

Chapter 1 : Rousseau, Jean-Jacques | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution [Carol Blum] on blog.quintoapp.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. Book by Blum, Carol.*

His mother died only a few days later on July 7, and his only sibling, an older brother, ran away from home when Rousseau was still a child. Rousseau was therefore brought up mainly by his father, a clockmaker, with whom at an early age he read ancient Greek and Roman literature such as the Lives of Plutarch. His father got into a quarrel with a French captain, and at the risk of imprisonment, left Geneva for the rest of his life. Rousseau stayed behind and was cared for by an uncle who sent him along with his cousin to study in the village of Bovey. In 1722, Rousseau was apprenticed to an engraver and began to learn the trade. Although he did not detest the work, he thought his master to be violent and tyrannical. He therefore left Geneva in 1728, and fled to Annecy. Here he met Louise de Warens, who was instrumental in his conversion to Catholicism, which forced him to forfeit his Genevan citizenship in he would make a return to Geneva and publicly convert back to Calvinism. During this time he earned money through secretarial, teaching, and musical jobs. In 1733, Rousseau went to Paris to become a musician and composer. After two years spent serving a post at the French Embassy in Venice, he returned in 1735 and met a linen-maid named Therese Levasseur, who would become his lifelong companion they eventually married in 1735. They had five children together, all of whom were left at the Paris orphanage. It was also during this time that Rousseau became friendly with the philosophers Condillac and Diderot. The work was widely read and was controversial. But Rousseau attempted to live a modest life despite his fame, and after the success of his opera, he promptly gave up composing music. In the autumn of 1750, Rousseau submitted an entry to another essay contest announced by the Academy of Dijon. Rousseau himself thought this work to be superior to the First Discourse because the Second Discourse was significantly longer and more philosophically daring. The judges were irritated by its length as well its bold and unorthodox philosophical claims; they never finished reading it. However, Rousseau had already arranged to have it published elsewhere and like the First Discourse, it also was also widely read and discussed. In 1755, a year after the publication of the Second Discourse, Rousseau and Therese Levasseur left Paris after being invited to a house in the country by Mme. In 1756, after repeated quarrels with Mme. It was during this time that Rousseau wrote some of his most important works. In 1759 he published a novel, *Julie or the New Heloise*, which was one of the best selling of the century. Then, just a year later in 1762, he published two major philosophical treatises: *Paris* authorities condemned both of these books, primarily for claims Rousseau made in them about religion, which forced him to flee France. He settled in Switzerland and in 1765 he began writing his autobiography, his *Confessions*. A year later, after encountering difficulties with Swiss authorities, he spent time in Berlin and Paris, and eventually moved to England at the invitation of David Hume. However, due to quarrels with Hume, his stay in England lasted only a year, and in 1769 he returned to the southeast of France incognito. After spending three years in the southeast, Rousseau returned to Paris in 1770 and copied music for a living. It was during this time that he wrote *Rousseau: Judge of Jean-Jacques and the Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, which would turn out to be his final works. He died on July 3, 1778. His *Confessions* were published several years after his death; and his later political writings, in the nineteenth century. Rousseau wrote the *Confessions* late in his career, and it was not published until after his death. What is particularly striking about the *Confessions* is the almost apologetic tone that Rousseau takes at certain points to explain the various public as well as private events in his life, many of which caused great controversy. It is clear from this book that Rousseau saw the *Confessions* as an opportunity to justify himself against what he perceived as unfair attacks on his character and misunderstandings of his philosophical thought. His life was filled with conflict, first when he was apprenticed, later in academic circles with other Enlightenment thinkers like Diderot and Voltaire, with Parisian and Swiss authorities and even with David Hume. Although Rousseau discusses these conflicts, and tries to explain his perspective on them, it is not his exclusive goal to justify all of his actions. He chastises himself and takes responsibility for many of these events, such as his extra-marital affairs. At other times, however, his paranoia is clearly evident as he discusses his intense feuds with friends and contemporaries.

And herein lays the fundamental tension in the Confessions. Rousseau is at the same time trying both to justify his actions to the public so that he might gain its approval, but also to affirm his own uniqueness as a critic of that same public. As such, it is appropriate to consider Rousseau, at least chronologically, as an Enlightenment thinker. Descartes was very skeptical about the possibility of discovering final causes, or purposes, in nature. Yet this teleological understanding of the world was the very cornerstone of Aristotelian metaphysics, which was the established philosophy of the time. In the Meditations, Descartes claims that the material world is made up of extension in space, and this extension is governed by mechanical laws that can be understood in terms of pure mathematics. The State of Nature as a Foundation for Ethics and Political Philosophy The scope of modern philosophy was not limited only to issues concerning science and metaphysics. Philosophers of this period also attempted to apply the same type of reasoning to ethics and politics. In doing so, they hoped to uncover certain characteristics of human nature that were universal and unchanging. If this could be done, one could then determine the most effective and legitimate forms of government. Hobbes contends that human beings are motivated purely by self-interest, and that the state of nature, which is the state of human beings without civil society, is the war of every person against every other. Hobbes does say that while the state of nature may not have existed all over the world at one particular time, it is the condition in which humans would be if there were no sovereign. These obligations are articulated in terms of natural rights, including rights to life, liberty and property. Rousseau was also influenced by the modern natural law tradition, which attempted to answer the challenge of skepticism through a systematic approach to human nature that, like Hobbes, emphasized self-interest. Rousseau would give his own account of the state of nature in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, which will be examined below. Also influential were the ideals of classical republicanism, which Rousseau took to be illustrative of virtues. These virtues allow people to escape vanity and an emphasis on superficial values that he thought to be so prevalent in modern society. This is a major theme of the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. Discourse on the Sciences and Arts This is the work that originally won Rousseau fame and recognition. For the Enlightenment project was based on the idea that progress in fields like the arts and sciences do indeed contribute to the purification of morals on individual, social, and political levels. The First Discourse begins with a brief introduction addressing the academy to which the work was submitted. In addition to this introduction, the First Discourse is comprised of two main parts. The first part is largely an historical survey. Using specific examples, Rousseau shows how societies in which the arts and sciences flourished more often than not saw the decline of morality and virtue. He notes that it was after philosophy and the arts flourished that ancient Egypt fell. Similarly, ancient Greece was once founded on notions of heroic virtue, but after the arts and sciences progressed, it became a society based on luxury and leisure. The one exception to this, according to Rousseau, was Sparta, which he praises for pushing the artists and scientists from its walls. Sparta is in stark contrast to Athens, which was the heart of good taste, elegance, and philosophy. Interestingly, Rousseau here discusses Socrates, as one of the few wise Athenians who recognized the corruption that the arts and sciences were bringing about. In his address to the court, Socrates says that the artists and philosophers of his day claim to have knowledge of piety, goodness, and virtue, yet they do not really understand anything. The second part of the First Discourse is an examination of the arts and sciences themselves, and the dangers they bring. First, Rousseau claims that the arts and sciences are born from our vices: The attack on sciences continues as Rousseau articulates how they fail to contribute anything positive to morality. They take time from the activities that are truly important, such as love of country, friends, and the unfortunate. Philosophical and scientific knowledge of subjects such as the relationship of the mind to the body, the orbit of the planets, and physical laws that govern particles fail to genuinely provide any guidance for making people more virtuous citizens. Rather, Rousseau argues that they create a false sense of need for luxury, so that science becomes simply a means for making our lives easier and more pleasurable, but not morally better. The arts are the subject of similar attacks in the second part of the First Discourse. Artists, Rousseau says, wish first and foremost to be applauded. Their work comes from a sense of wanting to be praised as superior to others. Society begins to emphasize specialized talents rather than virtues such as courage, generosity, and temperance. This leads to yet another danger: And yet, after all of these attacks, the First Discourse ends with

