Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - The lure and the limits of dialogue

Presented to: Institute for Religious Life, upon receiving the Pro Fidelitate et Virtute Award - Mundelein, Illinois Dear Friends, I thought this evening, I would speak about the limits of dialogue and toleration.

Limits of Respect in Public Dialogue Preprint, published in: Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen eds. In this chapter I will argue that equal respect, understood as respect a priori conferred on persons, is not and should not be counted as a constitutive normative ground of public discourse. I will put forward this argument from the standpoint of argumentation or discourse theory, drawing consequences for dialogical theories of politics. Basing my argument on a pluralistic notion of public discourse â€" understood as a mixed discourse of persuasion, information-seeking and negotiation â€" I will argue that respect is a dynamic, situational phenomenon, and that the norm of equal respect for persons is contextually contingent in political deliberation: Respect seems to be first of all a moral and social attitude. It is not in itself necessarily reciprocal: Neither does reciprocity imply equality: Even those who see respect as a moral ideal of intrinsic value might not agree that its intrinsic moral value implies the intrinsic moral value of equal respect. But should respect be equal? Should we submit it to some normative principle of equality? Some contest this, affirming that if there is a normative principle regulating respect, it is not equality. For instance, Harry Frankfurt states: In dealing with people we should be guided only by what is genuinely relevant. Hence the commitment to respect, equal or not, is not necessary insofar as it is often withdrawn in practice. Against equal respect as universal a priori. Given this, we can come closer to our argumentation theory approach. This means first of all that equal respect for persons is not a universal a priori that must be satisfied in order to enter into any form of dialogue. This means that there are dialogical commitments we necessarily and a priori endorse whenever we enter into dialogue: This was because Habermas acknowledged that there are different kinds of arguments â€" ethical-political, juridical, moral, pragmatic, prudential, negotiation and so on â€" and to submit them all to the normative principle of universalisation would deny their peculiarity and normative autonomy. The general principle D requires only impartiality for argumentative justification of norms and is detached from the requirement, typical of moral discourse, of universality and equality of rights for all possible participants. If this is to be consistent, I think it should imply that the principle of universalistic equal respect for persons â€" implied by U and not by D â€" is not a necessary presupposition of public discourse: Defeasible respect in dialogue. So far I have argued that equal respect for persons is not a universal a priori in any form of dialogue. Even if we commit ourselves in the political sphere to the moral principle of universalisation as a regulative ideal not in itself political , and thus to universal equal respect for persons, this principle can always be balanced against other principles and values and eventually Italo Testa retracted: If so, what exactly is being respected here? Equal or not, would the kind of respect eventually required in dialogue be a respect for persons? Darwall considers the possibility that recognition respect â€" which according to his previous article is not necessarily personal, since we could have recognition respect also for inanimate beings such as claims, norms, institutions and so on 38 â€" could come in degrees, be more or less earned, or eventually in some circumstances retracted. Here we are expected, first, to acknowledge by default some authority of the person we are dealing with as a rational being, a witness, an expert or practical advisor and so on and thus recognitionally respect him or her; nevertheless it may become apparent afterwards that this authority was not reliable, and we may be driven to grade our acknowledgement of authority or deny it. In the aforementioned examples the authority we recognise in the second person showing recognition respect for theoretical knowledge, practical wisdom, etc. Recognition respect in the second person may be proper to moral discourse but is not required in most contexts of public discourse, where we are primarily expected to acknowledge an epistemic, defeasible authority that must be expressed in the third person. Some may call this acknowledgement respect, but it need not be egalitarian in a strong sense: We now must look closely at some structural features of public discourse. In order to be validity structures for discourses, distinguishing sound arguments from bad ones, argumentation theories usually assume that we must appeal to a position that has been identified as either the rational judge, the generalised other, the universal audience, the community of

communication, or whatever one wishes to call it. The validity structure implies the third person perspective of a judge: Hence, the grammar of the second person is necessary but not sufficient to articulate the grammar of public Italo Testa discourse. Secondly, the authority we acknowledge in the second person is in many cases one we may see as an instantiation of a third person authority: Furthermore there is no indissoluble connection between the defeasible authority we acknowledge in our partners and what they say: I need to separate your claim from your authority and look at it in the third person. Focus on reasons, not persons. The validity of your claim should be weighed separately from your authority; that may itself come under scrutiny and be graded at a different stage. Of course there are contexts of dialogue where it may be relevant that precisely you made that claim â€" as in a quarrel, where I am not committing a fallacy by reproaching you; or in negotiation, where you are protecting your own interests; but this should be not generalised to all contexts of dialogue, otherwise ad hominem attacks would always be sound. Of course there are ethical-political discourses where your identity, your history, what you have suffered, may be relevant in evaluating your claim; but this is not always so in political deliberation, otherwise politics per se is reduced to identity politics. This does not satisfy our intuition that personal respect should be an individualising act, referring to the person as this individual - just you on this see Galeotti Were this reciprocal respect, it could not be required for it to be a universal principle of discourse. Even political discourse should not be modelled upon one single context of dialogue: From this, deliberative politics might gain a pluralistic notion of public discourse, which implies not conflating public discourse with moral argumentation, and not posing moral equal respect for persons as the monistic principle of political deliberation. A further point is that making respect for persons a pre-condition of discourse could foster argumentative fallacies such as ad hominem attacks and refusals to enter into dialogue with people we do not sometimes for good reasons respect. Dialogue requires that we respect what is said, not who says it: A frequent fallacy in public dialogues, particularly in political contexts, is the ad hominem argument. Argumentation theories have tried in various ways to explain what exactly is wrong in fallacies. Here I assume following contemporary theories that no arguments are of themselves fallacious; they become fallacious when used in ways that break the rules of the dialogical game. This characterisation is rather formal, and I think much remains to be explained about what exactly happens in public dialogues where fallacies such as ad hominem are ubiquitous. If in scientific inquiry an argument is attacked on the basis of the alleged personal immorality of the scientist â€" he harassed a student some years ago â€" it is pretty clear that an illicit shift from persuasion dialogue or inquiry to eristic dialogue has occurred. But in a political context where we listen to an expert about waste disposal i. The theory of context shift lets us glimpse a general structure of fallacies but misses something about what is peculiar to ad hominem attacks. A definition of ad hominem is this: In the first, instead of attacking your argument on a scientific basis, I attack your argument because you are not worthy of respect as a person: Since you are unworthy of respect, so is your argument. The respect in the first part of that sentence is personal moral respect, whereas that in the second part is epistemic respect. One could also say that the recognition respect due to the epistemic authority of the person is attacked because of the lack of moral authority of the person, which is then transmitted to the claim. In dialogue we should be prepared to disentangle the authority of the claim from the authority of the claimer and judge it from a third person standpoint. The systematic conflation of the third person with the second could be the source of frequent fallacies in public discourse. Nevertheless there can be occurrences where the moral authority of the claimer is relevant to judge the credibility of her or his third person epistemic authority and in weighing the authority of what is being said â€" as in the waste disposal case, where the alleged hidden agenda justifies doubting the person as an objective arguer. But this cannot be the general rule. Hence the norm of personal respect in public discourse is contextually contingent, in the third person and retractable. I want to make a further point with regard to fallacies. The appeal to authority can amount to the fallacy ad verecundiam, as in a critical discussion when someone, instead of raising critical questions and giving arguments, just pays respect to some authority. But appeal to authority is by no means always fallacious, since it is pretty reasonable that in some contexts â€" when we seek information relevant to a decision â€" we appeal to experts for relevant information. So clearly epistemic authority in dialogue is gradable â€" not everyone counts as an expert â€" and if there is to be a rule of respect for personal authority in dialogue, this

would be a non-egalitarian recognition respect: What about the alleged two kinds of respect? So, even if one admits that moral respect in this second sense is not a precondition for entering into a dialogue, and that an unnecessary demand for it may cause fallacies, this would not prove that moral respect in the first sense is not required as a precondition of dialogue. That this is a rather recent theoretical construal resulting from processes of emancipation within the modern world does not, of course, in itself mean that such a distinction may not be somehow justified. I want to stress what has been noticed by many, i. Adding a genealogical trait to the picture, I would say that it is from an experience of appraisal respect of concrete individuals that we may eventually come, through education and abstraction, to think of individuals â€" the ones we have interacted with or distant ones â€" as worthy of status respect as persons per se, and maybe form a habit of doing so. There are reasons not to presuppose such a distinction a priori and base a discourse theory on it. First, such a distinction does not seem to be deeply rooted in ordinary language and discourse, where there is no sharp line between the alleged two senses. The distinction is rather theoretical, introduced on the basis of philosophical assumptions. Thus the burden of proof seems to be on those who introduce it. This indicates a need for further thinking; basing a discourse theory on such an ambiguous distinction may produce more problems than it solves. Were the distinction between two kinds of respect better worked out and even justified from a moral point of view, we would nevertheless not need to take it preliminarily into account in developing a framework for public dialogue. Unwelcome Consequences of Personal Respect. Recognising the other as an equal co-member of a moral community could contingently facilitate dialogue and agreement between persons, but it may be unnecessary, and sometimes dangerous, if respect for what the other person says whoever he or she may be is the thing really to be secured. I here develop a suggestion from Dryzek and Niemeyer Arguably respect for the moral standing of others may prevent violence against them, thus facilitating dialogue. However, respect for persons may be beside the point when it comes to generating "meta-consensus": Even if it were possible to construe this as a case of equal respect for reasons, I doubt this would prove that respect for persons â€" and in particular a priori respect for persons per se â€" is a necessary condition for respect for what is said. Even if some constraints in dialogue could be construed as norms of equal respect, under some particular interpretation of equality not necessarily a universalistic one , that would not in itself imply that these are norms of equal respect for persons. The burden of proof should be on those who assume this connection and the need for a notion of personhood to account for these norms of dialogue. For instance, respect for the moral standing of others is consistent with a refusal to engage with their claims in dialogue. So any connection between moral respect for persons and respect for what they say is contingent and varies from case to case. The participants were selected to represent democratic diversity and included Gay Activists, people with AIDS, and Fundamentalist Christians active in anti-gay-rights campaigns. So we have a case where moral respect for persons per se is at least insufficient to entertain dialogue: Note that applying the distinction between the two kinds of respect so as to dig an unbridgeable gap between the person per se to be respected and the person with her or his individual features and circumstances that I may disrespect could be part of a excluding attitude, since I can always say that I respect you as a person per se while refusing to deal with your particular moral identity. And the fact that I am ready to give you personal recognition respect as a person per se does not advance the situation, but eventually makes it worse. I think this example illustrates that the idea of respect in the second person either recognition or appraisal respect as a universal precondition of dialogue is flawed. In the Colorado case no progress could be made until after the Christians set aside the - 14 - Italo Testa entirely moral issue of the moral personhood of the others. We could say that progress could be made when they came to distinguish respect due to persons from respect due to what is claimed. Restrictions on Dialogue and its Openness.

The Limits of Choice Link Last week Education Secretary Betsy DeVos announcedâ€"to the astonishment of many commentatorsâ€"that historically black colleges and universities "are real pioneers when it comes to school choice.".

June 07, June 06, Kumaraswamy has triggered a huge controversy. Haasan say that was so provocative? He said that the court should be the last resort for dispute resolution and that people-to-people contact should be promoted to find the way forward. Various political leaders have asked: At the moment, the CWMA is not fully constituted because three full-time members have not been appointed and there are no nominations from Kerala and Karnataka. If one goes resolutely by the law, the long-pending Cauvery dispute should come to a close after the final verdict and after the CWMA becomes fully and legally functional. Therefore, the question is, will Tamil Nadu farmers get water as per the schedule prescribed in the final award upheld by the apex court? It needs to be acknowledged that the Cauvery dispute is the longest and most bitter inter-State water dispute that has been fought post-Independence. It has been almost three decades since the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal was constituted. We have gone through a full legal cycle; yet, uncertainty and tension remain in both States. So, it this an appropriate time to initiate people-to-people contact, as suggested by Mr. Past initiatives If we recall, there have been at least a couple of civil society dialogue initiatives in the past what is regarded as Track II diplomacy. The first such dialogue took place in It was initiated by S. Guhan, a distinguished civil servant and former Secretary, Finance and Planning, Tamil Nadu government. The meeting was held in Bengaluru and was attended by S. From the Karnataka side, the meeting was attended by H. It is important to remember that this unofficial dialogue was organised after the declaration of the interim award in , which was followed by unprecedented violence in Karnataka. The total number of Tamilians killed in the violence was 18 and an estimated 2 lakh Tamilians left Karnataka in a month. Against this background, this dialogue opened up a new chapter in dispute resolution and was appreciated as a positive approach by people in both States. The second civil society dialogue, which I initiated in , followed the eruption of violence in After the initial meetings, a committee was formed with 15 members from each State. This committee later came to be known as the Cauvery Family. It had advisers such as Ramaswamy R. Bhavani Shankar, and Gangappa. The Cauvery Family met 18 times in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, alternatively, between and and finally evolved five water-sharing formulae. There continued to be differences of opinion, especially on sharing water during deficit years. The most significant feature of this dialogue initiative was that the members of the Cauvery Family developed a long-term perspective and affirmed their faith in caring, sharing and promoting a feeling of fraternity. What the Cauvery Family could contribute was best described by Ramaswamy Iyer: Unfortunately, while it has brought about remarkable mutual understanding and goodwill between the farmers of the two States, it has not so far been able â€" in spite of several meetings â€" to arrive at an agreed settlement, including a distress-sharing formula, which can be presented to the Tribunal and the Supreme Court. Even the understanding and goodwill achieved by it is under threat in the present situation of conflict and hostility between the two States, at both official and non-official levels. The legal recourse The Cauvery Family last met in It did not meet after that due to lack of recognition and patronage from political parties and other official institutions. I took a strong negative position because the legal recourse has taken a full cycle and it took nearly 40 years and the stage is set to see the value of the legal route in resolving the dispute. Kumaraswamy, advocating people-to-people contact, needs to be seen in this context. He could have waited for at least a year to see how effectively the CWMA functions before making such a statement. Under the present conditions, seeking people-to-people contact for a social dialogue is unwise, untimely and uncalled for.

Chapter 3 : Schwalb: The limits of post-election dialogue

Aileen Kavanagh* THE LURE AND THE LIMITS OF DIALOGUE† Over the last two decades, the metaphor of 'dialogue' has become a common way of characterizing the relationship between courts and legislatures under bills of rights.

Send Email Cancel Just days after the election of Donald Trump, think pieces galore called for liberals to reach out to those they have disrespected or ignored. The next four years would require, many wrote, a renewal of empathy for those snubbed by East Coast Liberal Elites: The hypocrisy is ripe. Dialogue does not work when it is not reciprocal. The white working class should highlight their own call for conversation with the East Coast Liberal Elites â€"â€" I have not seen such think pieces. And yet, dialogue is often romanticized. While the idea of conversation may soothe white liberal fears about the next four years, it obscures the limits of talking. When the repercussions are much larger, this principle holds. But in truth, Trump supporters, not just liberal elites, must put forth extra empathy during the next four years. Instead of demonizing forms of protest which are less convenient or palatable, these folks would do well to listen to their own advice and reach out of their own bubble. It is far easier to criticize the manner in which something is said than to engage with its substance. Dialogue is not sufficient. Simply talking with those who voted differently does nothing to combat the post-election reality of violence and fear, especially considering The Southern Poverty Law Center compiled reports of hate crimes that occurred in the 10 days following the election. To champion dialogue exclusively diffuses blame and responsibility for the intolerance highlighted during this election cycle. It simplistically implies that conversations over coffee can alleviate entrenched prejudices about the populations Trump has excluded from the America he is to make great again. Not all can walk away from dialogue and return to a status quo where they are guaranteed safety, particularly if they are Muslim or a woman or immigrant. Not all choose discussion as their primary means of social change and resistance. I do not seek to dismiss the value of dialogue outright, because words certainly have power. The ability to listen to a viewpoint distinct from our own is a skill worth cultivating during our four years at NU, despite the fact that many Trump supporters have depicted college campuses as politically-correct bubbles. We certainly need more spaces at NU to engage with the rhetoric espoused by Trump supporters, if only to humanize individuals who share these beliefs. We do not need, however, to sanctify the impact of dialogue beyond what is reasonable nor should we place sole responsibility on one group to initiate it. Jessica Schwalb is a Weinberg sophomore. She can be contacted at jessicaschwalb u. If you would like to respond publicly to this column, send a Letter to the Editor to opinion dailynorthwestern. The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect the views of all staff members of The Daily Northwestern.

Chapter 4 : The Limits of Choice | Agora Dialogue

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This essay sets out to demonstrate that there are important limits to the capacity of insitutional dialogue to legitimize the institution of judicial review. To that end, it situates the theory of institutional dialogue within the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation within democracy and introduces a distinction between two conceptions of dialogueâ€"dialogue as deliberation and dialogue as conversationâ€"and examines the limits of each theory. The author does not contend that there can be no dialogue between courts and legislatures but, rather, that the kind of dialogue that would be needed to confer legitimacy on the institution and practice of judicial review does notâ€"and cannotâ€"exist. Consequently, the normative character of institutional dialogue theory, as conceived thus far, is ultimately rhetorical. It is an ongoing dialogue because the judiciary does not necessarily have the last word with respect to constitutional matters and policies; the legislatures would almost always have the power to reverse, modify, or void a judicial decision nullifying legislation and, therefore, to achieve their social or economic policy ends. Consequently the countermajoritarian objection to judicial review cannot be sustained. See infra, section I. The theory of institutional dialogue has emerged conceptually out of the experience of Canadian constitutionalism and in light of constitutional practice under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. According to the limitation clause, legislatures are constitutionally allowed to limit by law any guaranteed rights, provided that the limits comply with a set of justificatory requirements amounting to complex tests of legitimacy, rationality, necessity, and proportionality. This would be wrong. The theory has much broader pertinence and appeal. In particular, it may occur in any jurisdiction where the constitution contains explicit limitation clauses, 8 or, in the absence of an explicit limitation clause entrenched in the constitution, where the courts have introduced some form of balancing test to control the constitutionality of the laws limiting guaranteed rights. Oakes, [] 1 S. See generally, Deliberative Democracy: My purpose in this text will be to show that there are important limits to the theory of institutional dialogue. This is not to say that no form of dialogue between the courts and the legislatures is possible; at least my arguments do not entail such a conclusion. Rather, my claim is that the kind of dialogue that would be needed to confer legitimating force on the institution and practice of judicial review does not and cannot exist. Consequently, the normative character of institutional dialogue theory, as so far conceived, is ultimately rhetorical in nature. The second section introduces a distinction between two conceptions of dialogue: The third and the fourth sections introduce two limits to the theory of institutional dialogue as deliberation. The fifth section examines the limits of the theory of institutional dialogue as conversation. The problem of legitimacy and the institutional dialogue theory The problem of legitimacy raised by the institution of judicial review is well known. It is rooted in the majoritarian assumption that the ultimate source of legitimate lawmaking in a democracy lies in the will of a majority of the people or of their elected representatives. It has been generally assumed, therefore, that legislation enacted in accordance with majority rule by the people or by their elected representatives is, in principle, democratically legitimate. On the other hand, judicial review involves judges who are able to nullify legislation democratically enacted in accordance with the majority rule, and yet these judges neither are the people nor are they elected by them; they neither represent the citizens and nor are they held accountable for their decisions. This state of affairs is understood to be essentially countermajoritarian. It follows, then, that judicial review is democratically illegitimate in principle, and that the onus of showing it is legitimate necessarily rests on those who believe it desirable. To this end, various strategies have been propounded, which may be described, variously, as source based, process based, or substance based. The most enduring and relevant approach for our purposes has been source based. It postulates that judicial review can be legitimized if, and only if, it can be shown that, in some ways, such an approach possesses a positive democratic source or pedigree. There have been two main source-based strategies. The first constitutes the prevailing orthodoxy in

Canada and has been such in the United States for a long time. The legitimacy of the judicial review of legislation, in this view, lies in the fact that the written constitution, on the basis of which judicial review finds its authority, was initiated, willed, or ratified by the people or by their elected representatives. In Canada, for example, in an important decision dealing with the legitimacy of judicial review, Motor Vehicle Act B. Reference, the Supreme Court said: It ought not be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy. But this view proves incoherent. Insofar as the strategy postulates that democracy represents the ultimate normative principle underlying legitimate lawmaking, it means that the people or their elected representatives not only have the ultimate right to rule over their society, that is, to make or unmake any law whatsoever, but that they are entitled, as well, to change their minds with respect to any legal principle and social policy. This idea is expressed in the notion of popular sovereignty and requires that a democracy be continuous. Accordingly, and as a matter of principle, the courts should always uphold the law that best represents the will or the consent of the actual people or of their elected representatives. It follows that where there is a clear conflict of laws, they should uphold the law that has been enacted by the later democratic body of citizens. Yet, the first strategy states that it would be morally permissible for the courts to uphold the will or judgment of past citizensâ€"the source of the legitimating, democratic pedigreeâ€"against the will or judgments of present-day citizens and thus limit their power to determine democratically for themselves what kinds of policies, values, interests, and ends should be promoted pursuant to their own interests. Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. Indeed, this argument might not hold when the legislation has been enacted prior to the enactment of the constitution. The second strategy purports to avoid this incoherence. The legitimacy of judicial review, here, derives from the fact that constitutional norms and values express a kind of collective will that is democratically superior to the will or consent expressed in ordinary legislation. This strategy may take various forms. Thus courts, in upholding constitutional values against some particular piece of legislation, may be said to thwart legitimately the will of representatives on behalf of the people. Foundations Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. These versions of the dualist strategies, as well as others, might be objectionable on their merit. But even if they were acceptable and internally coherent, they hardly legitimize the institution of judicial review. Otherwise, the courts would be basing their decisions on values not expressed or embodied in the constitution and, consequently, on values not legitimated by their democratic pedigree. Now, it is widely acknowledged that constitutional provisions are vague and indeterminate, and it is arguable, for example, that the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected any form of legal formalism with respect to constitutional interpretation. The strategies described above require constitutional norms to be carved in a democratic stone, but the text looks like an empty shell. Madison and Canadian Constitutionalism: Rhetoric and Practice, 37 Rev. More generally, see Luc B. Tremblay, Le droit a-t-il un sens? Finally, even if the constitution were democratically superior to ordinary legislation, it would not necessarily follow that judges should have the power to review legislation. Insofar as political legitimacy is a matter of democratic pedigree, it seems to follow that the legislatures, not the courts, should be morally entitled to make the final decisions with respect to constitutional interpretation and applicationâ€"for the very reason that they best represent the people. These strategies seem to require legislative supremacy even as they actually seek to legitimize judicial supremacy. The theory of institutional dialogue can be thought of as a response to the foregoing objections; namely, the objection from the continuous character of democratic legitimacy, the objection from indeterminacy, and the objection from judicial supremacy. There are various versions of the theory of institutional dialogue. This version has been refined or endorsed by various scholars. While the judges may assess the validity of the laws in accordance with the values of the constitution, as they understand them, the legislatures generally will be able either to respect judicial judgments or to correct them, whether by redrafting their laws or by enacting new legislation that carries out the former legislative objectives. Legislative corrections may take a variety of forms. The Canadian Charter, for example, provides four procedures, the first two being the most important: However, these cases are exceptional. The normal situation

would be one of institutional dialogue. Similarly, the objection from indeterminacy loses its point. While the courts may nullify legislation on the basis of their own formal or substantive understanding of constitutional principles and purposes, the legislatures may almost always reverse, modify, or avoid their decisions. Thus, as already noted, the courts would not have the last word concerning the proper balance between individual interests and social policies, and the constitution would not necessarily be whatever the courts say it is. These are constraints on the democratic process, no doubt, but the final decision is the democratic one.

Chapter 5 : Limits to dialogue - The Hindu

The Limits of Dialogue: Q Ideas, Gay Marriage, and Chuck Colson Matthew Lee Anderson on April 17, On Wednesday, Owen Strachan and Eric Teetsel offered a strong challenge to Q Ideas for hosting dialogues on questions relating to homosexuality and gay marriage with David Gushee and Matthew Vines, both of whom are affirming of gay marriage.

The position of Walton is taken as the contrary view. The paper provides a set of descriptions of dialogues in which arguments feature in the order of the increasing com- plexity of the argument presentation at each turn of the dialogue, and argues that when arguments of great complexity are traded, the exchanges between arguers are turns of a dialogue only in an extended or metaphorical sense. Dialogue, model, argument, Walton, pragma-dialectical rules 1. What an argument is cannot be so straightforwardly described, for there are many different conceptions, not all compatible. Arguments sense 1 , the functionally defined ordered sets of statements, are typically asserted during arguments sense 2 , disputatious interchanges; and such inter- changes are typically dialogues. This close tie between argument and dialogue has been studied in the argumentation literature for some time now. In , van Eemeren and Grootendorst published a powerful idealized dialogue model of argument sense 2 as a discussion aimed at the rational resolution of disagreements Argumentation Printed in the Netherlands. In , Johnson and I made a case that argument sense 1 has important dialogical properties, a fact we thought tended to be overlooked in the informal logic literature. And over the past decade Walton has produced a stream of monographs a number of which have developed the theme that arguments sense 1 and argumentation sense 2 can be illuminated by the model of the dialogue. Walton and Krabbe To be sure, not all dialogues are arguments or contain arguments. Think of dialogues in which the parties exchange greetings, or reminiscences, or in general just pass the time of day together. Walton and Krabbe do not explicitly say that the dialogue types Walton lists are all types of argument-dialogue. However, their interest in dialogues seems clearly motivated by expected connections between argument or else fallacy and dialogue. Walton more recently has proposed a tight connection between argument and dialogue: An argument, according to the pragmatic theory advocated here, is typically a sequence of subarguments used in a larger goal-directed unit of dialogue. Although arguments occur in dialogue, often a dialogue can best be seen as one large argument. The core of the argument is always a set of inferences or propositions, but the argument is determined by how those inferences are used in a context of dialogue 40â€" Hence, in any argument, there is a triadic containment relation of nested components see figure 1. It is this view, that dialogue is a necessary condition of argument, that argu- ments always occur in a context of dialogue, that I want to challenge in the present paper. I contend that at a certain stage in the increasing complexity of the argument turns, there is a qualitative change in the nature of the dialogue. The following account arranges argument-dialogues into four groups arranged according to increasing complexity within and among the groups. Group A In perhaps the simplest class of argument-dialogues the typical objective is for one party to force the other into conceding a proposition that con- tradicts some other proposition that the other party had earlier endorsed. At each turn after the opening one, each party must respond to the imme- diately preceding turn in the exchange. The answerer must answer honestly and con- sistency is obligatory. This type of dialogue is modelled in the following schema, where the letters are variables for propositions: Questioner Answerer 01 p? Open-ended Question and Answer dialogues. The questioner asks open- ended questions, which require simple propositions as answers. Dialogues with a combination of questions of type 1. Here is an excerpt from The Republic that illustrates it. Simonides thought this to be just, to give to each man what is proper to him, and he called this what is due? It is the craft which prescribes medicines and food and drink for our bodies. And what does the craft which we call cooking give that is due and fitting and to whom? It adds flavor to food. What, and to whom, does that craft give which we would call justice? Now, when people are not ill. Nor is the pilot when they are not sailing? So to people who are not fighting a war the just man is useless? Justice then is useful also in peace time? Republic I, câ€"a It is a feature of dialogues of this first group that no argument is provided at any given turn of the dialogue. Instead, the turns separately establish the ingredients of the arguments â€" the premises or reasons, the reasoning steps,

and the conclusions. The answers are often affirmations, or asser- tions, of propositions that are logically implied by propositions affirmed or asserted at earlier turns in the dialogue. So the dialogue is a medium or vehicle for the presentation of the argument. The question-and-answer exchange is not essential. Group B In a somewhat more complicated class of interactions, the rules will permit fuller exchanges. A somewhat more complicated exchange than type 4. If the roles of questioner and answerer could be switched back and forth between the parties during the argument, and each permitted the same moves, the dialogue would become yet more complex. What all the dialogues of group B. An implication of this requirement is that in such dialogues the speaker would be permitted to offer reasons in support of the premises or of the inference links in his or her arguments only if these were challenged by the interlocutor. Had such supporting reasons been allowed initially together the argument, then there would have been at least two invited inferences at that step, the argument would no longer have been simple, and the complexity would have been increased to a significant degree. An example of argument-dialogues of Group B. Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz It looks to me as though the Permissive Persuasive Dialogue model defined by Walton and Krabbe may belong here too, but it is not clear whether they want to restrict each interlocutor at each move to simple arguments. Argument-dialogues of groups A. It may also need to be noted that although argument is the essential product of such exchanges, that does not preclude ancillary kinds of move at any given turn, such as requests for and the provision of definitions, distinctions, explanations, examples, and so on. Once support for a premise J. Consider some sub-types, again in order of increasing complexity. Perhaps the simplest of this group is the dialogue in which one or both parties are permitted to provide in a single turn a line of argument for a proposition. Any such premise-support or link-support argument is in effect an answer to a question about the acceptability of that premise or that link. These supporting arguments are one kind of indirect support for the main conclusion. We will see others below. There is no reason in principle why the premises or inference links of these supporting arguments should not themselves be supported by arguments, at the discretion of the interlocutor whose turn it is. However, each additional iteration adds to the complexity of the turn. Complexity increases in a different direction once more than one line of argument is permitted in any turn. A combination of 8. In fact, although type Once an interlocutor in a dialogue is permitted to offer, and in turn support, several lines of argument for a proposition, he or she is no longer responding to a single question or challenge from the other party. So far all the argument-dialogue types described have the feature that nothing other than arguments which have as their conclusion a proposi- tion in question is envisaged at a given turn in the dialogue, whether that proposition is the main point at issue, a premise of a supporting argument or an inference link of a supporting argument. Group D The next level of complexity is to permit at any one turn, in addition to the above, two other kinds of indirect arguments in support of the main proposition at issue. In addition to the moves permitted in 1â€"12, permit a arguments intended as refutations of alternatives to the main proposition, and b arguments intended as refutations of arguments aimed at refuting the main proposition. Here we have the possibility of a whole case for a position presented in a single turn. P1 arguments, with the position at issue as their conclusion pl, p2, p3,. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to leave open the possibility that a turn in the dialogue can reach level So it is not clear to me where their model should be mapped on the above continuum. This point can perhaps be appre- ciated by considering some examples. One example is the paper which was the original version of this article, and the response to that paper written Dr. W Krabbe, which were presented together at a conference. That paper can be understood as one turn of a dialogue, and Dr. In the first five chapters of this book, Harman defends a version of moral rela- tivism. In the next three chapters, written independently, Thomson defends a version of moral objectivity. The conclusion that Harman draws from his defence of moral relativism is presumably incompatible with the conclusion Thomson draws from her defence of moral objectivity, yet the two parts of the book in which each author defends his and her conclusions do not engage each other at all. Only in the second part of the book does each co-author take up and argue against the case each had made in the first part. Assuredly, their authors are responding to doubts or questions raised against their positions and argu- ments by arguments against their positions or against their arguments, and by incompatible positions found in the literature and argued for elsewhere. Yet if such extended arguments count as argument-dialogue turns, they are turns of level Moreover, while they presuppose the two sides Walton

There seem to be several noteworthy differences in the properties of these two pairs, which I will discuss under three headings. The respondent is typically physically absent, and in any case the argument must be developed without direct questioning from or inter- action with the respondent. However, while that fact gives the proponent something to go on, there can be doubts about the precise interpretation of those views, and there are likely to be doubts about how the respondent would reply to the premises or inference links used by the solo arguer. The solo arguer is free to take the argumentation in directions that are not envisaged by the questions of the respondent, and to refrain from taking up points that the other side might challenge. Even when there is a dialogue of sorts, such as when one paper followed by a response to it are presented together at a scholarly meeting, the author of the initial paper is not exclusively in an interchange with the antici- pated challenges of the respondent. You cannot predict, for example, who will be reading your letter- to-the-editor. An example of such a diverse audience is the electorate addressed by a politician in a nationally-televised inter- view with a journalist. The commitment stores of the audience members or groups may conflict, and often do. These choices cannot always be based solely on the known cognitive attitudes of the audience, since by hypothesis in such cases these may be contradictory. They can be enforced by the participants or by the referee or judge. The norms themselves can be challenged, leading to meta-arguments over the standards that apply or over procedural issues. Whether contrived games or live duets, the norms of argument in such dialogues are fairly determinate.

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Abstract. Open, honest, inclusive, transparent, and self-reflexive dialogue is the process by which ethical norms are transmitted from one generation to the next, abandoned, replaced, criticized, improved upon, and, finally, legitimated (only to begin the process once again).

By Dow Marmur Columnist Mon. For a long time it had been primarily about Christian-Jewish relations in western countries with occasional attempts to include Muslims and local representatives of other religions. Eighty per cent of all Christians once lived in Europe and North America. Today, two-thirds live in Latin America, Africa and Asia where they only rarely encounter Jews but interact with many other faiths. And some million Muslims live nowadays in non-Muslim countries. Religious leaders gather every year at the Doha Conference on Interfaith Dialogue. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has also become a factor. I was made acutely aware of it last month when I attended an international interfaith conference in Doha , hosted by the government of Qatar. It was the 10th gathering of its kind there. Though the some participants included Christians from many countries and more than a dozen Jews from Europe and the Americas â€" but not from Israel â€" the gathering was naturally dominated by exponents of Islam. Many speakers quoted chapter and verse to show how their tradition stresses tolerance and respect for all genuine paths to God. Thus, for example, even in relatively liberal Muslim Qatar where there are several churches for its many Christian foreign workers, non-Muslim religious symbols such as the cross cannot be displayed in public. Laudably, the conference tried to stress affinities rather than differences. In light of these assertions, psychological insights might have helped us to better understand why, despite common origins, siblings are so often in conflict â€" in the Bible no less than in the modern family, as well as between sister religions. Instead, priority was given to practical co-operation. Four areas of best practices were particularly explored: The reports came from different countries and were very impressive. The winner came from Lebanon. Not only religious but also political leaders in the Muslim world, especially in Qatar, seem to believe that interfaith work is vitally important and that its absence would make relations between peoples, cultures and religions even more perilous. Veteran participants told me that the annual Doha conferences have come a long way since their inception, and that the prospects of future progress are considerable. But due to the apparent absence of self-criticism by presenters, much of what was said had the character of apologetics and defensive self-promotion, which made many sessions less penetrating than they deserved to be. Looking ahead, it seems reasonable to hope that more representatives of the monotheistic Abrahamic faiths will find the courage to share with others what troubles them in their own communities and thus further deepen the encounters by demonstrating that we have a lot to learn from each other. His column appears every other week.