infantry regiment had also suffered cutbacks, dropping from three batteries each to two. With this structure, the X Corps, commanded by Major General Almond, was established to conduct the amphibious assault at Inchon. X Corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division, plus one regiment withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter in order to bring that Division to a full wartime strength of three regiments, and the 7th Infantry Division. While X

Corps was the assault force, overall command and joint support was under the umbrella control of Joint Task Force JTF 7, with seven subordinate task forces. JTF-7 was a true joint operational command, incorporating Navy, Army and Marine units in order to support the assault force. JTF-7 would strike the North Koreans at a weak, unprepared point, effecting surprise and mass before the North Koreans could react. North Korean military doctrine closely resembled the Chinese model. The North Koreans were not as road bound as the American army was, which gave them more flexibility than the Americans. The North Korean force structure closely resembled the Chinese and Soviet triangular formation. On the offense, the two up and one back method was used. On the defense, this formation was reversed. While sorely lacking in air support with only nineteen outdated Soviet aircraft and almost no navy to speak of, the North Koreans did possess the T tank and towed artillery. North Korean shore artillery consisted of 75mm guns inside concrete revetments. Control of the skies permitted the isolation of the invasion area and prevented reinforcing units from reaching the invasion area. Control of the sea permitted the logistical support of the assault force without fear of interruption by enemy surface or submarine forces. The presence of a secure logistical base on Japan ensured a smooth flow of supplies, both to units at Inchon as well as Pusan. With naval gunfire support, the Americans also pounded defensive positions on Wolmi-do Island with high explosives and napalm, effectively neutralizing the North Koreans. Securing the island was absolutely critical to success of the operation, because without it, the North Koreans could enfilade the invading amphibious forces with artillery and small arms fire. The capture of key terrain at Inchon, specifically Cemetery and Observatory Hills was also crucial in ensuring that X Corps would have a secure beachhead. The capture of Kimpo airfield on the morning of 18 September facilitated the staging of Marine Corsairs flying Close Air Support missions for the Marines on the ground. Further, small unit actions, such as the capture of the causeway linking Wolmi-do with Inchon illustrate the value of highly trained, motivated, veteran soldiers as a combat multiplier. In retrospect, the preconditions for victory were already and in place and the outcome of foregone conclusion; the combination of U. MacArthur had other options, besides Kunsan, which all seemed more prudent, but he stuck to his guns. Indeed, if he had simply introduced more troops into the Pusan Perimeter, or had made the envelopment more shallow, he would not have ended up with the results he achieved: The North Koreans were unable to disengage from the American Eighth Army units in front of them and reinforce the invasion area. As part of their force was held by Eighth Army, even while withdrawing, North Korean rear area support units were devastated by X Corps. While the Americans gained their goals, the North Koreans nearly lost everything. In their gamble, they had committed all of their resources, stretching themselves thinly, only to have their logistical tail cut behind them. MacArthur realized that he had to make a political statement as well as conduct a military operation. The psychological effect of quickly recapturing the South Korean national capital sent a very strong statement to the rest of the Pacific rim, including China and Russia. General MacArthur chose Inchon as the landing site for the amphibious operation primarily because of its proximity to Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Inchon, located on the west coast of the Korean peninsula, is eighteen miles west of Seoul. MacArthur saw the recapture of Seoul as vital for winning the support of the United Nations and for putting fire into the motivation of the Allied Asian countries. Inchon was thus not only a military objective but a political one. CHROMITE would place the Allied forces on the offensive and gain the decisive momentum required to prevent the war from stagnating and becoming a long, drawn out war of attrition which MacArthur, a veteran of World War One was already familiar with. The invasion force, X Corps, consisted of 70, troops. Intelligence estimates put the NKPA strength in the Inchon-Seoul area at 8, soldiers, of whom 1,, were garrisoned in the landing area. This was later confirmed by POWs who stated that the Inchon garrison numbered 2, This was a great risk, but the 1 st Division commander, Major General Oliver Smith, did not feel that he would be able to accomplish the landings without the regiment. When MacArthur reviewed the risk of pulling one regiment out of Pusan, he reasoned that once the landings were successful, the NKPA would withdraw north to counterattack, thus taking pressure off Eighth Army. The Americans had the advantage of interior lines at the Pusan perimeter, but were free to exploit exterior lines because of the lack of an opposing naval force. The NKPA was also at a disadvantage because of their terrain induced flanks: This was more critical than it appears on the surface because of the very multi-service nature of the Corps. With one Marine

Division and one Army Division, a lesser commander might have decided to let each Division commander have his own area, without a single unified command and staff structure. General Almond understood this, and also knew that once the landings were completed, he was to return to Japan and continue his duties as the Far East Command CofS. Surprise could not be achieved unless the enemy was caught wholly unprepared. This was achieved partly because of negligible North Korean air and naval capability to gather intelligence on American troop movements. Also, Inchon was not considered the best location for an amphibious assault, by anyone, North Korean or American. Inchon has no beaches, only mud flats. There is also a serious tide problem, with a tidal variance of -. The assault troops encountered only spotty resistance and friendly casualties were much lighter than expected. Within 24 hours of the main landings, the 1 st Marine Division had secured the high ground six miles east of Inchon. This prevented the North Koreans from reinforcing their rear areas. The Eighth Army was then to drive north, pushing the logistically cut off NKPA back north, where the Americans would link up with the landing force at Seoul. Eugene Clark begins his intelligence collection mission at Yonghung-do. Air strikes hit Wolmi-do Island. High tide in Inchon harbor. Initial D-Day objectives secured. Army in World War II. The Evolution of U. Army Tactical Doctrine,

Chapter 6 : Battle of Busan Perimeter, The First Major Conflict In The Korean War

Although not part of Pusan Perimeter battles, little mentioned at the time but now recognized as a classic example of small unit team coordination in combat is the capture of Maryang San by the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Army.

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Chapter 7 : Battle of Pusan Perimeter | World History Project

The Pusan Perimeter was the area in extreme southeast Korea which was defined by the furthest advance of the North Korean troops during the Korean War. It extended along miles and was named after the coastal city of Pusan.

It was one of the first major engagements of the Korean War. An army of , UN troops, having been pushed to the brink of defeat, were rallied to make a final stand against the invading North Korean army , 98, men strong. The massive North Korean assaults were unsuccessful in forcing the United Nations troops back further from the perimeter, despite two major pushes in August and September. North Korean troops, hampered by supply shortages and massive losses, continually staged attacks on UN forces in an attempt to penetrate the perimeter and collapse the line. However, the UN used the port to amass an overwhelming advantage in troops, equipment, and logistics, and its navy and air forces remained unchallenged by the North Koreans during the fight. After six weeks, the North Korean force collapsed and retreated in defeat after the UN force launched a counterattack at Inchon on September . The battle would be the furthest the North Korean troops would advance in the war, as subsequent fighting ground the war into a stalemate. The United States subsequently sent ground forces to the Korean peninsula with the goal of fighting back the North Korean invasion and to prevent South Korea from collapsing. The division was understrength, and most of its equipment was antiquated due to reductions in military spending. Regardless, the 24th Infantry Division was ordered into South Korea. The Pusan Perimeter is the border of the green portion of the peninsula. Having captured Taejon, North Korean forces began surrounding the Pusan Perimeter from all sides in an attempt to envelop it. The smaller South Korean army suffered from widespread lack of organization and equipment, and was unprepared for war. North and South Korean units sparred for control of several cities, inflicting heavy casualties on one another. Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment , newly arrived in the country, were wiped out at Hadong in a coordinated ambush by North Korean forces on July 27, leaving open a pass to the Pusan area. Suffering mounting losses, the North Korean force on the west flank withdrew for several days to re-equip and receive reinforcements. This granted both sides several days of reprieve to prepare for the attack on the Pusan Perimeter. Thus, the UN established the Pusan Perimeter in a location outlined by the Sea of Japan to the south and east, the Naktong River to the west, and extremely mountainous terrain to the north, using the terrain as a natural defense. The North Korean army had around 70, combat troops committed to the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, with most of its divisions far understrength. Thus the UN ground combat force outnumbered the North Koreans 92, to 70, Though logistics situations improved over time, ammunition was short for much of the war. There were no C rations in Korea and only a small reserve in Japan at the outbreak of the war. Subsistence of the ROK troops was an equally important and difficult problem. Pusan was the only port in South Korea that had dock facilities large enough to handle a sizable amount of cargo. The consumption of aviation gasoline thanks to both combat and transport aircraft was so great in the early phase of the war, taxing the very limited supply available in the Far East, that it became one of the serious logistical problems. This logistics network was therefore capable of moving far fewer supplies, and this caused considerable difficulty for front-line troops. Based on the efficient Soviet model, this ground-based network relied primarily on railroads to transport supplies to the front while troops transported those items to the individual units on foot, trucks, or carts. This second effort, though more versatile, was also a substantial disadvantage because it was less efficient and often too slow to follow the moving front-line units. The first of these targets was Wonsan on the east coast. Wonsan was important as a communications center that linked Vladivostok , Siberia , with North Korea by rail and sea. From it, rail lines ran to all the North Korean build-up centers. The great bulk of Russian supplies for North Korea in the early part of the war came in at Wonsan, and from the beginning it was considered a major military target. Destruction of the rail bridges over the Han near Seoul would cut rail communication to the Pusan Perimeter area. On July 28 the FEAF gave Bomber Command a list of targets in the rail interdiction program, and two days later a similar plan was ready for interdiction of highways. Other than this, however, aircraft played almost no role in North Korean logistics. Ports in Wonsan and Hungnam could be used for the transport of some troops and supplies,

but they remained far too underdeveloped to support any large-scale logistical movements, and the port of Inchon in the south was difficult to navigate with large numbers of ships. The supremacy of the Fifth Air Force in the skies over Korea forced the North Koreans in the first month of the war to resort to night movement of supplies to the battle area. The United Nations air effort failed to halt military rail transport. Army built up its forces and launch a counteroffensive. Eventually the commander was forced to demolish the bridge, taking several hundred refugees with it. It would kick off with an attack by the US reserve units on the Masan area to secure Chinju from the North Korean 6th Division, followed by a larger general push to the Kum River in the middle of the month. Task Force Kean consisted of the 25th Division, less the 27th Infantry and a field artillery battalion, plus the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attachedâ€”a force of about 20, men. However, the offensive was considered to have significantly increased morale among the troops of the 25th Infantry Division, which performed extremely well in subsequent engagements. Church , monitored the river area. Artillery and mortar fire were also dispersed so large amounts of fire could be poured on any one spot. Heavy casualties were incurred by C Company, the first unit of the battalion to reach the post. A and B Companies counterattacked the North Korean positions with tanks and armored vehicles, eventually rescuing the beleaguered C Company.

Chapter 8 : The Pusan Perimeter: Korea, by Edwin P. Hoyt

This is the order of battle for United Nations and North Korean forces during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter in August and September during the Korean War. The engagement brought each side to muster substantial ground, air and sea resources to fight across southeastern Korea.

Eventually, though, the United Nations troops were facing defeat at the hands of 98,000 North Koreans. They won the battle during their final stand. The Busan Perimeter is a mile stretch of land on the Korean Peninsula that is also home to Busan, a port. The North Koreans attacked troops stationed there for six entire weeks, while also striking in other locations. Regardless, the United Nations troops stood firm and managed to outlast the multiple attacks. It was very helpful the United Nations had access to the port of Busan, which enabled them to ship in extra manpower, equipment and more. Eventually, after waiting them out, the North Koreans retreated. United Nations troops arriving in South Korea. The United States additionally sent extra troops. The goal was to prevent the invasion by North Korea, while also helping the South Koreans to defend themselves and succeed economically and diplomatically. The United Nations forces began to create a perimeter around Busan through the summer of 1950. It also touched on a few other cities. The United Nations forces were using these mountains and valleys as natural defenses. It was very hard, though, for any of the troops to cross it. The area also gave soldiers little access to clean water and was also very jungle-heavy. This was not only a bad thing for the enemy, but also for the United Nations troops. The North Korean forces were arranged into ten divisions, most having appropriate training and with hundreds of T-34 tanks. The United Nations forces were under the command of the United States military. North Korean T-34 tanks destroyed by UN. In August 1950, the United Nations forces began to withdraw from the perimeter leaving behind defensive positions. This would enable them to regroup and come back to fight later. Also, it would provide the necessary manpower to keep the North Koreans at bay. They feared that any further retreat would be detrimental to the United Nations forces. They also wanted to be sure they could keep control of Busan Port, so they could continue to receive supplies and more manpower. North Korea attacked the perimeter trying to make their way into Busan. They attacked in four different places: The United Nations troops began to plan a counter-offensive move, and it would be their first in the war. They encountered North Korean infantry and defeated them, then overran the North Korean 6th Division headquarters. Fierce fighting lasted for three days near Chindong-ni, and United Nations troops were redeployed as needed. When one infantry division was rerouted several days later, the difficult terrain became a serious problem. American forces stuck in the mud were attacked by the North Koreans, who were hiding out at a higher elevation, perfect for a surprise assault. The attack quickly took out almost two battalions and their corresponding equipment. The Americans, although receiving back up, could not regain the ground. The Tables Turn in September Troops of the 24th Infantry move to the Masan battleground. However, after many similar encounters, the North Korean army was highly reduced. The North Korean disadvantage was growing more apparent by the day. They had fewer tanks, while the UN. In light of this, the North Koreans decided that flanking the forces was a waste of time, thanks to the UN. They choose to go with a frontal attack. They wanted to take one last shot at capturing the area, at the risk of losing it for good. To plan ahead for the offensive attack, the North Koreans added four new troop divisions. A five-pronged attack was scheduled for August 31 and September 2. The attacks greatly surprised the United Nations forces. They were busy building in Busan, believing they had successfully taken care of North Korean troops in the area. The North Koreans broke through the first lines and pushed the United Nations troops back. However, United Nations troops rallied and forced back the North Koreans by September 15, with the fight ending around Busan a few days later. The Aftermath During the Busan conflicts, two war correspondents were killed. Both sides committed war crimes. The North Koreans were accused of severely torturing captured United Nations soldiers.

CHAPTER XV. Establishing the Pusan Perimeter. When I hear talk of lines I always think I am hearing talk of the walls of China. The good ones are those that nature has made, and the good entrenchments are good dispositions and brave soldiers.

The North Koreans, many having learned to fight in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese when Korea was under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945, were mobile fighters, skilled at nighttime attacks, fighting in the mountains, and hand-to-hand combat. They also had developed an effective method of sending troops around and to the rear of the enemy while the main forces were fighting at the front. Enveloping the enemy troops, they were often able to cut them off from help and to inflict terrible casualties. Because the North Koreans kept attacking, relentlessly pushing U. S. forces back, the North Koreans were characterized by the American media as unstoppable "waves" of soldiers. This was not true. The North Koreans were exhausted and far away from their home base and supplies. They had a serious shortage of food and equipment. To make up for their battle losses, they were recruiting soldiers from the newly occupied South Korean cities. Many of these young men had no training and were not even given weapons. The North Koreans continued to distinguish themselves, however, motivated by the confidence of their many victories and their mission of reunifying Korea. But by August, they knew that time was running out. If members of the United Nations UN kept pouring more troops and weapons toward the defense of South Korea, the North Koreans would not have a chance against them. American general Walton H. Walker, the heavy weaponry being airlifted in daily could be set up to fire at all possible avenues of approach. There was even a railroad loop "Pusan-Kyongju-Taegu-Pusan" that could deliver supplies and troops throughout the perimeter as needed. However, defending the Pusan Perimeter was no simple task, even with new troops and supplies. The area was too large for a dense defense line, and the troops who were arriving had little combat experience and no familiarity with Korea. Walker carefully planned the positions of every unit assigned to Korea for the defense of the huge area. The five divisions of the South Korean Army defended a large line in the north and northwest; the First Cavalry defended an eighteen-mile line from Waegwan south along the Naktong River; the Twenty-fourth Division defended a twenty-five-mile line extending to the meeting of the Naktong and Nam Rivers; and a reinforced Twenty-fifth Division defended the line south to the Korean Strait. The Twenty-fifth had recently been built up significantly with newly arrived battalions and ROK survivors. In addition, two regiments of the Second Infantry Division had arrived. Along with other weapons, Sherman tanks were arriving from Japan that could destroy the dreaded T tanks the North Koreans were using. With more troops and supplies, and a more defensible position, it seemed as though the Eighth Army could quickly defeat the NKPA. However, it was not so easy. A weak start The first order of business after setting up the defensive line in the perimeter was to stop the North Korean drive down the western roads leading to Masan. Task Force Kean began a counterattack on August 7. The counterattack ultimately failed despite the fact that the Americans outnumbered the NKPA twenty thousand to seventy-five hundred and seemed to have all the advantages. Several things contributed to the loss. It was very hot, with temperatures reaching degrees Fahrenheit. Many soldiers dropped from heat exhaustion. On their way to battle, the Fifth Regimental Combat Team took a wrong road, allowing the North Koreans time to get control in the hills. Marines, in their first highly publicized fight in Korea, did extremely well, twice bailing out the Twenty-fifth Division. The marines were not only combat experienced, but brought with them their own air support and good weapons and ammunition. But even their support was not enough. From the hills, the North Koreans achieved the advantage, engaging the Americans in a vicious battle later known as Bloody Gulch. At the end of August, the Masan front was in a stalemate. The Americans were using the river as a part of their defense, but the North Koreans by the hundreds managed to cross it during the night. The North Koreans then infiltrated the very weak Thirty-fourth and Nineteenth Regiments of the Twenty-fourth Division that defended this line. For several days, despite fierce combat, the NKPA continued on their drive into the perimeter, getting as far as Yongsan, a village eight miles east of the Naktong. They also set up a powerful roadblock on the road to Miryang. More American units arrived but counterattacks,

though heavy in casualties, failed to drive the North Koreans from the bulge. Then the marines were called in, along with several new army regiments. On August 17, the marines struck the ridgeline within the Naktong Bulge called Obnong-ni, where the savage fighting had been taking place. The marines first came in with their Corsairs fighter planes, strafing the North Koreans, attacking them with machine gun or cannon from the low-flying aircraft. Then the infantry climbed the hills under heavy enemy fire. After being repulsed, the marines made a combined effort with the army regiments and shattered the North Koreans. When, as a last resort, the North Koreans pulled out their T tanks, three U. M26 Pershings heavily armed forty-six-ton tanks met the Ts and quickly destroyed them. After a full day of fierce battle, at great cost in American and North Korean lives, the marines had shattered the enemy. The next morning, after a Corsair bombing had destroyed a machine-gun emplacement, the surviving North Koreans ran back to the Naktong River. The North Koreans were facing a new enemy and fighting a different kind of war. The battle for Taegu Taegu was the headquarters for the Eighth Army and the seat of the South Korean government during this phase of the war. In mid-August, the U. Army had learned through decoded North Korean radio messages that the NKPA was approaching on the roads leading to Taegu, ready to attack. They lit the sky with flares and started heavy fire on the North Koreans, killing thousands. But the attack on Taegu was a desperate one for the North Koreans: The NKPA kept attacking until their enemy was exhausted. By August 15, the North Koreans had pushed past them and gone on to Tabu, fifteen miles north of Taegu. A massive bombing In what many consider to be a large-scale blunder, General Douglas MacArthur "â€"; commander of the UN Command in Korea decided to bomb a twenty-six-squaremile area north of Waegwan in the belief that the North Korean troops were gathering there. Air Force officers explained to him that the area he wished to bomb was too large and mountainous for this kind of bombing, but he went ahead with his plans. On August 16, twelve B squadrons released 3, five-hundred-pound bombs and one-thousand-pound bombs over the area in question. Apparently no North Korean troops were killed in the bombing, and in fact there is evidence that they were elsewhere at the time. A few North Koreans got close enough to Taegu to fire mortar small cannon rounds in the city, creating general panic. Rhee [â€"] was president of South Korea at the time. There a seven-night battle raged in a place called the "Bowling Alley," a twomile stretch of road with mountains rising on either side. Each night during this battle, the North Korean tanks would begin the attack by firing down the road at the Americans. As the North Koreans fired, red balls flew down the road. General Paik recalled these battles in his memoirs From Pusan to Panmunjom: By day, the air support strafed the enemy. Unable to penetrate the UN positions, the North Koreans traveled around them in the hills and very successfully attacked the Twenty-third Regiment of the Second Division, but the air support again bombed them relentlessly, stopping their drive for Taegu. Now or never There was a lull in the fighting in the last few days of August. The North Koreans were too weak to continue but unwilling to give up. General MacArthur was finalizing his plans for an amphibious using land, sea, and air forces attack at the port city of Inchon, near the capital city of Seoul. Though it should have been top secret, his boasts to the media made the plan common knowledge, even if the place for the landing was unknown. The North Koreans were more aware than ever that they had to capture the Pusan Perimeter soon. They rapidly overhauled their army, filling it up with about thirty thousand new recruits and lumping together survivors of vanquished divisions into reformulated units. Once again, in the first days of September, they struck savagely on five different fronts. And once again, although outnumbered and without food and supplies, the North Koreans were successful: They moved in force into many mountains just north of Taegu. General Walker deployed all his forces to the trouble spots in these critical days. He was most worried about the Naktong Bulge, where the penetration was deepest. Although he was aware that the marines were being moved to Pusan to embark for the attack at Inchon, in desperation he called for their help. MacArthur allowed him the use of the marines for three days. In those three days, the marines counterattacked, reaching the ridge at Obong-ni for a second time by the third day. There they engaged in fierce battle. But just after midnight on September 6, they pulled out, under orders from MacArthur. As the marines got ready for the attack at Inchon, Walker was faced with a continuing North Korean penetration at the Pusan Perimeter. The loss of the marines was devastating, as they were the only force that had been able to stop the NKPA so far. He knew that another withdrawal was the only way to ensure the safety of his troops. But he decided to hold

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the line. Where to Learn More Alexander, Bevin. The First War We Lost. Hippocrene Books, , revised edition, America in Korea, " From Pusan to Panmunjom: Words to Know amphibious attack: Communist Chinese army divisions were closer to 10, soldiers strong. DC-4 transportation aircraft and 2 nurses Troops throughout war: