DOWNLOAD PDF PROGRAMS, BUGS, DNA AND A DESIGN ARGUMENT ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

Chapter 1 : Azel | Luigi's corner

Programs, Bugs, DNA and a Design Argument. Alexander R. Pruss. May 27, e-mail: ap85@blog.quintoapp.com Department of Philosophy. Georgetown University. Washington.

Strolling with a skeptical biochemist More Recent Comments Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments An atheist reader send me this argument for the existence of God: The basic Leibnizian argument has the following steps: My first reaction whenever I see arguments like this is to look for evidence that supports the claim. What is the actual evidence that this God really exists? What is a "contingent fact" and why should I believe that every one of them has an explanation? The article by Alexander R. Pruss tries to convince me that this belief is related to something called the Principle of Sufficient Reason PSR and that it is self-evident. To me, this just seems like silly sophistry. The god of the cosmological argument is an imaginary god who exists only in the minds of philosophers. There is no connection between that imaginary "necessary being" and a god who actually does anything. The cosmological arguments are just rhetorical devices for satisfying theists who have acquired a belief in God for entirely different reasons. Nobody, including theists, arrives at a belief in a Christian godâ€”or any other personal godâ€”via the cosmological argument. To a non believer, the entire argument looks silly no matter how much you dress it up in philosophical finery. This is not proof of the existence of god so much as post hoc rationalization for believers. Remember that Pruss is trying to convince us that you must accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason and that principle leads automatically to the conclusion that "Every contingent fact has an explanation. On the other hand, it is not right to shoot one innocent person to save five. What is the morally relevant difference between the two cases? If we denied the PSR, then we could simply say: Both of these moral facts are just brute facts, with no explanation. Almost all moral theorists accept the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. But without the PSR, would we really have reason to accept that? We could simply suppose brute contingent facts. In this world, torture is wrong. In that world, exactly alike in every other respect, torture is a duty. No reason, just contingent brute fact. The denial of the PSR, thus, would bring much philosophical argumentation to a standstill. An interesting thing about this argument is that it yields a PSR not just for contingent truths but also for necessary ones. There was at least one American President who liked the idea and in the not-too-distant past torture was good sport in the Roman Catholic Church. What has this got to do with the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Take the five steps above. My real first reaction is more like, "Holy shit! Are there really people who believe this nonsense!

Chapter 2 : Sandwalk: Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments

I argue that an examination of the analogy between the notion of a bug and that of a genetic defect supports an analogy not just between a computer program and DNA.

A cosmological argument takes some cosmic feature of the universe â€" such as the existence of contingent things or the fact of motion â€" that calls out for an explanation and argues that this feature is to be explained in terms of the activity of a First Cause, which First Cause is God. A typical cosmological argument faces four different problems. If these problems are solved, the argument is successful. The first problem is that although some features, such as the existence of contingent things, call for an explanation, it can be disputed whether an explanation exists. The kalam and Thomistic arguments posit an intuitively plausible Causal Principle CP that says that every item of some sort â€" for example, event, contingent being, instance of coming-into-existence, or movement â€" has a cause. The arguments then split depending on how they handle the Regress Problem. The kalam argument proceeds by arguing, on a priori or a posteriori grounds, that the past is finite and hence, in fact, no infinite regress occurred. Every contingent fact has an explanation. There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts. Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact. This explanation must involve a necessary being. This necessary being is God. Then we get to the first ground for a Leibnizian PSR: And it is not clear on what grounds we could accept the LEM other than self-evidence. Is there some inductive argument like: Sighâ€¦ You accept the LEM as an axiom of your logical system. If LEM is true, this is equivalent to equating necessity with provability. But defenders of the Leibnizian cosmological argument typically use a notion of broadly logical necessity when they claim that God is a necessary being, and broadly logical necessity is weaker than provability. Self-evidence might well give those of us to whom the PSR is self-evident a good reason to believe it. But if we want to convince others, we need arguments. It may be taken to follow from this that if the PSR were false or maybe even not known a priori, we would not know any empirical truths. And now, get in gear for the third ground: That will be fun. We can use this insight to generate an ad hominem argument for the PSR. Most atheists and agnostics and many theists as well, but it is to atheists and agnostics that the argument is addressed believe that there is a complete naturalistic evolutionary explanation of the development of the human species from a single-celled organism. I claim that they are not justified in believing this if they do not accept the PSR. Had nothing better in store? We might first try an inductive argument. Some features of some organisms can be given naturalistic evolutionary explanations. Therefore, all features of all organisms can be given naturalistic evolutionary explanations. The first is that it might just be that naturalistic explanations are easier to find than nonnaturalistic ones; hence, it is no surprise that we first found those explanations that are naturalistic. But even if one could get around this objection, it would not obviate the need for the PSR. For the argument, at most, gives us reason to accept the claim that those features that have explanations have naturalistic evolutionary explanations. But what plausibility is there in the claim that natural occurrences have naturalistic explanations if one does not accept the PSR for contingent propositions? But everything that is governed by the laws of physics has a naturalistic explanation. Hence, the development of the human race has a naturalistic explanation, and an evolutionary one is the best candidate we have. Otherwise, why stop using a tool which actually works? Biology lab resources are limited after all. Also, the first argument may avail us nothing to defeat the PSR, it can serve as basis to being pragmatic. And to the likeliness argument thinking about it: And now, to the fourth ground: But does it make any sense to assign a probability to the hypothesis that a brick comes to exist ex nihilo in midair in front of us for no reason at all, assuming this is possible? Because the cardinality is so high, some of the photons would have to share the same quantum state; but photons are bosons, so they should be able to do that. And the number of ways such things could happen seems to have no limit if the PSR fails. On the other hand, if we get our probabilities a priori from some sort of principle of indifference, supposing all arrangements to be equally likely, the messy PSR-violating arrangements would seem much more probable. Why would we get

them from a principle of indifference though, as if no law of nature where applicable to that kind of events? Or the fact that the macro scale exists, thinking about it. We need both parts for the explanation: Also, his gods may very well be tricksters: One might think that some physical law, say, a conservation law, would do the explanatory work here, a principle other than the PSR. But the logical possibility of miracles shows that it should be possible for a supernatural being to cause photon clouds to show up ex nihilo, and if the PSR is false, such supernatural beings could be coming into existence all the time, causing the weird effects. Our best explanation for why this is not happening is that there is nothing in existence that would be likely to cause such supernatural beings to come into existence, and by the PSR they cannot come into existence uncaused. Now on to the next argument: Yes, I did theoretical CS, aka college-level maths. Yes, we are pains in the neck about that. Yes, these things appear in practice: And now, the modality accounts according to Pruss, starting with the narrowly logical one: Assuming classical logic, as these thinkers did, it follows that necessity is equivalent to provability. And a proposition is possible if and only if no contradiction can be proved from it. Hm, so the issue is that narrowly logical modality is descriptive and not prescriptive? It would be interesting to see non-classical logics applied to that account of modality though. Next us is the Lewisian account: The Lewisian account, also known as Extreme Modal Realism EMR , says that a proposition is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world, and necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds. This is only going to be of help if we have an independent account of possible worlds, and indeed EMR supplies one. A possible world is a maximal spatiotemporally interconnected aggregate of things. We can also stipulate that abstract entities count as existing in every world. We live in one of these worlds, the actual world, and there are infinitely many others. Every way that things could have been is a way that things are in some world. We then make a distinction between existence and actuality. Something exists provided it exists in some world or other. Something is actual provided it exists in the actual world. EMR has a number of problematic consequences. For instance, if EMR holds, consequentialistic moral reasoning breaks down completely because no matter what I do, the overall consequences in reality are the same, since reality always already contains all possible worlds. I cannot affect what happens in other worlds, but I can be the cause of goods in our world. Of course, this makes no difference in the space of all possible worlds â€" in infinitely many of them, people very much like me are causes of goods and in infinitely many of them, people very much like me are not causes of goods, and the distribution of worlds is not affected by my action. But my relationship to the goods is affected. However, this unacceptably reduces the moral weight of consequences. But since the agent-centered reason to be the cause of goods has extremely low weight, it follows that EMR radically lowers the weight of reasons to help strangers. If we accept a more traditional assessment of the weight of these reasons, we shall have to reject EMR. I see an argument to consequences hereâ€¦two problems though: And second point, his personal morality pokes out here: Note that the theoretical reason for believing in these Platonic propositions is largely independent of issues of modality. Adams then constructs a possible world as a maximal consistent collection of propositions. An argument is needed that such collections exist, but let that pass. Exactly one world is then absolutely actual: A proposition can be said to be true at a world, providing it is one of the propositions that are members of the collection of propositions that the world is identical with. Note that because the worlds are Platonic entities, I had to distinguish between the concrete universe, which we physically inhabit, and the actual world, which is the collection of all true propositions. What is it that picks out one relation in the Platonic heaven rather than another as the relation of representation? The relation of representation is one of the primitive terms in their theory, and it is not a primitive chosen ad hoc to explain possible worlds but a primitive needed for other explanatory purposes, such as for making sense of our practices of claiming, believing, and paraphrasing. But while a complete reduction is probably impossible, it could be desirable to give at least a partial reduction, on which the whole realm of alethic possibility would be seen to have its root in some more comprehensible subclass [â€¦] However, in a deeper way, the Platonic approach is not faithful to what the Aristotelian maxim affirms. When Aristotelians say that a possibility is grounded in an actuality, they mean that actuality includes some powers, capacities, or dispositions capable of

producing that possibility, which of course once produced would no longer be a mere possibility. That part on the Platonic account brings two things to my mind: Second, he seems to love himself some is-ought problems: Once again, the same question comes up: However, the Aristotelian is better off here than the proponent of just the narrowly logical view because the truths contained in the essences of things provide a rich set of nonarbitrary axioms. But eh, Mr Pruss is slamming the Lewisian account because it offends its sensibilities. The problem, thus, is with what constrains what essences there could be. What constrains which essences can exist? Some of these problems can be solved by going a theistic route.

Chapter 3 : New Waves in Philosophy of Religion

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Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments An atheist reader send me this argument for the existence of God: The basic Leibnizian argument has the following steps: My first reaction whenever I see arguments like this is to look for evidence that supports the claim. What is the actual evidence that this God really exists? What is a "contingent fact" and why should I believe that every one of them has an explanation? The article by Alexander R. Pruss tries to convince me that this belief is related to something called the Principle of Sufficient Reason PSR and that it is self-evident. To me, this just seems like silly sophistry. The god of the cosmological argument is an imaginary god who exists only in the minds of philosophers. There is no connection between that imaginary "necessary being" and a god who actually does anything. The cosmological arguments are just rhetorical devices for satisfying theists who have acquired a belief in God for entirely different reasons. Nobody, including theists, arrives at a belief in a Christian godâ€”or any other personal godâ€”via the cosmological argument. To a non believer, the entire argument looks silly no matter how much you dress it up in philosophical finery. This is not proof of the existence of god so much as post hoc rationalization for believers. Remember that Pruss is trying to convince us that you must accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason and that principle leads automatically to the conclusion that "Every contingent fact has an explanation. On the other hand, it is not right to shoot one innocent person to save five. What is the morally relevant difference between the two cases? If we denied the PSR, then we could simply say: Both of these moral facts are just brute facts, with no explanation. Almost all moral theorists accept the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. But without the PSR, would we really have reason to accept that? We could simply suppose brute contingent facts. In this world, torture is wrong. In that world, exactly alike in every other respect, torture is a duty. No reason, just contingent brute fact. The denial of the PSR, thus, would bring much philosophical argumentation to a standstill. An interesting thing about this argument is that it yields a PSR not just for contingent truths but also for necessary ones. There was at least one American President who liked the idea and in the not-too-distant past torture was good sport in the Roman Catholic Church. What has this got to do with the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Take the five steps above. My real first reaction is more like, "Holy shit! Are there really people who believe this nonsense!

Chapter 4 : Watch Alexander () online. Free streaming

4 Programs, Bugs, DNA and a Design Argument 55 Alexander R. Pruss 5 The 'Why Design?' Question 68 Neil A. Manson 6 Divine Command Theory and the Semantics of.

Laddas ned direkt Recensioner i media The Blackwell Companions are a well-known and prestigious series that always form an up-to-date and high-quality entry to a certain academic domain My appreciation prevails and I believe this book really offers a most worthy introduction to the issue of science-Christianity relations. Congratulations to Stump and Padgett for putting together this valu-able collection of well-written essays. Philosophia Reformata, 1 November As I said at the outset, this Blackwell Companion has proved itself to be an indispensable companion to me as I try to set out the current shape of the field for the third generation, but I cannot help but wonder how different such a volume will look in their time. Modern Believing, 1 January The result is a fascinating, rich collection of fifty-four essays grouped into eleven major sections To sum up, this volume nicely complements other recent works in the ongoing interaction between science and religion. Students and teachers in the field will find this volume an accessible, reliable, and up-to-date resource for the contemporary discourse between science and Christianity. Themelios, 1 April For those who have such a background, this book will be a valuable asset for orienting themselves in the broader conversation. He is the philosophy editor of Christian Scholars Review, and has published articles there as well as in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science and Philosophia Christi. He has co-authored with Chad Meister Christian Thought: A Historical Introduction He has authored or edited ten other books, including Science and the Study of God Stump and Alan G. Bowler 5 Science Falsely So Called: Fundamentalism and Science 48 Edward B. Towards a Prophetic Epistemology 82 Lisa L. Stenmark 9 Practical Objectivity: Ganssle 13 Natural Theology after Modernism J. Stump 14 Religious Epistemology Personifi ed: God without Natural Theology Paul K. Pruss and Richard M. Barr 17 Does the Universe Need God? Page 19 The Fine-Tuning of the Cosmos: Alexander 22 Darwinism and Atheism: A Marriage Made in Heaven? Barrett 29 The Third Wound: Has Psychology Banished the Ghost from the Machine? Evans and Michael S. Salmon 50 Thomas F. Torrance Tapio Luoma 51 Arthur Peaco.

Chapter 5 : For an Answer - Topical Studies

Alexander R. Pruss. "Cosmological and design arguments On selection panel for and National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend Programs.

Washington, DC Abstract I argue that an examination of the analogy between the notion of a bug and that of a genetic defect supports an analogy not just between a computer program and DNA, but between a computer program designed by a programmer and DNA. This provides an analogical teleological argument for the existence of a highly intelligent designer. Introduction Prima facie, there seems to be an analogical argument from the claims that DNA is like a computer program and that computer programs have programmers, to the claim that the DNA of an organism has a designer. This is a teleological argument. But unfortunately an unsound one: If it is countered that in these cases there is still a programmer behind the scenes who wrote the initial programs, then a defeater comes up: I will argue, however, that the analogical argument can be rescued if one fleshes out the analogy further, by showing that if there were computer programs that were not themselves designed by intelligent agents, they would lack certain normative characteristics that designed computer programs have, and then by arguing that DNA exhibits these same characteristics. Moreover, these characteristics of designed computer programs are such that we do not know of any natural process that does not involve an intelligent agent which could produce a program with them. This strengthens the analogical argument. It will turn out, I expect, that the main question for debate will be whether in fact DNA has the characteristics in question. In the case of the Plucker project, which is an off-line web browser for PalmOS PDAs, we encourage the bulk of the reports to come through our bug tracker web site [3]. A user making a request from the development team, needs to describe the issue sufficiently clearly for us to understand and hopefully duplicate. Once we receive the report, we may do several things. We might reclassify a bug report or feature request. Or we might, immediately or later, fix the bug or add the requested feature. The distinction between a bug report and a feature request is of practical relevance to both development teams. For instance, both projects go through periodic feature freezes during which the focus is on fixing bugs rather than adding possibly buggy code that adds new features. To see the distinctions at work, consider some particular cases from the Plucker project. This dot is mark of bottom previous page. At the same time, I also noted in my resolution note that if the dot annoyed the user, the user was free to file a feature request to allow users to configure if they want the dot or not. There are a couple of things worth noting here. First, there really is a distinction between a bug, something that should not be there in the program, and a feature. This is true even if the feature, like the black square in question, annoys some users. Nonetheless, this inference was ampliative. It could have been the case that the square appeared there due to a bug in the scrolling code, say, and simply happened to serve a useful purpose. My own inference that this was a feature was more certain than one based on a black box type analysis, because I had seen the lines coding for the feature in the source code, and thought, defeasibly but with great confidence, that these lines were deliberate and correct. However, this was an incorrect classification, once again. In other words, the program did not do something that the user wanted it to do, something admittedly desirable. It did not do this because this capability had never been put into it. There was thus some desirable functionality that was missing at the time of the report, and several months later it was added in, but its being missing was not a bug. On the other hand, sometimes something is filed as a feature request, whereas in fact it reports a bug. While this was filed as a feature request, viz. It would have been reasonable to consider this a bug report. We thus have a three-fold distinction, between bugs, features and missing functionality. Note, too, that while bugs and missing functionality tend to have disvalue and features tend to have value, this is not sufficient to ground a distinction between features on the one hand and bugs or missing functionality on the other. After all, a feature can annoy the majority of users, and still be a feature, though a misguided one. For instance, an older version of Microsoft Word would guess if the user were typing a letter and annoyingly ask the user if she wanted help with writing a letterâ€”many users resented

this and Microsoft eventually removed the feature. Conversely, a particular bug might actually please some users, and it is conceivable that it could please the majority of users. For instance, if due to a bug in Microsoft Word the query about helping the user with writing a letter disappeared after three appearances, this might well have pleased the majority of users. Similarly, missing functionality might render a program smaller and faster, and if the user does not care about the functionality this might be an improvement. Thus, our distinction, though a normative one, cannot be made solely in terms of the value that an aspect of the program has to the users. Nor can it be made in terms of the value that it has to the developers. A software development team, against its better judgment, may have to implement a feature requested by a boss, even though neither the team nor the user community likes the feature. The square on the margin really was a feature and not a bug. The last two examples suggest that the way to figure out whether something is a bug, a feature or a piece of missing functionality is to look at the intentions of the developers. It may, however, be more complicated than that. There may, for instance, be an interaction between the intentions of the developers and social standards. Thus, there might be a reasonable expectation that a program should do something, e. It might count as a bug in a computer virus if it fails to crash or otherwise damage the system it is running on. Moreover there could be, and no doubt is, specialized software that for testing purposes induces crashes. All this makes highly plausible the claim that if a program appeared randomly on my computer, e. What is of greatest interest to me from now on is that I could not make a distinction between, on the one hand, a bug and, on the other, a feature or missing functionality. Given that a byte-by-byte duplicate of the code can be buggy if produced by a programmer with one set of intentions and not buggy if produced by another with other intentions, it does not appear that there is any hope for figuring out what is a bug and what is not. I cannot tell if the system is correctly following a rule that it is undesirable for it to follow or if it is incorrectly following a rule that it would have been desire for it to follow. Observe, however, that despite this, in practice judgments can be made about whether something is a bug or not without querying the developers. Recall the case of the marginal square which a user figured out to be a feature, despite the developers having failed to document it as such, and how I then confirmed this on the basis of internal features of the code. In the case of a program that was produced by cosmic rays, both the behavioral and the internal grounds would remain. Something may look to all users like a bug, and yet be a feature, and the code for it can look like buggy code even though it is perfectly correct, as we would find out if we queried that developer who actually wrote it. But even though these kinds of assertibility conditions that do not consider intentions are insufficient as truth-conditions for a claim of bugginess, the existence of these conditions shows that it is possible to make judgments about bugginess without communication with the developer. Now, is DNA like computer programs simpliciter, or is it more specifically like designed computer programs? Designed computer programs, we have seen, have the normative characteristic that they are subject to evaluation for bugginess. However, undesirability is insufficient to define a genetic disorder. Our DNA guides our development in such a way that we do not grow prehensile tails. The failure to grow prehensile tails is objectively undesirable, since it is prima facie objectively desirable that humans should have prehensile tailsâ€”they would enable them to better engage more easily in various activities that are now rather difficult, such as taking care of twins or using a computer mouse while typing with both hands. The desirability here is only prima facie. It may be that if I had a prehensile tail, I would find shoplifting too easy and hence too tempting to withstand or I might find life less challenging and hence less interesting, and therefore the net effect on me would be negative. So just as software bugs cannot be defined in terms of desirability, neither can genetic disorders be. Some of our attitudes towards software bugs parallel our attitudes towards genetic disorders. But a bug or genetic disorder is intrinsically a bad thing for a program or organism to have. But of course the program or organism can be good overall despite the bug or defect. In the case of an undesirable bug or an undesirable genetic disorder, we feel that something has gone wrong. It seems deeply plausible, though this may be controversial, that there is an intrinsic difference between a doctor surgically treating cleft palate and a doctor attaching a prehensile tail to a person. Yet under certain circumstances, both could result in an equal improvement of quality of life. For

instance, suppose that you live in a poor area where there is a very high unemployment rate, but having a prehensile tail would enable you to find a form of employment that keeps you from starving to death. Conversely, there seems to be a prima facie badness in parents genetically modifying the egg and sperm in such a way as to bring it about that the resultant person should have cleft palate, which badness would not be shared in by, or would not be shared in in the same way by, the actions of parents who found that their genes were such as to produce a child with a prehensile tail and who had the genetic material modified to remove this possibility. This is true even should it be the case that the community was such that the child would be much better off with the tail. This suggests that there is an analogy not just between the DNA of organisms on earth, specifically our DNA, and computer programs, but between this DNA and those computer programs that support a distinction between bugs and non-bugs. But those computer programs that support such a distinction are precisely those that are designed by an intelligent agent. Hence, by analogy, our DNA is probably designed by an intelligent agent. Insofar as the designer of our DNA would have to be a highly sophisticated intelligent agent, this is a teleological argument. Moreover, if one thinks that there is strong evidence that our DNA evolved under the guidance of apparently naturalistic processes from the DNA of an initial simple organism, then this intelligent agent has to be the sort of being that is capable of intentionally producing our DNA through such processes. Now while a pretty smart Tau Cetian might be able to design human DNA from scratch, to set things up so that human beings would arise through a billion years of apparently naturalistic processes and yet be the product of design would take more than just a pretty smart alien. If the processes behind evolution are in fact essentially deterministic, it would seem to require a being capable of predicting ahead of time the results of a billion years of such processes. If the processes essentially exhibit quantum randomness, then the being would have to be either capable of predicting how indeterministic processes would turn out, no mean feat, or of affecting the outcomes of quantum mechanical experiments, again a difficult task. If these are denied, then the argument indeed fails. But it is important to see the manifold consequences of such a view. Likewise, it destroys the rational basis for our common social attitudes towards genetic disorders, attitudes that imply that there is a special badness in producing them. These attitudes, in fact, apply not just in the case of humans, but in the case of animals, though there, depending on our views on animal experimentation, we may take the badness not to imply indefeasible claims of illiceity. The question of why God permits there to be genetic disorders is only relevant to arguing against the conclusion of this paper if there is a good argument from the claim that the species here on earth are designed by an intelligent being to the claim that there is a God. But I will bite, since in persona propria I think there is a God and I suspect, though I do not argue so here, that such an argument as described could be given if one combined this argument with other theistic arguments. One can expand on the worry about God and genetic defects in two different ways. Hence, they are not defects, and the argument is undercut. This argument, however, neglects the fact that intentions are an intensional phenomenon. One can intend something under one description and not under another. Thus, a programmer working under a deadline may release a buggy program, knowing it is buggy, and intending that this program be the one that is sold. The bugs are, nonetheless, bugs. Now, it may be argued that God does not operate under such limitations as programmers do, and hence there is no excuse for non-intentionally present bugs. This leads to the second argument, namely what sort of excuse a perfectly good being would have for producing a world containing genetic defects. And for that, alas, there is no room here.

Chapter 6 : Sandwalk: October

DNA: The Message in the Message (Nancy R. Pearcey,) The Prospects for Natural Theology (Alvin Plantinga,) Programs, Bugs, DNA and a Design Argument (Alexander R. Pruss,).

Chapter 7 : Alexander Pruss's Blog: An argument that insects are not conscious

Alexander R Pruss said. Ian: When dealing with old evidence, one's actual order of learning doesn't have to match the order of Bayesian update from some sort of deemed priors (which aren't actually temporally prior).

Chapter 8 : Alexander Pruss's Blog: 'Ought' implies 'can'?

/ T.J. Mawson --Programs, bugs, DNA and a design argument / Alexander R. Pruss --The 'why design?' question / Neil A. Manson --Divine command theory and the semantics of quantified modal logic / David Efird --Divine desire theory and obligation / Christian B. Miller --The puzzle of prayers of Thanksgiving and praise / Daniel Howard-Snyder --A.

Chapter 9 : New Items at the University of Toledo Libraries

The book New Waves in Philosophy of Religion has been published by Palgrave MacMillan last December as part of its New Waves in Philosophy anthology blog.quintoapp.com series aims to "gather the young and up-and-coming scholars in philosophy to give their view of the subject now and in the years to come, and to serve a documentary purpose.".