the praise of some very wise thinkers, among them, Bacon, Descartes, and Newton. These men were carried by their vast genius and were able to avoid corruption. However, Rousseau says, they are exceptions; and the great majority of people ought to focus their energies on improving their characters, rather than advancing the ideals of the Enlightenment in the arts and sciences. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality The Second Discourse, like the first, was a response to a question put forth by the academy of Dijon: It exceeded the desired length, it was four times the length of the first, and made very bold philosophical claims; unlike the First Discourse, it did not win the prize. However, as Rousseau was now a well-known and respected author, he was able to have it published independently. This is primarily because Rousseau, like Hobbes, attacks the classical notion of human beings as naturally social. In the Confessions, Rousseau writes that he himself sees the Second Discourse as far superior to the first. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is divided into four main parts: Like them, Rousseau understands society to be an invention, and he attempts to explain the nature of human beings by stripping them of all of the accidental qualities brought about by socialization. Thus, understanding human nature amounts to understanding what humans are like in a pure state of nature. This is in stark contrast to the classical view, most notably that of Aristotle, which claims that the state of civil society is the natural human state. Like Hobbes and Locke, however, it is doubtful that Rousseau meant his readers to understand the pure state of nature that he describes in the Second Discourse as a literal historical account. In its opening, he says that it must be denied that men were ever in the pure state of nature, citing revelation as a source which tells us that God directly endowed the first man with understanding a capacity that he will later say is completely undeveloped in natural man. However, it seems in other parts of the Second Discourse that Rousseau is positing an actual historical account. Some of the stages in the progression from nature to civil society, Rousseau will argue, are empirically observable in so-called primitive tribes. Hobbes describes each human in the state of nature as being in a constant state of war against all others; hence life in the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Instead, they have taken civilized human beings and simply removed laws, government, and technology.

Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment

*A review of Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution by Carol Blum*  
*Share I think I know man, but as for men, I know them not.*

Where I, Ron, blog on a variety of different subjects--social theoretical, historical, cultural, political, social ethical, the media, and so on I got the Max Weber and Mark Twain in me --in a sometimes Niebuhrian or ironic way all with an attitude. Be very afraid particularly if you have a socially and culturally constructed irrational fear of anything over characters. I was a doctoral student in Anthropology but I was developing a strong interest in history. I had begun to recognise that a Sociology and Anthropology without history--the disciplines without history--were anemic and as such problematic. So I started taking History classes and started applying what I learned in these history classes to my exploration of social and cultural theory and the study of culture and ideology. Perhaps the most controversial issue in late twentieth century social science has been the nature and role ideology has in and continues to play in social and cultural formations. Traditionally, ideology has been conceptualised as political in nature, those interrelated ideas western civilisation has referred to as conservative, liberal, or communist, or as the justifications for particular economic systems, capitalist or feudal, for example. In this other perspective ideology is naturalisation. It is that which makes "real" a particular world view. This version of ideology perhaps reaches its apex in its Foucauldian variant where ideology becomes discourse, ways of seeing embedded in binary form in human language in all of its forms. Blum delineates how one particular reading of a virtue derived from Rousseau by Robespierre and his coterie of revolutionary disciples gave rise to a specific ideology which emphasized the natural virtuousness of man. This revolutionary reading of Rousseau, claims Blum, had an emotive quality that was mystical in nature and was believed to allow the real revolutionaries to mystically unite their revolutionary virtue with that of the general will, the virtuous common will. Revolutionary intellectuals, claims Blum, came to believe that they, because they had merged their virtue with that of the common will, could, by looking into their own hearts express the will of "the people" and distinguish between the virtuous and good and the non-virtuous and wicked in revolutionary French society. Given this revolutionary intellectuals, claims Blum, came to believe that it was their duty to give definition to and build "institutions" which would allow this revolutionary virtue to flourish. In short they believed it was their duty to build a "republic of virtue" that would allow the good to flourish, the common will to flourish. It was, for Blum, this discourse derived from a reading, or better perhaps a misreading, of Rousseau, and the rise of a dictatorship of the revolutionary intellectuals that led to the Terror. The Terror, for Blum, is predicated on the distinction between the virtuous and the non-virtuous. Any hindrance of the revolutionary programme was ascribed by revolutionary intellectuals to the heinous and evil actions of anti-revolutionaries. Moreover, since it was believed that this evilness could not emerge from within the general will it had to, it was believed, derive solely from an external source. Hence the Jacobin emphasis on treason and the external counterrevolutionary threat. Thus the need to fight the foreign aggressor. Blum recognises the role institutional factors like the economic, the political, and other social factors played during the revolutionary years. She convincingly shows how these others were often viewed through the lenses of a particular ideology. Since his view of virtue was tied to an antimaterialism and to suffering he could not support the mass riots of this period which were aimed at obtaining foodstuffs, including luxury items like coffee and sugar, since it was an abrogation of revolutionary virtue. It was thus ideology, claims Blum, which brought about or furthered the split between the Jacobins and the sans-culottes. Blum convincingly explicates how this Rousseavian cultural script arose and how it was diffused among particular groups, sometimes somewhat differently. For the former, virtue was indicated in actions. For the latter virtue was the union with the mystical general will. For the latter it was anti-rational, emotive, and expressed itself in the attempt to "legislate", give birth to, and provide definition to the "republic of virtue". It did not, one assumes, originate in a vacuum. Moreover, although she differentiates between Rousseau, the actual living and breathing biological being, and "Rousseau", the self-representation of the former, she resorts to psychologicistic explanations too often for my taste to explain the differences between the two. Blum could, in other words,

have explored more extensively the differences between Rousseau and "Rousseau". Despite these rather picky caveats, however, Blum draws our attention, as did Weber in his essay on the origins of rationalistic capitalism, to the crucial role ideology plays in everyday life.

**Chapter 3 : Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment**

*Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue has 5 ratings and 0 reviews. Rousseau And The Republic Of Virtue: The Language Of Politics In The French Revolution.*

Rousseau left the city at the age of sixteen and came under the influence of a Roman Catholic convert noblewoman, Francoise-Louise de la Tour, Baronne de Warens. Rousseau spent some time working as a domestic servant in a noble household in Turin, and during this time a shameful episode occurred in which he falsely accused a fellow servant of the theft of a ribbon. This act marked him deeply and he returns to it in his autobiographical works. Rousseau then spent a brief period training to become a Catholic priest before embarking on another brief career as an itinerant musician, music copyist and teacher. Rousseau remained with Mme de Warens through the rest of the s, moving to Lyon in to take up a position as a tutor. In he travelled to Paris, having devised a plan for a new numerically-based system of musical notation which he presented to the Academy of Sciences. The system was rejected by the Academy, but in this period Rousseau met Denis Diderot. In , while walking to Vincennes to visit the briefly-imprisoned Diderot, Rousseau came across a newspaper announcement of an essay competition organized by the Academy of Dijon. The Academy sought submissions on the theme of whether the development of the arts and sciences had improved or corrupted public morals. Rousseau later claimed that he then and there experienced an epiphany which included the thought, central to his world view, that humankind is good by nature but is corrupted by society. Rousseau entered his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts conventionally known as the First Discourse for the competition and won first prize with his contrarian thesis that social development, including of the arts and sciences, is corrosive of both civic virtue and individual moral character. The Discourse was published in and is mainly important because Rousseau used it to introduce themes that he then developed further in his later work, especially the natural virtue of the ordinary person and the moral corruption fostered by the urge to distinction and excellence. The First Discourse made Rousseau famous and provoked a series of responses to which he in turn replied. The first of these was his opera *Le Devin du Village* *The Village Soothsayer* , which was an immediate success and stayed in the repertoire for a century. Rousseau, who had already developed a taste for Italian music during his stay in Venice, joined the dispute through his *Letter on French Music* and the controversy also informed his unpublished *Essay on the Origin of Languages*. Rousseau went so far as to declare the French language inherently unmusical, a view apparently contradicted by his own practice in *Le Devin*. In he regained this citizenship by reconvertng to Calvinism. In the following year he published his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, again in response to an essay competition from the Academy of Dijon. *Julie* appeared in and was an immediate success. The novel is centred on a love triangle between Julie, her tutor Saint Preux and her husband Wolmar. Unfortunately for Rousseau, the publication of these works led to personal catastrophe. *Emile* was condemned in Paris and both *Emile* and *The Social Contract* were condemned in Geneva on grounds of religious heterodoxy. Partly in response to this, Rousseau finally renounced his Genevan citizenship in May Rousseau was forced to flee to escape arrest, seeking refuge first in Switzerland and later, in January , at the invitation of David Hume, travelling to England. He spent fourteen months in Staffordshire where he worked on his autobiographical work, the *Confessions*, which also contains evidence of his paranoia in its treatment of figures like Diderot and the German author Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm. He returned to France in and then spent much of the rest of his life working on autobiographical texts, completing the *Confessions* but also composing the *Dialogues*: He also completed his *Considerations on the Government of Poland* in this period. In later life he further developed his interest in botany where his work proved influential in England via his letters on the subject to the Duchess of Portland and in music, as he met and corresponded with the operatic composer Christoph Gluck. Rousseau died in *Conjectural history and moral psychology* Rousseau repeatedly claims that a single idea is at the centre of his world view, namely, that human beings are good by nature but are rendered corrupt by society. Unfortunately, despite the alleged centrality of this claim, it is difficult to give it a clear and plausible interpretation. One obvious problem is present from the start: In various places Rousseau clearly states that morality is not a natural feature of human

life, so in whatever sense it is that human beings are good by nature, it is not the moral sense that the casual reader would ordinarily assume. Rousseau attributes to all creatures an instinctual drive towards self-preservation. Human beings therefore have such a drive, which he terms *amour de soi* self love. *Amour de soi* directs us first to attend to our most basic biological needs for things like food, shelter and warmth. Since, for Rousseau, humans, like other creatures, are part of the design of a benevolent creator, they are individually well-equipped with the means to satisfy their natural needs. In the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau imagines a multi-stage evolution of humanity from the most primitive condition to something like a modern complex society. Rousseau denies that this is a reconstruction of history as it actually was, and Frederick Neuhouser has argued that the evolutionary story is merely a philosophical device designed to separate the natural and the artificial elements of our psychology. The human race barely subsists in this condition, chance meetings between proto-humans are the occasions for copulation and reproduction, child-care is minimal and brief in duration. If humans are naturally good at this stage of human evolution, their goodness is merely a negative and amounts to the absence of evil. In this story, human beings are distinguished from the other creatures with which they share the primeval world only by two characteristics: Freedom, in this context, is simply the ability not to be governed solely by appetite; perfectibility is the capacity to learn and thereby to find new and better means to satisfy needs. Together, these characteristics give humans the potential to achieve self-consciousness, rationality, and morality. Nevertheless, it will turn out that such characteristics are more likely to condemn them to a social world of deception, dissimulation, dependence, oppression, and domination. As human populations grow, simple but unstable forms of co-operation evolve around activities like hunting. According to Rousseau, the central transitional moment in human history occurs at a stage of society marked by small settled communities. At this point a change, or rather a split, takes place in the natural drive humans have to care for themselves: In *Emile*, where Rousseau is concerned with the psychological development of an individual in a modern society, he also associates the genesis of *amour propre* with sexual competition and the moment, puberty, when the male adolescent starts to think of himself as a sexual being with rivals for the favours of girls and women. *Amour propre* makes a central interest of each human being the need to be recognized by others as having value and to be treated with respect. The presentation of *amour propre* in the *Second Discourse* and especially in his note XV to that work often suggests that Rousseau sees it as a wholly negative passion and the source of all evil. Interpretations of *amour propre* centered on the *Second Discourse* which, historically, are the most common ones for example Charvet, often focus on the fact that the need for recognition always has a comparative aspect, so that individuals are not content merely that others acknowledge their value, but also seek to be esteemed as superior to them. This aspect of our nature then creates conflict as people try to exact this recognition from others or react with anger and resentment when it is denied to them. More recent readings of both the *Second Discourse*, and especially of *Emile*, have indicated that a more nuanced view is possible Den, Neuhouser This project of containing and harnessing *amour propre* finds expression in both *The Social Contract* and *Emile*. In some works, such as the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau presents *amour propre* as a passion that is quite distinct from *amour de soi*. In others, including *Emile*, he presents it as a form that *amour de soi* takes in a social environment. The latter is consistent with his view in *Emile* that all the passions are outgrowths or developments of *amour de soi*. Although *amour propre* has its origins in sexual competition and comparison within small societies, it does not achieve its full toxicity until it is combined with a growth in material interdependence among human beings. In the *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau traces the growth of agriculture and metallurgy and the first establishment of private property, together with the emergence of inequality between those who own land and those who do not. In an unequal society, human beings who need both the social good of recognition and such material goods as food, warmth, etc. Subordinates need superiors in order to have access to the means of life; superiors need subordinates to work for them and also to give them the recognition they crave. In such a structure there is a clear incentive for people to misrepresent their true beliefs and desires in order to attain their ends. Thus, even those who receive the apparent love and adulation of their inferiors cannot thereby find satisfaction for their *amour propre*. Once people have achieved consciousness of themselves as social beings, morality also becomes possible and this relies on the further

faculty of conscience. It is, to that extent, akin to a moral sentiment such as Humean sympathy. But as something that is merely instinctual it lacks, for Rousseau, a genuinely moral quality. Genuine morality, on the other hand, consists in the application of reason to human affairs and conduct. This requires the mental faculty that is the source of genuinely moral motivation, namely conscience. Conscience impels us to the love of justice and morality in a quasi-aesthetic manner. However, in a world dominated by inflamed amour propre, the normal pattern is not for a morality of reason to supplement or supplant our natural proto-moral sympathies. For recent discussion of Rousseau on conscience and reason, see Neidleman, , ch. So, for example, theatre audiences derive enjoyment from the eliciting of their natural compassion by a tragic scene on the stage; then, convinced of their natural goodness, they are freed to act viciously outside the theater. Philosophy, too, can serve as a resource for self-deception. However, many of his other works, both major and minor, contain passages that amplify or illuminate the political ideas in those works. This idea finds its most detailed treatment in *The Social Contract*. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau sets out to answer what he takes to be the fundamental question of politics, the reconciliation of the freedom of the individual with the authority of the state. This reconciliation is necessary because human society has evolved to a point where individuals can no longer supply their needs through their own unaided efforts, but rather must depend on the co-operation of others. The process whereby human needs expand and interdependence deepens is set out in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*. In the *Second Discourse*, this establishment amounts to the reinforcement of unequal and exploitative social relations that are now backed by law and state power. In an echo of Locke and an anticipation of Marx, Rousseau argues that this state would, in effect, be a class state, guided by the common interest of the rich and propertied and imposing unfreedom and subordination on the poor and weak. The propertyless consent to such an establishment because their immediate fear of a Hobbesian state of war leads them to fail to attend to the ways in which the new state will systematically disadvantage them. *The Social Contract* aims to set out an alternative to this dystopia, an alternative in which, Rousseau claims, each person will enjoy the protection of the common force whilst remaining as free as they were in the state of nature. The key to this reconciliation is the idea of the general will: The general will is the source of law and is willed by each and every citizen. In obeying the law each citizen is thus subject to his or her own will, and consequently, according to Rousseau, remains free. On such a reading, Rousseau may be committed to something like an a posteriori philosophical anarchism. Such a view holds that it is possible, in principle, for a state to exercise legitimate authority over its citizens, but all actual statesâ€”and indeed all states that we are likely to see in the modern eraâ€”will fail to meet the conditions for legitimacy. Rousseau argues that in order for the general will to be truly general it must come from all and apply to all. This thought has both substantive and formal aspects. Formally, Rousseau argues that the law must be general in application and universal in scope. The law cannot name particular individuals and it must apply to everyone within the state. Rousseau believes that this condition will lead citizens, though guided by a consideration of what is in their own private interest, to favor laws that both secure the common interest impartially and that are not burdensome and intrusive. For this to be true, however, it has to be the case that the situation of citizens is substantially similar to one another. In a state where citizens enjoy a wide diversity of lifestyles and occupations, or where there is a great deal of cultural diversity, or where there is a high degree of economic inequality, it will not generally be the case that the impact of the laws will be the same for everyone. In such cases it will often not be true that a citizen can occupy the standpoint of the general will merely by imagining the impact of general and universal laws on his or her own case. First, individuals all have private wills corresponding to their own selfish interests as natural individuals; second, each individual, insofar as he or she identifies with the collective as a whole and assumes the identity of citizen, wills the general will of that collective as his or her own, setting aside selfish interest in favor of a set of laws that allow all to coexist under conditions of equal freedom; third, and very problematically, a person can identify with the corporate will of a subset of the populace as a whole. The general will is therefore both a property of the collective and a result of its deliberations, and a property of the individual insofar as the individual identifies as a member of the collective. In a well-ordered society, there is no tension between private and general will, as individuals accept that both justice and their individual self-interest require their submission to a law which safeguards their

freedom by protecting them from the private violence and personal domination that would otherwise hold sway.

**Chapter 4 : I, Ron, eek!: Musings on Carol Blum's Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue**

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This idea of negative liberty Berlin associates especially with the classic English political philosophers Hobbes, Bentham, and J. Mill, and it is today probably the dominant conception of liberty, particularly among contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. Roughly speaking, a person or group is free in the positive sense to the extent that they exercise self-control or self-mastery. It is not agreed, however, what exactly constitutes this self-mastery in the relevant sense. For example, the addicted gambler may be free in the negative sense not to gamble—since no one actually forces him to do so—but he is not free in the positive sense unless he actually succeeds in acting on his presumed second-order desire not to desire gambling. Berlin associates this second conception especially with such continental philosophers as Spinoza, Rousseau, and Hegel. Although it found some support among English Hegelians like T. Green, those who advocate the positive conception of liberty have generally been in the minority, particularly among contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. The troubling implications of the positive conception of liberty are well-known, and need not be rehearsed at length here. Regarding this danger, Berlin writes: It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good which I am too blind to see: The question remains, however, whether the received view of negative liberty as non-interference in particular adequately captures the political ideal we should be most interested in. Contemporary civic republicans argue that it does not. In the first, imagine a group of slaves with a generally well-meaning master. While the latter has an institutionally-protected right to treat his slaves more or less as he pleases he might start whipping them just for the heck of it, say, let us suppose that this master in particular leaves his slaves for the most part alone. Now to the extent that he does not in fact interfere with his slaves on a day-to-day basis, we are committed to saying—on the non-interference view of liberty—that they enjoy some measure of freedom. Some find this conclusion deeply counterintuitive: Even if we are willing to accept this conclusion, the non-interference view of liberty commits us to others that are perhaps even more paradoxical. For one thing, notice that we are committed to saying that the slaves of our well-meaning master enjoy greater freedom than the slaves of an abusive master down the road. Of course, the former slaves are better off in some respect than the latter, but do we really want to say that they are more free? Thus, on the non-interference view of liberty, we are committed to saying that his freedom is increasing over time. Now consider a second scenario. Imagine the colony of a great imperial power. Suppose that the colonial subjects have no political rights, and thus that the imperial power governs them unilaterally. But further suppose that the imperial power, for one reason or another, chooses not to exercise the full measure of its authority—that its policy towards the colony is one of more or less benign neglect. From the point of view of liberty as non-interference, we must conclude that the colonial subjects enjoy considerable freedom with respect to their government for, on a day-to-day basis, their government hardly ever interferes with them. Next suppose that the colonial subjects revolt with success, and achieve political independence. The former colony is now self-governing. On the view of liberty as non-interference, we must therefore say that there has been a decline in freedom with independence. As in the first scenario, many find this counterintuitive. Surely, a nation that has secured its independence from colonial rule must have increased its political liberty. What these examples are driving at is that political liberty might best be understood as a sort of structural relationship that exists between persons or groups, rather than as a contingent outcome. Whether a master chooses to whip his slave on any given day, we might say, is a contingent outcome: What is not contingent or at least not in the same way is the broader configuration of laws, institutions, and norms that effectively permit masters to treat their slaves however they please. The republican conception of political liberty aims to capture this insight as directly as possible. It defines freedom as a sort of structural independence—as the condition of not being subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of a master. Pettit, who has done more than anyone else to develop this republican conception of freedom philosophically, puts it thus: Pettit, , , , This view has since been widely embraced by republican-minded authors such as Skinner, , , , Viroli, Maynor, , , Laborde, , , Costa

, , , Honohan , , and Taylor Republican freedom merely requires the absence of something, namely, the absence of any structural dependence on arbitrary power or domination. Also like non-interference, non-domination comes in degrees: Despite these similarities, however, republican freedom is not equivalent to the received view of negative liberty as non-interference. In contrast to the non-interference view, it easily accounts for our intuitions in the two scenarios described above. The slave lacks freedom because he is vulnerable to the arbitrary power of his master; whether his master happens to exercise that power is neither here nor there. Likewise, what matters with respect to political freedom on the republican view is not how much the imperial power chooses to govern its colony, but the fact that the former may choose to govern the latter as much and however it likes. Moreover, the republican conception captures in a more intuitively satisfying way what would improve either situation with respect to political liberty. This is not necessarily to say that the slaves will enjoy greater well-being, all things considered—only that because their domination is lessened, they enjoy greater freedom to that extent. And of course, no matter how benevolent their particular master happens to be, no slave can be completely free until the institution of slavery itself is abolished. Political freedom, in other words, is constituted by rightly-ordered laws, institutions, and norms: Political freedom is most fully realized, on this view, in a well-ordered self-governing republic of equal citizens under the rule of law, where no one citizen is the master of any other Pettit , , ; Skinner , ; Spitz , ; Viroli ; Maynor ; Lovett a, a. Problems and Debates The appeal of the republican conception of political liberty as independence from the arbitrary power of a master is perhaps understandable. This is not to say, however, that this conception is uncontroversial. Before discussing its role in developing contemporary civic republican arguments, we should consider various problems and debates surrounding the republican idea of freedom. A common objection to the republican idea of freedom is that it fails to pick out a distinct conception at all. The suggestion here, first noted perhaps by Paley , is that talking about non-domination is really just another more obscure way of talking about security of non-interference Goodin ; Carter ; Kramer Contemporary civic republicans must reject this view. Pettit , 73—4 observes that one might secure a low expected level of non-interference in more than one way, and the republican idea of freedom is by no means indifferent as to the method adopted. Supposing then that non-domination and non-interference are indeed distinct ideas, one might wonder where this leaves the latter, on the civic republican view of things. Is obtaining freedom from arbitrary power the only thing we should care about? Roughly speaking, there are three possible answers civic republicans might give to this question. The first is simply to answer yes. It was a mistake, one might argue, to ever think non-interference important or desirable in itself. There are good reasons for rejecting this first answer, however. Imagine living in a community where our lives are regulated down to the tiniest detail, but always in strict accordance with commonly-known, non-arbitrary rules and procedures. Although we enjoy extensive freedom from arbitrary power, we have hardly any freedom of individual choice. Most would not want to live in such a community, and this suggests that we do indeed place some independent value on non-interference Larmore ; Wall This leaves two other possible answers. On the one hand, we might try to incorporate some measure of non-interference into our idea of freedom as non-domination. Something like this approach was initially taken by Pettit , 74—7: Perhaps my republican freedom is compromised when someone gains arbitrary power over me, but it is merely conditioned when I lack the means or opportunities to make full use of it, and interferences might be one such conditioning factor. On the other hand, we might allow that republican freedom and non-interference are distinct goods, but hold that both are valuable in some degree. We might either regard them as having roughly equal value Skinner , or we might regard republican liberty as having greater importance than non-interference, other things equal Viroli , Pettit Each of these options has its advantages and disadvantages, and there is no settled view in the contemporary civic republican literature on this point see Lovett A second major difficulty in developing the republican idea of freedom lies in giving precise meaning to the notion of arbitrariness. Not simply when its exercise is random or unpredictable. This view would undermine the whole point of the republican conception of political liberty. Discretionary power might be delegated to a public agency with a view to advancing certain policy goals or ends—as for example Congress has delegated discretionary authority to the Federal Reserve—but we would not want to say that this reduces our freedom or, at any rate, not so long as that discretionary authority is

appropriately answerable to a common knowledge understanding of the goals or ends it is meant to serve and the means it is permitted to employ. For reasons explained in the fourth section of this entry, contemporary civic republicans must be able to offer an account of non-arbitrary, yet discretionary authority. How then should we characterize arbitrary power? Broadly speaking, two answers have been proposed. The first defines non-arbitrariness procedurally. Power is not arbitrary, on this view, to the extent that it is reliably controlled by effective rules, procedures, or goals that are common knowledge to all persons or groups concerned Lovett , To be reliable and effective, on this view, constraints must be resilient over a wide range of possible changes or modifications in the relevant circumstances Lovett c. Roughly speaking, the procedural view equates republican freedom with the traditional idea of the rule of law, provided we are willing to extend the latter idea considerably List ; Lovett a. Alternatively, we might define non-arbitrariness democratically. Power is not arbitrary, on this second view, to the extent that it is directly or indirectly controlled by the concerned persons or groups themselves. In an example offered by Pettit , 57â€”58 , suppose Andrea has given Bob the keys to her alcohol cupboard, with strict instructions that no matter how much she pleads, he is not to return them except on twenty-four hours notice. Since Bob must answer to Andrea for his conduct in this regard, his power over her is not arbitrary. In roughly the same way, the power of the state over its citizens will not be arbitrary provided the people have an equal share in controlling how their state exercises its power. Many authors subscribe to some version of this democratic view see for example Bohman ; Laborde ; Forst ; McCammon . Either way, two caveats are worth noting. The first is that, on either view, arbitrariness simply means uncontrolled and vice versa. The second caveat is that, again on either view, arbitrary or uncontrolled power should not be defined along substantive lines as power that is unjust or illegitimate. The well-known problem with a moralized definition of arbitrariness is that it would collapse our conception of republican freedom into a general account of the human good Larmore ; Costa ; Carter . Some have wondered whether this is the case, however. This objection is most often expressed via the example of benevolent care-giving relationships. On the republican view that one enjoys freedom only to the extent that one is independent from arbitrary power, it would seem that children do not enjoy republican freedom with respect to their parents. But surely, one might suppose, the parent-child relationship is in most cases an extremely valuable one, and so we would not want greater republican freedom in such a context. Republican freedom is, perhaps, not always a good thing Ferejohn

**Chapter 5 : Carol Blum (Author of Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue)**

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Youth[ edit ] Rousseau was born in Geneva , which was at the time a city-state and a Protestant associate of the Swiss Confederacy. Since , Geneva had been a Huguenot republic and the seat of Calvinism. Five generations before Rousseau, his ancestor Didier, a bookseller who may have published Protestant tracts, had escaped persecution from French Catholics by fleeing to Geneva in , where he became a wine merchant. Rousseau was proud that his family, of the moyen order or middle-class , had voting rights in the city. The citizens were a minority of the population when compared to the immigrants, referred to as "inhabitants", whose descendants were called "natives" and continued to lack suffrage. In fact, rather than being run by vote of the "citizens", the city was ruled by a small number of wealthy families that made up the "Council of Two Hundred"; these delegated their power to a twenty-five member executive group from among them called the "Little Council". There was much political debate within Geneva, extending down to the tradespeople. Much discussion was over the idea of the sovereignty of the people, of which the ruling class oligarchy was making a mockery. In , a democratic reformer named Pierre Fatio protested this situation, saying "a sovereign that never performs an act of sovereignty is an imaginary being". Isaac followed his grandfather, father and brothers into the business, except for a short stint teaching dance as a dance master. After local officials stepped in, it was Isaac who was punished, as Geneva was concerned with maintaining its ties to foreign powers. She was raised by her uncle Samuel Bernard, a Calvinist preacher. He cared for Suzanne after her father Jacques who had run into trouble with the legal and religious authorities for fornication and having a mistress died in his early thirties. Vincent Sarrasin, whom she fancied despite his continuing marriage. After a hearing, she was ordered by the Genevan Consistory to never interact with him again. The child died at birth. Later, the young Rousseau was told a romantic fairy-tale about the situation by the adults in his familyâ€”a tale where young love was denied by a disapproving patriarch but that prevailed by sibling loyalty that, in the story, resulted in love conquering all and two marriages uniting the families on the same day. Rousseau never learnt the truth. While the idea was that his sons would inherit the principal when grown up and he would live off the interest in the meantime, in the end the father took most of the substantial proceeds. Sometimes, in the morning, on hearing the swallows at our window, my father, quite ashamed of this weakness, would cry, "Come, come, let us go to bed; I am more a child than thou art. Throughout his life, he would recall one scene where, after the volunteer militia had finished its manoeuvres, they began to dance around a fountain and most of the people from neighboring buildings came out to join them, including him and his father. Rousseau would always see militias as the embodiment of popular spirit in opposition to the armies of the rulers, whom he saw as disgraceful mercenaries. He remarried, and from that point Jean-Jacques saw little of him. Here, the boys picked up the elements of mathematics and drawing. Rousseau, who was always deeply moved by religious services, for a time even dreamed of becoming a Protestant minister. At age 13, Rousseau was apprenticed first to a notary and then to an engraver who beat him. At 15, he ran away from Geneva on 14 March after returning to the city and finding the city gates locked due to the curfew. She was a noblewoman of Protestant background who was separated from her husband. As professional lay proselytizer, she was paid by the King of Piedmont to help bring Protestants to Catholicism. They sent the boy to Turin , the capital of Savoy which included Piedmont, in what is now Italy , to complete his conversion. This resulted in his having to give up his Genevan citizenship, although he would later revert to Calvinism in order to regain it. Finding himself on his own, since his father and uncle had more or less disowned him, the teenage Rousseau supported himself for a time as a servant, secretary, and tutor, wandering in Italy Piedmont and Savoy and France. During this time, he lived on and off with De Warens, whom he idolized and called his "maman". Flattered by his devotion, De Warens tried to get him started in a profession, and arranged formal music lessons for him. At one point, he briefly attended a seminary with the idea of becoming a priest. Early adulthood[ edit ] When Rousseau

reached 20, De Warens took him as her lover, while intimate also with the steward of her house. A rather profligate spender, she had a large library and loved to entertain and listen to music. She and her circle, comprising educated members of the Catholic clergy, introduced Rousseau to the world of letters and ideas. Rousseau had been an indifferent student, but during his 20s, which were marked by long bouts of hypochondria, he applied himself in earnest to the study of philosophy, mathematics, and music. At 25, he came into a small inheritance from his mother and used a portion of it to repay De Warens for her financial support of him. At 27, he took a job as a tutor in Lyon. His system, intended to be compatible with typography, is based on a single line, displaying numbers representing intervals between notes and dots and commas indicating rhythmic values. Believing the system was impractical, the Academy rejected it, though they praised his mastery of the subject, and urged him to try again. He befriended Denis Diderot that year, connecting over the discussion of literary endeavors. This awoke in him a lifelong love for Italian music, particularly opera: I had brought with me from Paris the prejudice of that city against Italian music; but I had also received from nature a sensibility and niceness of distinction which prejudice cannot withstand. I soon contracted that passion for Italian music with which it inspires all those who are capable of feeling its excellence. In listening to barcaroles, I found I had not yet known what singing was. The risk of the education of the foundling hospital was much less". Ten years later, Rousseau made inquiries about the fate of his son, but no record could be found. When Rousseau subsequently became celebrated as a theorist of education and child-rearing, his abandonment of his children was used by his critics, including Voltaire and Edmund Burke, as the basis for ad hominem attacks. In 1769, Rousseau was paying daily visits to Diderot, who had been thrown into the fortress of Vincennes under a *lettre de cachet* for opinions in his "Lettre sur les aveugles", that hinted at materialism, a belief in atoms, and natural selection. According to science historian Conway Zirkle, Rousseau saw the concept of natural selection "as an agent for improving the human species. He wrote that while walking to Vincennes about three miles from Paris, he had a revelation that the arts and sciences were responsible for the moral degeneration of mankind, who were basically good by nature. Rousseau continued his interest in music. The king was so pleased by the work that he offered Rousseau a lifelong pension. He also turned down several other advantageous offers, sometimes with a brusqueness bordering on truculence that gave offense and caused him problems. Rousseau as noted above, was an enthusiastic supporter of the Italians against Jean-Philippe Rameau and others, making an important contribution with his Letter on French Music. Return to Geneva[ edit ] On returning to Geneva in 1764, Rousseau reconverted to Calvinism and regained his official Genevan citizenship. In 1762, Rousseau completed his second major work, the Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men the Discourse on Inequality, which elaborated on the arguments of the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. He resented being at Mme. Diderot later described Rousseau as being "false, vain as Satan, ungrateful, cruel, hypocritical, and wicked He sucked ideas from me, used them himself, and then affected to despise me". His mansion was Le Palais du Peyrou. These men truly liked Rousseau and enjoyed his ability to converse on any subject, but they also used him as a way of getting back at Louis XV and the political faction surrounding his mistress, Madame de Pompadour. Even with them, however, Rousseau went too far, courting rejection when he criticized the practice of tax farming, in which some of them engaged. Even his friend Antoine-Jacques Roustan felt impelled to write a polite rebuttal of the chapter on Civil Religion in the Social Contract, which implied that the concept of a Christian republic was paradoxical since Christianity taught submission rather than participation in public affairs. Rousseau helped Roustan find a publisher for the rebuttal. A famous section of Emile, "The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar", was intended to be a defense of religious belief. Because it rejected original sin and divine revelation, both Protestant and Catholic authorities took offense. This religious indifferentism caused Rousseau and his books to be banned from France and Geneva. He was condemned from the pulpit by the Archbishop of Paris, his books were burned and warrants were issued for his arrest. Rousseau, he wrote, "has not had the precaution to throw any veil over his sentiments; and, as he scorns to dissemble his contempt for established opinions, he could not wonder that all the zealots were in arms against him. The liberty of the press is not so secured in any country. Subsequently, when the Swiss authorities also proved unsympathetic to him"condemning both Emile, and also The Social Contract"Voltaire issued an invitation to Rousseau to come and reside with him,

commenting that: Let him come here [to Ferney]! I shall receive him with open arms. He shall be master here more than I. I shall treat him like my own son. He also mentioned that he had criticized Frederick in the past and would continue to be critical of Frederick in the future, stating however: We must succor this poor unfortunate. His only offense is to have strange opinions which he thinks are good ones. I will send a hundred crowns, from which you will be kind enough to give him as much as he needs. I think he will accept them in kind more readily than in cash. If we were not at war, if we were not ruined, I would build him a hermitage with a garden, where he could live as I believe our first fathers did I think poor Rousseau has missed his vocation; he was obviously born to be a famous anchorite, a desert father, celebrated for his austerities and flagellations I conclude that the morals of your savage are as pure as his mind is illogical. Frederick made no known reply, but commented to Keith that Rousseau had given him a "scolding". In the meantime, the local ministers had become aware of the apostasies in some of his writings, and resolved not to let him stay in the vicinity. He wrote back asking to be excused due to his inability to sit for a long time due to his ailment. Around midnight of 6<sup>th</sup> September, stones were thrown at the house Rousseau was staying in, and some glass windows were shattered. Although it was within the Canton of Bern, from where he had been expelled two years previously, he was informally assured that he could move into this island house without fear of arrest, and he did so 10 September. However, on 17 October, the Senate of Bern ordered Rousseau to leave the island and all Bernese territory within fifteen days. He replied, requesting permission to extend his stay, and offered to be incarcerated in any place within their jurisdiction with only a few books in his possession and permission to walk occasionally in a garden while living at his own expense. On 29 October he left the Ile de St. Here he met Hume, and also numerous friends, and well wishers, and became a very conspicuous figure in the city. No person ever so much enjoyed their attention Voltaire and everybody else are quite eclipsed. Diderot wanted to reconcile and make amends with Rousseau.

**Chapter 6 : Holdings : Rousseau and the republic of virtue : | York University Libraries**

*This is a review of Carol Blum's Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue that I wrote for a seminar on the French Revolution in I was a doctoral student in Anthropology but I was developing a strong interest in history.*

Holger Ross Lauritsen and Mikkel Thorup eds. Rousseau and Revolution Published: Reviewed by David Lay Williams, DePaul University Jean-Jacques Rousseau is perhaps most famous or even infamous for two features associated with his work and its influence. Among casual readers, he is known as the muse of the Jacobins in the French Revolution. Among more familiar readers, he is known for the many paradoxes and ambiguities that cover most corners of his oeuvre. The volume, written by scholars from Europe and the United States and drawn from a conference held in Aarhus, Denmark, consists of eleven essays plus an introduction. To be sure, Rousseau and the general will were very clearly in the air during the French Revolution -- on both sides. It was constantly heard in the Jacobin Club and in the branches later established by it throughout the country. Of course, this history is by no means a happy one. As Julian Bourg and Antoine Hatzenberger quote him, sometimes in the life of a state there are periods of violence. The noble become commoners, the rich become poor, the monarch becomes subject. We are approaching a state of crisis and the age of revolutions. As Bachofen 17 observes, Rousseau pledged as a young man "never to be party to any civil war, and never to uphold domestic freedom with arms. In every country let us respect the laws, let us not disturb the worship they prescribe; let us not lead the citizens to disobedience. For we do not know whether it is a good thing for them to abandon their opinions in exchange for others, and we are very certain that it is an evil thing to disobey the laws. He is ultimately too slippery on the matter to lend himself to such unanimity among interpreters. Many of the essays, however, do offer greater insight into his thoughts on revolution, continuity, disruption, and order that make it well worth reading. The volume is divided into three parts: In Part I, Blaise Bachofen argues for a largely conservative Rousseau, emphasizing some of the passages cited above. He contrasts his Rousseau with Locke, who is depicted as evincing a greater "anthropological optimism" 22 insofar as Locke trusts his people to wield revolutions wisely. Radical Requirements of Democratic Legitimacy in the Writing of Rousseau and Fanon," is less focused on Rousseau than on echoes of his thought in the post-colonial work of Frantz Fanon. She claims to find this in their shared methods, support for liberation, rejection of natural slavery, emphasis on equality, and openness to violence as a means of political change. The essay succeeds at this level, though the reader wonders what is special about Rousseau in this regard, as compared with other canonical or non-canonical figures who can roughly be said to embrace the same ideas. His essay offers a useful history of the rhetorical employment of Rousseau in various stages of the Revolution. He notes that through Rousseau was appreciated and cited, but not revered as a quasi-deity. Nor, he suggests, is there much evidence to link Rousseau to the Terror through , since this stage of the Revolution "was emergency government and not the general will" Hegel was a careful reader of Rousseau -- at first as a student, and then as a critic. Part II offers a less coherently linked set of essays. In the end, however, for Falaky, "it was. He pursues reconciliation of these contradictory impulses in Rousseau in what he calls "revolutionary government" , embodied in the impetus to "continue the revolution by organizing constant popular uprisings" , which he associates with Maoism. Lauritsen acknowledges that this reading is not what Rousseau actually advocated , but thinks it is within the spirit of Rousseau. Denmark " is addressed to a fairly specific subset of scholars: The Danes certainly read and even respected Rousseau, but he cannot be said to have had the influence of other figures, such as Hegel. Must they be "already bound together by some union of origin, interest, or convention" or should they be free from "deep-rooted customs" and "deep-rooted superstitions"? Mossin notes, however, that these demands are fundamentally different, characterizing them respectively as the path of continuity and the path of destruction Remarks on a Natural Metaphor" is the shortest essay in the collection and the most difficult to place. It opens with an extended excerpt from Deleuze almost the entire introduction on the inevitable disappointments of revolution and then goes on to consider the Corsican revolution, which understood itself as "having recovered its liberty" The essay is more evocative than argumentative. Insofar as the Lawgiver establishes these mores, he represents this conservative principle.

In an age where revolutions are sweeping the Middle East, it seems as good a time as any to reconsider the principles on which revolutions are grounded. But these essays also invite students of Rousseau to consider his works more generally. While this volume does not answer once and for all the timeless questions raised by his political thought, one at least takes a few steps toward a more sophisticated political philosophy through engaging its essays. Manchester University Press, , p. Michael Sonenscher Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, [] , p. Bob Blaisdell Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, [] , p. Vintage Books, , p. Cornell University Press, , p. Prentice-Hall, [] , p. Cambridge University Press, [] Allan Bloom New York: Basic Books, [] , p. All have shined, and every state which shines is on decline. I have reasons more particular than this maxim for my opinion, but it is unseasonable to tell them, and everyone sees too well. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. University Press of New England, , p. Cambridge University Press, [] , p. The University Press of New England, [] , p. Cambridge University Press, ,

**Chapter 7 : Jean-Jacques Rousseau - Wikipedia**

*Carol Blum is Research Professor of Humanities at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. She is the author of Diderot, the Virtue of a Philosopher and Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution.*

Arete moral virtue and Virtus virtue In the classical culture of Western Europe and those places that follow its political tradition, concern for civic virtue starts with the oldest republics of which we have extensive records, Athens and Rome. Attempting to define the virtues needed to successfully govern the Athenian polis was a matter of significant concern for Socrates and Plato ; a difference in civic vision ultimately was one of the factors that led to the trial of Socrates and his conflict with the Athenian democracy. The Politics of Aristotle viewed citizenship as consisting, not of political rights , but rather of political duties. Citizens were expected to put their private lives and interests aside and serve the state in accordance with duties defined by law. Rome, even more than Greece , produced a number of moralistic philosophers such as Cicero , and moralistic historians such as Tacitus , Sallust , Plutarch and Livy. Many of these figures were either personally involved in power struggles that took place in the late Roman Republic , or wrote elegies to liberty which was lost during their transition to the Roman Empire. They tended to blame this loss of liberty on the perceived lack of civic virtue in their contemporaries, contrasting them with idealistic examples of virtue drawn from Roman history, and even non-Roman " barbarians ". During the Medieval Age and the Renaissance[ edit ] Texts of antiquity became very popular by the Renaissance. Scholars tried to gather as many of them as they could find, especially in monasteries, from Constantinople, and from the Muslim world. Humanists wanted to reinstate the ancient ideal of civic virtue through education. Instead of punishing sinners, it was believed that sin could be prevented by raising virtuous children. Living in the city became important for the elite, because people in the city are forced to behave themselves when communicating with others. A problem was that the proletarianization of peasants created an environment in cities where such workers were hard to control. Cities tried to keep the proletarians out or tried to civilize them by forcing them to work in poor houses. Important aspects of civic virtue were: It became more focused on individual behavior instead of a communion of people. The people who believed in civic virtue belonged to a small majority surrounded by "barbarity". Parental authority was popular, especially the authority of the monarch and the state. Parental authority began to wane. But people can only be free by containing their emotions in order to keep some space for others. Trying to keep proletarians out or putting them in a poor house was not done anymore. The focus was now on educating. Work was an important virtue during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, but the people who worked were treated with contempt by the non-working elite. The 18th century brought an end to this. The advancing rich merchants class emphasized the importance of work and contributing to society for all people including the elite. The government and the elites tried to change the world and humanity positively by expanding the bureaucracy. Leading thinkers thought that education and the breach of barriers would liberate everybody from stupidity and oppression. Civic conversations were held in societies and scientific journals. American historian Gordon S. Wood called it a universal 18th-century assumption that, while no form of government was more beautiful than a republic, monarchies had various advantages: By contrast, in a republic, the rulers were the servants of the public, and there could therefore be no sustained coercion from them. In the absence of such persuasion, the authority of the government would collapse, and tyranny or anarchy were imminent. Authority for this ideal was found once more among the classical, and especially the Roman, political authors and historians. But since the Roman writers wrote during a time when the Roman republican ideal was fading away, its forms but not its spirit or substance being preserved in the Roman Empire, the 18th-century American and French revolutionaries read them with a spirit to determine how the Roman republic failed, and how to avoid repeating that failure. Civic Virtue , These widely held ideals led American revolutionaries to found institutions such as the Society of the Cincinnati , named after the Roman farmer and dictator Cincinnatus , who according to Livy left his farm to lead the army of the Roman republic during a crisis, and voluntarily returned to his plow once the crisis had passed. About Cincinnatus, Livy

writes: *Operae pretium est audire qui omnia prae diuitiis humana spernunt neque honori magno locum neque uirtuti putant esse, nisi ubi effuse affluent opes* It is worth while for those who disdain all human things for money, and who suppose that there is no room either for great honor or virtue, except where wealth is found, to listen to his story. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. November Learn how and when to remove this template message

Civic virtues were especially important during the 19th and 20th century. Additionally several major ideologies came into being, each with their own ideas about civic virtues. Conservatism emphasized family values and obedience to the father and the state. Nationalism carried by masses of people made patriotism an important civic virtue. Liberalism combined republicanism with a belief in progress and liberalization based on capitalism. Civic virtues focused on individual behavior and responsibility were very important. Many liberals turned into socialists or conservatives in the end of the 19th century and early 20th century. A focus on agriculture and landed nobility was supplanted by a focus on industry and civil society. An important civic virtue for socialists was that people be conscious of oppression within society and the forces which uphold the status quo. This consciousness should result in action to change the world for the good, so that everybody can become respectful citizens in a modern society. The first category, citizens, were to possess full civic rights and responsibilities. Citizenship would be conferred only on those males of pure racial stock who had completed military service, and could be revoked at any time by the state. Only women who worked independently or who married a citizen could obtain citizenship for themselves. Subjects would have no voting rights, could not hold any position within the state, and possessed none of the other rights and civic responsibilities conferred on citizens. The final category, aliens, referred to those who were citizens of another state, who also had no rights: Citizens, subjects of the State, and aliens. The principle is that birth within the confines of the State gives only the status of a subject. It does not carry with it the right to fill any position under the State or to participate in political life, such as taking an active or passive part in elections. Another principle is that the race and nationality of every subject of the State will have to be proved. A subject is at any time free to cease being a subject and to become a citizen of that country to which he belongs in virtue of his nationality. The only difference between an alien and a subject of the State is that the former is a citizen of another country. He is the master in the Reich. But this high honour has also its obligations. Those who show themselves without personal honour or character, or common criminals, or traitors to the fatherland, can at any time be deprived of the rights of citizenship. Therewith they become merely subjects of the State. A number of institutions and organizations promote the idea of civic virtue in the older democracies. Boy Scouts of America Scout Oath: On my honor I will do my best To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight. I pledge that I will serve faithfully in the Civil Air Patrol Cadet Program, and that I will attend meetings regularly, participate actively in unit activities, obey my officers, wear my uniform properly, and advance my education and training rapidly to prepare myself to be of service to my community, state and nation. We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does. Furthermore, I resolve to do my duty and live honorably so help me God. Institutions that might be said to encourage civic virtue include the school , particularly with social studies courses, and the prison , namely in its rehabilitative function. William Bennett , a Reagan administration cabinet member turned conservative commentator, produced *The Book of Virtues: Comparable ideas in non-Western societies*[ edit ] Confucianism , which specifies cultural virtues and traditions which all members of society are to observe, in particular the heads of households and those who govern, was the basis of Chinese society for more than years and is still influential in modern China. Its related concepts can be compared to the Western idea of civic virtue. Related concepts[ edit ] Friendliness Friendliness is a pro-social set of behaviors seen in people who are pleasant, agreeable, interested in others, genial, empathetic, considerate, and helpful. Not all civil behaviors are friendly. For example, duelling in response to an intolerable insult has been considered a civil behavior in many cultures, but it is not a friendly action. Politeness Politeness focuses on the application of good manners or etiquette. Because politeness is informed by cultural values, there is substantial overlap between what is polite and what is civil. However, if the action in question is not related to civic virtues, then it may be polite or rude, without strictly

being considered civil or incivil.

**Chapter 8 : Republicanism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*Jean-Jacques Rousseau was one of the most influential thinkers during the Enlightenment in eighteenth century Europe. His first major philosophical work, A Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, was the winning response to an essay contest conducted by the Academy of Dijon in In this work.*

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*Jean-Jacques Rousseau remains an important figure in the history of philosophy, both because of his contributions to political philosophy and moral psychology and because of his influence on later thinkers.*