

Chapter 1 : Aristotle's Philosophy (Summary)

Homeopathic philosophy and Dr. Hahnemann's Organon of Medicine. -.

Manish Bhatia Comments Off on Lecture on Aphorism 41 to 42 Last month we discussed the formation and treatment of complex diseases, where both the diseases were natural in origin. In my last lecture I had said that young students often wonder why the cures in the books of our old Continue Reading Date: Manish Bhatia Comments Off on Lecture on Aphorism 40 Last month we discussed what happens when two dissimilar diseases, of which the later is stronger, meet in a human body. We saw that if the disease coming later is stronger, it suspends the former till it completes its course Continue Reading Date: Manish Bhatia Comments Off on Lecture on Aphorism 38 to 39 Last month we discussed the first among three case when two diseases meet in a body. We saw that the second disease, if weaker than the former, is repelled or not allowed to affect the body. We also understood that Continue Reading Date: Manish Bhatia Comments Off on Lecture on Aphorism 36 to 37 Last month we started a discussion about why the remedy needs to be similar to have a curative effect. In aphorism number 36 Continue Reading Date: We learnt that there are two reasons for this relative superior action of remedies: Control of dose and similarity. Now Hahnemann shares with us how the Continue Reading Date: Manish Bhatia Comments Off on Understanding Aphorism 30 to 33 In my last lecture, we had discussed the possible mode of action of homeopathic remedies. I had ended that lecture with the following question: A weaker dynamic affection is permanently extinguished in the living organism by a stronger one, if the latter whilst differing in kind is very similar to the former Continue Reading Date: When I last wrote a lecture on the aphorisms, I had promised the next lecture the following month. I knew my lecture was overdue, but when I started writing today, it struck me that nearly seven months have Continue Reading Date: Manish Bhatia Leave a comment Knowledge of Medicine Do you remember my lecture on the third aphorism? Let us recollect a little about it. The third aphorism states: If the physician clearly perceives what is to be cured in diseases, that is to say, in Continue Reading Date: Today we will discuss aphorisms 16 to 18 and explore the role of Vital Force in cure. The 16th Continue Reading.

Chapter 2 : Organon - Wikipedia

The Organon (Greek: ὀργανὸν, meaning "instrument, tool, organ") is the standard collection of Aristotle's six works on logic. The name Organon was given by Aristotle's followers, the Peripatetics.

References and Further Reading 1. Albans, and Lord Chancellor of England was born in London in to a prominent and well-connected family. Lady Anne was a learned woman in her own right, having acquired Greek and Latin as well as Italian and French. Bacon was educated at home at the family estate at Gorhambury in Herfordshire. In , at the age of just twelve, he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where the stodgy Scholastic curriculum triggered his lifelong opposition to Aristotelianism though not to the works of Aristotle himself. Yet only a year later he interrupted his studies in order to take a position in the diplomatic service in France as an assistant to the ambassador. In , while he was still in France, his father died, leaving him as the second son of a second marriage and the youngest of six heirs virtually without support. With no position, no land, no income, and no immediate prospects, he returned to England and resumed the study of law. In the meantime, he was elected to Parliament in as a member for Melcombe in Dorsetshire. He would remain in Parliament as a representative for various constituencies for the next 36 years. In his blunt criticism of a new tax levy resulted in an unfortunate setback to his career expectations, the Queen taking personal offense at his opposition. Any hopes he had of becoming Attorney General or Solicitor General during her reign were dashed, though Elizabeth eventually relented to the extent of appointing Bacon her Extraordinary Counsel in . It was around this time that Bacon entered the service of Robert Devereux, the Earl of Essex, a dashing courtier, soldier, plotter of intrigue, and sometime favorite of the Queen. No doubt Bacon viewed Essex as a rising star and a figure who could provide a much-needed boost to his own sagging career. After being knighted by the king, he swiftly ascended the ladder of state and from filled a succession of high-profile advisory positions: As Lord Chancellor, Bacon wielded a degree of power and influence that he could only have imagined as a young lawyer seeking preferment. Yet it was at this point, while he stood at the very pinnacle of success, that he suffered his great Fall. In he was arrested and charged with bribery. After pleading guilty, he was heavily fined and sentenced to a prison term in the Tower of London. Although the fine was later waived and Bacon spent only four days in the Tower, he was never allowed to sit in Parliament or hold political office again. The entire episode was a terrible disgrace for Bacon personally and a stigma that would cling to and injure his reputation for years to come. Yet the damage was done, and Bacon to his credit accepted the judgment against him without excuse. According to his own *Essays, or Counsels*, he should have known and done better. In this respect it is worth noting that during his forced retirement, Bacon revised and republished the *Essays*, injecting an even greater degree of shrewdness into a collection already notable for its worldliness and keen political sense. Yet whatever his flaws, even his enemies conceded that during his trial he accepted his punishment nobly, and moved on. Bacon spent his remaining years working with renewed determination on his lifelong project: The final edition of his *Essays, or Counsels*. The remarkable *Sylva Sylvarum*, or *A Natural History in Ten Centuries* a curious hodge-podge of scientific experiments, personal observations, speculations, ancient teachings, and analytical discussions on topics ranging from the causes of hiccups to explanations for the shortage of rain in Egypt. His utopian science-fiction novel *The New Atlantis*, which was published in unfinished form a year after his death. Literary Works Despite the fanatical claims and very un-Baconian credulity of a few admirers, it is a virtual certainty that Bacon did not write the works traditionally attributed to William Shakespeare. Indeed even if Bacon had produced nothing else but his masterful *Essays* first published in and then revised and expanded in and , he would still rate among the top echelon of 17th-century English authors. And so when we take into account his other writings, e. In fact it is actually a fairly complex affair that achieves its air of ease and clarity more through its balanced cadences, natural metaphors, and carefully arranged symmetries than through the use of plain words, commonplace ideas, and straightforward syntax. In this connection it is noteworthy that in the revised versions of the essays Bacon seems to have deliberately disrupted many of his earlier balanced effects to produce a style that is actually more jagged and, in effect, more challenging to the casual reader. The work thus stands in the great

tradition of the utopian-philosophical novel that stretches from Plato and More to Huxley and Skinner. In terms of its sci-fi adventure elements, the *New Atlantis* is about as exciting as a government or university re-organization plan. But in terms of its historical impact, the novel has proven to be nothing less than revolutionary, having served not only as an effective inspiration and model for the British Royal Society, but also as an early blueprint and prophecy of the modern research center and international scientific community.

Scientific and Philosophical Works It is never easy to summarize the thought of a prolific and wide-ranging philosopher. Yet Bacon somewhat simplifies the task by his own helpful habits of systematic classification and catchy mnemonic labeling. In effect, he dedicated himself to a long-term project of intellectual reform, and the balance of his career can be viewed as a continuing effort to make good on that pledge. In 1620, while he was still at the peak of his political success, he published the preliminary description and plan for an enormous work that would fully answer to his earlier declared ambitions. Of the intended six parts, only the first two were completed, while the other portions were only partly finished or barely begun. Consequently, the work as we have it is less like the vast but well-sculpted monument that Bacon envisioned than a kind of philosophical miscellany or grab-bag. It is basically an enlarged version of the earlier *Proficience and Advancement of Learning*, which Bacon had presented to James in 1612. It first appeared in 1620 as *The Advancement of Learning*.

Relatively early in his career Bacon judged that, owing mainly to an undue reverence for the past as well as to an excessive absorption in cultural vanities and frivolities, the intellectual life of Europe had reached a kind of impasse or standstill. Yet he believed there was a way beyond this stagnation if persons of learning, armed with new methods and insights, would simply open their eyes and minds to the world around them. This at any rate was the basic argument of his seminal treatise *The Proficience and Advancement of Learning*, arguably the first important philosophical work to be published in English. It is in this work that Bacon sketched out the main themes and ideas that he continued to refine and develop throughout his career, beginning with the notion that there are clear obstacles to or diseases of learning that must be avoided or purged before further progress is possible. But the phrase applies to any intellectual endeavor in which the principal aim is not new knowledge or deeper understanding but endless debate cherished for its own sake. *Prodigal ingenuity* i.e. *Sterile results* i.e. *What is needed* and this is a theme reiterated in all his later writings on learning and human progress is a program to re-channel that same creative energy into socially useful new discoveries. In many respects this idea was his single greatest invention, and it is all the more remarkable for its having been conceived and promoted at a time when most English and European intellectuals were either reverencing the literary and philosophical achievements of the past or deploring the numerous signs of modern degradation and decline. Indeed, while Bacon was preaching progress and declaring a brave new dawn of scientific advance, many of his colleagues were persuaded that the world was at best creaking along towards a state of senile immobility and eventual darkness. That history might in fact be progressive, i.e. In the *Advancement*, the idea is offered tentatively, as a kind of hopeful hypothesis. But in later works such as the *New Organon*, it becomes almost a promised destiny: Enlightenment and a better world, Bacon insists, lie within our power; they require only the cooperation of learned citizens and the active development of the arts and sciences.

The Reclassification of Knowledge In Book II of *De Dignitate* his expanded version of the *Advancement* Bacon outlines his scheme for a new division of human knowledge into three primary categories: Although the exact motive behind this reclassification remains unclear, one of its main consequences seems unmistakable: Meanwhile, poesy the domain of everything that is imaginable or conceivable is set off to the side as a mere illustrative vehicle. This notion of surpassing ancient authority is aptly illustrated on the frontispiece of the volume containing the *New Organon* by a ship boldly sailing beyond the mythical pillars of Hercules, which supposedly marked the end of the known world. The *New Organon* is presented not in the form of a treatise or methodical demonstration but as a series of aphorisms, a technique that Bacon came to favor as less legislative and dogmatic and more in the true spirit of scientific experiment and critical inquiry. Bacon points out that recognizing and counteracting the idols is as important to the study of nature as the recognition and refutation of bad arguments is to logic. Thus a Baconian idol is a potential deception or source of misunderstanding, especially one that clouds or confuses our knowledge of external reality. Bacon identifies four different classes of idol. Each arises from a different source, and each presents its own special hazards and difficulties. The

Idols of the Tribe. These are the natural weaknesses and tendencies common to human nature. Because they are innate, they cannot be completely eliminated, but only recognized and compensated for. Our senses are which are inherently dull and easily deceivable. Which is why Bacon prescribes instruments and strict investigative methods to correct them. Our tendency to discern or even impose more order in phenomena than is actually there. As Bacon points out, we are apt to find similitude where there is actually singularity, regularity where there is actually randomness, etc. Our tendency to rush to conclusions and make premature judgments instead of gradually and painstakingly accumulating evidence. The Idols of the Cave. Unlike the idols of the tribe, which are common to all human beings, those of the cave vary from individual to individual. They arise, that is to say, not from nature but from culture and thus reflect the peculiar distortions, prejudices, and beliefs that we are all subject to owing to our different family backgrounds, childhood experiences, education, training, gender, religion, social class, etc. Special allegiance to a particular discipline or theory. High esteem for a few select authorities. The Idols of the Market Place. The Idols of the Theatre. Like the idols of the cave, those of the theatre are culturally acquired rather than innate. And although the metaphor of a theatre suggests an artificial imitation of truth, as in drama or fiction, Bacon makes it clear that these idols derive mainly from grand schemes or systems of philosophy and especially from three particular types of philosophy: Sophistical Philosophy that is, philosophical systems based only on a few casually observed instances or on no experimental evidence at all and thus constructed mainly out of abstract argument and speculation. Bacon cites Scholasticism as a conspicuous example. Empirical Philosophy that is, a philosophical system ultimately based on a single key insight or on a very narrow base of research, which is then erected into a model or paradigm to explain phenomena of all kinds. Bacon cites the example of William Gilbert, whose experiments with the lodestone persuaded him that magnetism operated as the hidden force behind virtually all earthly phenomena. He cites Pythagoras and Plato as guilty of this practice, but also points his finger at pious contemporary efforts, similar to those of Creationists today, to found systems of natural philosophy on Genesis or the book of Job. According to Bacon, his system differs not only from the deductive logic and mania for syllogisms of the Schoolmen, but also from the classic induction of Aristotle and other logicians. As Bacon rightly points out, one problem with this procedure is that if the general axioms prove false, all the intermediate axioms may be false as well. In effect, each confirmed axiom becomes a foothold to a higher truth, with the most general axioms representing the last stage of the process. Thus, in the example described, the Baconian investigator would be obliged to examine a full inventory of new Chevrolets, Lexuses, Jeeps, etc. And while Bacon admits that such a method can be laborious, he argues that it eventually produces a stable edifice of knowledge instead of a rickety structure that collapses with the appearance of a single disconfirming instance. Indeed, according to Bacon, when one follows his inductive procedure, a negative instance actually becomes something to be welcomed rather than feared. For instead of threatening an entire assembly, the discovery of a false generalization actually saves the investigator the trouble of having to proceed further in a particular direction or line of inquiry. Meanwhile the structure of truth that he has already built remains intact. Although he himself firmly believed in the utility and overall superiority of his method, many of his commentators and critics have had doubts.

Homeopathic philosophy and Dr. Hahnemann's Organon of Medicine. - Page 2 of 4. What happens when two dissimilar diseases meet in a body and the later disease is stronger than the.

His technique bears a resemblance to the modern formulation of the scientific method in the sense that it is centered on experimental research. Preface[edit] Bacon begins the work with a rejection of pure a priori deduction as a means of discovering truth in natural philosophy. Of his philosophy, he states: Now my plan is as easy to describe as it is difficult to effect. For it is to establish degrees of certainty, take care of the sense by a kind of reduction, but to reject for the most part the work of the mind that follows upon sense; in fact I mean to open up and lay down a new and certain pathway from the perceptions of the senses themselves to the mind. The emphasis on beginning with observation pervades the entire work. Originally intending *Instauratio magna* to contain six parts of which *Novum organum* constituted the second, Bacon did not come close to completing this series, as parts V and VI were never written at all. *Novum organum*, written in Latin and consisting of two books of aphorisms, was included in the volume that Bacon published in 1620; however, it was also unfinished, as Bacon promised several additions to its content which ultimately remained unprinted. In the first book of aphorisms, Bacon criticizes the current state of natural philosophy. The object of his assault consists largely in the syllogism, a method that he believes to be completely inadequate in comparison to what Bacon calls "true Induction": The syllogism is made up of propositions, propositions of words, and words are markers of notions. Thus if the notions themselves and this is the heart of the matter are confused, and recklessly abstracted from things, nothing built on them is sound. The only hope therefore lies in true Induction. Induction, methodologically opposed to deduction, entails beginning with particular cases observed by the senses and then attempting to discover the general axioms from those observations. In other words, induction presupposes nothing. Deduction, on the other hand, begins with general axioms, or first principles, by which the truth of particular cases is extrapolated. Bacon emphasises the strength of the gradual process that is inherent in induction: There are and can only be two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one rushes up from the sense and particulars to axioms of the highest generality and, from these principles and their indubitable truth, goes on to infer and discover middle axioms; and this is the way in current use. The other way draws axioms from the sense and particulars by climbing steadily and by degrees so that it reaches the ones of highest generality last of all; and this is the true but still untrodden way. The Idols *Idola* [edit] *Novum organum*, as suggested by its name, is focused just as much on a rejection of received doctrine as it is on a forward-looking progression. They appear in previous works but were never fully fleshed out until their formulation in *Novum organum*: *Idols of the Tribe* *Idola tribus* "Idols of the Tribe are rooted in human nature itself and in the very tribe or race of men. For people falsely claim that human sense is the measure of things, whereas in fact all perceptions of sense and mind are built to the scale of man and not the universe. Bacon includes in this idol the predilection of the human imagination to presuppose otherwise unsubstantiated regularities in nature. An example might be the common historical astronomical assumption that planets move in perfect circles. *Idols of the Cave* *Idola specus* These "belong to the particular individual. For everyone has besides vagaries of human nature in general his own special cave or den which scatters and discolours the light of nature. Now this comes either of his own unique and singular nature; or his education and association with others, or the books he reads and the several authorities of those whom he cultivates and admires, or the different impressions as they meet in the soul, be the soul possessed and prejudiced, or steady and settled, or the like; so that the human spirit as it is allotted to particular individuals is evidently a variable thing, all muddled, and so to speak a creature of chance This type of idol stems from the particular life experiences of the individual. Variable educations can lead the individual to a preference for specific concepts or methods, which then corrupt their subsequent philosophies. Bacon himself gives the example of Aristotle, "who made his natural philosophy a mere slave to his logic". For men associate through conversation, but words are applied according to the capacity of ordinary people. Therefore shoddy and inept application of words lays siege to the intellect in wondrous ways" Aphorism Bacon considered these "the greatest nuisances of them

all" Aphorism Because humans reason through the use of words they are particularly dangerous, because the received definitions of words, which are often falsely derived, can cause confusion. He outlines two subsets of this kind of idol and provides examples Aphorism First, there are those words which spring from fallacious theories, such as the element of fire or the concept of a first mover. These are easy to dismantle because their inadequacy can be traced back to the fault of their derivation in a faulty theory. Second, there are those words that are the result of imprecise abstraction. Earth, for example, is a vague term that may include many different substances the commonality of which is questionable. These terms are often used elliptically, or from a lack of information or definition of the term. Book II[edit] After enumerating the shortcomings of the current and past natural philosophies, Bacon can now present his own philosophy and methods. Bacon retains the Aristotelian causes, but redefines them in interesting ways. While traditionally the final cause was held as most important among the four material, formal, efficient, and final , Bacon claims that it is the least helpful and in some cases actually detrimental to the sciences aph. For Bacon, it is the formal cause which is both the most illusive and most valuable, although each of the causes provides certain practical devices. By forms and formal causes, Bacon means the universal laws of nature. To these Bacon attaches an almost occult like power: But he who knows forms grasps the unity of nature beneath the surface of materials which are very unlike. Thus is he able to identify and bring about things that have never been done before, things of the kind which neither the vicissitudes of nature, nor hard experimenting, nor pure accident could ever have actualised, or human thought dreamed of. And thus from the discovery of the forms flows true speculation and unrestricted operation aphorism 3 In this second book, Bacon offers an example of the process that of what he calls true induction. In this example, Bacon attempts to grasp the form of heat. The first step he takes is the surveying of all known instances where the nature of heat appears to exist. To this compilation of observational data Bacon gives the name Table of Essence and Presence. The next table, the Table of Absence in Proximity, is essentially the oppositeâ€”a compilation of all the instances in which the nature of heat is not present. Because these are so numerous, Bacon enumerates only the most relevant cases. Lastly, Bacon attempts to categorise the instances of the nature of heat into various degrees of intensity in his Table of Degrees. The aim of this final table is to eliminate certain instances of heat which might be said to be the form of heat, and thus get closer to an approximation of the true form of heat. Such elimination occurs through comparison. For example, the observation that both a fire and boiling water are instances of heat allows us to exclude light as the true form of heat, because light is present in the case of the fire but not in the case of the boiling water. Through this comparative analysis, Bacon intends to eventually extrapolate the true form of heat, although it is clear that such a goal is only gradually approachable by degrees. Indeed, the hypothesis that is derived from this eliminative induction, which Bacon names The First Vintage, is only the starting point from which additional empirical evidence and experimental analysis can refine our conception of a formal cause. The "Baconian method" does not end at the First Vintage. Bacon described numerous classes of Instances with Special Powers, cases in which the phenomena one is attempting to explain is particularly relevant. These instances, of which Bacon describes 27 in *Novum Organum*, aid and accelerate the process of induction. They are "labour-saving devices or shortcuts intended to accelerate or make more rigorous the search for forms by providing logical reinforcement to induction. These additional aids, however, were never explained beyond their initial limited appearance in *Novum Organum*. It is likely that Bacon intended them to be included in later parts of *Instauratio magna* and simply never got to writing about them. As mentioned above, this second book of *Novum organum* was far from complete and indeed was only a small part of a massive, also unfinished work, the *Instauratio magna*. Both thinkers were, in a sense, some of the first to question the philosophical authority of the ancient Greeks. Bacon and Descartes both believed that a critique of preexisting natural philosophy was necessary, but their respective critiques proposed radically different approaches to natural philosophy. Two over-lapping movements developed; "one was rational and theoretical in approach and was headed by Rene Descartes; the other was practical and empirical and was led by Francis Bacon. On the one hand, Descartes begins with a doubt of anything which cannot be known with absolute certainty and includes in this realm of doubt the impressions of sense perception, and thus, "all sciences of corporal things, such as physics and astronomy. In this method of deduction, the philosopher begins by

examining the most general axioms such as the Cogito , and then proceeds to determine the truth about particulars from an understanding of those general axioms. Conversely, Bacon endorsed the opposite method of Induction, in which the particulars are first examined, and only then is there a gradual ascent to the most general axioms. Descartes professed to be aiming at absolute Truth. It is questionable whether Bacon believed such a Truth can be achieved. In his opening remarks, he proposes "to establish progressive stages of certainty. Bacon never claimed to have brilliantly revealed new unshakable truths about nature" in fact, he believed that such an endeavour is not the work of single minds but that of whole generations by gradual degrees toward reliable knowledge. His innovation is summarised in *The Oxford Francis Bacon: Before Bacon where else does one find a meticulously articulated view of natural philosophy as an enterprise of instruments and experiment, and enterprise designed to restrain discursive reason and make good the defects of the senses? Where else in the literature before Bacon does one come across a stripped-down natural-historical programme of such enormous scope and scrupulous precision, and designed to serve as the basis for a complete reconstruction of human knowledge which would generate new, vastly productive sciences through a form of eliminative induction supported by various other procedures including deduction? Where else does one find a concept of scientific research which implies an institutional framework of such proportions that it required generations of permanent state funding to sustain it? And all this accompanied by a thorough, searching, and devastating attack on ancient and not-so-ancient philosophies, and by a provisional natural philosophy anticipating the results of the new philosophy? Ignored How Much Longer? Novum organum and Associated Texts.*

Organon - Bacon's New Organon or Novum Organon, refers to one of Aristotle's works. The Organon, or "Instrument for rational thinking" set out Aristotle's views on logic, which Bacon sees as useless for modern scientific inquiry.

Researcher and professor at the time, Aristotle has systematized all knowledge of his time. It remains primarily the creator of logic. Aristotle and Logic Logic: This term is unknown to Aristotle, however, is the author of the first systematic logical doctrine, disciple determining for the operations of the mind, which are valid, which ones are not. This study is conducting a formal point of view, that is to say, regardless of the content itself. Were collected, in the second century AD. What does the term syllogism mean? A speech in which, certain things being stated, something other than the data necessarily results by the mere fact of such data eg Socrates is a man that all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal. The logic of Aristotle is primarily a study of the syllogism, but the philosopher has also studied the proposal. Expression of the sentence in words, he defined science as a set of judgments and proposals. Concept also developed by Aristotle as the system in which everything that follows is known, necessarily, from first principles. Science represents a type of universal knowledge. The universal It means, for Aristotle, which applies to all cases. To arrive at science, do not neglect the induction Induction: Consists in the passage of special cases to the universal. Finally, Aristotle stated the principle of non-contradiction. It is the principle that it is impossible that the same attribute belongs and does not belong simultaneously to the same subject and in the same report, as well as the excluded middle. Excluded third, which this time is the principle that two contradictory propositions, one is true and the other false. By their logic and formalizing the statement of principles that shape our thinking, logical thinking and Organon of Aristotle are central in philosophy. There are four types of cases to know and understand the production of reality: The formal cause is especially important. When the material structure, that is to say the power and potentiality, which is not completed, occurs a passage from potency to act, what is virtual which is fully realized. So what is the form in Aristotle? It is a vitalistic explanation and not mechanistic. It is a vital principle and soul that we provide here a key explanation. Yet it must not misunderstand the meaning of the word soul is the form of an organized body, the faculty animating a body. Also can be defined independently of the body. It is in fact related to the body and life, that is to say that to feed, grow and wither away of itself. The ultimate purpose of metaphysics God, Pure Act, in which all the perfections are updated and completed. Transcending the world, God moves it without being moved: It can thus be understood as a living eternal and absolutely perfect. Aristotle, Morality and Politics: The moral of Aristotle, developed especially in the Nicomachean Ethics a eudemonistic approach, as are all the morals of antiquity: Aristotle sees the happiness as the end of life. Happiness is essentially activity of reason, consisting in contemplation: Then there is the pleasure that Aristotle does not neglect because the real fun is an element of happiness. But how to conceive? It is the completion of the act, which is superimposed, as the glow of beauty in the prime of life. The moral analysis can not be divorced from politics. Like all great thinkers, Aristotle unifies the legal study of what is right and good, and political science from the City. How could we separate them, then that man is basically a political animal, born to live in the city? Analyzing the organization of the City, Aristotle comes to various forms of government and are three in politics , called the State where the monarchy command, directed to the common interest, belongs to a alone, aristocracy, in which he is assigned to more than one, republic, one where the host government for the public. The kingdom may degenerate into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy in the republic. Aristotle, from logic to politics, has given us the vision of the structures that today still inform our lives. The figure of Sage comes off full of his work: Related articles on Aristotle:

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PHILOSOPHY - SAMUEL HAHNEMANN. When it was announced that the long-awaited Sixth Edition of Hahnemann's "Organon" was at last available and about to be published, there was great curiosity on the part of his present-day followers to see what changes, additions or developments were embodied in it.

No deduction has two negative premises No deduction has two particular premises A deduction with an affirmative conclusion must have two affirmative premises A deduction with a negative conclusion must have one negative premise. A deduction with a universal conclusion must have two universal premises He also proves the following metatheorem: All deductions can be reduced to the two universal deductions in the first figure. His proof of this is elegant. First, he shows that the two particular deductions of the first figure can be reduced, by proof through impossibility, to the universal deductions in the second figure: This proof is strikingly similar both in structure and in subject to modern proofs of the redundancy of axioms in a system. Many more metatheoretical results, some of them quite sophisticated, are proved in Prior Analytics I. In contrast to the syllogistic itself or, as commentators like to call it, the assertoric syllogistic, this modal syllogistic appears to be much less satisfactory and is certainly far more difficult to interpret. Aristotle gives these same equivalences in On Interpretation. However, in Prior Analytics, he makes a distinction between two notions of possibility. He then acknowledges an alternative definition of possibility according to the modern equivalence, but this plays only a secondary role in his system. Most often, then, the questions he explores have the form: A premise can have one of three modalities: Aristotle works through the combinations of these in order: Two necessary premises One necessary and one assertoric premise Two possible premises One assertoric and one possible premise One necessary and one possible premise Though he generally considers only premise combinations which syllogize in their assertoric forms, he does sometimes extend this; similarly, he sometimes considers conclusions in addition to those which would follow from purely assertoric premises. Since this is his procedure, it is convenient to describe modal syllogisms in terms of the corresponding non-modal syllogism plus a triplet of letters indicating the modalities of premises and conclusion: The conversion rules for necessary premises are exactly analogous to those for assertoric premises: Aristotle generalizes this to the case of categorical sentences as follows: This leads to a further complication. Such propositions do occur in his system, but only in exactly this way, i. Such propositions appear only as premises, never as conclusions. He does not treat this as a trivial consequence but instead offers proofs; in all but two cases, these are parallel to those offered for the assertoric case. The exceptions are Baroco and Bocardo, which he proved in the assertoric case through impossibility: A very wide range of reconstructions has been proposed: Malink, however, offers a reconstruction that reproduces everything Aristotle says, although the resulting model introduces a high degree of complexity. This subject quickly becomes too complex for summarizing in this brief article. From a modern perspective, we might think that this subject moves outside of logic to epistemology. However, readers should not be misled by the use of that word. We have scientific knowledge, according to Aristotle, when we know: The remainder of Posterior Analytics I is largely concerned with two tasks: Aristotle first tells us that a demonstration is a deduction in which the premises are: Aristotle clearly thinks that science is knowledge of causes and that in a demonstration, knowledge of the premises is what brings about knowledge of the conclusion. The fourth condition shows that the knower of a demonstration must be in some better epistemic condition towards them, and so modern interpreters often suppose that Aristotle has defined a kind of epistemic justification here. However, as noted above, Aristotle is defining a special variety of knowledge. Comparisons with discussions of justification in modern epistemology may therefore be misleading. In Posterior Analytics I. Whatever is scientifically known must be demonstrated. The premises of a demonstration must be scientifically known. They then argued that demonstration is impossible with the following dilemma: If the premises of a demonstration are scientifically known, then they must be demonstrated. The premises from which each premise are demonstrated must be scientifically known. Either this process continues forever, creating an infinite regress of premises, or it comes to a stop at some point. If it continues forever, then there are no first

premises from which the subsequent ones are demonstrated, and so nothing is demonstrated. On the other hand, if it comes to a stop at some point, then the premises at which it comes to a stop are undemonstrated and therefore not scientifically known; consequently, neither are any of the others deduced from them. Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated. Aristotle does not give us much information about how circular demonstration was supposed to work, but the most plausible interpretation would be supposing that at least for some set of fundamental principles, each principle could be deduced from the others. Some modern interpreters have compared this position to a coherence theory of knowledge. However, he thinks both the agnostics and the circular demonstrators are wrong in maintaining that scientific knowledge is only possible by demonstration from premises scientifically known: To solve this problem, Aristotle needs to do something quite specific. It will not be enough for him to establish that we can have knowledge of some propositions without demonstrating them: Moreover and obviously, it is no solution to this problem for Aristotle simply to assert that we have knowledge without demonstration of some appropriate starting points. He does indeed say that it is his position that we have such knowledge. There is wide disagreement among commentators about the interpretation of his account of how this state is reached; I will offer one possible interpretation. What he is presenting, then, is not a method of discovery but a process of becoming wise. The kind of knowledge in question turns out to be a capacity or power *dunamis* which Aristotle compares to the capacity for sense-perception: Likewise, Aristotle holds, our minds have by nature the capacity to recognize the starting points of the sciences. In the case of sensation, the capacity for perception in the sense organ is actualized by the operation on it of the perceptible object. Similarly, Aristotle holds that coming to know first premises is a matter of a potentiality in the mind being actualized by experience of its proper objects: So, although we cannot come to know the first premises without the necessary experience, just as we cannot see colors without the presence of colored objects, our minds are already so constituted as to be able to recognize the right objects, just as our eyes are already so constituted as to be able to perceive the colors that exist. It is considerably less clear what these objects are and how it is that experience actualizes the relevant potentialities in the soul. Aristotle describes a series of stages of cognition. First is what is common to all animals: Next is memory, which he regards as a retention of a sensation: Even fewer have the next capacity, the capacity to form a single experience *empeiria* from many repetitions of the same memory. Finally, many experiences repeated give rise to knowledge of a single universal *katholou*. This last capacity is present only in humans.

Definitions The definition *horos*, *horismos* was an important matter for Plato and for the Early Academy. External sources sometimes the satirical remarks of comedians also reflect this Academic concern with definitions. Aristotle himself traces the quest for definitions back to Socrates. What has an essence, then? In general, however, it is not individuals but rather species *eidos*: A species is defined by giving its genus *genos* and its differentia *diaphora*: As an example, human might be defined as animal the genus having the capacity to reason the differentia. However, not everything essentially predicated is a definition. Such a predicate non-essential but counterpredicating is a peculiar property or *proprium idion*. Aristotle sometimes treats genus, peculiar property, definition, and accident as including all possible predications *e*. Later commentators listed these four and the differentia as the five predicables, and as such they were of great importance to late ancient and to medieval philosophy *e*. Just what that doctrine was, and indeed just what a category is, are considerably more vexing questions. They also quickly take us outside his logic and into his metaphysics. Here are two passages containing such lists: These are ten in number: An accident, a genus, a peculiar property and a definition will always be in one of these categories. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: Categories 4, 1b25a€”2a4, tr. Ackrill, slightly modified These two passages give ten-item lists, identical except for their first members. Here are three ways they might be interpreted: First, the categories may be kinds of predicate: On this interpretation, the categories arise out of considering the most general types of question that can be asked about something: Thus, the categories may rule out certain kinds of question as ill-formed or confused. Second, the categories may be seen as classifications of predications, that is, kinds of relation that may hold between the predicate and the subject of a predication. For Aristotle, the relation of predicate to subject in these two sentences is quite different in this respect he differs both from Plato and from modern logicians. The categories may be interpreted as ten

different ways in which a predicate may be related to its subject. Third, the categories may be seen as kinds of entity, as highest genera or kinds of thing that are. A given thing can be classified under a series of progressively wider genera: Socrates is a human, a mammal, an animal, a living being. The categories are the highest such genera. Each falls under no other genus, and each is completely separate from the others. Which of these interpretations fits best with the two passages above? The answer appears to be different in the two cases.

Chapter 6 : SAMUEL HAHNEMANN'S PHILOSOPHY | I LOVE HOMEOPATHY

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Indeed, parts of them seem to be a scheme of a lecture on logic. The arrangement of the works was made by Andronicus of Rhodes around 40 BC. Aristotle discusses the square of opposition or square of Apuleius in Chapter 7 and its appendix Chapter 8. Chapter 9 deals with the problem of future contingents. The Prior Analytics Latin: *Analytica Priora* introduces his syllogistic method see term logic , argues for its correctness, and discusses inductive inference. The Posterior Analytics Latin: *Analytica Posteriora* deals with demonstration , definition , and scientific knowledge. *Topica* treats issues in constructing valid arguments, and inference that is probable, rather than certain. It is in this treatise that Aristotle mentions the *Predicables* , later discussed by Porphyry and the scholastic logicians. The *Sophistical Refutations* Latin: *The Categories* and *On Interpretation* are the only significant logical works that were available in the early Middle Ages. These had been translated into Latin by Boethius. The other logical works were not available in Western Christendom until translated into Latin in the 12th century. However, the original Greek texts had been preserved in the Greek -speaking lands of the Eastern Roman Empire aka Byzantium. In the mid-twelfth century, James of Venice translated into Latin the Posterior Analytics from Greek manuscripts found in Constantinople. The books of Aristotle were available in the early Arab Empire, and after AD Muslims had most of them, including the *Organon*, translated into Arabic, sometimes via earlier Syriac translations. They were studied by Islamic and Jewish scholars, including Rabbi Moses Maimonides " and the Muslim Judge Ibn Rushd , known in the West as Averroes " ; both were originally from Cordoba, Spain , although the former left Iberia and by lived in Egypt. All the major scholastic philosophers wrote commentaries on the *Organon*. Aquinas , Ockham and Scotus wrote commentaries on *On Interpretation*. Ockham and Scotus wrote commentaries on the *Categories* and *Sophistical Refutations*. Grosseteste wrote an influential commentary on the Posterior Analytics. In the Enlightenment there was a revival of interest in logic as the basis of rational enquiry, and a number of texts, most successfully the Port-Royal Logic , polished Aristotelian term logic for pedagogy. There was a tendency in this period to regard the logical systems of the day to be complete, which in turn no doubt stifled innovation in this area. Indeed, he had already become known by the Scholastics medieval Christian scholars as "The Philosopher", due to the influence he had upon medieval theology and philosophy. His influence continued into the Early Modern period and *Organon* was the basis of school philosophy even in the beginning of 18th century.

Chapter 7 : Novum Organum - Wikipedia

Organon and Philosophy The Organon of the Healing Art (Organon der rationellen Heilkunde) by Samuel Hahnemann, , laid the foundations of all theory and method of homoeopathy. The work was repeatedly revised by Hahnemann and published in six editions, with the name changed from the second onwards to Organon of Medicine (Organon der.

Chapter 8 : Project MUSE - Semantics in Aristotle's Organon

Organon, in Greek, means "instrument" or "tool." It is so titled because logic is an instrument that helps develop other sciences. It is so titled because logic is an instrument that helps.

Chapter 9 : Organon & Philosophy | Homeopathy

The-Philosophy helps high-school & university students but also curious people on human sciences to quench their thirst for knowledge. The site thus covers the main philosophical traditions, from the Presocratic to the contemporary philosophers, while trying to bring a philosophical reading to the cultural field in general, such as cinema, literature,

politics or music.