

Chapter 1 : David Hume - Wikipedia

Jim Powell Jim Powell, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is an expert in the history of blog.quintoapp.com has lectured in England, Germany, Japan, Argentina and Brazil as well as at Harvard, Stanford and other universities across the United States.

But the manner in which such dignity is exercised is of the greatest moment, inasmuch as on the use that is made of liberty the highest good and the greatest evil alike depend. Man, indeed, is free to obey his reason, to seek moral good, and to strive unswervingly after his last end. Yet he is free also to turn aside to all other things; and, in pursuing the empty semblance of good, to disturb rightful order and to fall headlong into the destruction which he has voluntarily chosen. The Redeemer of mankind, Jesus Christ, having restored and exalted the original dignity of nature, vouchsafed special assistance to the will of man; and by the gifts of His grace here, and the promise of heavenly bliss hereafter, He raised it to a nobler state. In like manner, this great gift of nature has ever been, and always will be, deservedly cherished by the Catholic Church, for to her alone has been committed the charge of handing down to all ages the benefits purchased for us by Jesus Christ. Yet there are many who imagine that the Church is hostile to human liberty. Having a false and absurd notion as to what liberty is, either they pervert the very idea of freedom, or they extend it at their pleasure to many things in respect of which man cannot rightly be regarded as free. We have on other occasions, and especially in Our encyclical letter *Immortale Dei*,^[2] in treating of the so-called modern liberties, distinguished between their good and evil elements; and We have shown that whatsoever is good in those liberties is as ancient as truth itself, and that the Church has always most willingly approved and practiced that good: Seeing, however, that many cling so obstinately to their own opinion in this matter as to imagine these modern liberties, cankered as they are, to be the greatest glory of our age, and the very basis of civil life, without which no perfect government can be conceived, We feel it a pressing duty, for the sake of the common good, to treat separately of this subject. It is with moral liberty, whether in individuals or in communities, that We proceed at once to deal. But, first of all, it will be well to speak briefly of natural liberty; for, though it is distinct and separate from moral liberty, natural freedom is the fountainhead from which liberty of whatsoever kind flows, *sua vi suaque sponte*. The unanimous consent and judgment of men, which is the trusty voice of nature, recognizes this natural liberty in those only who are endowed with intelligence or reason; and it is by his use of this that man is rightly regarded as responsible for his actions. For, while other animate creatures follow their senses, seeking good and avoiding evil only by instinct, man has reason to guide him in each and every act of his life. Reason sees that whatever things that are held to be good upon earth may exist or may not, and discerning that none of them are of necessity for us, it leaves the will free to choose what it pleases. But man can judge of this contingency, as We say, only because he has a soul that is simple, spiritual, and intellectual “a soul, therefore, which is not produced by matter, and does not depend on matter for its existence; but which is created immediately by God, and, far surpassing the condition of things material, has a life and action of its own” so that, knowing the unchangeable and necessary reasons of what is true and good, it sees that no particular kind of good is necessary to us. As the Catholic Church declares in the strongest terms the simplicity, spirituality, and immortality of the soul, so with unequalled constancy and publicity she ever also asserts its freedom. These truths she has always taught, and has sustained them as a dogma of faith, and whensoever heretics or innovators have attacked the liberty of man, the Church has defended it and protected this noble possession from destruction. History bears witness to the energy with which she met the fury of the Manicheans and others like them; and the earnestness with which in later years she defended human liberty at the Council of Trent, and against the followers of Jansenius, is known to all. At no time, and in no place, has she held truce with fatalism. Liberty, then, as We have said, belongs only to those who have the gift of reason or intelligence. Considered as to its nature, it is the faculty of choosing means fitted for the end proposed, for he is master of his actions who can choose one thing out of many. Now, since everything chosen as a means is viewed as good or useful, and since good, as such, is the proper object of our desire, it follows that freedom of choice is a property of the will, or, rather, is identical with the will in so far as it has in its action the faculty of

choice. But the will cannot proceed to act until it is enlightened by the knowledge possessed by the intellect. In other words, the good wished by the will is necessarily good in so far as it is known by the intellect; and this the more, because in all voluntary acts choice is subsequent to a judgment upon the truth of the good presented, declaring to which good preference should be given. No sensible man can doubt that judgment is an act of reason, not of the will. The end, or object, both of the rational will and of its liberty is that good only which is in conformity with reason. Since, however, both these faculties are imperfect, it is possible, as is often seen, that the reason should propose something which is not really good, but which has the appearance of good, and that the will should choose accordingly. For, as the possibility of error, and actual error, are defects of the mind and attest its imperfection, so the pursuit of what has a false appearance of good, though a proof of our freedom, just as a disease is a proof of our vitality, implies defect in human liberty. The will also, simply because of its dependence on the reason, no sooner desires anything contrary thereto than it abuses its freedom of choice and corrupts its very essence. Thus it is that the infinitely perfect God, although supremely free, because of the supremacy of His intellect and of His essential goodness, nevertheless cannot choose evil; neither can the angels and saints, who enjoy the beatific vision. Augustine and others urged most admirably against the Pelagians that, if the possibility of deflection from good belonged to the essence or perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power, would have no liberty at all, or would have less liberty than man has in his state of pilgrimage and imperfection. This subject is often discussed by the Angelic Doctor in his demonstration that the possibility of sinning is not freedom, but slavery. It will suffice to quote his subtle commentary on the words of our Lord: When, therefore, it acts through a power outside itself, it does not act of itself, but through another, that is, as a slave. But man is by nature rational. When, therefore, he acts according to reason, he acts of himself and according to his free will; and this is liberty. Whereas, when he sins, he acts in opposition to reason, is moved by another, and is the victim of foreign misapprehensions. Such, then, being the condition of human liberty, it necessarily stands in need of light and strength to direct its actions to good and to restrain them from evil. Without this, the freedom of our will would be our ruin. First of all, there must be law; that is, a fixed rule of teaching what is to be done and what is to be left undone. This rule cannot affect the lower animals in any true sense, since they act of necessity, following their natural instinct, and cannot of themselves act in any other way. On the other hand, as was said above, he who is free can either act or not act, can do this or do that, as he pleases, because his judgment precedes his choice. And his judgment not only decides what is right or wrong of its own nature, but also what is practically good and therefore to be chosen, and what is practically evil and therefore to be avoided. This ordination of reason is called law. Nothing more foolish can be uttered or conceived than the notion that, because man is free by nature, he is therefore exempt from law. Were this the case, it would follow that to become free we must be deprived of reason; whereas the truth is that we are bound to submit to law precisely because we are free by our very nature. Foremost in this office comes the natural law, which is written and engraved in the mind of every man; and this is nothing but our reason, commanding us to do right and forbidding sin. Nevertheless, all prescriptions of human reason can have force of law only inasmuch as they are the voice and the interpreters of some higher power on which our reason and liberty necessarily depend. For, since the force of law consists in the imposing of obligations and the granting of rights, authority is the one and only foundation of all law — the power, that is, of fixing duties and defining rights, as also of assigning the necessary sanctions of reward and chastisement to each and all of its commands. But all this, clearly, cannot be found in man, if, as his own supreme legislator, he is to be the rule of his own actions. It follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing as the eternal law, implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to their right action and end; and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the Creator and Ruler of all the world. To this rule of action and restraint of evil God has vouchsafed to give special and most suitable aids for strengthening and ordering the human will. The first and most excellent of these is the power of His divine grace, whereby the mind can be enlightened and the will wholesomely invigorated and moved to the constant pursuit of moral good, so that the use of our inborn liberty becomes at once less difficult and less dangerous. Not that the divine assistance hinders in any way the free movement of our will; just the contrary, for grace works inwardly in man and in harmony with his natural inclinations, since

it flows from the very Creator of his mind and will, by whom all things are moved in conformity with their nature. As the Angelic Doctor points out, it is because divine grace comes from the Author of nature that it is so admirably adapted to be the safeguard of all natures, and to maintain the character, efficiency, and operations of each. What has been said of the liberty of individuals is no less applicable to them when considered as bound together in civil society. For, what reason and the natural law do for individuals. Of the laws enacted by men, some are concerned with what is good or bad by its very nature; and they command men to follow after what is right and to shun what is wrong, adding at the same time a suitable sanction. But such laws by no means derive their origin from civil society, because, just as civil society did not create human nature, so neither can it be said to be the author of the good which befits human nature, or of the evil which is contrary to it. Laws come before men live together in society, and have their origin in the natural, and consequently in the eternal, law. The precepts, therefore, of the natural law, contained bodily in the laws of men, have not merely the force of human law, but they possess that higher and more august sanction which belongs to the law of nature and the eternal law. And within the sphere of this kind of laws the duty of the civil legislator is, mainly, to keep the community in obedience by the adoption of a common discipline and by putting restraint upon refractory and viciously inclined men, so that, deterred from evil, they may turn to what is good, or at any rate may avoid causing trouble and disturbance to the State. Now, there are other enactments of the civil authority, which do not follow directly, but somewhat remotely, from the natural law, and decide many points which the law of nature treats only in a general and indefinite way. For instance, though nature commands all to contribute to the public peace and prosperity, whatever belongs to the manner, and circumstances, and conditions under which such service is to be rendered must be determined by the wisdom of men and not by nature herself. It is in the constitution of these particular rules of life, suggested by reason and prudence, and put forth by competent authority, that human law, properly so called, consists, binding all citizens to work together for the attainment of the common end proposed to the community, and forbidding them to depart from this end, and, in so far as human law is in conformity with the dictates of nature, leading to what is good, and deterring from evil. From this it is manifest that the eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not only in each individual man, but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when united. Therefore, the true liberty of human society does not consist in every man doing what he pleases, for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion, and bring on the overthrow of the State; but rather in this, that through the injunctions of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of the eternal law. Likewise, the liberty of those who are in authority does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and capricious commands upon their subjects, which would equally be criminal and would lead to the ruin of the commonwealth; but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as applications of the eternal law, and incapable of sanctioning anything which is not contained in the eternal law, as in the principle of all law. Augustine most wisely says: Therefore, the nature of human liberty, however it be considered, whether in individuals or in society, whether in those who command or in those who obey, supposes the necessity of obedience to some supreme and eternal law, which is no other than the authority of God, commanding good and forbidding evil. And, so far from this most just authority of God over men diminishing, or even destroying their liberty, it protects and perfects it, for the real perfection of all creatures is found in the prosecution and attainment of their respective ends; but the supreme end to which human liberty must aspire is God. These precepts of the truest and highest teaching, made known to us by the light of reason itself, the Church, instructed by the example and doctrine of her divine Author, has ever propagated and asserted; for she has ever made them the measure of her office and of her teaching to the Christian nations. As to morals, the laws of the Gospel not only immeasurably surpass the wisdom of the heathen, but are an invitation and an introduction to a state of holiness unknown to the ancients; and, bringing man nearer to God, they make him at once the possessor of a more perfect liberty. Thus, the powerful influence of the Church has ever been manifested in the custody and protection of the civil and political liberty of the people. The enumeration of its merits in this respect does not belong to our present purpose. It is sufficient to recall the fact that slavery, that old reproach of the heathen nations, was mainly abolished by the beneficent efforts of the Church. The impartiality of law and the true brotherhood of man were first asserted

by Jesus Christ; and His apostles re-echoed His voice when they declared that in future there was to be neither Jew, nor Gentile, nor barbarian, nor Scythian, but all were brothers in Christ. So powerful, so conspicuous, in this respect is the influence of the Church that experience abundantly testifies how savage customs are no longer possible in any land where she has once set her foot; but that gentleness speedily takes the place of cruelty, and the light of truth quickly dispels the darkness of barbarism. Nor has the Church been less lavish in the benefits she has conferred on civilized nations in every age, either by resisting the tyranny of the wicked, or by protecting the innocent and helpless from injury, or, finally, by using her influence in the support of any form of government which commended itself to the citizens at home, because of its justice, or was feared by their enemies without, because of its power. Moreover, the highest duty is to respect authority, and obediently to submit to just law; and by this the members of a community are effectually protected from the wrong-doing of evil men. But where the power to command is wanting, or where a law is enacted contrary to reason, or to the eternal law, or to some ordinance of God, obedience is unlawful, lest, while obeying man, we become disobedient to God. Thus, an effectual barrier being opposed to tyranny, the authority in the State will not have all its own way, but the interests and rights of all will be safeguarded — the rights of individuals, of domestic society, and of all the members of the commonwealth; all being free to live according to law and right reason; and in this, as We have shown, true liberty really consists. If when men discuss the question of liberty they were careful to grasp its true and legitimate meaning, such as reason and reasoning have just explained, they would never venture to affix such a calumny on the Church as to assert that she is the foe of individual and public liberty. Such, for instance, are the men belonging to that widely spread and powerful organization, who, usurping the name of liberty, style themselves liberals. What naturalists or rationalists aim at in philosophy, that the supporters of liberalism, carrying out the principles laid down by naturalism, are attempting in the domain of morality and politics. The fundamental doctrine of rationalism is the supremacy of the human reason, which, refusing due submission to the divine and eternal reason, proclaims its own independence, and constitutes itself the supreme principle and source and judge of truth. Hence, these followers of liberalism deny the existence of any divine authority to which obedience is due, and proclaim that every man is the law to himself; from which arises that ethical system which they style independent morality, and which, under the guise of liberty, exonerates man from any obedience to the commands of God, and substitutes a boundless license. The end of all this it is not difficult to foresee, especially when society is in question. Hence the doctrine of the supremacy of the greater number, and that all right and all duty reside in the majority. But, from what has been said, it is clear that all this is in contradiction to reason. To refuse any bond of union between man and civil society, on the one hand, and God the Creator and consequently the supreme Law-giver, on the other, is plainly repugnant to the nature, not only of man, but of all created things; for, of necessity, all effects must in some proper way be connected with their cause; and it belongs to the perfection of every nature to contain itself within that sphere and grade which the order of nature has assigned to it, namely, that the lower should be subject and obedient to the higher. Moreover, besides this, a doctrine of such character is most hurtful both to individuals and to the State. For, once ascribe to human reason the only authority to decide what is true and what is good, and the real distinction between good and evil is destroyed; honor and dishonor differ not in their nature, but in the opinion and judgment of each one; pleasure is the measure of what is lawful; and, given a code of morality which can have little or no power to restrain or quiet the unruly propensities of man, a way is naturally opened to universal corruption. With reference also to public affairs: Now, this is simply a road leading straight to tyranny. The empire of God over man and civil society once repudiated, it follows that religion, as a public institution, can have no claim to exist, and that everything that belongs to religion will be treated with complete indifference. Furthermore, with ambitious designs on sovereignty, tumult and sedition will be common amongst the people; and when duty and conscience cease to appeal to them, there will be nothing to hold them back but force, which of itself alone is powerless to keep their covetousness in check. Of this we have almost daily evidence in the conflict with socialists and members of other seditious societies, who labor unceasingly to bring about revolution. It is for those, then, who are capable of forming a just estimate of things to decide whether such doctrines promote that true liberty which alone is worthy of man, or rather, pervert and destroy it.

Chapter 2 : How Should Christians Approach the Problem of Evil? - Christian Research Institute

*Law and liberty in the manifestations of the human will [microform] nature and origin of evil, and t [Daniel Dodge] on blog.quintoapp.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This is a pre historical reproduction that was curated for quality.*

As the ideas developed, the essay was expanded, rewritten and "sedulously" corrected by Mill and his wife, Harriet Taylor. Mill states that *On Liberty* "was more directly and literally our joint production than anything else which bears my name. He divides this control of authority into two mechanisms: Mill admits that this new form of society seemed immune to tyranny because "there was no fear of tyrannizing over self. First, even in democracy, the rulers were not always the same sort of people as the ruled. Where one can be protected from a tyrant, it is much harder to be protected "against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling. On a particular issue, people will align themselves either for or against that issue; the side of greatest volume will prevail, but is not necessarily correct. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign. For example, according to Mill, children and "barbarian" nations are benefited by limited freedom. Mill concludes the Introduction by discussing what he claimed were the three basic liberties in order of importance: This includes the freedom to act on such thought, i. Mill attempts to prove his claim from the first chapter that opinions ought never to be suppressed. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: Therefore, Mill concludes that suppression of opinion based on belief in infallible doctrine is dangerous. Mill points out the inherent value of individuality since individuality is *ex vi termini* i. He states that he fears that Western civilization approaches this well-intentioned conformity to praiseworthy maxims characterized by the Chinese civilization. Rather, the person behind the action and the action together are valuable. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machineryâ€”by automatons in human formâ€”it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilised parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. Mill explains a system in which a person can discern what aspects of life should be governed by the individual and which by society. Rather, he argues that this liberal system will bring people to the good more effectively than physical or emotional coercion. Governments, he claims, should only punish a person for neglecting to fulfill a duty to others or causing harm to others , not the vice that brought about the neglect. Mill spends the rest of the chapter responding to objections to his maxim. He notes the objection that he contradicts himself in granting societal interference with youth because they are irrational but denying societal interference with certain adults though they act irrationally. For example, a Muslim state could feasibly prohibit pork. However, Mill still prefers a policy of society minding its own business. He begins by summarising these principles: Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of

others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. He concludes that free markets are preferable to those controlled by governments. While it may seem, because "trade is a social act," that the government ought intervene in the economy, Mill argues that economies function best when left to their own devices. Second, he states that agents must consider whether that which can cause injury can cause injury exclusively. Poison can cause harm. However, he points out that poison can also be used for good. Therefore, selling poison is permissible. He considers the right course of action when an agent sees a person about to cross a condemned bridge without being aware of the risk. Mill states that because the agent presumably has interest in not crossing a dangerous bridge i. He qualifies the assertion stating that, if the means are available, it is better to warn the unaware person. He states that to tax solely to deter purchases is impermissible because prohibiting personal actions is impermissible and "[e]very increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price. He argues that a person who is empirically prone to act violently i. He further stipulates that repeat offenders should be punished more than first time offenders. He states that the purpose of liberty is to allow a person to pursue their interest. Therefore, when a person intends to terminate their ability to have interests it is permissible for society to step in. In other words, a person does not have the freedom to surrender their freedom. He states that they should enforce mandatory education through minor fines and annual standardised testing that tested only uncontroversial fact. Mill concludes by stating three general reasons to object to governmental interference: The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes" will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish. On Liberty was enormously popular in the years following its publication. Denise Evans and Mary L. Onorato summarise the modern reception of On Liberty, stating: Mill claims that all of his principles on liberty appeal to the ultimate authority of utilitarianism, according to Nigel Warburton , much of the essay can seem divorced from his supposed final court of appeals. Mill seems to idealize liberty and rights at the cost of utility. For instance, Mill writes: Warburton suggests that there are situations in which it would cause more happiness to suppress truth than to permit it. For example, if a scientist discovered a comet about to kill the planet in a matter of weeks, it may cause more happiness to suppress the truth than to allow society to discover the impending danger. Thus, those who suppress it are worthy of punishment. Mill makes clear that he only considers adults in his writing, failing to account for how irrational members of society, such as children, ought to be treated. Some religions believe that they have a God given duty to enforce religious norms. For them, it seems impossible for their religious beliefs to be wrong, i. Early in the book, he claims that simply being offensive does not constitute harm. Therefore, if morality is undermined, so is individual happiness. He states that "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians". However, during his term as a Member of Parliament , he chaired the extraparliamentary Jamaica Committee , which for two years unsuccessfully sought the prosecution of Governor Eyre and his subordinates for military violence against Jamaican Blacks.

Chapter 3 : Bolton's Ridiculous "Troika of Tyranny" Speech | The American Conservative

Such writers, for instance as Huxley, Spencer and the Agnostics and Positivists generally, admit no true liberty in man, and therefore they cannot consistently treat of human acts as such: there are no human acts with them, for there are no acts which a man has the power to do or not to do.

Biographical Sketch Hannah Arendt, one of the leading political thinkers of the twentieth century, was born in Hanover and died in New York in 1962. In 1929, after having completed her high school studies, she went to Marburg University to study with Martin Heidegger. The encounter with Heidegger, with whom she had a brief but intense love-affair, had a lasting influence on her thought. After a year of study in Marburg, she moved to Freiburg University where she spent one semester attending the lectures of Edmund Husserl. In the spring of 1931 she went to Heidelberg University to study with Karl Jaspers, a philosopher with whom she established a long-lasting intellectual and personal friendship. During her stay in Paris she continued to work on her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, which was not published until hereafter RV. In 1941 she was forced to leave France and moved to New York with her husband and mother. In New York she soon became part of an influential circle of writers and intellectuals gathered around the journal *Partisan Review*. During the post-war period she lectured at a number of American universities, including Princeton, Berkeley and Chicago, but was most closely associated with the New School for Social Research, where she was a professor of political philosophy until her death in 1962. In 1949 she published *The Origins of Totalitarianism* hereafter OT, a major study of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes that soon became a classic, followed by *The Human Condition* in hereafter HC, her most important philosophical work. In 1951 she attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem as a reporter for *The New Yorker* magazine, and two years later published *Eichmann in Jerusalem* hereafter EJ, which caused a deep controversy in Jewish circles. The same year saw the publication of *On Revolution* hereafter OR, a comparative analysis of the American and French revolutions. A number of important essays were also published during the 1950s and early 1960s: At the time of her death in 1962, she had completed the first two volumes on *Thinking and Willing* of her last major philosophical work, *The Life of the Mind*, which was published posthumously in 1969 hereafter LM. Introduction Hannah Arendt was one of the seminal political thinkers of the twentieth century. In these works and in numerous essays she grappled with the most crucial political events of her time, trying to grasp their meaning and historical import, and showing how they affected our categories of moral and political judgment. What was required, in her view, was a new framework that could enable us to come to terms with the twin horrors of the twentieth century, Nazism and Stalinism. She provided such framework in her book on totalitarianism, and went on to develop a new set of philosophical categories that could illuminate the human condition and provide a fresh perspective on the nature of political life. Although some of her works now belong to the classics of the Western tradition of political thought, she has always remained difficult to classify. Her political philosophy cannot be characterized in terms of the traditional categories of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. Nor can her thinking be assimilated to the recent revival of communitarian political thought, to be found, for example, in the writings of A. Her name has been invoked by a number of critics of the liberal tradition, on the grounds that she presented a vision of politics that stood in opposition some key liberal principles. However, it would be a mistake to view Arendt as an anti-liberal thinker. Arendt was in fact a stern defender of constitutionalism and the rule of law, an advocate of fundamental human rights among which she included not only the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression, but also the right to action and to opinion, and a critic of all forms of political community based on traditional ties and customs, as well as those based on religious, ethnic, or racial identity. Arendt did not conceive of politics as a means for the satisfaction of individual preferences, nor as a way to integrate individuals around a shared conception of the good. Her conception of politics is based instead on the idea of active citizenship, that is, on the value and importance of civic engagement and collective deliberation about all matters affecting the political community. If there is a tradition of thought with which Arendt can be identified, it is the classical tradition of civic republicanism originating in Aristotle and embodied in the writings of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Jefferson, and Tocqueville. According to this tradition politics finds its

authentic expression whenever citizens gather together in a public space to deliberate and decide about matters of collective concern. Political activity is valued not because it may lead to agreement or to a shared conception of the good, but because it enables each citizen to exercise his or her powers of agency, to develop the capacities for judgment and to attain by concerted action some measure of political efficacy. In these writings Arendt is primarily concerned with the losses incurred as a result of the eclipse of tradition, religion, and authority, but she offers a number of illuminating suggestions with respect to the resources that the modern age can still provide to address questions of meaning, identity, and value. For Arendt modernity is characterized by the loss of the world, by which she means the restriction or elimination of the public sphere of action and speech in favor of the private world of introspection and the private pursuit of economic interests. Modernity is the age of mass society, of the rise of the social out of a previous distinction between the public and the private, and of the victory of animal laborans over homo faber and the classical conception of man as zoon politikon. Modernity is the age of bureaucratic administration and anonymous labor, rather than politics and action, of elite domination and the manipulation of public opinion. It is the age when totalitarian forms of government, such as Nazism and Stalinism, have emerged as a result of the institutionalization of terror and violence. Modernity is the age where the past no longer carries any certainty of evaluation, where individuals, having lost their traditional standards and values, must search for new grounds of human community as such. In her political writings, and especially in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt claimed that the phenomenon of totalitarianism has broken the continuity of Occidental history, and has rendered meaningless most of our moral and political categories. The break in our tradition has become irrevocable after the tragic events of the twentieth century and the triumph of totalitarian movements East and West. In the form of Stalinism and Nazism, totalitarianism has exploded the established categories of political thought and the accepted standards of moral judgment, and has thereby broken the continuity of our history. Faced with the tragic events of the Holocaust and the Gulag, we can no longer go back to traditional concepts and values, so as to explain the unprecedented by means of precedents, or to understand the monstrous by means of the familiar. Our inherited concepts and criteria for judgment have been dissolved under the impact of modern political events, and the task now is to re-establish the meaning of the past outside the framework of any tradition, since none have retained their original validity. It is the past, then, and not tradition, that Arendt attempts to preserve from the rupture in modern time-consciousness. The hermeneutic strategy that Arendt employed to re-establish a link with the past is indebted to both Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger. From Benjamin she took the idea of a fragmentary historiography, one that seeks to identify the moments of rupture, displacement and dislocation in history. Such fragmentary historiography enables one to recover the lost potentials of the past in the hope that they may find actualization in the present. From Heidegger she took the idea of a deconstructive reading of the Western philosophical tradition, one that seeks to uncover the original meaning of our categories and to liberate them from the distorting incrustations of tradition. Such deconstructive hermeneutics enables one to recover those primordial experiences *Urphaenomene* which have been occluded or forgotten by the philosophical tradition, and thereby to recover the lost origins of our philosophical concepts and categories. In her view it is no longer possible, after the collapse of tradition, to save the past as a whole; the task, rather, is to redeem from oblivion those elements of the past that are still able to illuminate our situation. To re-establish a linkage with the past is not an antiquarian exercise; on the contrary, without the critical reappropriation of the past our temporal horizon becomes disrupted, our experience precarious, and our identity more fragile. Only by means of this critical reappropriation can we discover the past anew, endow it with relevance and meaning for the present, and make it a source of inspiration for the future. Against tradition Arendt sets the criterion of genuineness, against the authoritative that which is forgotten, concealed, or displaced at the margins of history. Arendt articulates her conception of modernity around a number of key features: World alienation refers to the loss of an intersubjectively constituted world of experience and action by means of which we establish our self-identity and an adequate sense of reality. Earth alienation refers to the attempt to escape from the confines of the earth; spurred by modern science and technology, we have searched for ways to overcome our earth-bound condition by setting out on the exploration of space, by attempting to recreate life under laboratory conditions, and by

trying to extend our given life-span. The rise of the social refers to the expansion of the market economy from the early modern period and the ever increasing accumulation of capital and social wealth. With the rise of the social everything has become an object of production and consumption, of acquisition and exchange; moreover, its constant expansion has resulted in the blurring of the distinction between the private and the public. The victory of animal laborans refers to the triumph of the values of labor over those of homo faber and of man as zoon politikon. All the values characteristic of the world of fabrication – permanence, stability, durability – as well as those characteristic of the world of action and speech – freedom, plurality, solidarity – are sacrificed in favor of the values of life, productivity and abundance. Arendt identifies two main stages in the emergence of modernity: She also identifies a number of causes: I will focus my attention on two categories employed by Arendt, those of nature, and the social. With respect to the category of nature, Arendt oscillates between two contrasting accounts. According to the first account, the modern age, by elevating labor, the most natural of human activities, to the highest position within the *vita activa*, has brought us too close to nature. Instead of building and preserving the human artifice and creating public spaces for action and deliberation, we are reduced to engage in the activity of sheer survival and in the production of things that are by definition perishable. According to the second account, however, the modern age is characterized by a growing artificiality, by the rejection of anything that is not man-made. Arendt cites the fact that natural processes, including that of life itself, have been recreated artificially by means of scientific experiment, that our natural environment has been extensively transformed and in some instances entirely replaced by technology, and that we have searched for ways to overcome our natural condition as earth-bound creatures by setting out on the exploration of space and envisaging the possibility of inhabiting other planets. All this leads to a situation where nothing around us will be a naturally given event, object, or process, but will instead be the product of our instruments and the will to refashion the world in our image. These two accounts are difficult to reconcile, since in the former we have nature intruding upon and even destroying the human artifice, while in the latter we have art *techne* expanding upon and replacing everything natural or merely given. The result is to endow nature with an ambiguous status, since in the former case the victory of animal laborans indicates our subjection to natural processes, while in the latter case the expansion of scientific knowledge and of technological mastery indicates the overcoming of all natural limits. The modern world would thus appear to be too natural and too artificial, too much under the dominance of labor and the life-process of the species, as well as too much under the dominance of *techne*. With respect to the second category, that of the social, Arendt was unable to account for certain important features of the modern world. Arendt identifies the social with all those activities formerly restricted to the private sphere of the household and having to do with the necessities of life. Her claim is that, with the tremendous expansion of the economy from the end of the eighteenth century, all such activities have taken over the public realm and transformed it into a sphere for the satisfaction of our material needs. Society has thus invaded and conquered the public realm, turning it into a function of what previously were private needs and concerns, and has thereby destroyed the boundary separating the public and the private. Arendt also claims that with the expansion of the social realm the tripartite division of human activities has been undermined to the point of becoming meaningless. In her view, once the social realm has established its monopoly, the distinction between labor, work and action is lost, since every effort is now expended on reproducing our material conditions of existence. Obsessed with life, productivity, and consumption, we have turned into a society of laborers and jobholders who no longer appreciate the values associated with work, nor those associated with action. I would argue, however, that it blinds her to many important issues and leads her to a series of questionable judgments. She claims that the social is the realm of labor, of biological and material necessity, of the reproduction of our condition of existence. She also claims that the rise of the social coincides with the expansion of the economy from the end of the eighteenth century. However, having identified the social with the growth of the economy in the past two centuries, Arendt cannot characterize it in terms of a subsistence model of simple reproduction. She is, in fact, unable to acknowledge that a modern capitalist economy constitutes a structure of power with a highly asymmetric distribution of costs and rewards. By relying on the misleading analogy of the household, she maintains that all questions pertaining to the economy are

pre-political, and thus ignores the crucial question of economic power and exploitation. Finally, by insisting on a strict separation between the private and the public, and between the social and the political, she is unable to account for the essential connection between these spheres and the struggles to redraw their boundaries. Today many so-called private issues have become public concerns, and the struggle for justice and equal rights has extended into many spheres. By insulating the political sphere from the concerns of the social, and by maintaining a strict distinction between the public and the private, Arendt is unable to account for some of the most important achievements of modernity – the extension of justice and equal rights, and the redrawing of the boundaries between the public and the private. By distinguishing action praxis from fabrication poiesis, by linking it to freedom and plurality, and by showing its connection to speech and remembrance, Arendt is able to articulate a conception of politics in which questions of meaning and identity can be addressed in a fresh and original manner. Moreover, by viewing action as a mode of human togetherness, Arendt is able to develop a conception of participatory democracy which stands in direct contrast to the bureaucratized and elitist forms of politics so characteristic of the modern epoch. Lastly, I will look at the remedies for the unpredictability and irreversibility of action, namely, the power of promise and the power to forgive. HC, 7 For Arendt, action is one of the fundamental categories of the human condition and constitutes the highest realization of the *vita activa*. Arendt analyzes the *vita activa* via three categories which correspond to the three fundamental activities of our being-in-the-world: Labor is the activity which is tied to the human condition of life, work the activity which is tied to the condition of worldliness, and action the activity tied to the condition of plurality. For Arendt each activity is autonomous, in the sense of having its own distinctive principles and of being judged by different criteria. Labor is judged by its ability to sustain human life, to cater to our biological needs of consumption and reproduction, work is judged by its ability to build and maintain a world fit for human use, and action is judged by its ability to disclose the identity of the agent, to affirm the reality of the world, and to actualize our capacity for freedom. Although Arendt considers the three activities of labor, work and action equally necessary to a complete human life, in the sense that each contributes in its distinctive way to the realization of our human capacities, it is clear from her writings that she takes action to be the *differentia specifica* of human beings, that which distinguishes them from both the life of animals who are similar to us insofar as they need to labor to sustain and reproduce themselves and the life of the gods with whom we share, intermittently, the activity of contemplation. In this respect the categories of labor and work, while significant in themselves, must be seen as counterpoints to the category of action, helping to differentiate and highlight the place of action within the order of the *vita activa*. The two central features of action are freedom and plurality. By freedom Arendt does not mean the ability to choose among a set of possible alternatives the freedom of choice so dear to the liberal tradition or the faculty of *liberum arbitrium* which, according to Christian doctrine, was given to us by God. Rather, by freedom Arendt means the capacity to begin, to start something new, to do the unexpected, with which all human beings are endowed by virtue of being born. Action as the realization of freedom is therefore rooted in natality, in the fact that each birth represents a new beginning and the introduction of novelty in the world.

Chapter 4 : Socialism: Evil and Stupid | International Liberty

The work of Rowe and other non-theistic philosophers have made evidential evil a relevant and predominantly modern argument, addressing real life cases of animal and human sufferings, thereby making a case for atheism and also creating an awareness for not just the irrationality of theism but also the problem of the probity, morality, or.

From this description or depiction, it can be understood that natural condition of man is not good at all. On the contrary, it is miserable due to the fact that man is an enemy to his fellow men as Hobbes himself suggests. He actually tries to imply that the natural condition of man necessitates some regulations; otherwise, he cannot survive or unavoidably leads a miserable life with the fear of death that would be caused by other people. This is because the existence of states and governments show that man needs a common institution for peace and order in society. Secondly, in natural state of man, chaos out of anarchy is possible and finally, peace cannot be sustained without cooperation, collaboration and consent of the majority. On the other hand, it seems that Hobbes justifies Christianity and Holy Bible by stating that man is evil. All societies naturally need a sovereign power to rule over them. This sovereign power will supply them with necessary conditions in the midst of peace and order as well as preserve their right of self-protection. As a result of this, man will be able to get rid of his natural condition. In a way, he will be civilized and socialized without the fear of a painful death. According to Hobbes, One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. And he that carryeth this Person, is called Sovereigne, and said to have Sovereigne Power; and every one besides his Subject As man is a wolf to his fellow men, this kind of protection will guarantee the continuation of human society as well as self-preservation. From this perspective, I believe that Hobbes is self-justified with such an argument, because natural condition of man is desperate; that is, man cannot know how to protect himself from the others who already have the natural right to attack others. Chaotic conditions arise out of anarchy due to human nature. Man cannot trust his fellow men and cannot lead a safe and secure life. This means anarchy can be eliminated with only with a mutual covenant and this is actually for common defense as Hobbes says. In my view, peace and order are indispensable components of a healthy society, because man cannot deal with chaos through his own efforts; there should be an agent that will protect him from chaos and death. Cooperation, collaboration and consent of the majority are necessary for the well-being of people. In other words, without cooperation of power, man cannot achieve happiness because chaos is inevitable in the natural condition. The majority must gather and choose sovereign power so that liberty for all can be sustained. According to Hobbes, The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige. What Hobbes tries to claim is that man has to understand the easy truth about what is good and what is evil. Cooperation will definitely bring peace and order. To explain it more, man does not need a natural order for survival, but a certain political power that will enable him to act as freely as required. Such a political formation will help him to establish order and lead a peaceful life. It may seem that man sacrifices his own liberties and rights, but this is for his own sake. For unity of man, political formation is a must and it certainly opens up possibilities for a better society. Hobbes also says some conditions for man attacking others, which also pose a risk to the survival of men. These conditions can be summarized with the desire of gain, safety and reputation. They actually pose a risk to the survival of humans owing to the fact that for these desires, man becomes a sort of enemy to other people. I also agree with these arguments of Hobbes because these impair the chance of cooperation of men with his fellow men. For these reasons, political establishments of man save his life. On the other hand, some people assert that man is not inherently evil, but conditions make him aggressive and violent. However, I believe that human nature is changeable according to changing conditions, which means he may turn into inherently evil. That is, when conditions go reverse, his aggressiveness and violence may emerge. For this reason, commonwealth, which refers to the accumulation of power of all people and voluntary consent to the transfer of this power to the sovereign, is of utmost necessity for the well-being

of people. In other words, commonwealth hinders man from attacking others and encourages him to strengthen bonds in society, which will actually bring life, liberty and happiness for the entire society. Still, there can be some people who claim that Hobbes justifies Christianity and Holy Bible, because in those institutions, man is considered evil when he is born; religion and a pious civilization makes him good. In this sense, those claimers are justifiable too. That is the only point that I agree with the opponents of Hobbes. In sum, Hobbes has valid arguments about human nature because wars and conflicts never end in human history. We can understand it from the necessity of state and government. When there is anarchy, human nature operates and chaos may arise out of this anarchy. However, some argue that Hobbes appears to have supported the essential argument of Christianity and Bible. That is, they also agree that man is naturally evil. I also agree with them to a certain extent. Works Cited Hobbes, Thomas.

Chapter 5 : On Liberty Quotes by John Stuart Mill

Such, then, being the condition of human liberty, it necessarily stands in need of light and strength to direct its actions to good and to restrain them from evil. Without this, the freedom of our will would be our ruin.

For those who want details, I have dozens of columns about real-world socialist failure, looking at both the totalitarian version in places like Cuba , China , Venezuela , and North Korea , as well as the majoritarian version in nations such as France , Italy , and Greece. Yet notwithstanding the horrible track record of every version of socialism, we actually have a presidential candidate in America who actually calls himself a socialist. Socialism was an economic system where the means of production e. Sure, he believes in a highly regulated and heavily taxed private enterprise, but he does not seem to want the state to own banks and make cars. Socialism is the Big Lie of the twentieth century. While it promised prosperity, equality, and security, it delivered poverty, misery, and tyranny. Equality was achieved only in the sense that everyone was equal in his or her misery. By failing to emphasize incentives, socialism is a theory inconsistent with human nature and is therefore doomed to fail. Ben Domenech, writing for Commentary, analyzes the current version of socialism, which “ particularly in the feeble minds of young people ” is simply more middle-class entitlements financed by high tax rates on evil rich people. Sanders holds massive events populated by kids who think what he is preaching is very cool. If everything Obama is trying to do is socialism, “then perhaps we need to go full socialist to actually get things done. The final part of the excerpt is very insightful. Young people have no idea about the real nature of socialism. To them, socialism is simply bigger government. Which is very offensive to people who actually have suffered under socialism. Or at least ironic. The latter version is preferable, of course, though the end result is still economic misery. Unsurprisingly, they say no. You can see my favorites here , here , and here. You can also use two cows to teach about socialism, as well as other theories.

Chapter 6 : About Center on Human Exceptionalism | Human Exceptionalism

Liberty Humane Society's mission is to foster a community of compassion and respect, and provide animals in need with a chance at a lifelong, loving home.

Life A leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law and one of the founders of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham was born in Houndsditch, London on February 15, 1748. Bentham lived during a time of major social, political and economic change. Though qualified to practice law, he never did so. Instead, he devoted most of his life to writing on matters of legal reform—though, curiously, he made little effort to publish much of what he wrote. Bentham spent his time in intense study, often writing some eight to twelve hours a day. While most of his best known work deals with theoretical questions in law, Bentham was an active polemicist and was engaged for some time in developing projects that proposed various practical ideas for the reform of social institutions. Although his work came to have an important influence on political philosophy, Bentham did not write any single text giving the essential principles of his views on this topic. His most important theoretical work is the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, in which much of his moral theory—which he said reflected "the greatest happiness principle"—is described and developed. In 1781, Bentham became associated with the Earl of Shelburne and, through him, came into contact with a number of the leading Whig politicians and lawyers. In 1789, he briefly joined his brother Samuel in Russia, where he pursued his writing with even more than his usual intensity, and he devised a plan for the now infamous "Panopticon"—a model prison where all prisoners would be observable by unseen guards at all times—a project which he had hoped would interest the Czarina Catherine the Great. After his return to England in 1791, and for some 20 years thereafter, Bentham pursued—fruitlessly and at great expense—the idea of the panopticon. Fortunately, an inheritance received in 1792 provided him with financial stability. Still, his influence was, arguably, still greater on the continent. Bentham was made an honorary citizen of the fledgling French Republic in 1793, and his *The Theory of Legislation* was published first, in French, by his Swiss disciple, Etienne Dumont, in 1796. At his death in London, on June 6, 1832, Bentham left literally tens of thousands of manuscript pages—some of which was work only sketched out, but all of which he hoped would be prepared for publication. He also left a large estate, which was used to finance the newly-established University College, London for those individuals excluded from university education—that is, non-conformists, Catholics and Jews, and his cadaver, per his instructions, was dissected, embalmed, dressed, and placed in a chair, and to this day resides in a cabinet in a corridor of the main building of University College. His principal target was the presence of "fictions"—in particular, legal fictions. On his view, to consider any part or aspect of a thing in abstraction from that thing is to run the risk of confusion or to cause positive deceit. While, in some cases, such "fictional" terms as "relation," "right," "power," and "possession" were of some use, in many cases their original warrant had been forgotten, so that they survived as the product of either prejudice or inattention. In those cases where the terms could be "cashed out" in terms of the properties of real things, they could continue to be used, but otherwise they were to be abandoned. Still, Bentham hoped to eliminate legal fictions as far as possible from the law, including the legal fiction that there was some original contract that explained why there was any law at all. He thought that, at the very least, clarifications and justifications could be given that avoided the use of such terms. Human Nature For Bentham, morals and legislation can be described scientifically, but such a description requires an account of human nature. Just as nature is explained through reference to the laws of physics, so human behavior can be explained by reference to the two primary motives of pleasure and pain; this is the theory of psychological hedonism. There is, Bentham admits, no direct proof of such an analysis of human motivation—though he holds that it is clear that, in acting, all people implicitly refer to it. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: It is, in short, on the basis of pleasures and pains, which can exist only in individuals, that Bentham thought one could construct a calculus of value. Bentham believed

that the nature of the human person can be adequately described without mention of social relationships. To begin with, the idea of "relation" is but a "fictitious entity," though necessary for "convenience of discourse. On this view, pleasure and pain are objective states and can be measured in terms of their intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity and purity. This allows both for an objective determination of an activity or state and for a comparison with others. Though these characteristics are present throughout his work, they are particularly evident in the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, where Bentham is concerned with articulating rational principles that would provide a basis and guide for legal, social and moral reform. In adverting to this principle, however, he was not referring to just the usefulness of things or actions, but to the extent to which these things or actions promote the general happiness. Specifically, then, what is morally obligatory is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, happiness being determined by reference to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Thus, Bentham writes, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: That which does not maximize the greatest happiness such as an act of pure ascetic sacrifice is, therefore, morally wrong. Bentham admits that his version of the principle of utility is something that does not admit of direct proof, but he notes that this is not a problem as some explanatory principles do not admit of any such proof and all explanation must start somewhere. And, in fact, he provides a number of suggestions that could serve as answers to the question of why we should be concerned with the happiness of others. First, Bentham says, the principle of utility is something to which individuals, in acting, refer either explicitly or implicitly, and this is something that can be ascertained and confirmed by simple observation. Indeed, Bentham held that all existing systems of morality can be "reduced to the principles of sympathy and antipathy," which is precisely that which defines utility. A second argument found in Bentham is that, if pleasure is the good, then it is good irrespective of whose pleasure it is. Thus, a moral injunction to pursue or maximize pleasure has force independently of the specific interests of the person acting. Bentham also suggests that individuals would reasonably seek the general happiness simply because the interests of others are inextricably bound up with their own, though he recognized that this is something that is easy for individuals to ignore. Nevertheless, Bentham envisages a solution to this as well. Specifically, he proposes that making this identification of interests obvious and, when necessary, bringing diverse interests together would be the responsibility of the legislator. Finally, Bentham held that there are advantages to a moral philosophy based on a principle of utility. To begin with, the principle of utility is clear compared to other moral principles, allows for objective and disinterested public discussion, and enables decisions to be made where there seem to be conflicts of prima facie legitimate interests. Moreover, in calculating the pleasures and pains involved in carrying out a course of action the "hedonic calculus", there is a fundamental commitment to human equality. The principle of utility presupposes that "one man is worth just the same as another man" and so there is a guarantee that in calculating the greatest happiness "each person is to count for one and no one for more than one. As discussed in the preceding section, for Bentham, the principles that govern morals also govern politics and law, and political reform requires a clear understanding of human nature. While he develops a number of principles already present in Anglo-Saxon political philosophy, he breaks with that tradition in significant ways. Bentham advocated the rational revision of the legal system, a restructuring of the process of determining responsibility and of punishment, and a more extensive freedom of contract. This, he believed, would favor not only the development of the community, but the personal development of the individual. Against Blackstone and a number of earlier thinkers including Locke, Bentham repudiated many of the concepts underlying their political philosophies, such as natural right, state of nature, and social contract. Bentham then attempted to outline positive alternatives to the preceding "traditionalisms. Bentham says that "[L]iberty is the absence of restraint" and so, to the extent that one is not hindered by others, one has liberty and is "free. In fact, Bentham holds that people have always lived in society, and so there can be no state of nature though he does distinguish between political society and "natural society" and no "social contract" a notion which he held was not only unhistorical but pernicious. Correlative with this account of liberty, Bentham as Thomas Hobbes before him viewed law as "negative. Law, which is by its very nature a

restriction of liberty and painful to those whose freedom is restricted, is a prima facie evil. It is only so far as control by the state is limited that the individual is free. Law is, Bentham recognized, necessary to social order and good laws are clearly essential to good government. Indeed, perhaps more than Locke, Bentham saw the positive role to be played by law and government, particularly in achieving community well-being. Unlike many earlier thinkers, Bentham held that law is not rooted in a "natural law" but is simply a command expressing the will of the sovereign. This account of law, later developed by Austin, is characteristic of legal positivism. Thus, a law that commands morally questionable or morally evil actions, or that is not based on consent, is still law. These criticisms are especially developed in his *Anarchical Fallacies* a polemical attack on the declarations of rights issued in France during the French Revolution, written between 1791 and 1792 but not published until 1830, in French. Rights are created by the law, and law is simply a command of the sovereign. The existence of law and rights, therefore, requires government. Rights are also usually though not necessarily correlative with duties determined by the law and, as in Hobbes, are either those which the law explicitly gives us or those within a legal system where the law is silent. The view that there could be rights not based on sovereign command and which pre-exist the establishment of government is rejected. According to Bentham, then, the term "natural right" is a "perversion of language. At best, such a "right" may tell us what we ought to do; it cannot serve as a legal restriction on what we can or cannot do. The term "natural right" is ambiguous, Bentham says, because it suggests that there are general rights—that is, rights over no specific object—so that one would have a claim on whatever one chooses. Thus, there cannot be any general rights in the sense suggested by the French declarations. Moreover, the notion of natural rights is figurative. Properly speaking, there are no rights anterior to government. The assumption of the existence of such rights, Bentham says, seems to be derived from the theory of the social contract. Here, individuals form a society and choose a government through the alienation of certain of their rights. But such a doctrine is not only unhistorical, according to Bentham, it does not even serve as a useful fiction to explain the origin of political authority. Governments arise by habit or by force, and for contracts and, specifically, some original contract to bind, there must already be a government in place to enforce them. Finally, the idea of a natural right is "anarchical. Since a natural right would be anterior to law, it could not be limited by law, and since human beings are motivated by self-interest if everyone had such freedom, the result would be pure anarchy. Such restriction, as noted earlier, is the province of the law. Bentham concludes, therefore, that the term "natural rights" is "simple nonsense: All rights must be legal and specific that is, having both a specific object and subject. They ought to be made because of their conduciveness to "the general mass of felicity," and correlatively, when their abolition would be to the advantage of society, rights ought to be abolished. So far as rights exist in law, they are protected; outside of law, they are at best "reasons for wishing there were such things as rights. Nevertheless, Bentham did not dismiss talk of rights altogether. There are some services that are essential to the happiness of human beings and that cannot be left to others to fulfill as they see fit, and so these individuals must be compelled, on pain of punishment, to fulfill them. They must, in other words, respect the rights of others. Thus, although Bentham was generally suspicious of the concept of rights, he does allow that the term is useful, and in such work as *A General View of a Complete Code of Laws*, he enumerates a large number of rights. While the meaning he assigns to these rights is largely stipulative rather than descriptive, they clearly reflect principles defended throughout his work. There has been some debate over the extent to which the rights that Bentham defends are based on or reducible to duties or obligations, whether he can consistently maintain that such duties or obligations are based on the principle of utility, and whether the existence of what Bentham calls "permissive rights"—rights one has where the law is silent—is consistent with his general utilitarian view. This latter point has been discussed at length by H. Hart and David Lyons

References and Further Reading a.

Chapter 7 : Liberty Humane Society

quotes from John Stuart Mill: 'Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing.', 'A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury.', and 'I have learned to seek my happiness by limiting my desires, rather than in attempting to satisfy them.'

Some have denied proposition 5, that anything truly evil occurs. What seems evil is really good. Our perceiving it as evil is illusion. This has been the answer of pantheism, Gnosticism, and modern Christian Science, but never of Christianity. If evil is an illusion, Christianity is false. But then the illusion of evil certainly seems to be as evil as evil itself would have been if real. The same suffering, grief, terror, anger, envy, and other mental states that we associate with evil still occur. Others have argued that while evil is not an illusion, neither is it a real thing in itself. Thomas Aquinas, and before him Augustine in his early thought, held that evil is not an entity but a deprivation or absence of good. A few have admitted that real evil occurs and that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God would not have created a world in which evil would occur. They have decided that contrary to propositions 2, 3, and 4, God is not all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. The most common answer to the problem of evil through the centuries has been the free-will defense. This states that God is indeed all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good; that there are certain things that even such a Being cannot do; and that one of those things is to create a morally good world in which no evil occurs. Is Human Will Absolutely Free? The Bible tells us that God cannot lie Heb. Lying would contradict His own nature, for God is truth Exod. A round square is a contradictionâ€”something the Bible condemns Isa. Proponents of the free-will defense, such as C. Lewis,⁴ Alvin Plantinga,⁵ and Ronald Nash,⁶ argue that it would be impossible for God to create a morally good world in which no one would ever sin. According to this argument, it is better to have moral capacity than to lack it. But moral capacity entails the capacity to choose right or wrongâ€”equally in any given circumstanceâ€”no prior condition can ensure either choice. It is better for God to create a world with moral than with only amoral beings, but moral beings by definition are capable of sin; consequently, if God were to create a world at all, He could not create one with moral inhabitants who could never do evil. I used this solution in the first edition of *Answers for Atheists*. First, either God must not be a moral being or God could choose evil as readily as good. The Bible, however, by affirming the holiness and goodness of God and the impossibility of His doing evil, rejects both those options. Second, Christ must have been able to sin, and God could not have prevented it; but His sinning would have made His offering of Himself as a sinless sacrifice impossible, and therefore would have made the prophecies of His sacrifice unreliable. Third, the doctrines of original, inevitable, and universal sin must be false. The Bible, however, affirms each of them Rom. Fourth, the doctrine that the saints in heaven cannot sin must be false, yet the Bible affirms it Heb. Relevant to these third and fourth problems, Augustine taught that before the fall Adam and Eve were righteous but able to sin *posse peccare* ; since the fall, each human has been, until conversion, sinful and not able not to sin *non posse non peccare* ; after conversion, one remains sinful but becomes able not to sin *posse non peccare* ; and at death the believer becomes not able to sin *non posse peccare*. If the free-will defense is right, then we have been wrong all along in believing that humans are not able not to sin before conversion and believers after death are not able to sin. But since God does foreknow and infallibly prophesy even the sinful acts of moral beings or agents, moral choice and some kind of predetermination must be compatible, and hence libertarian free will is an unnecessary element of the solution to the problem of evil. Something other than libertarian free will, then, must be the reason why a being is moral and not amoral. The Reformers Martin Luther¹¹ and John Calvin,¹² along with other great Reformed thinkers, distinguished between freedom and free will. To demonstrate this they cited many biblical texts, such as Acts 4: This insight implies the historic Reformed answer to the problem of evil: The first point of this argument sums up a longer argument. The God who created this world is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, and 2. Christians, however, say the anti-theists, also should believe that: An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God is not a God who would create a world that contained evil; therefore, 4.

Proposition 4, however, though implied by propositions 2 and 3 together, contradicts proposition 1. The Christian therefore must believe either proposition 4 or proposition 1, but cannot believe both. The antitheist has posed a powerful dilemma: As we have seen, pantheists and Gnostics answer by denying proposition 2 on the grounds that evil is an illusion; Open Theists answer by denying propositions 1 and 2. Neither option is compatible with historic Christian faith. Adherents of the free-will defense deny proposition 3 by arguing that a moral world without evil is impossible, which, as we have seen, is also mistaken. The Reformed answer of Luther, Calvin, the Westminster Divines, and others also denies proposition 3, but on different grounds. They argue that although it would not have been logically impossible for God to create only moral creatures that would never sin, He in fact created a moral world with creatures whose evil He foreordained for His own good purposesâ€”to display His justice in punishing some Prov. Does this mean God justifies His means by His ends? An end-justifies-the-means ethic is fallacious and therefore wicked for finite men who can neither control nor know all the results of their choices , but it is perfectly fitting for the infinite God who both controls and knows all the results of His choices â€”and, after all, God being supreme need not justify His choices to anyone: So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires. For who resists His will? Or does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for common use? Does the reality of evil make the existence of the Christian God impossible? For good reasons, God created a world that contained evil. For those same reasons, as we have seen, the Christian position does not self-contradict. Feinberg, *No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God*. Foundations of Evangelical Theology, ed. Nash, Faith and Reason Grand Rapids: In Evangelical Heathenism 80â€”92 , I explain the difference between free agency and free will. Clark, *God and Evil: The Problem Solved*, 2nd ed. Clark, *Religion, Reason, and Revelation*, 3rd ed. Trinity Foundation, , Ford Lewis Battles, ed. Westminster Press, , II. Westminster Confession of Faith Glasgow: Free Presbyterian Publications, , 9. The torrents of evil and human suffering are always with us. In a world like oursâ€”filled with horrendous evilâ€”does it make sense to believe in the perfect God of the Bible? Atheists have argued for centuries that it does not. They have produced a straightforward argument against the reasonableness of belief in the God that the Bible describes as omnipotent all-powerful , omniscient all-knowing , and omnibenevolent all-good: Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil? This crucial point is often overlooked, but whether one holds to a theistic, atheistic, pantheistic, or other worldview, one is not off the hook in offering an account of evil. Everyoneâ€”every worldviewâ€”must give an answer to explain the experienced reality of evil. As I argue elsewhere, though, the Christian has by far the best answer of any of the competing worldviews. It is important to note first that there are rational responses and there are emotional responses. We told her that we were there to talk about God with anyone interested in the dialogue. This was obviously not the time to dive into a theological or philosophical diatribe about the logical consistency of God and evil. It was rather a time to show the love of Christ to her, to affirm her in her grief, and to simply receive her as a fellow human being whom God deeply loves. We did this as best we could, and one of the women in our group ended up developing an ongoing friendship with her. This kind of emotional response is just as important as a rational response. At times, however, Christians and non-Christians alike need more than love, sympathy, and friendshipâ€”they need solid, rational, logical answers. The rest of this essay, then, will be an attempt to offer what I take to be the most persuasive rational response to the problem of evil. In his book *On the Free Choice of the Will*,⁴ he provided in seminal form what has become a powerful response to the problem of evil. Contemporary Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga has reformulated the argument which is commonly referred to as the free-will defense⁵. Here is his most concise formulation of it: A world containing creatures who are significantly free and freely perform more good than evil actions is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. Fortunately, both the Bible and our own experience affirm that we do have such free will. If God were the author of evil, the atheist would be rightâ€”we would have a real conundrum on our hands. As powerful as it is, we Christians do have more than the free-will defense at our disposal. There are additional reasons why God might allow evil to continueâ€”reasons that we consistently

can couple with the free-will defense. Consider the points in the following sections.

Chapter 8 : Thomas Hobbes | Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism

quotes from On Liberty: 'A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable t.

Biography[edit] Early life and education[edit] Hume was the second of two sons born to Joseph Home of Ninewells , an advocate, and his wife The Hon. Throughout his life Hume, who never married, spent time occasionally at his family home at Ninewells in Berwickshire , which had belonged to his family since the sixteenth century. His finances as a young man were very "slender". His family was not rich, and, as a younger son, he had little patrimony to live on. He was therefore forced to make a living somehow. At first, because of his family, he considered a career in law , but came to have, in his words, "an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of Philosophy and general Learning; and while [my family] fancied I was poring over Voet and Vinnius , Cicero and Virgil were the Authors which I was secretly devouring". Due to this inspiration, Hume set out to spend a minimum of 10 years reading and writing. He soon came to the verge of a mental breakdown , suffering from what a doctor diagnosed as the "Disease of the Learned". Hume wrote that it started with a coldness, which he attributed to a "Laziness of Temper", that lasted about nine months. Later, some scurvy spots broke out on his fingers. Hume wrote that he "went under a Course of Bitters and Anti-Hysteric Pills", taken along with a pint of claret every day. Hume also decided to have a more active life to better continue his learning. Career[edit] At 25 years of age, Hume, although of noble ancestry, had no source of income and no learned profession. Hume described his "love for literary fame" as his "ruling passion" [24] and judged his two late works, the so-called "first" and "second" enquiries, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* , respectively, as his greatest literary and philosophical achievements, [24] asking his contemporaries to judge him on the merits of the later texts alone, rather than the more radical formulations of his early, youthful work, dismissing his philosophical debut as juvenilia: Hume was just 23 years old when he started this work and it is now regarded as one of the most important in the history of Western philosophy. However, the position was given to William Cleghorn [31] after Edinburgh ministers petitioned the town council not to appoint Hume because he was seen as an atheist. However, it was then that Hume started his great historical work *The History of England*. This took him fifteen years and ran to over a million words. During this time he was also involved with the Canongate Theatre through his friend John Home , a preacher. Often called the *First Enquiry*, it proved little more successful than the *Treatise*, perhaps because of the publishing of his short autobiography, *My Own Life*, which "made friends difficult for the first Enquiry". It was necessary in the s for his friends to avert a trial against him on the charge of heresy. However, he "would not have come and could not be forced to attend if he said he was not a member of the Established Church". He had published the *Philosophical Essays* by this time which were decidedly anti-religious. Even Adam Smith , his personal friend who had vacated the Glasgow philosophy chair, was against his appointment out of concern public opinion would be against it. In the following year "the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office from which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a large library". Once in England, Hume and Rousseau fell out. Here he wrote that he was given "all the secrets of the Kingdom". Anyone hankering for startling revelations or amusing anecdotes had better look elsewhere. Hume told him he sincerely believed it a "most unreasonable fancy" that there might be life after death. In his will he requests that it be inscribed only with his name and the year of his birth and death, "leaving it to Posterity to add the Rest". Get into the boat this instant". According to the logical positivists, unless a statement could be verified by experience, or else was true or false by definition i. Hume thought that we can form beliefs about that which extends beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as custom and the imagination, but he was sceptical about claims to knowledge on this basis. For example, experiencing the painful sensation of touching the handle of a hot pan is more forceful than simply thinking about touching a hot pan. Similarly, a person experiences a variety of taste-sensations, tactile-sensations, and smell-sensations when biting into an apple, with the overall sensation again being a complex impression. Thinking about an apple allows a person to form

complex ideas, which are made of similar parts as the complex impressions they were developed from, but which are also less forceful. Hume believes that complex perceptions can be broken down into smaller and smaller parts until perceptions are reached that have no parts of their own, and these perceptions are thereby referred to as being simple. For example, a person looking at an illustration of a flower can conceive of an idea of the physical flower because the idea of the illustrated object is associated with the idea of the physical object. The principle of contiguity describes the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are near to each other in time or space, such as when the thought of one crayon in a box leads a person to think of the crayon contiguous to it. Finally, the principle of cause and effect refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are causally related, which explains how remembering a broken window can make someone think of the baseball that caused the window to shatter. Hume elaborates more on this last principle of cause and effect. As Hume wrote, induction concerns how things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, or the records of our memory". With regard to demonstrative reasoning, Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular. As this is using the very sort of reasoning induction that is under question, it would be circular reasoning. According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events. It is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation. Matters of Fact are dependent on the observer and experience. They are often not universally held to be true among multiple persons. In these three branches he explains his ideas, in addition to comparing and contrasting his views to his predecessors. Next, Hume uses the Constructive Phase to resolve any doubts the reader may have while observing the Critical Phase. Associating ideas has become second nature to the human mind. This leads Hume to the third branch of causal inference, Belief. Belief is what drives the human mind to hold that expectancy of the future based on past experience. Throughout his explanation of causal inference, Hume is arguing that the future is not certain to be repetition of the past and the only way to justify induction is through uniformity. The logical positivist interpretation is that Hume analyses causal propositions, such as "A caused B", in terms of regularities in perception: Shall we rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? Philosopher Simon Blackburn calls this a quasi-realist reading. This view is forwarded by, for example, positivist interpreters, who saw Hume as suggesting that terms such as "self", "person", or "mind" referred to collections of "sense-contents". They argue that distinct selves can have perceptions that stand in relations of similarity and causality with one another. Thus, perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct "bundles" before they can be associated according to the relations of similarity and causality. In other words, the mind must already possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Instead, it is suggested by Strawson that Hume might have been answering an epistemological question about the causal origin of our concept of the self. According to his view, Hume is not arguing for a bundle theory, which is a form of reductionism, but rather for an eliminative view of the self. That is, rather than reducing the self to a bundle of perceptions, Hume is rejecting the idea of the self altogether. On this interpretation, Hume is proposing a "no-self theory" and thus has much in common with Buddhist thought. Hume is mainly considered an anti-rationalist, denying the possibility for practical reason as a principle to exist, although other philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard, Jean Hampton, and Elijah Millgram claim that Hume is not so much of an anti-rationalist as he is just a skeptic of practical reason. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. His views on ethics are that "[m]oral decisions are grounded in moral sentiment. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. He wrote in the Treatise that in every system of morality he has read, the author begins with stating facts about the world, but then suddenly is always referring to what ought to be the case. Hume demands that a reason should be given for inferring what ought to be the case, from what is the case. This because it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others". His views are rooted in the work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson. However, a reliable critic of taste can be recognised as being objective, sensible and unprejudiced, and having extensive experience. Hume was concerned with the way spectators find pleasure in the sorrow and anxiety depicted in a tragedy. He argued

that this was because the spectator is aware that he is witnessing a dramatic performance. There is pleasure in realising that the terrible events that are being shown are actually fiction. Hume, to this end, was influenced greatly by the scientific revolution and by in particular Sir Isaac Newton. For if our actions were not necessitated in the above sense, they would "have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other". But if our actions are not thus connected to the will, then our actions can never be free: Once this has been abandoned, Hume argues that "liberty and necessity will be found not to be in conflict one with another". Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. Human beings assess a situation based upon certain predetermined events and from that form a choice. Hume believes that this choice is made spontaneously. Hume calls this form of decision making the liberty of spontaneity.

Chapter 9 : Libertas Praestantissimum - Papal Encyclicals

Political liberty is its guarantee, consequently political liberty is indispensable. But to ask the peoples of our day to sacrifice, like those of the past, the whole of their individual liberty to political liberty, is the surest means of detaching them from the former and, once this result has been achieved, it would be only too easy to.

Already in , as a young bishop at Vatican II, Karol Wojtyla criticized the draft of the declaration on religious freedom because it did not sufficiently emphasize the connection between freedom and truth. Hence the words of our Lord, which speak so clearly to everyone: There is no freedom without truth. Despite their variety, he declares, these systems are at one in minimizing or even denying the dependence of freedom upon truth. Many people today would say that freedom and truth are wholly separable, since anyone is free to affirm the truth and abide by it, to ignore the truth, or even to deny it and act against it. If freedom were bound by the truth, they ask, how could it be freedom? In the course of his discussion of freedom and law in *Veritatis Splendor* , the Pope proposes his answer to questions such as these. At the lower level, that of nature, freedom means the absence of physical constraint. A balloon rises freely when nothing obstructs it; a stone falls freely when nothing impedes it. A dog is free if it is let off the leash so that it can follow its impulses. To be free, in this sense, is to act according to an inner inclination. To be unfree is to have that inclination frustrated. At the higher level, distinctive to persons, freedom demands, in addition, the absence of psychological compulsion. My freedom as a person is limited to the extent that instinct or passion compels me to act in certain ways, e. If my motives could never transcend my individual self-interest or the collective self-interest of my group, I could never be truly free. I could always be manipulated and compelled to act in specific ways by fear of punishment or hope of reward. Just as animals can be drawn by dangling a carrot or banana in front of their noses, so a child can be induced to behave in certain ways by the prospect of gratification or the fear of pain. Unable to escape from the determinism of instinct or appetite, we could be forced to act by threats and promises. One of the benefits of training and discipline is to enhance our zone of inner freedom. By education and exercise we develop the motivation and character that enable us to resist physical and especially psychological pressures. Some learn to go for long periods without sleep, to abstain from food, or to endure intense physical pain without abandoning their resolve. Such persons have greater freedom than others. They have a larger zone of inner self-determination. In determining my own course of action, I cannot dispense with motives. If choices were completely arbitrary, freedom would be meaningless and in the last analysis impossible. In my free actions I follow what I apprehend as good and worthy of being chosen, but the choice is not forced upon me. I consent to the attraction because my reason approves of it. In acting freely I experience myself as the source of my own activity and as responsible for the results. My actions recoil to some degree on myself, and so make me to be what I am. John Paul II explains this at some length in his major work, *The Acting Person* , and in various philosophical essays written before he became pope. Gregory of Nyssa on the royal dignity that pertains to those who have this kind of dominion over themselves. Of whom else can this be said, save a king? To this effect the Pope quotes from Vatican II: *Gaudium et Spes* 17; *Veritatis Splendor* 38 As I have said, we possess this freedom only when we go beyond individual and collective selfishness and reach out to that which reason perceives as objectively good and true. Our freedom is not diminished but expanded and fulfilled when we employ it to bring about a true good. This, again, is the teaching of Vatican II: Human dignity requires one to act through conscious and free choice, as motivated and prompted personally from within, and not through blind impulse or merely external pressure. People achieve such dignity when they free themselves from all subservience to their feelings, and in a free choice of the good, pursue their own end by effectively and assiduously marshalling the appropriate means. *GS* 17; *VS* 21 Because the moral law, as known by reason, does not constrain us, it leaves us physically and psychologically free either to obey or to violate it. But if we reject the true good, we inevitably yield to the passions and instincts of our lower nature and thereby undermine our authentic freedom. To act freely against the truth is to erode freedom itself. While compulsion by force or by neurotic obsession excludes responsibility, compulsion by universal intent establishes responsibility. The freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is

overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he must. Those who have a constitutional right to do as they ought are politically free, and if they are not physically or psychologically impeded from following the moral imperative, they are also free in the philosophical sense of the word. Every person, he maintains, is both a being willed by God for itself and at the same time a being turned toward others. To be isolated from others is a form of self-imprisonment. We become most truly human in the measure in which we go out of ourselves and give ourselves for the sake of others. He confirms this insight by quoting from Vatican II: The citizen serves the common good out of a free commitment or devotion. Those who love God serve him freely, and if they refuse that service they undermine the freedom that love has given them. Those who obey the commandments out of fear are not fully free, but they fall into even deeper slavery if they disobey God in order to gratify their own impulses. The truly free person is one who does what is good out of love for goodness itself. Thinkers who consider the law of God to be a hindrance to human freedom have been misled into regarding obedience as a form of heteronomy or self-alienation, as though God were a hostile power imposing terms on humanity as a defeated enemy. The moral law is intended to safeguard human dignity. Human freedom and divine law conspire to the same end. Consequently one must acknowledge in the freedom of the human person the image and the nearness of God, who is present in all. But one must likewise acknowledge the majesty of the God of the universe and revere the holiness of the law of God, who is infinitely transcendent: The supreme exemplars of freedom for John Paul II are the martyrs. They are the heroic persons who are so committed to the known good that they stand up under pressures that would overcome the willpower of most others. Given the choice between denying their principles and losing their lives, they freely lay down their lives and thereby give witness to the truth. Jesus, who freely laid down his life for our sakes, sets the pattern for martyrs. The martyrs represent an achievement of freedom beyond the capacities of the great majority of men and women. They inspire us by their example to rise above the more limited measure of freedom that we can claim for ourselves. For the theology of freedom it is important to recognize that the freedom with which we are born is frail and limited. John Paul II compares it to a seed that must be cultivated. Some degree of freedom is an essential part of the reflection of God that is constitutive of human nature, but our freedom is incomplete. Wounded as we are by original sin, we often prefer limited and ephemeral goods to those that are pure and abiding. We are even tempted to assert our freedom against our Creator, as though freedom could exist without regard for truth. As Paul writes in Galatians 5: Since Christ himself is the truth John III It is partly in revealing the law that God liberates his people. Already in the Old Testament, God brought the tribes of Israel out of bondage and united them to himself through the Sinai Covenant, which contained the basic precepts of the moral law. As a new and interior law, the gospel teaches us both by enlightening our minds and by instilling a love and affection for the truth. The divinely given attraction toward the true goal of human existence, which is none other than God himself, does not impede our freedom of choice, since it inclines us toward the very thing that right reason would select. The inner instinct of grace heals our rebellious wills and inclines us to do as God wills. In so doing it removes an obstacle to freedom-our innate tendency to pursue the immediate and apparent good rather than the ultimate and true good. It brings us closer to the final condition of the blessed in heaven, who cannot do other than love God, but who do so freely because they see how lovable God is. IV In speaking of the interior law of the gospel imprinted by God on the human heart, I am inevitably raising the question of conscience, which is a subject of considerable confusion in our day. John Paul II remarks that the idea of conscience has been deformed by modern thinkers who have lost the sense of the transcendent and are in some cases atheistic. These thinkers often depict conscience as a supreme and infallible tribunal that dispenses us from considerations of law and truth, putting in their place purely subjective and individualistic criteria such as sincerity, authenticity, and being at peace with oneself VS In opposition to this trend John Paul II shows in *Veritatis Splendor* that conscience is an act of intelligence that adheres to objective norms. The freedom of conscience is secured by its conformity to truth. In the depths of his own conscience man detects a law which he does not impose on himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart more specifically: To obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged GS 16, quoted in VS According to these authoritative texts, conscience is not

a purely subjective and autonomous principle: Its judgments always presuppose the first principle of practical reason, the obligation to do good and avoid evil. Paul, as we have seen, describes conscience as an unwritten law inscribed by God on the human heart. Bonaventure spells out this relationship more explicitly. In a text quoted by John Paul II he writes: This is why conscience has a binding force. Conscience, he writes in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, is the voice of God in the nature and heart of man. In a justly famous paragraph he declares: Newman contrasts this true and traditional conception of conscience with what he calls its modern counterfeit. While some philosophers attack the very concept of conscience as a primitive and irrational force, the popular mind, in advocating so-called rights of conscience, really seeks to assert human self-will, without any thought of God at all. He then goes on to remark that conscience is neither adequate nor infallible as a source of moral guidance. Because it attests to a higher intelligence and will to which it is subject, it arouses a concern or anxiety to find out what course of action is here and now required of the individual to do good and avoid evil. Conscience impels one to seek authoritative direction. Newman eloquently points out the providential role of the Church in supplying this need.