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Chapter 1 : About and With W. V. Quine

The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Volume 18 (Library of Living Philosophers) 2nd Edition by Lewis Edwin Hahn (Editor), Paul Arthur Schilpp (Editor).

Meaning philosophy of language There have been several distinctive explanations of what a linguistic "meaning" is. Each has been associated with its own body of literature. The ideational theory of meaning, most commonly associated with the British empiricist John Locke , claims that meanings are purely mental contents provoked by signs. This tradition goes back at least to Frege and is associated with a rich body of modern work, spearheaded by philosophers like Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson. Wittgenstein was interested in the way in which the communities use language, and how far it can be taken. Strawson , John Searle , Robert Brandom , and others. Speech act theory was developed by J. Austin , although other previous thinkers have had similar ideas. There are two broad subspecies of externalism: The traditional formulation of such a theory is that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification or falsification. Dummett attributes such a theory of meaning to Charles Sanders Peirce and other early 20th century American pragmatists. Gottlob Frege was an advocate of a mediated reference theory. Frege divided the semantic content of every expression, including sentences, into two components: The sense of a sentence is the thought that it expresses. Such a thought is abstract, universal and objective. The sense of any sub-sentential expression consists in its contribution to the thought that its embedding sentence expresses. Senses determine reference and are also the modes of presentation of the objects to which expressions refer. Referents are the objects in the world that words pick out. The senses of sentences are thoughts, while their referents are truth values true or false. The referents of sentences embedded in propositional attitude ascriptions and other opaque contexts are their usual senses. Logically proper names are such terms as I, now, here and other indexicals. Trump may be an abbreviation for "the current President of the United States and husband of Melania Trump. Such phrases denote in the sense that there is an object that satisfies the description. However, such objects are not to be considered meaningful on their own, but have meaning only in the proposition expressed by the sentences of which they are a part. Hence, they are not directly referential in the same way as logically proper names, for Russell. For example, co-referential names, such as Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain, cause problems for a directly referential view because it is possible for someone to hear "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" and be surprised " thus, their cognitive content seems different. Despite the differences between the views of Frege and Russell, they are generally lumped together as descriptivists about proper names. Kripke put forth what has come to be known as "the modal argument" or "argument from rigidity". Consider the name Aristotle and the descriptions "the greatest student of Plato", "the founder of logic" and "the teacher of Alexander". Aristotle obviously satisfies all of the descriptions and many of the others we commonly associate with him , but it is not necessarily true that if Aristotle existed then Aristotle was any one, or all, of these descriptions. Aristotle may well have existed without doing any single one of the things for which he is known to posterity. He may have existed and not have become known to posterity at all or he may have died in infancy. Suppose that Aristotle is associated by Mary with the description "the last great philosopher of antiquity" and the actual Aristotle died in infancy. But this is deeply counterintuitive. Hence, names are rigid designators , according to Kripke. That is, they refer to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. In the same work, Kripke articulated several other arguments against " Frege"Russell " descriptivism. Some important questions are How much of language is innate? Is language acquisition a special faculty in the mind? What is the connection between thought and language? There are three general perspectives on the issue of language learning. The first is the behaviorist perspective, which dictates that not only is the solid bulk of language learned, but it is learned via conditioning. The final candidate for explanation is the innatist perspective, which states that at least some of the syntactic settings are innate and hardwired, based on certain modules of the mind. Reductionist models attempt to explain higher-level mental processes in terms of the

basic low-level neurophysiological activity of the brain. There have been a number of different perspectives on this issue, each offering a number of insights and suggestions. Philosopher Michael Dummett is also a proponent of the "language-first" viewpoint. The "knowledge-first" position can be found, for instance, in the work of Paul Grice. According to his argument, spoken and written language derive their intentionality and meaning from an internal language encoded in the mind. Another argument is that it is difficult to explain how signs and symbols on paper can represent anything meaningful unless some sort of meaning is infused into them by the contents of the mind. One of the main arguments against is that such levels of language can lead to an infinite regress. Another tradition of philosophers has attempted to show that language and thought are coextensive – that there is no way of explaining one without the other. Donald Davidson, in his essay "Thought and Talk", argued that the notion of belief could only arise as a product of public linguistic interaction. Daniel Dennett holds a similar interpretationist view of propositional attitudes. Some thinkers, like the ancient sophist Gorgias, have questioned whether or not language was capable of capturing thought at all. Hence, since the objects of sight cannot be presented to any other organ but sight, and the different sense-organs cannot give their information to one another, similarly speech cannot give any information about perceptibles. Therefore, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is incommunicable. Some of them were performed by Lera Boroditsky. For example, English speakers tend to say things like "John broke the vase" even for accidents. However, Spanish or Japanese speakers would be more likely to say "the vase broke itself. Later everyone was asked whether they could remember who did what. Spanish and Japanese speakers did not remember the agents of accidental events as well as did English speakers. The Piraha, a tribe in Brazil, whose language has only terms like few and many instead of numerals, are not able to keep track of exact quantities. The descriptions they gave differed in a way predicted by grammatical gender. For example, when asked to describe a "key" – a word that is masculine in German and feminine in Spanish – the German speakers were more likely to use words like "hard," "heavy," "jagged," "metal," "serrated," and "useful," whereas Spanish speakers were more likely to say "golden," "intricate," "little," "lovely," "shiny," and "tiny. They had to guess whether each alien was friendly or hostile, and after each response they were told if they were correct or not, helping them learn the subtle cues that distinguished friend from foe. A quarter of the participants were told in advance that the friendly aliens were called "leebish" and the hostile ones "grecious", while another quarter were told the opposite. For the rest, the aliens remained nameless. It was found that participants who were given names for the aliens learned to categorize the aliens far more quickly, reaching 80 per cent accuracy in less than half the time taken by those not told the names. By the end of the test, those told the names could correctly categorize 88 per cent of aliens, compared to just 80 per cent for the rest. It was concluded that naming objects helps us categorize and memorize them. In another series of experiments [40] a group of people was asked to view furniture from an IKEA catalog. Half the time they were asked to label the object – whether it was a chair or lamp, for example – while the rest of the time they had to say whether or not they liked it. It was found that when asked to label items, people were later less likely to recall the specific details of products, such as whether a chair had arms or not. It was concluded that labeling objects helps our minds build a prototype of the typical object in the group at the expense of individual features. Questions inevitably arise on surrounding topics. One question is, "What exactly is a convention, and how do we study it? Noam Chomsky proposed that the study of language could be done in terms of the I-Language, or internal language of persons. If this is so, then it undermines the pursuit of explanations in terms of conventions, and relegates such explanations to the domain of "meta-semantics". Metasemantics is a term used by philosopher of language Robert Stainton to describe all those fields that attempt to explain how semantic facts arise. Etymology the study of the origins of words and stylistics philosophical argumentation over what makes "good grammar", relative to a particular language are two other examples of fields that are taken to be meta-semantic. Not surprisingly, many separate but related fields have investigated the topic of linguistic convention within their own research paradigms. The presumptions that prop up each theoretical view are of interest to the philosopher of language. For instance, one of the major fields of sociology, symbolic

interactionism , is based on the insight that human social organization is based almost entirely on the use of meanings. Rhetoric is the study of the particular words that people use to achieve the proper emotional and rational effect in the listener, be it to persuade, provoke, endear, or teach. Some relevant applications of the field include the examination of propaganda and didacticism , the examination of the purposes of swearing and pejoratives especially how it influences the behavior of others, and defines relationships , or the effects of gendered language. It can also be used to study linguistic transparency or speaking in an accessible manner , as well as performative utterances and the various tasks that language can perform called "speech acts". It also has applications to the study and interpretation of law, and helps give insight to the logical concept of the domain of discourse. Literary theory is a discipline that some literary theorists claim overlaps with the philosophy of language. It emphasizes the methods that readers and critics use in understanding a text. This field, an outgrowth of the study of how to properly interpret messages, is unsurprisingly closely tied to the ancient discipline of hermeneutics. Language and Continental philosophy[edit] In Continental philosophy , language is not studied as a separate discipline, as it is in analytic philosophy. Rather, it is an inextricable part of many other areas of thought, such as phenomenology , semiotics , hermeneutics , Heideggerean ontology , existentialism , structuralism , deconstruction and critical theory. The idea of language is often related to that of logic in its Greek sense as " logos ", meaning discourse or dialectic. Language and concepts are also seen as having been formed by history and politics, or even by historical philosophy itself. The field of hermeneutics, and the theory of interpretation in general, has played a significant role in 20th century Continental philosophy of language and ontology beginning with Martin Heidegger. Heidegger combines phenomenology with the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger believed language was one of the most important concepts for Dasein. Heidegger believed that language today is worn out because of overuse of important words, and would be inadequate for in-depth study of Being Sein. For example, Sein being , the word itself, is saturated with multiple meanings.

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Chapter 2 : Past and Projected Volumes | Philosophy | SIU

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His father, Cloyd R. His thesis supervisor was Alfred North Whitehead. He was then appointed a Harvard Junior Fellow , which excused him from having to teach for four years. During the academic year 1933, he travelled in Europe thanks to a Sheldon fellowship, meeting Polish logicians including Alfred Tarski and members of the Vienna Circle including Rudolf Carnap , as well as the logical positivist A. Tarski survived the war and worked another 44 years in the USA. Political beliefs Quine was politically conservative, but the bulk of his writing was in technical areas of philosophy removed from direct political issues. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, he wrote a defense of moral censorship ;[12] while, in his autobiography, he made some criticisms of American postwar academic culture. Only after World War II did he, by virtue of seminal papers on ontology , epistemology and language, emerge as a major philosopher. By the s, he had worked out his "naturalized epistemology" whose aim was to answer all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning using the methods and tools of the natural sciences. Quine roundly rejected the notion that there should be a "first philosophy", a theoretical standpoint somehow prior to natural science and capable of justifying it. These views are intrinsic to his naturalism. But like the logical positivists, he evinced little interest in the philosophical canon: Although Quine is not normally associated with verificationism , some philosophers believe the tenet is not incompatible with his general philosophy of language, citing his Harvard colleague B. Skinner , and his analysis of language in Verbal Behavior. Unlike them, however, he concluded that ultimately the definition was circular. In other words, Quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory. The objection to synonymy hinges upon the problem of collateral information. We intuitively feel that there is a distinction between "All unmarried men are bachelors" and "There have been black dogs", but a competent English speaker will assent to both sentences under all conditions since such speakers also have access to collateral information bearing on the historical existence of black dogs. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths. A traditional Wittgensteinian view of meaning held that each meaningful sentence was associated with a region in the space of possible worlds. Quine finds the notion of such a space problematic, arguing that there is no distinction between those truths which are universally and confidently believed and those which are necessarily true. The premise of confirmation holism is that all theories and the propositions derived from them are under-determined by empirical data data, sensory-data, evidence ; although some theories are not justifiable, failing to fit with the data or being unworkably complex, there are many equally justifiable alternatives. Quine concluded his " Two Dogmas of Empiricism " as follows: As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits. For Duhem, underdetermination applies only to physics or possibly to natural science , while for Quine it applies to all of human knowledge. Thus, while it is possible to verify or falsify whole theories, it is not possible to verify or falsify individual statements. Almost any particular statement can be saved, given sufficiently radical modifications of the containing theory. For Quine, scientific thought forms a coherent web in which any part could be altered in the light of empirical evidence, and in which no empirical evidence could force the revision of a given part. Existence and Its contrary The problem of non-referring names is an old puzzle in philosophy, which Quine captured when he wrote, "A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: Certainly

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when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing. Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. Lejewski writes further, "This state of affairs does not seem to be very satisfactory. The idea that some of our rules of inference should depend on empirical information, which may not be forthcoming, is so foreign to the character of logical inquiry that a thorough re-examination of the two inferences [existential generalization and universal instantiation] may prove worth our while. Quine had considered the problem of the empty set unrealistic, which left Lejewski unsatisfied. Quine confined logic to classical bivalent first-order logic, hence to truth and falsity under any nonempty universe of discourse. Hence the following were not logic for Quine: Higher order logic and set theory. He referred to higher order logic as "set theory in disguise"; Much of what Principia Mathematica included in logic was not logic for Quine. Formal systems involving intensional notions, especially modality. Quine wrote three undergraduate texts on formal logic: While teaching an introductory course in , Quine discovered that extant texts for philosophy students did not do justice to quantification theory or first-order predicate logic. Quine wrote this book in 6 weeks as an ad hoc solution to his teaching needs. The four editions of this book resulted from a more advanced undergraduate course in logic Quine taught from the end of World War II until his retirement. A concise and witty undergraduate treatment of a number of Quinian themes, such as the prevalence of use-mention confusions, the dubiousness of quantified modal logic, and the non-logical character of higher-order logic. It shows that much of what Principia Mathematica took more than pages to say can be said in pages. The proofs are concise, even cryptic. Techniques he did not teach and discuss include analytic tableaux, recursive functions, and model theory. His treatment of metalogic left something to be desired. For example, Mathematical Logic does not include any proofs of soundness and completeness. Early in his career, the notation of his writings on logic was often idiosyncratic. His later writings nearly always employed the now-dated notation of Principia Mathematica. Set against all this are the simplicity of his preferred method as expounded in his Methods of Logic for determining the satisfiability of quantified formulas, the richness of his philosophical and linguistic insights, and the fine prose in which he expressed them. For a comprehensive treatment of predicate functor logic and its history, see Quine For an introduction, see chpt. Quine was very warm to the possibility that formal logic would eventually be applied outside of philosophy and mathematics. He wrote several papers on the sort of Boolean algebra employed in electrical engineering, and with Edward J. McCluskey, devised the Quine-McCluskey algorithm of reducing Boolean equations to a minimum covering sum of prime implicants. Set theory While his contributions to logic include elegant expositions and a number of technical results, it is in set theory that Quine was most innovative. He always maintained that mathematics required set theory and that set theory was quite distinct from logic. Over the course of his career, Quine proposed three variants of axiomatic set theory, each including the axiom of extensionality: New Foundations, NF, creates and manipulates sets using a single axiom schema for set admissibility, namely an axiom schema of stratified comprehension, whereby all individuals satisfying a stratified formula compose a set. A stratified formula is one that type theory would allow, were the ontology to include types. The metamathematics of NF are curious. NF allows many "large" sets the now-canonical ZFC set theory does not allow, even sets for which the axiom of choice does not hold. Since the axiom of choice holds for all finite sets, the failure of this axiom in NF proves that NF includes infinite sets. The relative consistency of NF is an open question. Jensen and admitting urelements entities that can be members of sets but that lack elements, turns out to be consistent relative to Peano arithmetic, thus vindicating the intuition behind NF. Quine derived the foundations of mathematics once again. However, Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy do a better job of surveying set theory as it stood at mid-century. All three set theories admit a universal class, but since they are free of any hierarchy of types, they have no need for a distinct universal class at each type level. For Quine, there is but one connective, the Sheffer stroke, and one quantifier, the universal quantifier. All polyadic predicates can be reduced to one dyadic predicate, interpretable as set membership. His rules of proof were limited to modus ponens and

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substitution. He preferred conjunction to either disjunction or the conditional , because conjunction has the least semantic ambiguity. He was delighted to discover early in his career that all of first order logic and set theory could be grounded in a mere two primitive notions: According to Quine, normative epistemology is the trend that assigns ought claims to conditions of knowledge. This approach, he argued, has failed to give us any real understanding of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Quine recommended that, as an alternative, we look to natural sciences like psychology for a full explanation of knowledge. Thus, we must totally replace our entire epistemological paradigm. An Eternal Golden Braid. Quine is a recurring character in the webcomic "Existential Comics". The Web of Belief. From a Logical Point of View. Contains "Two dogmas of Empiricism. The closest thing Quine wrote to a philosophical treatise. The Ways of Paradox. Contains chapters on ontological relativity , naturalized epistemology , and natural kinds. Set Theory and Its Logic. The Philosophy of Logic. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. A work of essays, many subtly humorous, for lay readers, very revealing of the breadth of his interests. A short, lively synthesis of his thought for advanced students and general readers not fooled by its simplicity. Important articles , "Concatenation as a basis for arithmetic.

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Chapter 3 : Willard Van Orman Quine - Wikipedia

This volume on Quine includes 25 critical essays by contemporary philosophers such as William blog.quintoapp.com, Ulrich Gahde, Geoffrey Hellman, Hao Wang and Charles Parsons and Quine's answers to these critics. The text also includes a bibliography of Quine's works and discusses his views on the philosophy.

References and Further Reading 1. As a teenager, he was an avid stamp collector and a budding cartographer. One of his first publications was a free-hand map of the Portage Lakes of Ohio, which he sold for pennies to lakefront stores. When he was sixteen, Quine wrote the first edition of O. Stamp News, which was distributed to stamp collectors and dealers. Quine went on to write and distribute six more editions of the philatelic newspaper before moving on to new interests. Quine received his undergraduate degree from Oberlin College, in Oberlin, Ohio. He majored in mathematics with honors in mathematical philosophy and mathematical logic. During his college years, along with cultivating his interest in mathematics, mathematical logic, linguistics and philosophy, Quine began his secondary career as an intrepid traveler. He hitchhiked to, at least, Virginia, Kentucky, Canada and Michigan. In , he made his way to Denver and back with a few friends, hopping freight trains, hitchhiking, and riding on running boards. Lodging often included jail houses where one could sleep for free in relative safety , park benches and the ground. At the end of his junior year, he traveled to Europe. Quine writes in his autobiography, *The Time of My Life: Graduating from Oberlin with an A- average, he was accepted, and received his Ph. For our purposes, we may understand an extensional definition as a set of particular things. For instance, the extensional definition of a cat would consist of the set of all cats and the extensional definition of the property orange would consist of the set of all orange things which could include things that are only partly orange. Intensional definitions are, broadly speaking, generalizations, where particular things for example, particular cats are not employed in the definition. This distinction underlines the difference between objects and names of objects. Quine uses single quotation marks to denote a name. After completing his dissertation in , Quine was awarded a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship by Harvard. This would prove to be a momentous trip; Carnap had a singular and lasting influence on Quine. A Focus on Analyticity As Quine understood it via Carnap , analytic truths are true as a result of their meaning. Rather, the truth of these statements turns on facts. Is there a difference between logical axioms and empirical sentences? Perhaps I seek a distinction just for its utility, but it seems he is right: But as we saw above, Quine had been brooding over the matter since at least Not only did his qualms about this distinction surface in his discussions and correspondence with Carnap but also in conversation with other prominent philosophers and logicians, for example, Alfred Tarski, Nelson Goodman, and Morton White Quine, For instance, he points out, the two general terms "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" both have the same extension because every creature with a heart has a kidney, and likewise. Thus, for Quine there is a clear distinction between intensions and extensions, which reflects an equally clear distinction between meanings and references. Quine then briefly explains the notion of what a word might mean, as opposed to what essential qualities an object denoted by that word might be said to have. Or as Quine puts it: And thus Quine writes: Logical truths, Quine explains, are any statements that remain true no matter how we interpret the non-logical particles in the statement. Logical particles are logical operators, for example, not, if then, or, all, no, some, and so forth. Quine suggests that one might, as is often done, appeal to definitions to explain the notion of synonymy. In fact, Quine writes, the only kind of definition that does not presuppose the notion of synonymy, is the act of ascribing an abbreviation purely conventionally. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it" Quine, Perhaps then, Quine suggests, one could define synonymy in terms of "interchangeability. However, this is problematic as well. However, Quine is not quite sure what cognitive synonymy entails. In particular, we had to assume the meanings of the two kinds of analyticity explained above, that is, analyticity qua logical axioms and analyticity qua synonymy. And thus, Quine writes: So, the question is, can we give an account of cognitive synonymy by appealing to interchangeability recall that this is*

the task at hand without presupposing any definition of analyticity? Generally speaking, this plays out as follows: We can try to assimilate a natural language to a formal language by appealing to the semantical rules developed by Carnap see the article on Rudolf Carnap , sections However, Quine finds the same kind of circularity here that he has found elsewhere. To show why, Quine reconstructs a general Carnapian paradigm regarding artificial languages and semantical rules, that, broadly speaking, proceeds as follows: Its semantical rules explicitly specify which statements are analytic in L0. But, Quine asks, why the specific class K, and not some other arbitrary class, for example, L-Z? So I create a list of things that just so happen to be green. But why did I pick just green things? Why not orange things, or things that had no particular color at all? But not all truths, just a certain set of truths. And so, "A statement is analytic if it is not merely true but true according to the semantical rule" Quine, According to the main camp of metaphysicians, metaphysics, generally speaking, employs a method where deductive logical laws are applied to a set of axioms that are necessarily true. For the most part, these truths, the axioms that they are derived from, and the logical laws that are used to derive them, are thought to reflect the necessary and eternal nature of the universe. However, if there are, as Quine claims, no such things as necessary truths, that is, analytic truths, then this main camp of metaphysics is essentially eviscerated. This attack on metaphysics by Quine has spawned new camps of metaphysics which do not rely in this way on deductive methods. What method then, did Quine use? In this respect, Quine was a scientific philosopher, that is, what is often called a naturalistic philosopher. Like Hume, he believed that philosophical conclusions were not necessarily true—they did not reflect or capture the essential nature of humanity, let alone the nature of the universe. Rather, they were testable, and potentially could be rejected.

References and Further Reading Carnap, R. George, Berkeley and Los Angeles: The Logical Syntax of Language. Second edition with supplements. Chicago University Press, Dear Carnap, Dear Van: University of California Press, Words and Objections, Essays on the Work of W. Reidel Publishing Company, Philosophy International, London School of Economics, Cambridge University Press, Gibson, R. Cambridge University Press, Hintikka, J. Language, Experience and Reality. On Quine, New Essays. Cambridge University Press, Harvard University Press, Methods of Logic, fourth edition. Harvard University Press, [Original edition,]. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Harvard, Quine, W. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. The Roots of Reference, La Salle: The Time of My Life: An Autobiography, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [Original publication date: The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press, , Rocknak, S. Naturalism and Normativity, eds. Quine and Analytic Philosophy. Our Knowledge of the External World. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Library of Living Philosophers, II. Open Court, Schilpp, P. The Philosophy of W. Essays on the Philosophy of W.

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Chapter 4 : Philosophers: Alphabetical Index

The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Volume 18 (Library of Living Philosophers) by Paul Schilpp. Open Court. Used - Good. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside.

Internet link archive for Willard Van Orman Quine , mathematician and philosopher. Link descriptions are included but links are not "hot". Copy and paste the link to see whether it is active now. This page is maintained by webmaster: The Case for a Naturalized Music Theory Originally published in The Philosophical Review 60 Ken Coates, Elizabeth R. Eames Willard Van Orman Quine Os stimulu k v.. Herrmann a synovT, Praha, New Foundations Home Page "http: Randall Holmes of Boise State University and devoted to the ongoing study of the system of set theory originated by W. Eiichi Abe nato Willard Van Orman Quine. The Vienna Circle Historic Outline He received an M. That was a great year. Then I came back to Harvard as a Junior Fellow in Find all prime implicants. Find a minimal cover. Developing countless sensational arguments filled with insight covering fields from epistemology to philosophy of language and philosophy of science, Dr. The library is strictly complete, boasting as it does all possible books within certain rather reasonable limits. It admits no books in alien alphabets, nor any beyond the reasonable length say of the one you are now reading, but within those restrictions it boasts all possible books. There are books in all languages, transliterated where necessary. There are coherent books and incoherent We will watch approximately the first hour of this 90 minute video. After watching the video you should be able to answer the following questions: Miscellaneous - Logic Library The Group maintains an extensive collection of reprints, dissertations, project reports, course and seminar notes, and some Ayer ; J. This page is maintained by Gen Nakayama A brief discussion of the life and works of W. Quine, with links to additional information. His contributions to the development of contemporary philosophy often involve subtle modification of the empiricist traditions of pragmatism and logical positivism. In " Two Dogmas of Empricism" , for example, Quine criticized excessive reliance Mathematical logic, which has emerged only in the last hundred and fifty years, is well known to be abstruse and terrifying, and has made the logician into a creature mathematicians view in much the same way others view mathematicians, i. Philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine? Philosophy assignments and discussion questions. The Fara Interview Video. How does Quine characterize the philosophical position called logical positivism or logical empiricism? Explain what Quine means by the terms scientism, extensionalism and naturalism. The Dennett Panel Video. What does Quine think is the correct conclusion to be drawn from his argument in "Two Dogmas In what sense is Quine a pragmatist? The Dreben Panel Video. Why does Quine object to "quantifying in"? How is quantifying in similar to de re propositional attitudes? What properties does Quine use to draw a boundary between logic and mathematics? Contributions to Books ; D. Reviews of Books and Articles; H. Video] confirmed Sept 1, Compiled by Eddie Yeghiayan "http: This talk was written in response to a request from the Philosophy Club at Virginia Tech. Comments from Python fans, philosophers, interested bystanders, raving loonies, and any combination of the above are welcomed! The extension of the principle of parsimony from scientific to philosophical discourse is shown in the difference between epistemological and ontological parsimony. Because both disciplines deal with the search for truth, the philosophical use of ontological parsimony has the same justification as the scientific use of epistemological parsimony. Quine recent family tree guest. Quine ancestors back to the Isle of Man wv-quine. References for the biography of Willard Van Orman Quine "http: Some further items, mainly reviews, were uncovered by Katalin Makkai. Items in Chinese were scrutinized, and entries in some cases revised, by Montgomery Link. Some items that we had overlooked, both in English and Chinese, were called to our attention by Hongkuei Kang, to whom we are very grateful Quiddities is a collection of short pieces modeled on The following list surveys major texts in logic and critical reasoning. Although not a complete guide could there be The formal languages towards which I gravitate -- first order languages with standard logic -- are those preferred by Quine, but our reasons for this Er nahm Kontakt zum Wiener Kreis auf. Quine

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ist durch seine Arbeiten zur Klassenlogik Thought and Language, Semantics Linguistic Theory: The Linguist List linguist tam The Flowering of Thought in Language. Amenable to Machine Implementation. Applicable to Circuits with an Arbitrary Number of Inputs. Start with The Function Truth Table. The Final Two Groups. Quine is one of the most influential of. A comprehensive collection of online philosophy resources. Well-organized, easy to navigate, regularly updated. An den Treffen in der Boltzmannngasse nahmen u. Davidson was then accepted to graduate studies in philosophy at Harvard, where his teacher was Willard Van Orman Quine. Quine set Davidson on a course in philosophy quite different from that of Whitehead. Quine Mc Cluskey 2. Since he has also been Professor at Stanford University, since C. Written and edited 16 books and special issues of journals and around articles. Editor, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Essays on the Work of W. Quine is one of the most eminent philosophers alive today. Now he has produced a sharp, sprightly book that A program that generates a copy of its own source text as its complete output. Devising the shortest possible quine in some given programming language is a common hackish amusement. Here is one classic "http: In many ways, Quine carries on the approach of Bertrand Russell, with its stress on formal logic and ontology. These exercise materials are copyrighted c by Harry J. Gensler but may be distributed freely The Extensional Stance" by David Longley: Version in PDF format "http: The works of Willard Van Orman Quine, studied from historical and systematic viewpoints Willard Van Orman Quine "http: He completed his doctorate in two years, his The Quine Page self-reproducing code. One day, several years ago, I came across an article in an old Byte on "self-reproducing programs".

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Chapter 5 : Works by W. V. Quine - PhilPapers

Library of Living Philosophers. The Library of Living Philosophers (LLP), which commenced in with a volume on John Dewey, is an unparalleled series that has made an advancement to the understanding of philosophy through rational debate.

The Philosophy of W. Quine Open Court , eds. A very important collection of essays on Quine and his responses. For over 30 years, Willard Van Orman Quine has been a dominant figure in logical theory and philosophy of logic. His innovations in notions and techniques have been momentous, and his clear, elegant expositions have set new standards. His distinctive brand of pragmatic naturalism has helped blur the boundaries between speculative metaphysics and natural science, and provoked fruitful debates on such topics as the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, synonymy and its explication, meaning holism and the underdetermination of theory by particular experiences, the inscrutability of reference, and indeterminacy of translation Translation Determined published by Oxford , Robert Kirk. La Nuova Italia Editrice. Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. Both sections are organized chronologically. The secondary bibliography is selectively annotated. There are three indexes: Quine gives this book high praise. Convention, Translation, and Understanding: An Examination of W. A well written and eminently readable introduction to the systematic philosophy of Quine. Information about hardcover edition Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism: Ontological and Epistemological Implications of the Work of W. Quine and of N. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson. A special edition of the journal containing eight essays on Quine and his responses. Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Wittgenstein and Quine published by Routledge , by Robert L. Hardcover Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51, N. Quine has written responses to each of the essays. Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft: Olubi Sodipo, with a Foreword by W. Quine, published by Stanford University Press. It has had profound consequences for the development of philosophy in the African context. Knowledge, Language and Logic: The book also features an essay by Quine himself, and his replies to each of the papers presented at a conference in the Czech Republic in Grattan- Guinness Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. London, British Broadcasting Corporation, , pp. Quine, "Response to Dreben. Arrington and Hans-Johann Glock, eds. From a Logical Point of View. A Vindication of the Analytic vs. Perceptual similarity Shoemaker, Sidney, "Phenomenal similarity. Quine, "Response to Gibson. Quine, "Response to Hookway. A Study in Philosophical Exegesis. Quine, "Response to Abel. Harvard University Press, , pp. Quine, "Response to Davidson. Stanford University Press, , Orey, S. Oxford University Press, , pp. Hornsby, Jennifer, "Singular terms in contexts of propositional attitude. Cornell University Press, , pp. Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge: Syverson Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. According to the author, "this book presents the thesis that logic is conventional, that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given; they arise as conventions. Trading Ontology for Ideology: The eleven essays in this volume cover all the central topics of W. Quine was perhaps the most distinguished analytic philosopher of the later half of the twentieth century. His most important book, Word and Object, introduced the concept of indeterminacy of radical translation, a bleak view of the nature of the language with which we ascribe thoughts and beliefs to ourselves and others. For Philosophy by Vincent F. Hendricks [a collection of more than quotations from people from all walks of life expressing their rather critical and often quite humorous takes on both philosophy and philosophers - from Nietzsche to Einstein, from Catherine the Great to John F. Includes 4 from Quine] Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. Zammito University Of Chicago Press. From Philosophy to Politics by Vincent F. Hendricks [From Philosophy to Poetics is a collection of citations and aphorisms from all sorts of people - from Napoleon Bonaparte to Human League - expressing their embracing, critical and humorous views on logic and logical matters. Includes 3 from Quine] Book details, price, and availability from Amazon. The Indeterminacy of Translation. This view was first put forward in Word and Object and was

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shocking enough to draw criticisms from other leading philosophers like Noam Chomsky and Richard Rorty. Trading Ontology For Ideology. Decock argues that the tenet of extensionalism is at least as important as naturalism, and assesses the relation between the two. The other focus of the work is the relation between ontology, i. Decock shows that the interplay between ontology and ideology is far more complicated and interesting than has generally been assumed. Yet there is no doubt that it presents a considerable challenge. This, of course, is a question made from an empiricist point of view and is part of the doctrinal side of epistemology. It is part of the inquiry about the truth of scientific theories, i. Quine uses empirical psychology as a mean to achieve a broad view of the transition that occurs between the learning of observational sentences, through its stimulus meaning, and the composition of theoretical ones. The entire philosophical system of Quine, with his main theses of the inscrutability of reference, of the indeterminacy of translation and of under-determination of scientific theories, can be understood as an attempt to explain the inner operation of meaningful language, accepting, at the same time, the circularity inherent to the philosophical naturalized discourse. American Philosophical Quarterly and Quine: The July issue of American Philosophical Quarterly features articles on the life and work of American philosopher W. The contents list for APQ

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Chapter 6 : Willard Van Orman Quine | Revolv

*The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol 18)-- Paperback (expanded edition) by Lewis Edwin Hahn (Editor), et al Book details, price, and availability from blog.quintoapp.com Craig's Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed by Christian List in *Disputatio* 7 (November) -- downloadable from [http](http://).*

His father, Cloyd Robert, [16] was a manufacturing entrepreneur founder of the Akron Equipment Company, which produced tire molds [17] and his mother, Harriett E. His thesis supervisor was Alfred North Whitehead. He was then appointed a Harvard Junior Fellow, which excused him from having to teach for four years. During the academic year 1933, he travelled in Europe thanks to a Sheldon fellowship, meeting Polish logicians including Stanislaw Lesniewski and Alfred Tarski and members of the Vienna Circle including Rudolf Carnap, as well as the logical positivist A. Tarski survived the war and worked another 44 years in the US. During World War II, Quine lectured on logic in Brazil, in Portuguese, and served in the United States Navy in a military intelligence role, deciphering messages from German submarines, and reaching the rank of lieutenant commander. For the academic year 1947, Quine was a fellow on the faculty in the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. The deterioration of his short-term memory was so severe that he struggled to continue following arguments. Quine also had considerable difficulty in his project to make the desired revisions to *Word and Object*. Before passing away, Quine noted to Morton White, "I do not remember what my illness is called, Althusser or Alzheimer, but since I cannot remember it, it must be Alzheimer. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, he wrote a defense of moral censorship; [23] while, in his autobiography, he made some criticisms of American postwar academic culture. Only after World War II did he, by virtue of seminal papers on ontology, epistemology and language, emerge as a major philosopher. By the 1950s, he had worked out his "naturalized epistemology" whose aim was to answer all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning using the methods and tools of the natural sciences. Quine roundly rejected the notion that there should be a "first philosophy", a theoretical standpoint somehow prior to natural science and capable of justifying it. These views are intrinsic to his naturalism. Like the logical positivists, Quine evinced little interest in the philosophical canon: Two Dogmas of Empiricism In the 1950s and 40s, discussions with Rudolf Carnap, Nelson Goodman and Alfred Tarski, among others, led Quine to doubt the tenability of the distinction between "analytic" statements—those true simply by the meanings of their words, such as "All bachelors are unmarried"—and "synthetic" statements, those true or false by virtue of facts about the world, such as "There is a cat on the mat. Although Quine is not normally associated with verificationism, some philosophers believe the tenet is not incompatible with his general philosophy of language, citing his Harvard colleague B. Skinner and his analysis of language in *Verbal Behavior*. Unlike them, however, he concluded that ultimately the definition was circular. In other words, Quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory. The objection to synonymy hinges upon the problem of collateral information. We intuitively feel that there is a distinction between "All unmarried men are bachelors" and "There have been black dogs", but a competent English speaker will assent to both sentences under all conditions since such speakers also have access to collateral information bearing on the historical existence of black dogs. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths. A traditional Wittgensteinian view of meaning held that each meaningful sentence was associated with a region in the space of possible worlds. The premise of confirmation holism is that all theories and the propositions derived from them are under-determined by empirical data, sensory-data, evidence; although some theories are not justifiable, failing to fit with the data or being unworkably complex, there are many equally justifiable alternatives. Quine concluded his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" as follows: As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not

by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits. For Duhem, underdetermination applies only to physics or possibly to natural science, while for Quine it applies to all of human knowledge. Thus, while it is possible to verify or falsify whole theories, it is not possible to verify or falsify individual statements. Almost any particular statement can be saved, given sufficiently radical modifications of the containing theory. For Quine, scientific thought forms a coherent web in which any part could be altered in the light of empirical evidence, and in which no empirical evidence could force the revision of a given part. Existence and its contrary[edit] The problem of non-referring names is an old puzzle in philosophy, which Quine captured when he wrote, A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing. Quine resists the temptation to say that non-referring terms are meaningless for reasons made clear above. Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. Lejewski writes further, This state of affairs does not seem to be very satisfactory. The idea that some of our rules of inference should depend on empirical information, which may not be forthcoming, is so foreign to the character of logical inquiry that a thorough re-examination of the two inferences [existential generalization and universal instantiation] may prove worth our while. Lejewski then goes on to offer a description of free logic, which he claims accommodates an answer to the problem.

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Chapter 7 : The Significance of the New Logic | Bookshare

BOOK REVIEWS THE PHILOSOPHY OF W. V. QUINE, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp. Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 18, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn and.

Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine ; known to intimates as "Van";[7] June 25, 1908 – December 25, 1980, was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition , recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. A poll conducted among analytic philosophers named Quine as the fifth most important philosopher of the past two centuries. He also developed an influential naturalized epistemology that tried to provide "an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories on the basis of meager sensory input. This led to his famous quip that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough. His father, Cloyd Robert,[16] was a manufacturing entrepreneur founder of the Akron Equipment Company, which produced tire molds [17] and his mother, Harriett E. His thesis supervisor was Alfred North Whitehead. He was then appointed a Harvard Junior Fellow , which excused him from having to teach for four years. During the academic year 1932–33, he travelled in Europe thanks to a Sheldon fellowship, meeting Polish logicians including Stanislaw Lesniewski and Alfred Tarski and members of the Vienna Circle including Rudolf Carnap , as well as the logical positivist A. Tarski survived the war and worked another 44 years in the US. During World War II, Quine lectured on logic in Brazil, in Portuguese, and served in the United States Navy in a military intelligence role, deciphering messages from German submarines, and reaching the rank of lieutenant commander. For the academic year 1967–68, Quine was a fellow on the faculty in the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. The deterioration of his short-term memory was so severe that he struggled to continue following arguments. Quine also had considerable difficulty in his project to make the desired revisions to *Word and Object*. Before passing away, Quine noted to Morton White, "I do not remember what my illness is called, Althusser or Alzheimer, but since I cannot remember it, it must be Alzheimer. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, he wrote a defense of moral censorship ;[23] while, in his autobiography, he made some criticisms of American postwar academic culture. Only after World War II did he, by virtue of seminal papers on ontology , epistemology and language, emerge as a major philosopher. By the s, he had worked out his "naturalized epistemology" whose aim was to answer all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning using the methods and tools of the natural sciences. Quine roundly rejected the notion that there should be a "first philosophy", a theoretical standpoint somehow prior to natural science and capable of justifying it. These views are intrinsic to his naturalism. Like the logical positivists, Quine evinced little interest in the philosophical canon: Although Quine is not normally associated with verificationism , some philosophers believe the tenet is not incompatible with his general philosophy of language, citing his Harvard colleague B. Skinner and his analysis of language in *Verbal Behavior*. Unlike them, however, he concluded that ultimately the definition was circular. In other words, Quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory. The objection to synonymy hinges upon the problem of collateral information. We intuitively feel that there is a distinction between "All unmarried men are bachelors" and "There have been black dogs", but a competent English speaker will assent to both sentences under all conditions since such speakers also have access to collateral information bearing on the historical existence of black dogs. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths. A traditional Wittgensteinian view of meaning held that each meaningful sentence was associated with a region in the space of possible worlds. Quine finds the notion of such a space problematic, arguing that there is no distinction between those truths which are universally and confidently believed and those which are necessarily true. The premise of confirmation holism is that all theories and the propositions derived from them are under-determined by empirical data data, sensory-data, evidence ; although some theories are not justifiable, failing to fit with the data or being unworkably complex, there are many equally justifiable

alternatives. Quine concluded his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" as follows: As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits. For Duhem, underdetermination applies only to physics or possibly to natural science, while for Quine it applies to all of human knowledge. Thus, while it is possible to verify or falsify whole theories, it is not possible to verify or falsify individual statements. Almost any particular statement can be saved, given sufficiently radical modifications of the containing theory. For Quine, scientific thought forms a coherent web in which any part could be altered in the light of empirical evidence, and in which no empirical evidence could force the revision of a given part.

Existence and its contrary The problem of non-referring names is an old puzzle in philosophy, which Quine captured when he wrote, A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing. Quine resists the temptation to say that non-referring terms are meaningless for reasons made clear above. Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. Lejewski writes further, This state of affairs does not seem to be very satisfactory. The idea that some of our rules of inference should depend on empirical information, which may not be forthcoming, is so foreign to the character of logical inquiry that a thorough re-examination of the two inferences [existential generalization and universal instantiation] may prove worth our while. Lejewski then goes on to offer a description of free logic, which he claims accommodates an answer to the problem.

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Chapter 8 : Open Court - Library of Living Philosophers

The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, Volume 25 (Library of Living Philosophers) by Lewis Edwin Hahn 25 *The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (Vol. 26) (Library of Living Philosophers) by Lewis Edwin Hahn.*

Lewis September , vol. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations. Sander Verhaegh September , vol. This naturalistic turn is for a significant part due to the work of W. Robert Northcott and Gualtiero Piccinini September , vol. This account borrows from recent work on causation in order to make rigorous the notion of quantitative contributions to traits by different factors in development. We avoid the pitfalls of previous accounts and argue that the distinction between innate and acquired traits is scientifically useful. We therefore address not only previous accounts of innateness but also skeptics about any account. The two are linked, in that a better account of innateness also enables us better to address the skeptics. Matthieu Queloz September , vol. And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy as a pragmatic genealogy. David Enoch September , vol. Though a positive answer seems plausible, it has proved hard to defend against the claim most forcefully made by David Estlund that this is not how normative theories work - noncompliance shows a problem with the noncomplying agents, not with the normative theory. I think that this line of thought - this defense of Utopianism - wins the battle but loses the war. The right way to think about the feasibility worry is as essentially involving multiple agents, and how expected noncompliance by one agent may refute a normative claim addressed at another. Thus understood, feasibility problems may very well refute a theory in political philosophy. In this paper I develop this understanding of the feasibility worry, tie it to more general discussions in normative ethics about the morally right way to take into account expected violations by others , and in political philosophy about ideal and non-ideal theory; a long appendix engages that debate in detail. Julien Murzi and Lorenzo Rossi August , vol. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may vary with context, the Liar reasoning is blocked. But why should context shift? This provides a diagnosis of the Liar Paradox – one that equally applies to two revenge arguments against contextualist approaches, one recently advanced by Andrew Bacon , the other mentioned by Charles Parsons and more recently revived by Cory Juhl Robert Steel July , vol. Namely, we can anticipate that trying to respond to it is a bad deal with respect to our expected accuracy. Instead we should ignore it, and be conciliationists. Bernhard Nickel June , vol. However, while overt quantifiers are conservative, gen does not seem to be. A quantifier Q is conservative iff instances of the following schemas are equivalent: All ravens are black is obviously equivalent to All ravens are ravens that are black, yet ravens are black is not equivalent to ravens are ravens that are black. This may cast doubt on the viability of quantificational analyses of generics. Hartry Field June , vol. But the primary focus of the paper is less on this meta-epistemological view itself than on how it should affect ground-level issues in epistemology: It is hoped that these methodological consequences will seem attractive independent of the normative anti-realism. Indeed, some normative realists seem to embrace the view on skepticism, but it is argued that their position is unstable: The general theme of the paper is that the issue of normative realism is deeply entwined with issues of methodology, in strong contrast to the common claim that meta-epistemological views in the tradition of expressivism have no first order impact. Sinan Dogramaci May , vol. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience. Dimitris Tsementzis and Hans Halvorson May , vol. We will argue that this new point of view has important implications for philosophy, and especially for those

parts of analytic philosophy that take set theory and first-order logic as their benchmark of rigor. To do so, we will explore the connection between foundations and philosophy, outline what is distinctive about the logic of the Univalent Foundations, and then describe new philosophical theses one can express in terms of this new logic. McCoy April , vol. The at-at theory of motion states that to be in motion is to be at different places at different times, which in classical physics is naturally understood as the reduction of velocities to position developments. I first defend the at-at theory against the criticism raised by Arntzenius that it renders determinism impossible. I then develop a novel impetus theory of motion that reduces positions to velocity developments. As this impetus theory of motion is by construction a mirror image of the at-at theory of motion, I claim that the two theories of motion are in fact epistemically on par despite the unfamiliar metaphysical picture of the world furnished by the impetus version. Antti Kauppinen April , vol. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others. Norms in general differ from merely evaluative standards in virtue of the fact that it is fitting to hold subjects accountable for violating them, provided they lack an excuse. Different kinds of norm are most readily distinguished by their distinctive mode of accountability. My thesis is roughly that a norm is epistemic if and only if its violation makes it fitting to reduce epistemic trust in the subject, even if there is no doubt about their sincerity, honesty, or other moral virtues. Consequently, when one manifests epistemic distrust towards a subject in suitable circumstances, it amounts a way of holding her accountable. Since this form of accountability involves no opprobrium, there is good reason to think it is not linked to voluntary control in the same way as moral accountability. Finally, I make use of this account of what makes epistemic norms distinctive to point out some faulty diagnostics in debates about norms of assertion. My aim is not to defend any substantive view, however, but only to offer tools for identifying the right kind of evidence for epistemic norms. Joe Stratmann February , vol. Proponents of metaphysical one-object interpretations claim that things in themselves and appearances are related by some kind s of one-object grounding relation s , through which the grounding and grounded relata are different aspects of the same object. Proponents of metaphysical two-object interpretations, by contrast, claim that things in themselves and appearances are related by some kind s of two-object grounding relation s , through which the grounding and grounded relata involve distinct objects. Our ignorance of things in themselves therefore extends to their distinctness from appearances â€” pace both metaphysical one-object interpretations and metaphysical two-object interpretations. Regina Rini February , vol. But what does that mean? This paper articulates a moral obligation to make ourselves open to sincere moral persuasion by others. Doing so allows us to participate in valuable relationships of reciprocal respect for agency. Yet this proposal can sound tritely agreeable. To explore its full implications, the paper applies the general obligation to one of the most challenging topics of moral disagreement: I consider and reject arguments that abortion decisions have special features exempting them from the obligation to be open to moral persuasion. Further, I argue that viewing fetal ultrasound images can accomplish morally persuasion. Accordingly, in at least some cases a woman seeking abortion has an obligation to view fetal ultrasound images as a means of being open to moral persuasion. However, this conclusion does not support recent laws compelling women seeking abortion to view ultrasound images; such laws are in fact incompatible with the respect for agency that underwrites the obligation to be open to persuasion. Taylor February , vol. One concerns the logic of indeterminacy; the other concerns its nature or source. The aim of this paper is to introduce, motivate and go some way toward addressing a new, third project: An MC, to a first approximation, is a relatively pre-theoretical characterization of indeterminacy that is neutral between the various substantive theories of the nature and logic of indeterminacy. I begin by introducing the concept of an MC and outlining some of the main theoretical virtues of providing an MC. I then establish some desiderata on a suitable MC, and use these desiderata to rule out various initially attractive proposals. In the final part of the paper I sketch the beginnings of my own MC and defend it against objections. Ben Laurence February , vol. Unlike ethics, right involves an authorization to coerce, and this coercion serves as a pathological incentive. I argue that for Kant the distinctive character of right flows from the fact that juridical obligation has a different relational

structure than ethical obligation. I argue that this relational structure explains the connection of right to coercion, and also explains how a categorical imperative can be known a priori to issue in both a pathological and non-pathological incentive. Thus the justification of coercion and its special role as incentive are rooted in the relational character of juridical obligations, and so ultimately in categorical imperatives of reason. I illustrate the consequences of this reading by discussing the propensity to injustice, as Kant understands it, and the unique way in which the juridical incentive undermines it. John Lawless February , vol. Such conceptions unify two core commitments. First, they associate freedom with non-constraint. And second, they take seriously a distinction between the interpersonal and the non-personal. I argue that these commitments manifest two distinct concerns: However, construing freedom as non-interference unifies these concerns in a way that does justice to neither. In particular, it focuses our attention on phenomena that are at best tangential, and at worst hostile, to our interest in respect. If we wish to preserve the distinctive significance of the interpersonal, we would be better served by a conception of freedom that focuses immediately on what I call "the social conditions of respect. Common sense invokes synchronic probabilities with values between 0 and 1 e. Recently, philosophers have argued about whether any synchronic probabilities are best interpreted as objective chances. I add to this debate an underappreciated reason we might have to believe in synchronic chance; it might turn out that the best interpretation of our common sense and scientific theories is one in which the macrophysical properties of physical systems are partly determined by synchronic chance distributions over microphysical properties of those systems. Vranas January , vol. Such principles are uninformative about conditional obligations: Then maybe you cannot vaccinate me tomorrow e. More generally, I propose the ought-implies-can-obey principle:

Chapter 9 : Philosophy of Quine

With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar--but argues against the doctrine that the logical Logic and Philosophy of Logic Ontology of Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics.