

Chapter 1 : Insolubles (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

2 Peter of Ailly wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best estimate, in He was at that time only about twenty-two years old. He was born around " in Compiègne in the De de.

Many of the relevant works were lost e. Indeed, it is not at all clear just what it was that prompted medieval interest. One might have supposed that, even if particular theories about the Liar were not transmitted to the Latin West from antiquity, at least formulations of Liar-type paradoxes must have been known and available to stimulate the medieval discussions. In fact, however, there are strikingly few possibilities. But neither passage would likely be sufficient by itself to suggest the special problems of the Liar to anyone not already familiar with them. If you lie and speak that truth [namely, that you lie], are you lying or speaking the truth? But this passage is never cited in the insolubilia-literature. Yet, blatant as the paradox is here, and authoritative as the Epistle was taken to be, not a single medieval author is known to have discussed or even acknowledged the logical and semantic problems this text poses. When medieval authors discuss the passage at all, for instance in Scriptural commentaries, they seem to be concerned only with why St. Paul should be quoting pagan sources. In this context, Aristotle considers someone who takes an oath that he will become an oath-breaker, and then does so. Absolutely or without qualification, Aristotle says, such a man is an oath-breaker, even though with respect to the particular oath to become an oath-breaker he is an oath-keeper. It was this sentence that many medieval authors took to be a reference to the Liar Paradox, which therefore, on the authority of Aristotle, could be solved as a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. The widespread appeal to this passage throughout the history of the insolubilia-literature indicates that the text did play some role in prompting medieval interest in insolubles. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the earliest known medieval statement of the Liar occurs in , around the time the Sophistical Refutations first began to circulate in Western Europe in Latin translation see Section 2 below. The oath-breaker, as the example was generally interpreted, takes two oaths: The man is an oath-breaker and an oath-fulfiller, but with respect to different oaths; by breaking his second oath, rendering it false, he fulfills the first oath, making it true. However, it is possible to interpret the passage as referring to a single oath, when the oath is broken at the same time as it is made. Seen that way, it connects the Liar paradox with the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. But more must have been involved too. Martin suggests a connection with theories of obligations cf. At present we cannot say whether they did this on the basis of some still unidentified ancient source or whether it was through their own intellectual power and logical insight. There are conjunctive insolubles, e. There is also a nice example where a landowner has decreed that only those who speak truly will be allowed across his bridge and those who lie about their business will be thrown in the water or maybe even hanged on the nearby gallows. II book III ch. But now you must realise that you do know it. Such insolubles can involve doubt as well as knowledge, e. Further insolubles arise from the medieval theory of logical Obligations , e. The importance of this passage should not be exaggerated. It is true that it gives us the earliest known explicit medieval formulation of the Liar. It is not until later in the twelfth century that one finds an explicit statement of the special problems raised by insolubles. Again, if Socrates says he lies, and says nothing else, he says some proposition. Therefore, either a true one or a false one. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true or what is false. But if 1 Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is true, then it is true that Socrates lies. And if it is true that Socrates lies, Socrates says what is false. Therefore, if Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is true, he says what is false. But if 2 Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is false, then it is false that Socrates says what is false. And if it is false that Socrates says what is false, Socrates does not say what is false. But if Socrates says only that he lies, he says either what is true or what is false. Therefore, if Socrates says he lies, he says what is true. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, and he says what is false, then he says what is true. But if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true or false. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true and says what is false. Nevertheless, although it is clear that Neckham was fully aware of what is paradoxical about the Liar, he makes no attempt to solve the paradox.

From then on, there are a great number of surviving treatments see Spade In the early s, Thomas Bradwardine, in a preliminary section of his own treatise on insolubles, lists nine views in circulation in his day, including his own see Bradwardine [B-I], ch. Later in the insolubilia-literature, discussions often continued to be cast in terms of this fallacy. It was claimed in Spade Some authors in the early medieval literature, however, argued that insolubles are without qualification neither true nor false, but only true in a certain respect and false in a certain respect. This view is in effect a kind of restriction on self-reference. The word *transcasus* is not a common Latin word. It seems to be a literal translation of Greek *metaptosis*. In Stoic logic, propositions that change their truth value over time were called *metapiptonta* from the same root. Walter Burley in fact used the word *transcasus* exactly this way in in two short logical works Spade Nevertheless, in the particular context of insolubles, while the term *transcasus* does have an association with time, it does not imply any change of truth value over time. If the speaker did not in fact say anything earlier, then his present statement is simply false and no paradox arises. But it is not clear exactly what motivated it. The details of this theory are not yet well understood, but the basic strategy is to distinguish what the liar says he is doing namely, lying from what he really is doing. In order to avoid the paradox, this theory would seem to be committed to saying that the exercised act and the signified act are two distinct acts, so that the theory, like the theory of *transcasus* Section 2. Some theories of restriction went further and also ruled out other patterns of reference. Here *a* refers to *b* and *b* refers back to *a*. But reference is not a transitive relation, so that there is no real self-reference here. Token *a* is self-referential, but token *b* is not, since it refers to *a*, not to itself. Yet some authors thought the two tokens should be treated semantically alike, so that not only could the subject of *a* not refer to *a* itself, neither could the subject of *b*. Here, *b* is self-referential, but *a* is not. Nevertheless, *b* is the contradictory of *a*. Hence, by saying its contradictory is true, *a* is in effect saying that it itself is false. Thus, although it is not self-referential, *a* is nevertheless paradoxical. Some authors prevented such cases by maintaining that not only were terms unable to refer to the propositions in which they occurred, they also could not refer to the contradictories of the propositions in which they occurred. As a general theory, restriction is open to an obvious objection: Yet the general theory of restriction would disallow it. Medieval authors sometimes raised this objection. As a result, we find two kinds of restriction-theories in the medieval literature: Walter Burley and William of Ockham, for example, held the latter form of restriction Spade If general or strong theories of restriction are open to the objection stated above, the weaker theories are open to a different objection: This is no doubt true, but it is also a tautology. It is maintained in the earliest known treatise on insolubles *De Rijk* and in one other early anonymous text Spade It was briefly revived by John Dumbleton in the s: His essential idea was that signification requires uptake, so any utterance which cannot be understood cannot constitute a propositionâ€”and the insolubles defy understanding, for self-reference generates a regress of deferred intelligibility. The treatise in *De Rijk* presents more of a theory. Much of it is obscure to modern scholars, but it seems to appeal to a distinction between a mental act of asserting and a vocal act of uttering a proposition. It is tempting, yes, but highly speculative. The Second Quarter of the Fourteenth Century The preceding theories represent the earliest stage of the insolubilia-literature. The turning point is Thomas Bradwardine, whose own theory was enormously influential on later authors. Shortly after Bradwardine, two other English authors from this middle period are also important: Roger Swyneshed Section 3. A little later, important contributions were made by Parisian authors, Gregory of Rimini Section 3. It became one of the most important works on the topic in the Middle Ages. For the opinions mentioned above were those of the old [logicians], who understood little or nothing about insolubles. After them there arose the prince of modern philosophers of nature, namely Master Thomas Bradwardine. He was the first one who discovered something worthwhile about insolubles. By virtue of their constituent terms, propositions signify things; but, in addition, a proposition as a whole signifies that such-and-such is the case. For Bradwardine, a proposition is D1 true if it signifies only as is the case *tantum sicut est*, and D2 false if it signifies otherwise than is the case *aliter quam est*. Truth therefore, is more demanding than falsehood. In order for a proposition to be true, all of what it signifies to be the case must in fact be the case; if any of what it signifies to be the case fails to be the case, the proposition is false. He will then argue that insolubles signify more than at first appears, and that not everything they signify can be the case. Consequently, they are simply false. For him,

propositions signify many things, not in the sense of being ambiguous, but as requiring a multitude of conditions to be satisfied for their truth.

Chapter 2 : Logic Language - Glavnaia Books

2 Peter of Ailly wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best estimate, in He was at that time only about twenty-two years old. He was born around " in Compiègne in the De de France, although his 5 family name associates him with the village of Ailly in Picardy.

Many of the relevant works were lost e. Indeed, it is not at all clear just what it was that prompted medieval interest. One might have supposed that, even if particular theories about the Liar were not transmitted to the Middle Ages from antiquity, at least formulations of Liar-type paradoxes must have been known and available to stimulate the medieval discussions. In fact, however, there are strikingly few possibilities. If you say you lie, and you speak the truth, you lie; but you say you lie, and you speak the truth; therefore, you lie. Moreover Cicero, who wrote in Latin and so did not have to be translated to be available to the Middle Ages, calls such paradoxes "inexplicables" inexplicabilia. For this reason, the Liar Paradox is nowadays sometimes referred to as the "Epimenides. When medieval authors discuss the passage at all, for instance in Scriptural commentaries, they seem to be concerned only with why St. Paul should be quoting pagan sources. In this context, Aristotle supposes a man who takes an oath that he will become an oath-breaker, and then does so. Absolutely or on the whole, Aristotle says, such a man is an oath-breaker, even though with respect to the particular oath to become an oath-breaker he is an oath-keeper. It was this sentence that many medieval authors took to be a reference to the Liar Paradox, which therefore, on the authority of Aristotle, could be solved as fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. The widespread appeal to this passage throughout the history of the insolubilia-literature indicates that the text did play some role in prompting medieval interest in insolubles. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the earliest known medieval statement of the Liar occurs in , around the time the Sophistic Refutations first began to circulate in Western Europe in Latin translation. See Section 2 below. The oath-breaker, as the example was generally interpreted, takes two oaths: The man is an oath-breaker and an oath-fulfiller, but with respect to different oaths; by breaking his second oath, rendering it false, he fulfills the first oath, making it true. It is a long way from that to the Liar Paradox, in which the same proposition is it seems both false and true. Unless one already knew about the Liar, therefore, it is hard to see how this passage from Aristotle would have suggested it to anyone. But more must have been involved too. At present we cannot say whether they did this on the basis of some still unidentified ancient source or whether it was through their own intellectual power and logical insight. The importance of this passage should not be exaggerated. It is true that it gives us the earliest known explicit medieval formulation of the Liar. It is not until later in the twelfth century that one finds an explicit statement of the special problems raised by insolubles. In his *On the Natures of Things De naturis rerum* , of unknown date but apparently well known by the end of the century, Alexander Neckham , p. Again, if Socrates says he lies, and says nothing else, he says some proposition. Therefore, either a true one or a false one. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true or what is false. But if 1 Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is true, then it is true that Socrates lies. And if it is true that Socrates lies, Socrates says what is false. Therefore, if Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is true, he says what is false. But if 2 Socrates says only the proposition that Socrates lies, and he says what is false, then it is false that Socrates says what is false. And if it is false that Socrates says what is false, Socrates does not say what is false. But if Socrates says only that he lies, he says either what is true or what is false. Therefore, if Socrates says he lies, he says what is true. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, and he says what is false, then he says what is true. But if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true or false. Therefore, if Socrates says only that he lies, he says what is true and says what is false. Nevertheless, although clearly Neckham was fully aware of what is paradoxical about the Liar, he makes no attempt to solve the paradox. He presents it only as an example of the "vanities" logic deals with. From then on, there are a great number of surviving treatments. In the early s, Thomas Bradwardine, in a preliminary section of his own treatise on insolubles, lists nine views in circulation in his day. See Spade , pp. Some of these views can no longer be identified in the texts that survive from the period before Bradwardine, but among the surviving views, we can distinguish five

broad approaches to "solving" the paradox. Later in the insolubilia-literature, discussions often continued to be cast in terms of this fallacy, even though their real focus was generally on entirely different theoretical issues; Bradwardine is a good example. In the early period, however, many but by no means all authors actually tried to solve insolubles as fallacies *secundum quid et simpliciter*. But for reasons described in part in Section 1. Some authors in the early medieval literature, however, argued that insolubles are absolutely neither true nor false, but only true in a certain respect and false in a certain respect. The word *transcasus* is not a usual Latin word. It seems to be a literal translation of Greek *metaptosis*. In Stoic logic, propositions that change their true value over time were called *metapiptonta* from the same root. Walter Burley in fact used the word *transcasus* exactly this way in in two short logical works. Nevertheless, in the particular context of insolubles, while the term *transcasus* does have an association with time, it does not imply any change of truth value over time. Thus, when the liar says "I am lying," what he really means is "What I said just a moment ago was a lie. But it is not clear exactly what motivated it. Signified or Conceived Act A third theory from this early period distinguishes the "exercised" act from the "signified" or "conceived" act. The details of this theory are not yet well understood, but the basic strategy is to distinguish what the liar says he is doing namely, lying from he really is doing. John Duns Scotus, who held a version of this theory in his *Questiones on the Sophistic Refutations* Scotus, thought that what the liar is really doing his "exercised act" is speaking the truth. In order to avoid the paradox, this theory would seem to be committed to saying that the exercised act and the signified act are two distinct acts, so that the theory, like the theory of *transcasus* Section 2. Such theories were called "restriction," and their proponents were called "restricters" *restringentes*. All such theories maintained that in some or all cases, terms in propositions could not "supposit for" stand for, refer to the propositions in which they occur. Some theories of restriction went further and also ruled out other patterns of reference. Here a refers to b and b refers back to a. But reference is not a transitive relation, so that there is no real self-reference here. Nevertheless, the situation is paradoxical, and as a result some authors ruled out all referential "loops. Token a is self-referential, but token b is not, since it refers to a, not to itself. Yet some authors thought the two tokens should be treated semantically alike, so that not only the subject of a could not refer to a itself, neither could the subject of b. Here, b is self-referential, but a is not. Nevertheless, b is the contradictory of a. Hence, by saying its contradictory is true, a is in effect saying that it itself is false. Thus, although it is not self-referential, a is nevertheless paradoxical. Some authors prevented such cases by maintaining that not only were terms unable to refer to the propositions in which they occurred, they also could not refer to the contradictories of the propositions in which they occurred. As a general theory, restriction is open to an obvious objection: Yet the theory of restriction would disallow it. Medieval authors sometimes raised this objection. As a result, we find two kinds of restriction-theories in the medieval literature: Walter Burley and William of Ockham, for example, held the latter form of restriction Spade, If general or strong theories of restriction are open to the objection stated above, the weaker theories are open to a different objection: The proponents of weaker theories did not have any independent way of identifying paradoxical cases. In practice, their theories amounted to saying "all forms of reference are allowed, except for paradoxical ones, which are not allowed. It is maintained in the earliest known treatise on insolubles *De Rijk* and in one other anonymous text Spade, pp. The treatise in *De Rijk* presents more of a theory. Much of it is obscure to modern scholars, but it seems to appeal to a distinction between a mental act of asserting and a vocal act of uttering a proposition. But somehow this is the obscure part there is no "saying. It is tempting, yes, but highly speculative. Nevertheless, whatever the correct interpretation, it appears that the distinction between asserting and uttering drawn by this theory escapes the facile "refutation" of it used as early as the mid-thirteenth century, that it "plainly contradicts sensation that is not deceived. The Second Quarter of the Fourteenth Century The preceding theories represent the earliest stage of the insolubilia-literature. Although these theories are sometimes mentioned in the later literature, and in the case of "restriction" often accepted in the later literature, much more sophisticated treatments began to emerge in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. The turning point is Thomas Bradwardine, whose own theory was enormously influential on later authors. Shortly after Bradwardine, two other authors from this middle period are also important: Roger Swyneshed, and William Heytesbury. A little later, Gregory of Rimini appears to have made important

contributions to the discussion as well. It became one of the most important works on the topic in the Middle Ages. For the opinions mentioned above were those of the old [logicians], who understood little or nothing about insolubles. After them there arose the prince of modern philosophers of nature, namely Master Thomas Bradwardine. He was the first one who discovered something worthwhile about insolubles. He adopts what has been called an "adverbial" theory of propositional signification. By virtue of their constituent terms, propositions signify things; but, in addition, a proposition as a whole signifies that such-and-such is the case. For him, a proposition is true if and only if it signifies only as is the case *tantum sicut est*, and false if and only if it signifies otherwise than is the case *aliter quam est*.

Chapter 3 : Peter Of Ailly: Concepts And Insolubles: An Annotated Translation

2 Peter of Ailly wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best estimate, in He was at that time only about twenty-two years old.

To carry out and justify his ontological project of eliminating alleged entities falling under eight Aristotelian categories, Ockham needs and in effect uses a connotation theory which provides him a recursive semantics for the mental language. In this paper, I offer a new interpretation, based upon a distinction between metaphysical simplicity and semantic complexity of connotative terms, which I argue can accommodate both. The main mechanism that brings forth the ontological elimination is his theory of connotation. The theory of connotation is a theory about significations of terms in mental language. Ockham, following Boethius, distinguished three levels of language: Among the three, mental language is natural, while the other two conventional. In connection with the connotation theory, a further demarcation among categorematic terms is introduced: Despite its rich content, the central thesis of the connotation theory is simple: What this thesis suggests is a reductional program in the semantics of mental terms: With the help of the related theory of "exposition" and "exponibles,"⁴ we can easily extend the reductional program in the connotation theory to a recursive semantics⁵ in modern jargon, i. We have said that there are correlations between absolute terms and substances and qualities, and between connotative terms and putative entities falling under other Aristotelian categories. We have also said that the connotation theory, together with the theory of "exposition" and "exponibles," enables us to have a reductional semantics. But these two still do not suffice to give us ontological reduction. To have ontological elimination, we need some additional principles that hook up the connotation theory with ontology, principles that provide us sufficient reasons to posit ontological entities. Clearly the above principles only enable us to have "ontological elimination" in the weak sense, for we cannot rule out the possibility that there might be a sufficient reason to posit the existence of some putative entities under another philosophical context. To have "ontological elimination" in the strong sense, we must strengthen the principles. While Spade and Marilyn Adams disagree about the degree of defensibility of the synonymy thesis,¹⁰ they agree that Ockham did hold this thesis and it provides at least a programmatic scheme for ontological elimination. There seem to be other requirements too. So, a good interpretation of the connotation theory must also accommodate the thesis that there is no synonym in mental language. Unfortunately, among current interpretations of the connotation theory, none is able to satisfy all the above requirements [a], [b], and [c]. In their approach they treat mental language as having a compositional syntax, i. What this suggests is that a connotative term and its nominal definition are the same mental entity, not two distinct entities that are semantically equivalent. Hence, their approach satisfies requirement b. But since a connotative term is an aggregate of simples, it is complex. Hence, their approach does not satisfy requirement c. Claude Panaccio takes requirements b and c seriously, but largely motivated by a worry about the semantical reduction of relational terms,¹⁶ he rejects the synonymy thesis. In this section I argue that this interpretation is unfavorable. My strategy is to use both textual evidence and three arguments to show that mental propositions are simple for Ockham. During the late mediaeval period, the issue concerning the structure of mental propositions was a controversial one. One common view, held by John Buridan and commonly attributed to Ockham, is that a mental proposition has constitutive parts in a way similar to a written or spoken proposition. Take, for example, the mental counterpart of the written proposition "Every man is an animal. And if it is said that an act of apprehending or knowing one proposition is not some one simple act, but rather is an act [made up] of many acts, which acts all [together] make up one proposition, [I argue] against this [as follows]: To the second [argument] many things can be said. One is that a proposition in the mind is one [thing] composed of many acts of understanding. Alternatively, it can be said that this proposition is one act equivalent to three such acts existing simultaneously in the intellect. It is no doubt true that in several places Ockham said that a mental proposition is composed of mental terms,²⁴ and one possible interpretation the prevailing one is to take it as saying that a mental proposition is a complex having various constitutive parts. But there are other possible interpretations too. Notice that for the mature

Ockham a mental sign is an act of thinking or understanding rather than a "fictum" or thought-object a view he held in the early stages of his career, analogous to the phenomenological "intentional object," having no real but a sort of "intentional being. First, we may say that a mental proposition is or can be formed by putting together several mental terms. And this leaves open the question whether a mental proposition itself, as the product of combining several mental terms, is complex or not, because it is perfectly possible that by putting together several mental terms acts of understanding we get a new and simple entity an analog can be found in chemical experiments: Second, we may say that what we apprehend through an act of understanding which is a mental proposition is a complex, i. While it is not my business here to determine which of these two interpretations is more appropriate, I do want to show that the prevailing interpretation that a mental proposition is complex is unfavorable, by appealing to the following three arguments. First, for Ockham mental language is the one in which God thinks. And since mental signs are acts of understanding, they have to be simple. Third, there are the notorious word-order and word-binding problems²⁸ associated with the view that mental propositions have constitutive parts. The word-order problem is how we account for the mental counterpart of the word order in spoken and written language. And the word-binding problem or the problem of the unity of a proposition is how the various constituents of a proposition are bound together in the proposition. In the following let me show there are no easy solutions to both problems. Concerning the word-order problem, we know that mental word-order, if any, can be neither spatial nor temporal, since the acts of understanding are not spatial and the mind can produce a mental proposition instantaneously. But what can mental word-order be if it is neither spatial nor temporal? An easy solution is to adopt a "jigsaw" theory to account for mental word-order, i. Thus, to every categorematic term *e*. Accordingly, to find out mental word-order of a proposition in the new mental language, we only need to look at the constitutive terms in the proposition, extracting the syntactic information they bear. Now, it is true that this theory does nicely account for mental word-order; however, it has some undesirable implications. First, this theory implies that every categorematic term in written or spoken language is necessarily equivocal, since a written or spoken categorematic term *e*. But that does not seem to be held by Ockham. Hence, the "jigsaw" theory, although interesting by itself, can hardly be attributed to Ockham. Concerning the word-binding problem, an easy solution is to say that the mental copula "is" binds together the mental terms in the proposition. However, this solution, too, is not without problem. Consider a mere collection of mental terms including the mental copula "is" and a mental proposition which has exactly the same constituents. Certainly there is a difference between them, since a mere collection of terms is not a proposition. But if they have the same constituents, where does the difference come from? The only way to answer this question, it seems to me, is to appeal to the difference between mental copulas in the two cases. If we hold the former, how do we understand the binding mental copula in the mental proposition? Presumably the binding copula cannot occur outside a proposition, for if it did occur alone or in a mere collection of mental terms, it would not appear as a binding copula and hence would be a different concept. But Ockham does not seem to admit that there are mental terms *e*. If we hold the latter, how do we understand and explain the difference between behaviors of the same mental copula in the two cases? It cannot be psychological, because for Ockham the difference between a mere collection of terms and a proposition is not psychological, i. But a compositional syntax and a recursive semantics do not have to go hand in hand. However, the above worry does contain some legitimate element, i. And this poses a problem: It is in the context of solving this problem, I suggest, that Ockham and Peter of Ailly introduced the notion of "semantical equivalence. The idea behind these seems to be the introduction of an imaginary, compositional mental language which is semantically equipotent to the real, non-compositional mental language. Particularly, the construction of the imaginary mental language can take the following steps: This then solves the problem in the previous paragraph. Under this interpretation, the fully expanded nominal definition of a connotative term, a complex sign consisting of only absolute terms and syncategoremata, is not a sign in the real mental language, but a sign in the imaginary mental language, a piece of theoretical apparatus we create to explicate the signification of the connotative term. Hence, our interpretation satisfies requirement b. Whether or not my suggestions are ultimately satisfactory, a good interpretation should accommodate all. I am also grateful to an anonymous reader for his or her very helpful comments on an early draft of this paper.

Although the two themes are both called nominalism, they are mutually independent, e. Part I of the *Summa Logicae*, tr. University of Notre Dame Press, , p. In general, the theory of "exponibles" is a semantical theory of propositions, while the connotation theory a theory of terms. Girard Etzkorn and Francis Kelly [St. Bonaventure University,], p. This will enable us to deny the existence of alleged entities falling under eight Aristotelian categories. See Marilyn Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols. See Spade, *Thoughts, Words and Things*, pp. Latin has no indefinite article. An Annotated Translation par. Reidel, , pp. However, this objection fails to work, because it overlooks the fact that although the former language contains more types of acts of understanding than the latter, it has much less tokens of acts of understanding, and it is in fact a token of an act of understanding that was treated by Ockham as an entity in mental language. See Peter of Ailly, *Concepts and Insolubles* par. For Russell it is a relating relation that accounts for the unity of a proposition, and a relating relation is the same entity as its nominalization a saturated relation which does not relate terms and can function as logical subject. But then he admitted that there is a problem about the "inexplicable" difference between a relating relation and its nominalization, which he confessed that he was unable to solve. Kluwer Academic Publishers, , p. *Their Contents and Their Objects* London: Paideia logo design by Janet L.

Chapter 4 : Pdf Peter Of Ailly: Concepts And Insolubles: An Annotated Translation

A more famous treatise on concepts is Peter of Ailly's Concepts, given a modern translation by Paul Spade. Peter's treatise was written in Paris in the early s, and printed there and in Lyon several times in the s.

There he continued the struggle for his side in a humorous work, in which the partisans of the council are amusingly taken to task by the demon Leviathan. At the same time, by means of an exchange, he obtained to the highest dignity in the university, becoming chancellor of Notre Dame de Paris. Both were involved in expelling the Dominican Order from the university for refusing to embrace the idea of the Immaculate Conception and in the effort mentioned above to end the Great Schism by means of an ecumenical council. His obsequious language on this occasion, and the favours with which it was rewarded, formed a too violent contrast to the determined attitude of the university of Paris, which, tired of the schism, was even then demanding the resignation of the two pontiffs. Nevertheless, on his return from Avignon, he again in the presence of the king enlarged upon the advantages offered by the way which the university commended. The great number of benefices which he held left room for some doubt as to his disinterestedness. Henceforward he was under suspicion at the university, and was excluded from the assemblies where the union was discussed. After Le Puy, he was appointed bishop of Noyon , and bishop of Cambrai In order to take possession of his new episcopal see , he had to brave the wrath of Philip, duke of Burgundy , override the resistance of the clergy and bourgeoisie , and even withstand an armed attack on the part of several lords; but his protector, the duke of Orleans, had his investiture performed by Wenceslaus , king of the Romans. However, the language of the bishop of Cambrai seems on this occasion to have been lacking in decision; however that may be, it led to no felicitous result. Although he was slow at first to embrace the conciliar solution to the Schism, he was participating in councils by Schismatic pressures[edit] France next tried to bring violent pressure to bear to conquer the obstinacy of Benedict XIII by threatening a formal withdrawal from his obedience. He was sent by Charles VI on an embassy to Benedict and seized this opportunity of lavishing on the pontiff friendly congratulations mingled with useful advice. Two years later, before the same pontiff, he preached in the city of Genoa a sermon which led to the general institution, in the countries of the obedience of Avignon, of the festival of the Holy Trinity. The following year he and his disciple Gerson formed part of the great embassy sent by the princes to the two pontiffs, and while in Italy he was occupied in praiseworthy but vain efforts to induce the pope of Rome to remove himself to a town on the Italian coast, in the neighbourhood of his rival, where it was hoped that the double abdication would take place. Discouraged by his failure to effect this, he returned to his diocese of Cambrai at the beginning of In the council lay now, to judge from his words, the only chance of salvation; and, in view of the requirements of the case, he began to argue that, in case of schism, a council could be convoked by any one of the faithful, and would have the right to judge and even to depose the rival pontiffs. Afterwards, seeing the trend of events, he showed some uneasiness and hesitation. He refused, however, to undertake the defence of John XXIII, and only appeared in the trial of this pope to make depositions against him, which were sometimes of an overwhelming character. By this campaign, which exposed him to the worst retaliation of the English, he inaugurated his role of "procurator and defender of the king of France. His ideas on the powers of the college of cardinals and the infallibility of the general council were very influential. Many questions in science and astrology, such as calendar reform , attracted his attention. Works and translations[edit] Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum â€” , anastatic reprint of the edition of Petrus de Alliaco Questiones super primum, tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum. Principia et questio circa Prologum, cura et studio Monica Brinzei, Turnhout: De concordia astronomice veritatis et narrationis historice Tractatus de concordantia theologie et astronomie Destructiones modorum significandi, L. Tractatus de anima, O. Tractatus super De consolatione philosophiae, M. Conceptus et insolubilia Paris, c. Conceptus et insolubilia, Lyons c. Tractatus exponibilium, Paris

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Extra info for Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles: An Annotated Translation Example text It is clear therefore that a concept is able not to be a concept, and [that] a concept remains in such a situation, even when it does not remain a concept.

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Chapter 7 : Insolubles (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter)

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Description: 2 Peter of Aillyl wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best 3 estimate, in He was at that time only about twenty-two years old. He was at that time only about twenty-two years old.

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