

# DOWNLOAD PDF PLAYING WITH EUROPE : THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON THE HUNGARIAN PARTY SYSTEM ZSOLT ENYEDI

## Chapter 1 : Frontiers of Democracy: Faculty and Student Research | Central European University

Enyedi Z. () *Playing with Europe: The Impact of European Integration on the Hungarian Party System*. In: Lewis P.G., Mansfeldová; Z. (eds) *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*.

But as Zsolt Enyedi notes, recent election results have demonstrated that populist parties cannot only win power, but also show a surprising level of resilience when they enter government. He argues that populism can no longer be regarded simply as a symptom of the dysfunction of institutions: Populism “whether conceived as ideology, organisational strategy, a form of mobilisation, or discourse” is typically analysed in the context of protest movements and minor parties. Populist government receives less attention, and if it does, the discussion tends to be based on ideal-types or on the extrapolation of trends observed within the opposition circles of liberal democracies. Now that we can see populists in power in an increasing number of countries, we need to reconsider the anti-establishment nature of populism. The association between the two concepts is even stronger in Europe and in the US, where populist forces used to be marginal and oppositional. Well, they are no more. From Italy to Hungary, or from Poland to the United States, we now see how populists in government translate their ideas into policies. While removing anti-elitism from the definition of populism would deprive the term of much of its analytical value, we need to take some of the caveats more seriously than in the past. First, since typically the populist elements are part of a larger ideological package, the undifferentiated rejection of all elites is rare. Second, the veneration of the people, often considered as a hallmark of populists, can coexist with deep scepticism concerning their competence Trump famously wondered how stupid the people of Iowa can be. Even more importantly, the negative, transitory, disruptive and insurgent character of populism is more a product of historical happenstance than a consequence of the populist DNA. After the Second World War, populists faced a largely content and deferential electorate in much of the developed world. The talent of their leaders, their organisational capacity or their internal discipline fell short of the challenges they needed to meet, and therefore they could not reach much further than to temporarily disrupt the well-oiled machinery of welfare states and liberal democracies. The viability of the enterprise attracts the type of people that populists missed so far: But the inhibitions that constrain other political actors from using norm-breaking methods for keeping governmental power do not apply to populists, and therefore they can be surprisingly resilient in office. Naturally, populists need to change once in government. Primarily, they need to redefine the opponent so that the actual government and the parliamentary majority are excluded from the definition. The alternatives are many: There is no shortage of powerful actors against whom a national prime minister or president can be presented as an underdog. And since in the fight against such Goliaths the populist politician needs all the support he can get at home, the hierarchical and punitive aspects of domestic governance inevitably need to be enhanced. The established position of populist parties also means that their supporters will change. It is customary, for example, to measure populist attitudes through negative sentences about politicians. But in countries governed by populists, the opponents of the populists are more likely to agree with such statements. Researchers need measurement tools that are sensitive to how the populist establishment defines its enemies in order to understand why people keep supporting such governments. The Hungarian and the Polish cases show that effective and relatively stable populist governance requires the frequent change of specific rules of politics and business and the creation of an uneven playing field through the carefully calibrated redistribution of resources. Both regimes have repressive elements, but they do not imprison critical citizens, do away with freedom of speech or abolish the formal structures of liberal constitutionalism. This discourse is compatible with responsible fiscal policies and effective law-and-order measures. It is also important to acknowledge that while the antagonism of the populist establishment to constitutional democracy and to the division of power is undeniable, its hostility towards party pluralism is less obvious. Sure, there are many instances when the populists in government speak as if they were identical with the people but even more often they acknowledge that they exist in a

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legitimately fragmented political space. Fidesz and PiS or AKP in Turkey and PAIS in Ecuador originally won their power through fair party competition, and although subsequently they invested considerable energy into making this competition less fair, they are comfortable with the practices and rituals of electoral competition. The very fact that there are examples of populists operating and reforming states in a systematic fashion casts doubts on those approaches in the literature that emphasise the anti-institutional and un-institutionalised character of populism. Populism can no longer be regarded simply as a symptom of the dysfunction of institutions. Populists need to be appreciated as institution builders. His recent publications on this topic include contributions to the edited volumes *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession* , *Absorbing the Blow*:

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Chapter 2 : Zsolt Enyedi | Central European University - [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

64 4 *Playing with Europe: The Impact of European Integration on the Hungarian Party System* Zsolt Enyedi<sup>1</sup> *The literature on the impact of European integration (see Mudde, ;*

Allan Sikk Content, Competition, Constraints: School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London Draft version, please do not quote without permission The emergence and expansion of European Union has perhaps been the most important political development in European subcontinent during the past half a century. Only the fall of the Berlin wall “ that was a prelude to further expansion of the Union “ may rival that. After re-gaining independence, joining the EU was easily the main political and economic change for Estonia. However, the experience of old member states shows that the EU with all the delegated power has only modestly influenced national party competition “ especially directly regarding the power of European issue itself for structuring domestic party competition. Direct effects of EU membership on Estonian party politics are virtually non-existent, similarly to the experience of older member states of Western Europe and earlier evidence from new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. Repercussions of an exit would very likely be intolerable, and it is well understood. Almost no actors of any significance argue for that “hardly surprisingly given the very high popular support for EU membership. On the other hand, the direct impact of Estonian parties or politicians on the policies of EU is or is perceived to be minimal. Some issues related to EU that have caused some political debate “ such as the infamous levy on excess stocks of sugar, common energy policy, the use of European funds “ but none of them has had the potential to spark a new party, a faction within an existing one, or significantly restructure the competition among the existing parties. Therefore, this paper focuses on three somewhat isolated topics related to indirect effects: Content refers to the presence of EU-related issues in party programs and whether they may have subtly structured the party system. We will be looking at various indicators in public opinion surveys from and Furthermore, we will assess the EU element in their and national election manifestos. Even though the election coincided with the failure to comply with either or deadline of introduction of the Euro, the common currency was not a significant topic in the campaign. While it was discussed to some extent, it certainly failed to be decisive or distinguish parties in a run up to elections. Electoral systems are known to have impact on party systems starting from Maurice Duverger. First, as different electoral systems are used compared to national elections, they are bound to lead to somewhat different outcomes and may restructure party systems. The British rules for European elections are perhaps most different from the ones used for national elections, but there are important differences in other countries as well “ including Estonia. Secondly, a European Parliament election simply adds an event to electoral calendar. Each additional election provides opportunities and risks for political parties and has a potential to change party system by bringing in new players, increase the status or weaken others, and change the party elites as some take up positions non-compatible with those held thus far. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. More recent volumes on the topic include Arend Lijphart Electoral Systems and Party Systems: It can be argued that globalization in general and the EU in particular constrains feasible policy options of national actors. It is difficult to assess what Estonian politics would look like if the country did not become a member. Estonian politics without the existence of the EU is simply unimaginable “ that is certainly different from most old member states, as national politics had existed some time before the emergence of EU. New constraints are posed on policies by the introduction of Euro and the corresponding Maastricht criteria. Below, it would be argued that rather lax deadlines combined with opportunities available in national politics, and the lack of enthusiasm for common currency leaves some room for independent macroeconomic policies. Yet again, it is difficult to speculate about the range of policy options if the EU and EMU were not there. This categorization is not an attempt to propose a better or more comprehensive classification for the effects of Europeanization than has been proposed before, for example by Robert Ladrech. Ladrech singles out five areas where the membership in the EU may affect political parties:

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Party Positions on Europe In general, the support for EU membership has increased substantially in Estonia since accession. While in September the support for membership was 63 percent resulting in a 67 percent support at the accession referendum, it has remained at or over 70 percent since July , reaching 85 in May see Figure 1. It lingered at around 40 percent of the adult population during , increasing to 47 in May for the first time to surpass the figure for the opposed since September when respective data has become available. In the following sections, we analyse the partisan dimensions in various measures indicating the support or evaluation of EU membership. Support for the introduction of Euro as a percent of adult population. The official support of the EU for Estonia may have significantly increased the image, but the effect might not last long. The latter is still universally high i. The exact wording was: Others think that it has already gone too far. What do you think? What number on this scale best describes your position? Contrasting the data extracted from polls with data from expert surveys would give a better check on the reliability of the data. Unfortunately, expert survey data was only available for However, the scores were not very different, see Allan Sikk It is likely because the question here relates to further EU unification. Given the fate of constitutional treaty and uncertainty about what further unification may mean, 9 it is surprising that the share of those who could not specify their position remained at 15 percent of the respondents. Similar differences are present in its supporters assessment of EU membership and trust in EU decision-making. Even though the party mainly draws its support from rural areas and has always been softly Eurosceptic, the visibly decreased enthusiasm among its supporters poses a small puzzle as the party itself does not seem to have become more Eurosceptic. Indeed, the party was until in charge of the Ministry of Financial Affairs, and thus responsible for and pushing the introduction of Euro. Four years on, the references to the EU in the manifesto were considerably toned down. Most of the Eurosceptic sentiment stems from its rural supporters, but the difference in the position of rural and urban people is lesser than that between the PU and other main parties. Thus, the party perhaps has yet to come to terms with the anti-EU sentiment of its grassroots, that could lead to adoption of a less enthusiastic program. However, that would entail a significant risk of alienating its more EU-friendly supporters there are segments of rural population benefiting significantly from European agricultural means and more than a third of its voters lies at the middle-point of the scale or above. Also, its very rural outlook may make it difficult to gain foothold in urban areas. After all, the party has sometimes been argued to be the most reliant on clientelist practices in Estonia that may increase the importance of a coalition potential i. Eestimaa Rahvaliidu platvorm That was up from 54 percent in Its rural supporters had not only increased in number, but also grown more Eurosceptic. Circles indicate placement in and triangles in Based on post-election surveys after European and parliamentary elections conducted by the Department of Political Science, University of Tartu. Correlation between party positions on the EU and their placement on Left-Right scale has been noted for some new member states including Estonia,<sup>13</sup> while it has been disconfirmed in others. However, the party position on EU increases only very slightly with movement from Left to Right by 0. For Estonia, see Sikk An Apparent or Real Impact? Running the regression the other way around with Left-Right as a dependent variable yields a more marked increase. For one point increase on the EU integration scale, the party position increases by 0. For a discussion on the asymmetric nature of regression see Rein Taagepera forthcoming. See Andres Kasekamp Therefore, the correlation presumably only applies for larger parties, while at the fringes right-wing Euroscepticism persists in Estonia. Most Estonian political parties are positively in favour of the EU membership or have fully accepted it. Most parliamentary parties make a reference to responsible or beneficial use of EU funds in Estonia. Four of the parliamentary parties at the time of writing outlined more detailed policies to be addressed at the EU level. The limited attention to the EU in their manifestos may well be indicative of their less enthusiastic stance on the EU. Its European umbrella organization, ECPM stresses subsidiarity, national identity in the EU and balance between the member states and the EU while embracing solidarity. While the parties stressed those issues slightly more than the others, each of the manifestos had other references to EU policies and most of the topics listed were also found in manifestos of other parties. The Russian Party, the ethnic Russian Constitution Party and the

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Left Party all made favourable if somewhat vague mentions on the EU in their manifestos – the latter welcomed the EU and more integration if it was based on the Nordic model. The Independence Party stood out as the only eurosceptical party before Riigikogu elections. The contrast to the rest was especially strong as it called for leaving the EU and considered the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by parliament an act of high treason. Its strongly anti-EU rhetoric only managed to mobilize the support of 0. Competition Changes in Estonian Party System The European elections in Estonia were characterized by impressive success of the Social Democrats that was a modest party in Estonia, but managed to win half of the six seats. Even though polls conducted immediately after the election showed increase in intention to vote for the party in national elections, their success failed to increase significantly their popularity in elections to the national parliament. Even though turnout in European Parliament elections was much lower than in parliamentary elections 27 and 62 per cent respectively, there were actually more people voting for the Social Democrats in compared to The respective figure for other parties contesting the European elections was only 38 percent. It remains surprising that the popularity of Ilves managed to make his party second most popular immediately after the elections. While the later evidence shows that such effects may not be long-lasting, the parties may convert its European success into domestic gains if electoral calendar happens to be more favourable. Beside the 50 percent increase in the popularity of the Reform Party and the merger of Pro Patria and Res Publica parties, the major change in Estonian party system between and was the entry of the Greens to the parliament. While the intent was clear already in , the party itself was officially established in late and it did not contest local elections. It is difficult to assess the exact impact of contesting European elections on the success in parliamentary election, but it was certainly positive to a degree. On one hand, it was a test for the upcoming party; on the other, it provided the Greens with some necessary and relatively cheap – compared to national election campaigns – media coverage. On the other hand, it is known from electoral system research that different rules per se shape party systems. In particular, it is well-established that small magnitude – or effective magnitude to be more exact – lead to fewer parties and is harmful for smaller parties. An extreme example of that is posed by first-past-the-post systems in United Kingdom and USA, where third parties are strongly underrepresented. Rein Taagepera has proposed a general formula linking magnitude and effective threshold – i. In Estonian parliamentary elections, a five percent legal threshold is in use. No legal threshold is used and the magnitude yields an effective threshold of Therefore, a party may expect a seat only if it wins the support of slightly more than ten percent of voters. In principle, such a system should benefit larger parties at the expense of smaller ones.



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## Chapter 3 : Publications of Enyedi, Z. | Publications Repository

by Zsolt Enyedi. Download .pdf) *Playing with Europe. The Impact of European Integration on the restructure relations within the party system and create new.*

The Hungarian Party System in The central puzzle is that the combination of a party system dominated by two large parties and an electoral system with a strong majoritarian component has resulted in centrifugal, rather than centripetal, competition. Most comparative politics scholars associate majoritarian electoral systems with Downsian convergence on the median voters Downs Three other and related aspects of the Hungarian election stood out as unusual compared to developments elsewhere in Central Europe. First, Fidesz-KDNP secured more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, and thus the power to re-write the constitution. Second, the most stable party system in post-communist Central Europe underwent dramatic change. Two long-established small parties fell below the electoral threshold and seemingly disintegrated, leaving only two of the six parties that won seats in the election still standing. Third, Jobbik emerged as the third largest party, closely behind MSZP in terms of both votes and seats. These developments raised questions not only about Hungarian party politics, but also about whether and to what extent this fits into a broader European pattern. Was this a peculiar result of an unlikely set of circumstances; the consequence of the medium-term development of the Hungarian party system; or can it be seen as part of a broader trend in European politics? The centre-left coalition had been in power for eight years, under three different prime ministers albeit run more or as a less technocratic interim government for the last year. It had presided over an economy in crisis. The last two elections had been too close to call before the polling booths closed. These are factors that have been seen elsewhere in Europe, both separately and in this combination. However, the Hungarian story also featured its own more or less unique elements. The most important was the polarisation of party politics. Although the party system was remarkably stable in the and s, the process of party system stabilisation brought about two increasingly hostile blocs. By the end of the decade the Christian national bloc was falling apart, and Fidesz had taken over as the leading party on the right. The and elections were dominated by these two blocs. By this two-bloc contest had been reduced to a two-party contest between Fidesz and MSZP. The approach taken to analysis of party system development and change in the present chapter is one that focuses first and foremost on political parties as strategic actors. This perspective sees political parties or more specifically, the party leadership as more or less rational agents that that try to combine a series of goals that might not always be compatible: The proposition put forward in what follows is that the election can be seen as the latest development in the process of party system stabilization in Hungary in the sense that consolidated the MSZP â€” Fidesz rivalry at the core of the party system. Anti-communism and rhetoric about oligarchy and incomplete regime change returned to the political agenda, in sharp contrast to the declining role such questions played in other post-communist EU states. This process was far from inevitable, and can be understood as the result of a series of contingent decisions about party strategy that could easily have turned out otherwise. The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a brief review of the election, and the core characteristics of the Hungarian party system in The third concluding section returns to the opening questions, and assesses the Hungarian party system anno in a comparative perspective. These elections saw the emergence of new populist anti-tax parties that fundamentally changed the dynamics of party competition; as well as the rise of post-materialist socialist left parties. The label fits the Hungarian election well, since it saw two new parties win seats, neither of which fit into the established pattern of party competition. Both were protest parties. LMP was established as a green alternative to a discredited political establishment, building on commitment to social justice and participatory politics. Its first national poll was the EP elections, when it took 2. Table 1 â€” percentage of votes list votes and percentage of all the seats Party Votes seats votes seats votes seats votes Seats votes seats votes seats MSZP The most remarkable aspect of the election was also the most widely predicted: In , after four years in

government with the MDF and FKgP, Fidesz had come close to becoming the first governing party in Hungary to win re-election. Its defeat in came as a surprise. By the polls were clear: Fidesz-KDNP was set not only to win, but win an absolute number of the votes and capture two-thirds of the seats. Both parties had changed their profiles since the mids, and achieved a dominant position on their side of the political spectrum. However, this is hardly unique in post-communist Europe: Slovakia and Poland have provided ample examples of parties that are nominally on the right but which programmes are far from free market. A comparison with Italian or Norwegian politics reveals a similar pattern: In terms of economic policy it is tempting to conclude that the majoritarian elements of the electoral system, which rewarded the winners of the , , and elections with seats far out of proportion to their share of the votes see table 1 , may Nick Sitter, CEU and BI, 31 January , p4 offer some clues to the pattern of competition between the two main parties. Given the economic reforms introduced by the MSzP " SzDSz government, their defeat in came as no surprise. By both Fidesz and the MSzP had learned the lesson well. With a less controversial economic policy Fidesz almost managed re-election in Consistent and prudent economic policy took a lower priority than re-election. Consequently the coalition managed to secure re-election in If the Hungarian experience in the s and s hold one lesson, it is a lesson in the difficulties of managing tight economic policy in the context of winter-takes-all electoral systems. However, in Hungary the majoritarian part of the electoral system has re-enforced this trend more than a PR-system would have done. It may even have contributed to extending this phenomenon well into the s. Although this was hardly a surprise, since both parties had come perilously close to the threshold for parliamentary representation in and were polling poorly in the opinion polls in for more than a year leading up to the election, both were long- established features of the Hungarian party system. Their fates are hardly unique to Hungary: The story of the MDF in the s is one that several free-market liberal parties in formerly communist states have shared. As Fidesz moved toward the cultural right, MDF effectively leapfrogged Fidesz into the centre in the mid For outside observers, particularly the European press, the biggest shock of the Hungarian election was nevertheless that a far-right party with links to a uniformed movement took The second new party to enter parliament in , LMP, was far more ordinary by comparative European standards. Like Jobbik LMP made the most of the antiestablishment backlash, picked up on an anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist trend, and won support from a disproportionate share of young especially first-time voters; but it did this from the diametrically opposite ideology. Its effort to stay clear of both the both Fidesz and MSzP was reminiscent of the initial strategy of many West European green parties, as was its commitment to grass-roots participatory politics and its focus on the environment, tolerance and inclusion, and its rejection of the political establishment, clientelism and corruption. As the year came to a close, the question of how LMP would position itself in Hungarian parliamentary politics remained open, as did the future of the party itself. Party strategy, party competition and party system polarisation The central proposition put forward in this chapter is that the political developments that led to the election can be seen as part and parcel of the process of party system stabilization in Hungary, and that this process has been shaped more by the political parties strategic choices than by the underlying social structures of cleavages. As other contributors to this volume have observed, social cleavages play a major part in shaping party politics. The point is rather that party strategy has played a remarkable role in shaping Central European party systems in the two decades since Bakke and Sitter In Hungary, as in the rest of post-communist Europe, a number of very different strategies were pursued by a wide range of parties. Only a few proved successful in the long run. The key to this is party strategy. Party strategy may be defined as the link between goals and their achievement. This involves a broad formula for how a party is going to compete: Historically, most West European parties have come close to one of three strategies. Three Party Strategies Protest: Competing at the Defining left vs. Third, and alternatively, some inter-war parties rejected liberal democracy and thus operated at the communist and fascist extremes, although their post-war successors have either modernised or been crowded out by socialist left and new populist parties at the respective flanks Taggart To be sure, many parties represent a mix of strategies and some parties transform themselves from one type to another. In post-communist Hungary, as

elsewhere in Central Europe, most of these strategies were attempted by one political party or another as the main contenders struggled to define the left–right dimension of political competition and establish a dominant role on either side of the centre. As in Poland, the matter proved relatively straight-forward on the left side of the political spectrum. No party emerged to challenge the MSzP, which swiftly positioned itself near the centre, and won the elections. Its offer of a coalition to the SzDSz in 2002 has been interpreted as a tactical deal partly to ensure legitimacy for government policy and partly because the MSzP right wing correctly assessed that an alliance with the SzDSz would enable it to disarm its own left wing. The struggle to define and dominate the right followed a far less predictable pattern. The election was a triumph for the Christian national right over its more market-oriented and cosmopolitan liberal rivals. However, two sets of strategic choices were to shape the development of the centre-right in Hungary in directions that would have seemed imponderable in 2002. The first was the divisions within the three victors of the election, as each party divided over how to react to the electoral defeat in 2002. The second was the rise of Fidesz, as it moved into the space left open by the three Christian national parties in the mid-2000s and absorbed elements from all three parties. The KDNP formally split in 2006, and seven of its MPs were re-elected in 2006 when one of its two factions arranged to run on the Fidesz ticket after the rump-KDNP failed to win seats in either 2002 or 2006, the party re-united under the Fidesz umbrella. The reduction of political space in Hungary also involved the marginalisation of the extreme right until about 2006, as Fidesz occupied a broad space on the political right. By contrast the next party to emerge on the right flank, Jobbik, soon developed into a far better organised party. Between 2002 and 2006 the Hungarian party system thus saw a realignment from three blocs to two; and from six parties to four. As in other post-communist states, party system development included a considerable measure of trial and error. Several strategies and ideologies were adopted and tested. On the right a wider set of strategies were tested: Both chose economic policies that were more free-market than their respective partners and both saw heated debates on party strategy, which in turn contributed to their demise in 2006. From 2006 onwards Fidesz and MSzP each saw the other as its main competitor. However, unlike the cartel parties discussed by Katz and Mair these two parties found little common ground and hardly agreed on the government sharing the spoils of electoral victory with its defeated opponent. Both learned the lesson from MSzP defeat that year: They fought each other not Nick Sitter, CEU and BI, 31 January 2007, p9 so much on economic policy as on valence questions related to values, competence and corruption. Polarized and bipolar, but stable? In the central characteristic of Hungarian party competition was the increasingly polarised competition between MSzP and Fidesz. The campaign was almost as polarized. Fidesz showed no sign of moving to a more centrist strategy in the aftermath of the election; nor did MSzP.



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## Chapter 4 : Zsolt Enyedi -- Personal Website

*The Impact of the European Union on Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (with Paul G. Lewis) In Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova (eds.): The European.*

Faculty and Student Research Frontiers of Democracy: He is particularly interested in the history and changing practices of "great powers" and their role in global political order. He also analyzes questions of European and global governance including the future of European institutions. He is also interested in public opinion, survey methodology, and East European politics. He is also active in the field of comparative methodology, especially on set-theoretic methods, in particular Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA and its fuzzy set extension. Folsz is a political economist specializing in post-communist transition and the EU, with a special focus on enlargement and monetary unification. Theories and practices of good governance in and after democratic transition, and the role of courts in constructing the constitutional subject are at the center of her research interests. His current research program investigates the political economy of development, with a particular interest in the economic causes and consequences of political instability, civil conflict and democratization. Students CEU is a laboratory for ongoing doctoral research projects on the different stages of development, concerning various aspects of democracy. Below is information about some of them. Also, the dissertation analyzes whether voters in the two countries value constituency service. The project draws on a number of original data sets comprising parliamentary behavior data e. In his work, Schmidt explores the long-term consequences of post-conflict power-sharing agreements and focuses particularly on the inherent incompatibilities between the short-term necessities of external peace-making and the requirements for the long-term emergence of a self-sustaining peace and a functioning democratic system. His research is based on quantitative as well as comparative case study research and seeks to put the experiences of Bosnia Herzegovina since the Dayton Agreement into perspective. The perspective behind the research is that there is no direct connection between inequality and individual behavior; rather, shifts in both inequality and individual-level behavior or attitudes are influenced by party changes on a left-right axis in the s and s and the resulting transformations in welfare state strength. The analysis involves statistical analyses performed on voter surveys from 16 OECD countries starting from the s and s. All these topics are based the analysis of large datasets. Why was it the great power narrative that always managed to ensure social consolidation and compliance, while other narratives constantly failed? What did it mean for Russia to be a great power historically and today? To answer these questions, the dissertation employs a genealogy of great power discourse in Russian history from pre-modern times until the 21st century. Increased income from labor and the very top high-income earners are one of the factors behind the abrupt escalation of inequalities across the advanced capitalist economies, including the most egalitarian societies. There are, however, varieties of outcomes across countries, despite facing similar critical junctures where international and national regulators favor a more shareholder-oriented governance of corporations. The research address three central problems:

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*Playing with Europe: The Impact of European Integration on the Hungarian Party System. Enyedi, Zsolt. The Impact of EU Integration on the Bulgarian Party System.*

## Chapter 6 : EUROPP â€“ Understanding the rise of the populist establishment

*The paper focuses on the unique, role model characteristics of the Hungarian hybrid regime, the Hungarian political system's new incarnation forged in the past years' democratic backsliding process.*

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Chapter 7 : The Hungarian Party System in | Nick Sitter - [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*The impact of EU enlargement on the Romanian party system / RĂzvan Greco -- The impact of the European Union on party politics in Central and Eastern Europe / Zsolt Enyedi and Paul G. Lewis. "@en; schema:description " Examining the influence of the EU on party politics in the various countries from a variety of perspectives and using a range.*

Chapter 8 : Table of contents for Library of Congress control number

*Zsolt Enyedi of Central European University, Budapest (CEU) with expertise in: Comparative Politics, Political Organizations and Parties and Elections, Public Opinion and Voting Behavior. Read*