

**Chapter 1 : Perceptions of the UN in the US Press During the Iraq War – Assignment Example**

*Perceptions of War One of the most interesting conflicts of perception, in my mind, is that of opposing soldiers in war. The outlook on World War II, from an American soldiers point of view, was vastly different than that of a German soldier.*

This essay achieved a low 1st in the third year of my undergraduate. Public Perception of War As has been shown in prior conflicts of this nature, retention of public goodwill is a crucial factor in determining the ability of the government to conduct a war effectively. Perhaps the most obvious example was the Vietnam War; once public support for the conflict had largely evaporated, the administration was forced to withdraw, without having gained the victory their predecessors had claimed would be theirs with ease. The association of a war of this type with the memory of the failures and atrocities of Vietnam will make it very difficult to retain the support of the public if the coming conflict is allowed to publicly degenerate as much as in the past. Some of the realities of war have, in the past, been bypassed or ignored, perhaps most notably by Johnson in his State of the Union address in 1968. This report will therefore examine the way in which the realities of war have been conveyed in the films *Apocalypse Now* and *Platoon*, as well as questioning whether the films are actually anti-war, or merely realistic, an argument made by Tomasulo. The image put forward in many portrayals of the Vietnam War is of American soldiers being apparently unfazed by the prospect of killing Vietnamese non-combatants. When one combines this with some of the scandals surrounding the treatment of prisoners, particularly in Guantanamo Bay in more recent years, there has been a definite increase in scrutiny of the actions of the American military, with more emphasis being placed on the regard for human rights. As such, it will be argued that the realities of war cannot be shielded away from, nor should they be. The attempted concealment of such realities in the Vietnam War made the outrage so much more profound when they were discovered, particularly after the My Lai massacre, and the massacre at My Lai. The realities of the Vietnam War are displayed, but throughout the films there are obvious emphases which, one could argue narrow the scope. Both films have a strong focus on the psychological damage caused to the soldiers who fought in the war, with the main antagonist in *Apocalypse Now*, Colonel Walter E. Kurtz. Much of *Platoon* also aims to tell the story of the common soldier, how they dealt with the terrors of the War, and how it affected them psychologically. What has resulted is what might be criticised as a certain narrowness of scope, but it is important to remember the limitations of film as a medium – it will never be able to convey all that one would experience in person. In the end therefore, the American public found the films acceptable, because they reflected just enough American values. The shame that they underwent before this point is reached however is extremely poignant, as they are taken through much of the heavy-handedness which is perhaps symbolic of the Vietnam War. The way they have been slipped into war films which have equally graphic combat scenes would seem to imply that, for the American military, such acts are simply part of the brutality of war, given the matter of fact way they were dealt with by some of the characters in *Platoon* in particular. Overall, several problems in the portrayal of the Vietnam War have been highlighted through study of *Apocalypse Now* and *Platoon*. The main problem lies in distinguishing to the public the differences between full atrocities and the stark realities of war, and a decision must be taken as to how honest the administration is willing to be about both, as it is perhaps inevitable for the former to take place, however isolated the incident. The psychological impact of a potentially gruelling conflict must also be considered, and while many have criticised the approaching conflict as having all the hallmarks of another Vietnam, they seem to have failed to account for the enormous cultural and religious differences between the Middle East and South-East Asia, something which can potentially be used to the advantage of the administration. There are several ways in which these issues can be addressed. The brutal realities of war must not be hidden from the public, but the administration must also make an effort to stress the natural savagery of war against the atrocities of an unrestrained few. In a best-case scenario, the administration will only have to deal with the realities of war, as opposed to the massacres of the kind the administrations through the later part of the Vietnam War were faced with. The unfortunate possibility is, however, that at some point a scandal of the kind embodied by My Lai, Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib will occur, and it is important that the administration distance itself from it, and condemn those responsible. One of

the main reasons the American government lost credibility in the process of the Vietnam conflict was that it seemed to have no control over the actions of its own military – and some argued in the immediate aftermath of the war that atrocities of the kind committed at My Lai were actually commonplace; that they were the rule and not the exception. The psychological impact of any war, but particularly a war which degenerates into a counter-insurgency, should not be underestimated, and an effort should be made on the part of the administration to provide support for returning veterans – something which, however cynical it seems, should be as well-publicised as possible. In such a way, the government will have shown concern for the welfare of its individual soldiers rather than simply their value as resources in a war, which will in turn promote public support for the conflict. To conclude, many issues have been raised in post-Vietnam media, although some overarching themes have clearly emerged. As the first war in which the full extent of the barbarism was captured on camera, it is likely that the images had more of an impact on the public than they should have done. Since then, with the expansion of mass media, many more of the public will be far more aware of uglier side of war, thus making it easier to separate the brutality of war from actual atrocities. What is important is that no attempt is made on the part of the government to hide the savagery of war from the public, or in any way diminish the sacrifice of the soldiers who take part, as was perhaps done towards the end of the Vietnam War. As well as this, with the horrors of modern war, techniques for dealing with mental issues arising from the stresses of combat have developed, meaning that there are now suitable support networks in place, which need only be funded or at least subsidised by the government to allow them to cope with the demands of a larger-scale war. In short, the public face of the war should be handled with far more finesse than Vietnam was, and should remain sensitive to the cares and motivations of the many rather than the few. Devine, Vietnam at 24 Frames a Second: The opening paragraphs seemed, to my mind, to play things a little safe and hewed fairly closely to the example that we discussed in class. But, as it went on, it seemed that this was more to do with the framing than the analysis and argument – both of which became much more interesting by the bottom of p. You also offer a balanced assessment as to how these lessons can be applied to present circumstances in a way that is mature and even-handed. A couple of criticisms. Second, there were just a few places where the writing got a little untidy.

*perception-space, perception war, and perception operations (perceived-effects)-based operations.*

Facebook Twitter When we think of war, many of us envision images of their fellow citizens suffering. We think of soldiers who are hurt or killed overseas. We think of veterans who come home with life-changing injuries trying to recover. We think of the families of the young men and women lost at war. However, it was not always like this. It was not until the s and s, during and after the Vietnam War, that things started to move in a different direction. Vietnam War protestors march at the Pentagon in Washington, D. Today, with war in the Middle-East at times dominating the news, Americans are flooded with information and images depicting U. We see hour-long documentaries covering the perspective of families of the troops, both stationed overseas and killed in action. During Vietnam, rarely did journalists broadcast these intimate stories. Nor did they personalize the stories of our troops who were killed or injured while stationed abroad. To put this into perspective, during the Vietnam War, the New York Times published the names of only out of the 58, American soldiers killed in Vietnam. Only 16 biographical references were made, and only 14 photos of military servicemen found their way onto the pages of the Times. And only two articles talked about the suffering of soldiers posted in Vietnam. Martin Luther King, Jr. Americans were reacting to the news of these devastating casualties in ways previously unseen by the government. In order to avoid a long-term lack of domestic support for the war effort, the US needed to find a new way to honor the troops. The chances of victory in Vietnam were quickly dwindling, and it was important to find a way to honor those fighting for our country. The US changed the way they approached honoring their military service members in a few major ways. First, they changed the basis on which they awarded the Medal of Honor. Prior to Vietnam, the Medal of Honor was typically awarded to soldiers who had excelled offensively in war. In other words, if a certain soldier killed a large number of enemy troops, and thereby contributed to victory, he may be awarded the Medal of Honor. During and following Vietnam, the criteria for awarding the Medal of Honor changed. The medal was now being awarded to men who performed acts of heroism in defending or saving his fellow soldiers. Vietnam war, November Another way in which the US changed its honoring of US troops was in how the military handed down discipline. Prior to the Vietnam War, military leaders were renowned for their harsh discipline of new recruits and enlisted men. The s and 70s, however, were a time of individual autonomy and self-expression. The military had no choice but to embrace these values by allowing their own men to enjoy the same expressive freedoms US civilians did. Finally, the government and military changed the way in which the families of fallen soldiers were treated. Families were notified, in person, of the death of a loved one rather than by a telegram. It was not only the families of the fallen who were honored. The US changed the way in which they treated and handled prisoners of war. Families of POWs started to band together and demand respect and honor for their loved ones. For the first time, military personnel and journalists began to meet with the families and loved ones of soldiers who became prisoners of war. They wanted to show America the emotions felt by the families of these heroes. The cultural changes in how we view war and honor our troops have persisted up to today. The ways in which the US fights wars has changed. Casualties are much lower today than they were in Vietnam. One of the reasons for this is that the US military has changed its approach to war in foreign lands. Instead of the ground troops we saw in Vietnam, the military now uses high altitude bombing, drones, and heavily armed vehicles. Although this does lead to much fewer US casualties, it does typically increase the number of civilian casualties abroad. It also reduces the amount of interaction the US troops have with the locals which, inevitably, can reduce local support for the US cause. UH-1 helicopters just prior to takeoff in Vietnam. Vietnam did not make Americans pacifists. It did, however, make us more concerned with the well-being and safety of our troops. The end of the draft following the Vietnam War led to an all-volunteer military force. A fallen soldier tribute stands before panels of a replica Vietnam Memorial Wall. Because of this, new recruits have to be treated with much more respect today than they did decades ago. As a result, America will continue to honor their military troops for protecting each other even during conflicts in which American does not fare so well. While Americans have most always respected those who

serve, following the Vietnam War the ways in which we do so have changed significantly and in many different areas including the press and the military itself.

### Chapter 3 : Public Perceptions of the Vietnam War | Jack Beaman

*Yet most Americans saw the Tet offensive as a failure for the United States. Approval of President Lyndon B. Johnson's handling of the war slipped to a low of 26 percent.*

Worse, it contributed to a very negative public view of returning soldiers. News agencies established offices in Saigon, and correspondents were regularly dispatched with units going into combat. Early in the war, the media followed an anti-communist narrative, portraying the U.S. Fifty million people were witnessing death and destruction on their television screens every night, reported by journalists who were not censored by the military. By the Tet Offensive in 1968, the war was lost in the eyes of the media. While Tet was a key American victory, television programs, radio, and newspapers portrayed it as a devastating loss. To say that we are mired in a bloody stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory conclusion. Wright said, in an interview with the New Yorker. Vets were regularly spit on or had tomatoes and other objects thrown at them. Many were refused service at public establishments, and returning soldiers would often change out of their uniforms as quickly as possible as soon as they reached U.S. Worse, throngs received little to no support from the Veterans Administration — an arm of the very government that sent them to war in the first place. There was limited treatment for post-traumatic stress and other injuries, and few programs to help veterans find employment. Over 17,000 committed suicide, and thousands more ended up in jail or on the street. Many service members who served in Vietnam and stayed in uniform ended up in the highest levels of leadership after the war, swearing that no soldier would ever return home to an unappreciative country again. At the same time, public opinion in the late 1960s and early 1970s was swinging back in favor of veterans, culminating in the construction of the Vietnam Veteran Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C. It seemed people were finally realizing that service members who fought in Vietnam were just doing their jobs, and in many cases were pressed into service without much choice. During the Gulf War, generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell — both Vietnam vets — bent over backward to ensure the Southeast Asian conflict of the 1960s and 1970s was not repeated, not just in terms of planning and executing a war, but also of support for the troops. During the Gulf War, veterans were revered for their service. Care packages flooded downrange units. That sentiment remains in place today. Some of this may come from increased military controls over what the press releases publicly, but even our government — unwieldy, bureaucratic, and inefficient as it sometimes seems — usually has its heart right when it comes to veterans. Congress has put laws on the books to assist returning troops with job searches, provide tax breaks, and other benefits. Bill and home-buying benefits. Military services subject returning vets to a barrage of physical and mental health-related tests when they return home to ensure appropriate access to care for post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury, and other conditions — all unheard of during Vietnam and wars before. There are also thousands of assistance programs from private organizations. Some offer hiring incentives, while others may discount large purchases such as auto dealerships, among other things. Jason Nulton is an Air Force veteran with logistics experience in deployed environments and as a squadron commander. Currently teaching leadership and science at Ohio Valley University, he is drafting his next novel about a Vietnamese family who escaped Saigon in

Chapter 4 : War of Perceptions? | World Affairs Journal

*Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath [Mary Buckley, Sally N. Cummings] on blog.quintoapp.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. Nato intervention in Kosovo marked a major turning point in post cold war international relations.*

Clearly the phrase has appeal. This raises a number of interesting questions. Another is whether changing perceptions changes behavior. I will get back to this later. There were counterinsurgencies long before there was counterinsurgency theory. There have been counterinsurgencies since the Greek city-states fought amongst themselves, but counterinsurgency COIN was not isolated as a body of thought until after World War II. COIN had nothing to do with technology. COIN came into being as military thinkers like Galula aimed to counter Mao, who wrote and lectured on guerrilla warfare even as his armies fought Japanese invaders in the late s. Counterinsurgency theory could not have been formulated before a sort of Copernican inversion in looking at warfare was possible, and that this in turn depended on a wider cultural openness to the idea that reality is determined by the beholder. And that inversion, in turn, depended on a wider cultural faith in the power of perceptions. I will call this perspectival culture. In the arts, Duchamp did the most to promote perspectival culture, most influentially by exhibiting a urinal as a work of art in . In , it never was; in , the question was hotly debated. Today, it is definitely art in certain settings museums and galleries and to certain spectators, those socialized into the culture of modern art. That culture inverts the notion that someone who makes recognizable works of art is an artist, and says that anything the cognoscenti agree is art, is. Some even go so far as to say anything an artist makes is art. Galula was careful to note in his *Pacification in Algeria* that his predecessor and the two commanders who followed him in his area of operations were shot dead by insurgents. And sooner or later, all American commanders are going to leave Afghanistan. Turnabout is fair play: Do Afghans see what we are doing the same way we do? That reciprocity might not work. I think that many Afghans are quite happy to take our roads and bridges and dams if not our schools without changing their support for the insurgency. Consider the susceptibility of most Afghans to rumors and conspiracy theories. I think COIN assumes certain mental processes – and the consistency and stability of these processes. In fact, they think that someone who can afford to pay them is likely to be able to take care of their interests. Given big differences like this in our views of the world, are we sure we are striking the bargains we think we are in Afghanistan?

**Chapter 5 : perception of war | Übersetzung Englisch-Deutsch**

*LAURENCE REES: Is there enough knowledge about what was actually happening on the Eastern Front during the war in the popular consciousness today? GEOFFREY WAWRO: Well, it used to be a truism that we focused on Anglo-American-Canadian efforts in the West, and we neglected the scale of the fighting in the East.*

The purpose of this research was to: Thirty survey questions were formulated based on these interviews not including statistical questions and administered online. Questions focused on perceptions of leaders, perceptions of war, and the scriptural or doctrinal support of both. **CONCLUSIONS** The Mormon cultural experience appears to play a larger role in the formulation of political worldviews than official policy or doctrinal precedent, ostensibly reducing religious canon, in the political realm, to something of a Rorschach test. And this dangerous messianic brand of religion, one where self-doubt is minimal, has come increasingly to color the modern world of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. According to the Just War Theory, 4 six conditions must be met in order to justify a declaration of war: 1. Lethal force may only be used in self-defense, or to correct an unjustified aggression against populations; 2. Lethal force may only be decreed by legitimate ruling authorities i. Lethal force may only be used to re-establish a level of peace comparable to that which existed before the or aggression; there can be no national self-interest i. There is a reasonable chance of success; 5. The level of destruction must be outweighed by the good intended to be achieved; 6. All other attempts at peace must be exhausted. Language as a communication tool is reduced to codes and scripts manufactured by the state and weaponized about by the populace. The coded results of these interviews suggest Mormon support for war under three categories: Part of that grows out of the idea that the United States always has to have an enemy. We have this complex. And it started out being the British. From its earliest beginnings, Mormonism has faced important theological questions regarding the appropriated use of, and response to, violence. Though they often disagree doctrinally, there are several social issues on which Mormons and conservative Christians are united, such as war, euthanasia, capital punishment, the family, and homosexuality. People profess to be Buddhist, Mormon, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and so on, and yet are largely a product of their cultural environment rather than their canon. But then there are those who say that if you argue that the U. So you have Luther, Calvinâ€”all the great thinkers in the western theological traditionâ€”who have written on justifying violence in some sense. That happens to be one of the particularities that leads to unquestioning obedience to qualified authority. The entire history of the U. But Mormons have a kind of history and faith that intensifies and buttresses and elaborates that claim in a way that I think is unique to their doctrine. Responses were statistically categorized: Leaders One major pattern that emerged from the responses was the concept of strong devotion to righteous, moral leaders. Asked to describe their ideal leader, respondents wrote: Bush, Jimmy Carter, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Harry S. King Benjamin â€” no taxes. King Lamoni â€” same reason, and exhibited a desire for the best for his people. The primary reasons for support according to 11 categorized choices were: These responses indicate that participants do not believe their opinions came directly from scriptural sources or from LDS leadership. Open-ended responses for the support of war in revealed: Iraq was a good start for bringing lasting peace. Those who opposed the war in said: Then the reason shifted to WMDs. Then the reason shifted to Regime Change. Then it shifted to the establishment of Democracy. It was like we were all strung along. It appeared to place too many lives in jeopardy primarily for economic reasons. It therefore becomes incumbent to support both the war and its leader. Many have been speaking out and doing so emphatically. That is their privilege. That is their right, so long as they do so legally. However, we all must also be mindful of another overriding responsibility, which I may add, governs my personal feelings and dictates my personal loyalties in the present situation. Other specific references were: McKay, April p 72; and Dallin H. The most anomalous answer was: Reuben Clark gave a great one that was against war. When asked what specific church authorities come to mind on the subject of war, the most common answers were: Faust, and David O. The responses indicate a preference for and sentimentalization of pro-war-related scriptures, such as the stripling warriors, Captain Moroni, Pahoran and his support of Captain Moroni, the necessity of Amalickiah-Amoron wars in the book of Alma, etc.

Though anti-war verses in LDS scripture exist, they were not given major priority. Statements Respondents were shown the following three statements: When enemies rise up, we commit vast resources to the fabrication of gods of stone and steel “ ships, planes, missiles, fortifications ” and depend on them for protection and deliverance. General Eisenhower used to weep about it, that all these brains, all this intelligence, all this ingenuity and dedication was only devoted to killing each other. It was utter waste. The utter wastefulness of the thing, the wrongness of what we were doing was so strong that people would cry, they would weep, tears would stream down their faces. It was so utterly, unspeakably sad. Other common guesses were Gordon B. Hinckley and Spencer W. The most common guess was Gordon B. These conditions breed Nationalism, Racism, and a natural falling-away from the kindness and generosity championed by Christ. But it is possible to be on the right side of a just war. Freedom is worth fighting for or else we will become slaves. It is horrible and gruesome and everything about it is wrong. It takes sustained, repeated efforts. Mormons may well be the most stubborn, independent-minded group of people ever assembled in a religious community. Liberal views among Mormons outside of Utah, however, are not seen as a type of heresy. The research calls into question the source of the formulation of political beliefs. In times of uncertainty, it is natural for people to turn to their religious canon for answers. The Book of Mormon narrative contains episode after episode of melodramatic chapters on war and violence, good versus evil, Nephites and Lamanites, God and Satan. When America is wicked, the liberals and the Clintons are elected and America is vulnerable. To Mormons, death is not the end, but a passage from one state of existence to another where those who did not receive the Mormon message while in mortality will have the opportunity to do so during the-great-sorting-out-of-things“ a 1,year period on earth in which all wrongs will be rectified, including the tragic but necessary injustices of war, but not until the return of Jesus, and only after a great war in the Middle East. Based on the answers of respondents, however, these religious concepts, though central to their spiritual lives, apparently play a lesser role in the formulation of political worldviews. The single greatest correlation between support for George W. Bush and the war in Iraq, for example, is little more than geography participants residing within Utah county were four times more likely to support both. My parents are Democrats. I voted for Gore in Link Doctrine and Covenants Link Robertson, Mary Ellen. The Case for Pacifism. A Journal of Mormon Thought. Personal interview, conducted Jun. How conservatives won the heart of America. Link 1 Nephi The Denial of Death. Link This entry was posted on Friday, June 30th, at 9: You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2. You can leave a response , or trackback from your own site.

**Chapter 6 : World War 1 - Perspectives of War**

*World War 1 - Perceptions of War A conflict of the magnitude of the First World War impacts on everyone associated with it - the political leadership, the general public on the home front and all those involved in the various theatres of war around the world.*

Is it possible to identify a single aspect of this record stretching back over two decades which is likely to have overriding importance for all officers concerned with foreign affairs? Would this paramount aspect lie with the choices of action our leaders made, as compared with the alternatives available to them? Should one concentrate on re-examining the decision-making process itself? Or was the crucial factor the demonstrated need simply for more experience in dealing with traditionalist, non-Western societies? A few voices have been warning that the proponents of these solutions are missing the main point. These voices are saying Americans are "tripping over it without seeing it" — that we must look within ourselves. The point is, most Americans either have not attempted to see "the world of the Vietnamese" as the Vietnamese do, or have perhaps tried and not known how to do so. Only in the past decade has an increasing minority of young Americans been educated and trained for developing personal awareness of what may be the critical factors: I might add that we also need to learn how to organize what we learn at random about a foreign people from our personal experiences in contemplating them or interacting with them. Before arriving at this main task, we shall first prepare ourselves briefly by consulting some relevant observations and guidelines of prominent government leaders, educators, and researchers, as well as experienced journalists and outstanding Vietnam specialists. In addition, we shall need to sort out our ideas on whose perceptions must concern us as we do or do not find a text helpful for reflecting the intercultural and psychological dimension of the data discussed. We will need practical indicators for spotting the kinds of evidence we are seeking in the reports. Finally, I will conclude with a brief outline of the means presently available for strengthening the capabilities of the analysts to cope with intercultural problems through education and training. The Chicago Conference, June In June , 26 distinguished scholars and foreign affairs officers met in Chicago to search out and discuss the lessons Americans should learn from the Vietnam experience, at a conference sponsored by the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. But Morgenthau rejected out of hand any implication that man can learn nothing from the record of his experiences because each one is unique. Kissinger highlighted conceptual failures of American planners as sources of our difficulties in Vietnam. These conceptual errors persisted because the bureaucracies "run a competition with their own programs and measure success by the degree to which they fulfill their own norms. Whereas the machinery has exhibited rigidities and shortsightedness characteristic of most modern bureaucratic establishments, the perceptions, conceptions, and criteria of the bureaucrats can be explained only if we look beyond the institutions into the American political style as it has been shaped by American history — if we move from the organization to the minds. The kind of changes we may want to introduce into the machinery Our understanding of South Vietnamese society was poor, the expertise at our disposal limited. Our misreading of reality and our self-confidence have led one another in a vicious circle of ever-increasing delusions. The broader implications of our Vietnam experience can all be summarized in one formula: When he assigns a meaning to stimuli, he usually does so unconsciously. For our purposes here, we may usefully cite some of his examples of the use by Americans of terms which for us have connotations prompting hidden assumptions that distort our perceptions of the political scene in Vietnam: The tragedy of our course in Vietnam lies in our refusal to come to grips with those realities in South Vietnam that happened to be decisive from the viewpoint of politics. We failed to distinguish a sect from a party, a clique from an organization, a group of intellectuals or politicians with tiny clienteles from a political movement, a police force, officer corps, and set of rich South Vietnamese chaos to a South Vietnamese mistakes. We tended to attribute combination of Communist disruptiveness and reversible In our examination of the finished intelligence about the political scene we will want to give special attention to the kinds of "elements that seemed familiar and reassuring" which Hoffmann cites. One final alert is in order before we move on: It is difficult even to grasp intellectually the fact that we construct the reality in which we operate. We take our

perception of the world for granted. We know what is real. We live in this reality and we act accordingly. If someone else points out that our perceptions may be wrong, we may intellectually admit the possibility, but we continue to act as though our perceptions were true. We are familiar with illusions but dismiss them as interesting playthings. Our reality seems so solid, and we feel so in touch with it, that it is impossible for us to act with the realization that in fact our reality is inferred by us and may not match the reality which future events reveal. It is precisely in this feeling of certainty that the danger lies. One was the voice of the Frenchman Bernard B. Fall, who gave more than a decade and finally his life as well in Vietnam in a wide-ranging search for the hidden causes and meanings of the war. Some of these reasons tie into points we shall be discussing, for example: On the results of the Tet offensive of January , which "overthrew the assumptions of American strategy," Kissinger wrote: What had gone wrong? The basic problem has been conceptual: We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. The Tet offensive brought to a head the compounded weaknesses. To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, Tet was an American victory. But in a guerrilla war, purely military considerations are not decisive: Both the Hanoi Government and the United States are limited in their freedom of action by the state of mind of the population of South Vietnam, which will ultimately determine the outcome of the conflict. As for the magnitude of our problem of understanding the Vietnamese mind, Kissinger cites the "vast gulf in cultural and bureaucratic style between Hanoi and Washington. At the outset of his talk, he. As Stanley Karnow saw the problem: The first was the conviction that there must be measurable facts in Asia because, regarding ourselves as rational, we had to operate on the basis of facts. So in Vietnam, we proceeded to "quantify" situations with statistics and graphs and charts that told everything except the only important reality " what the people think. Our lack of understanding has also led us to miscalculate our enemies, with the result that we have been unable to estimate their response to force or diplomacy or a mixture of the two. We shall be looking at some of the better known kinds of local ground rules " traditional beliefs, values, and norms " which make such a practice wholly unrealistic in Vietnam as elsewhere in the traditional world. But what the local people think is important is only one aspect of what we shall be calling "the hidden psychological dimension" of the scene in Vietnam. Equally vital for helping Westerners understand "the world of the Vietnamese" is the way they think " how they put data together and reach conclusions. Happily I am addressing America, the country whose philosophy " native, genuine, "aboriginal" " is closest to Asia, the land of pragmatism. When an Asian approaches us [Westerners] We remove the man. Quite often, unfortunately, this is the view of the academicians in our part of the world. We think in terms of concepts. They think in terms of the complete man. Confucius was not interested in concepts because he was interested in the total man They have been trained by a Confucian civilization which impressed upon the people the way they should behave. Confucianism is not descriptive. It tells people how to behave. In her book *Fire in the Lake*: In doing so, she highlights the contradictions and misunderstandings which have abounded throughout this story, as well as the contrast of cultural elements and mind sets which go far to explain them. The book made many best sellers lists, and almost all reviews were unstinting in their praise and approval of her work. I make a whole lot of large generalities that no proper scholar would do. Some Chinese scholars would probably huff and puff about certain things. While she spent a good part of in South Vietnam and travelled widely through the country, Bernal observes: Quite rightly she has relied heavily on the work of others. Many sources are referred to both in the footnotes and in the text. Appropriately, Chapter I is titled "States of Mind;" it strives to convey some sense of the vast psychological gulf between East and West. FitzGerald identifies three distinct grounds for misunderstanding and miscommunication between Vietnamese and Americans: FitzGerald sums up her theme: The unknowns made the whole enterprise, from the most rational and tough-minded point of view, risky in the extreme. In going into Vietnam the United States was not only transposing itself into a different epoch of history; it was entering a world qualitatively different from its own. Culturally as geographically, Vietnam lies half a world away from the United States. Many Americans in Vietnam learned to speak Vietnamese, but the language gave no more than a hint of the basic intellectual grammar that lay beneath. In a sense there was no more correspondence between the two worlds than that between the atmosphere of the earth and that of the sea. To find the common ground

that existed between them, both Americans and Vietnamese would have to recreate the whole world of the other, the whole intellectual landscape. Whose Perceptions Concern Us Here? We might expect thus to determine quite accurately to what extent the person or persons did or did not "wear cultural blinders" with respect to the actual viewpoints, motives, aims, or expectations of the foreign individuals, groups, or societies involved. But for our broad discussion here we will necessarily take readings after the fact, based on written texts. Yet the initiation and follow-through on a particular report are normally the responsibilities of a single analyst. Furthermore, those analysts who hold "area" or "country" assignments generally have the final say on what is characteristic of their area or country, or "what makes it tick. Considerable research on these influences has been published in recent years, and selected highlights can be helpful here. First we sum up some basic research findings on how any group can influence the perceptions of its individual members, and then we examine certain recent studies of how such influences work in U. Government bodies concerned with problems in foreign affairs. Experiments publicized in by Solomon E. Asch showed that about three-fourths of the persons he tested went along with the majority in their respective groups on what they perceived to be going on in the room where they were. In subsequent tests with groups, Richard S. Crutchfield found that conformity on political questions was likely to be greater, more unconscious, and more permanent than conformity on visual perceptions. Ralph K White, Professor of Social Psychology at George Washington University, has pulled together lessons bearing on the Vietnam problem which may be drawn from such psychological research. Apparently, after being told that everyone else agreed with a certain attitude item, many of the subjects really changed their minds.

### Chapter 7 : Perception of Peace and War - Oxford Scholarship

*The new medium of photography came into its own during the Civil War, capturing thousands of images of soldiers, statesmen, freed slaves, and devastated towns and cities. Its impact on public perception of war was dramatic, demonstrating the power of visual media to shape public opinion. From.*

Before now Americans have always had a lot of people they knew that were in the military at some point, now that is not the case. The Soldier is the single most important profession in any society, because they preserve said society. Any perceived innate rights that you have are only as strong as the military that supports and enforces those rights. The first city-states formed because those who specialized in farming and crafting were at the mercy of roaming bandits. They built walled cities and formed militaries in order to protect their source of food, weapons, clothing, etc. When in need of cheap labor or more resources, they marched and conquered smaller tribes or city-states and subjugated them. A strong military also allows one to influence trade and the like, further benefiting the State. Sparta glorified soldiers more than Athens, and look where that got them. Besides, what about the Hittites, or the Celts? Warrior cultures fuck themselves over eventually. Why does it have to be the soldier? I respect fireman far more though, since the standards to join the fireman are higher than that for the military. If you want to save people, you join the fireman. This is actually a pretty neutral position believe or not. Hero worshiping soldiers helps no one. Not only will that make you turn a blind eye to anything that would tarnish your view of the "heroes" such as war crimes, it will also alienate all soldiers who come back home. There was definitely societies where men were all levied, or had potential to fight with the military, but these were quite common in advanced societies, such as many of the Greek City states, the Persian Empire, and others. Nobody thinks of Macedon of a "warrior culture", certainly not compared with Sparta. That however did not stop the superior technology and tactics of Macedon from defeating Sparta. It was however defeated by France under Napoleon due to better tactics. Warrior cultures are in general a very vague and honestly a very meaningless term from my study of history.

### Chapter 8 : Re-examining Our Perceptions on Vietnam – Central Intelligence Agency

*This essay achieved a low 1st in the third year of my undergraduate. Public Perception of War. As has been shown in prior conflicts of this nature, retention of public goodwill is a crucial factor in determining the ability of the government to conduct a war effectively.*

Zachary Taylor advanced to the Rio Bravo. This act was considered an open transgression on the territorial integrity of Mexico since Mexico had long considered the Nueces River the border of Texas as well as a violation of the Treaty of Limits signed on 12 January. Hence, Mexican public opinion demanded the protection of that territory, a stand supported by the government of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. This led to the first encounters between the U. After these battles, U. Polk requested and got a declaration of war by Congress. When Mexicans learned of the U. The general opinion among Mexicans was that Mexico was a weaker nation that was in danger of being oppressed by the United States; hence, Mexico was fighting for its survival against the unlawful acts of usurpation and injustice. The war, they said, had been started by the United States, and Mexico had no recourse but to defend itself. In July, the Mexican congress adopted a resolution for the national defense. The opinion in Mexico was not only that justice and law were on its side but also that the integrity and security of Mexico were in danger. On 3 March the U. One month later Nicholas P. Trist was appointed U. By then a new offensive, under the command of Gen. Winfield Scott, had begun to invade the territory between the port of Veracruz and Mexico City. Again, the opinion in Mexico, shared by the public and the government, was that Mexico should not sign a peace with ignominy. Even after the first communications had taken place between Trist and Mexican authorities, and despite all the military defeats experienced by Mexican forces, *El Diario del Gobierno* on 8 July stated, "After the Battle of Churubusco, when it became evident that armed resistance was futile, Mexican public opinion started to favor a negotiated end to the war, although it never accepted that the war had been just. The Mexicans always considered that they were fighting for their territorial integrity and their national security against the unjust territorial expansion of the United States. Also some Mexican journalists and political leaders, particularly the moderates and conservatives, emphasized the cultural and religious differences between Mexico and the United States. Hence, they saw Mexican resistance as a defense of Catholic and Latin culture against Anglo-Saxon Protestant encroachments. Finally, from a legal point of view, Mexican public opinion, during the entire war-even after the signature and approval of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo -was that Mexico had defended the principles of international law and that the U.

**Chapter 9 : Columbia University Libraries Online Exhibitions | Perceptions of War**

*Re-examining Our Perceptions on Vietnam, Anthony Marc Lewis. As the post-mortems on Vietnam proliferate, and with the survival of an independent South Vietnam still uncertain, intelligence officers as well as policy makers and executors of policy have a compelling need to know what lessons the record of American involvement holds.*

In this paper, I shall try to illustrate these three dimensions through a selective analysis of articles in major American publications. On occasion, I shall try to contrast attitudes in American publications with those in foreign publications. One important point I want to make at the start is that when the UN is mentioned in the press, it can be perceived in any one of three ways. Too often those ways are merged, confused, or deliberately distorted. First and foremost, the UN is its member states; it is not a world government. Since the UN is its member states, if the UN was marginalized, then what was actually marginalized, or ignored, was the international community. In other words, Washington acted almost unilaterally in going to war with Iraq. It ignored the wishes of the majority of governments in the world. To say this is not to make a moral judgment. The third face of the UN is that of the secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, which consists of more than 9, employees worldwide. If the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to send a team of mediators or a team of weapons experts to Iraq, for example, then the SG takes people from the Secretariat to do the job or he recruits foreign diplomats into the Secretariat to do the job. The Secretary General may be called upon for any variety of reasons to help implement a decision of the Security Council. In recent past, he has been asked to send political officials, civilian affairs specialists, election officials, etc. He is duty bound to respond to the demands of the various legislative bodies of the UN. But the UN Secretary General is not the head of a world government; he is the head of an intergovernmental organization. Moreover, the UN has not a single permanent soldier. All UN troops are on loan from member states. Thus, when UN troops are criticized for not taking effective action, the reason may be because the member states have not supplied sufficient troops, sufficient funds, or a strong enough mandate to get the job done. To be sure, there may be errors of judgment and performance by troops under the UN flag; but there can also be unrealistic expectations. Much of the misperception of the UN is because of the confusion regarding its three faces. Press that is critical of the UN usually exploits this confusion. This reference to the United Nations clearly refers to a function of the UN secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, who appoints the inspectors. The statements quoted in the article were made during a Security Council debate, and were clearly identified as such. Preston made clear in this article that the authority of the United Nations came through the wishes of its member states. The next example, however, is troubling. Reporters are often at the mercy of their editors, who compose the headlines to a story. Powell faced deep resistance to his call for a Security Council decision to authorize military force. Though headlines are frequently just a short and snappy way to refer to a story, in this case the brevity involved a distortion of the type discussed above. It was not the UN, an intergovernmental entity, that was being called upon to act. It was the member states of the Security Council that were being called upon to act. The headline could just as easily have read: While the distinction in this case may seem petty, this inaccuracy, when repeated time and again, has a way or confusing, in the minds of its readers, what the UN is and what it is not. In journalism there are sins of commission and sins of omission. Avoidance of a story may reveal a bias, just as distortion may. The New York Times “the single most influential media outlet in the United States” still had not printed anything about the story. How could that be? Though failure to give prominence to a particular action that may or may not have occurred at the UN does not directly distort the image of the UN, one has to wonder if a similar allegation might have been more thoroughly investigated had it occurred at a different site, under different conditions. Or was spying at the UN simply assumed, given the unworthy character of the organization? On hard security questions, the UN remained “at best” a sideshow. This was the story of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. It was a practical decision by two members of the Security Council that had troops on the ground, and who felt obligated to protect or remove those troops before NATO began bombing. The same blurring of distinctions between UN member states and the UN secretariat appears in another article the same day, in the same publication. This time the writer is Martin

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Hutchinson, a business and economic editor for United Press International, whose fulminations were originally published by UPI, and were reprinted. In practice, they impede rather than assist both functions. Hutchinson remarks later in his piece: How to cite this page Choose cite format: