

Chapter 1 : Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation - [PDF Document]

Is There Dowry Inflation in South Asia? Raj Arunachalam and Trevon Logan NBER Working Paper No. March JEL No. C1,D1,J1,O10 ABSTRACT This paper is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in.

Thus bride price and dowry are not necessarily the converse of each other. This suggests a usage of the term dowry to mean a groom price, the reverse of a bride price. Bride price and dowry need not be mutually exclusive, and marriage transfers in both directions can occur simultaneously. A complex set of norms may then govern the nature and the magnitude of payments in either direction. Although the custom of dowry payment has disappeared in most regions in the West, it remains widespread in South Asia. Bride prices were known to have prevailed extensively in Africa and also in areas of mainland, South, and East Asia, and North and South America. Both dowry and bride price regimes were present in South Asia in the early part of the twentieth century; in the second half of the century, dowry amounts were inflated, including a switch from bride price to dowry in many areas where the former practice was dominant. Both these forms of payment can be substantial in magnitude. It may consist of movable property such as money, ornaments, clothing, household goods, or cattle. In some cases land is also provided as a part of the payment. The norms associated with marriage payments can be complex and vary largely across societies. These norms govern issues such as when the marriage payment is to be made and to whom, to what use the marriage payment may be put, and who inherits the payment in case of death or dissolution of the marriage. In some African societies, on the other hand, the bride price received for a woman may be used to obtain a wife for her brother. But such a transaction is often regarded as a debt owed to the sister, and to repay it the brother must offer his daughter in marriage to her son. One theory links marriage payments to the rights of inheritance held by women and explains dowry as a premortem bequest made to daughters. Another hypothesis links marriage payments to the economic value of women. Brides command a positive worthâ€”a bride priceâ€”in areas where women make valuable contributions to agricultural work or other economic activity. In regions where women do not make an economic contribution, they constitute an economic liability and hence bring a dowry. Therefore, when grooms are relatively scarce brides pay dowries, and when brides are scarce grooms offer a bride price. Other theories link the existence of different types of marriage payments to the laws governing marital and social ties kinship structures. For example, bride price has been observed very often in societies with general polygyny polygyny practiced by the general populace and not just the rich , whereas dowry almost always occurs in monogamous societies. Marriage payments have also been linked to norms of hypergamyâ€”whereby brides are expected to marry into a higher caste or social groupâ€”and hypogamyâ€”whereby brides are expected to marry into a lower caste or social group. These and other explanations of marriage payments proposed by social scientists are not mutually exclusive, and more than one factor could contribute to the determination of marriage payments in any society. Moreover, because the combination of factors leading to dowry or bride price may be very different, the disappearance of one type of payment over time does not necessitate the appearance of the other. Incidents of violence against brides who were unable to pay the dowries demanded of them bride burning and dowry deaths also became increasingly commonplace during this time, despite the passage of the Dowry Prohibition Act , which made the payment of dowries illegal. The phenomenon of the Indian dowry inflation appears especially perplexing given that the widespread practices of female infanticide and female feticide contributed to a highly masculine sex ratio in India throughout the twentieth century. It seems puzzling, therefore, that scarce women in India should have to pay increasingly higher prices for grooms. It is possible that this ratio is skewed in favor of womenâ€”leading to a positive price of grooms i. The marriage squeeze hypothesis uses the idea of differential marriageable age of men and women to argue that population growth which occurred in India in the s explains dowry inflation. The argument runs as follows: High rates of population growth lead to younger cohorts outnumbering older cohorts in the population. When older men marry younger women, this leads to an excess supply of marriageable womenâ€”or a marriage squeeze against womenâ€”causing the price of grooms to be bid up. The norm of

caste hypergamy, practiced in some regions of India, has also been invoked to explain the Indian dowry inflation. Alternative explanations of the dowry inflation point to Sanskritization emulation, by lower castes, of the higher-caste practice of paying dowry , the changing economic value of women, and changing social structures in India during this time.

Chapter 2 : Dowry - Wikipedia

This paper is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia. The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South.

More Essay Examples on Marriage Rubric A dowry can be defined as everything a girl brings with her in a marriage: The root of dowry comes from several years ago , when the initial reason of giving a dowry was to help the newly married couple to start a new life Dowry -Wikipedia , n. It was more like a gift from parents to their daughters since the daughters did not have a share in the inheritance. The practice of dowry , which was once a voluntary act has now become a compulsory one Chaudary , n. There are alternate ways in which dowry can be paid and it differs from society to society. It may include cash , money , jewelry , furniture , household appliances , property or anything which can help to set up the lives of the newly weds Dowry " n. Majority of the population struggles to own a house of their own hence its next to impossible to gift their daughters a house , adding more burden on parents if they have more than one daughter. And the sad part about all this is that all classes are part of this evil system including the educated upper class. However the class which suffers the most is the middle class. As soon as a girl is born , her parents start to worry about saving for her dowry. They start with holding back economic resources so that by the time the daughter reaches the age of marriage , they are able to provide a respectable amount of dowry for her. Hence one reason for dowry being a social problem in south asian countries is that it leads to female foeticide , another very important social issue Ghansham , Girls are deprived of higher education since parents want to save their education money for dowry. It is also a widely accepted belief that more educated a girl is , the more dowry has to be paid since its hard to find a groom who is compatible to the highly educated girl. Research shows that there is a co-relation between dowry and education level of the groom. Boys who are engineers and doctors tend to receive a higher dowry. This is usually found in Pakistan and Bangladesh. So if the girl is educated , she will also have to find a boy who is highly educated which automatically means she will have to pay a higher dowry. To attract a better partner for their daughters , parents often disclose to their close family members and neighbors the amount of dowry they are willing to pay so that they can attract good marriage proposals. This shows that the physical attractiveness of the girl or her values are not the only factors which attract suitable grooms for her: Parents force their daughters to get married to the Quran so that they then do not have to pay dowry Niaz , Girls have no say in how to live their lives and due to the fear of dowry , parents decide to completely destroy their lives. This practice is not only unfair for the girls but also a serious disrespect for the religion since in no way such a concept is accepted in Islam. This tradition of giving expensive gifts as dowry was set by the upper class , which unfortunately the middle and lower class have to follow. As discussed previously , parents of daughters who belong to middle class family have to go through a lot of economic stress just to collect a respectable amount of dowry. This is also because there is often inter marriages between upper class and middle class due to children receiving the same level of education and going to same colleges and universities , where usually middle class and upper class children study under one roof and mingle with each other. Middle class families usually demand a high amount of dowry since they see it as a source for them to achieve upward social mobility. Even though parents of daughters who belong to upper class can easily give high amount of dowry , it is still not fair to make it compulsion on them. But what worries the society more are the consequences a girl faces after marriage if her parents were not able to pay dowry. Also , more attention is paid to other forms of violence in society such as rape and child labour which are common throughout the world and not just in South Asian countries Perveen et al , Thousands of brides are burnt , killed and tortured by husbands and in laws yet, no one is taking any serious action against it Menski, as cited in Parveen et al , This is when the husband simply murders the girl with the help of his family so that he could remarry and does not have to return the bride the dowry he got previously , which would be required in the case of divorce. In India , dowry killings are usually carried out by burning the bride, a practice derived from an old indian practice , suttee , when the bride was burned to death after the death of her husband. In Bangladesh , dowry killing are usually carried out by stabbing the bride or by poisoning her.

Dowry deaths are just not common in Pakistan but also in other South Asian countries. For example, in India, there are approximately dowry deaths every year according to the National Crime Bureau. Apart from dowry killings, there are also several ways through which girls are tortured if the in-laws are unhappy with the dowry they received. These include depriving them of food, not allowing them to visit their parents, limiting their social mobility, passing sarcastic remarks, beatings and continuous threat of divorce. These actions do not just affect the girls physically but also psychologically. According to Niaz who wrote from the psychological aspect about the effects of dowry, girls lose their self-esteem and are often driven to an extent where they attempt suicide. Most of the suicidal patients in a study she cited were who suffered conflict with husband and in-laws. Another 5-year survey at Psychiatric Department at Aga Khan Hospital Karachi found that out of all the patients going through counselling, majority were married women suffering with issues with in-laws and family. Niaz, A study in Thatta District in Sindh Pakistan, stated few of the cases of suicide which were the results of mentally frustrated women. Often such cases were found to be reported. A poor girl was driven to the extreme step after persistent harassment by her husband. In this study, married females were studied. It is simply a source of violence and discrimination against women Suran et al, Previously, the government of Pakistan did take a few steps to control the dowry system. For example, Restriction Act of stated that dowry amount should not exceed Rs However, just like the ban on lavish wedding food, this was even unsuccessful Perveen, This NGO, along with the help of media and interested groups tried to promote the issue of dowry. The country gender assessment report launched by World Bank in acknowledges the impact of FAD in Pakistani society Perveen, However, all these measures were not able to completely finish the system of dowry in Pakistan and some drastic measures need to be taken to do so. According to Shaikh n. Hence, according to her, this can only be done if women are provided with proper education. They have to be trained to be powerful so they can fight for their rights. So if overall girls are given education and are taught to be independent, they will not fear raising a voice against violence they experience after marriage due to the insufficient payment of dowry. Parents should simply refuse to give dowry and should get their daughters married in a family which demands dowry. An awareness about the consequences of dowry should also be created amongst parents so that they know what they are going into before they easily accept to pay dowry because majority of the girls, even after paying dowry were suffering from domestic violence. So if the parents think that by giving dowry their daughter will be treated well after marriage, this really isn't the case most of the time. Slowly and gradually, one step at a time we can work towards putting an end to this cruel system. On individual level, we can each play our part by promising never to take or give dowry and make sure all our close family members also follow our footsteps. By doing so, we are each going to take one step towards ending the dowry system. Other than that, parents should let their daughters know that they are going to support them in every situation so that no matter what happens, girls should not fear being left alone if their husbands and in-laws mistreat them. If this attitude continues, hopefully dowry system will come to an end one day. The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24 4, Paper submitted to Brown University. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Dowry System in Pakistan. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 2, World Psychiatry, 3 1, The most frequently forgotten form of gender violence in Pakistan. A socially endorsed form of violence in Pakistan. Does Dowry Improve Life for Brides? Choose Type of service.

Chapter 3 : Is There Dowry Inflation in South Asia? - CORE

The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to explain the rise of dowries in South Asia.

The history of dowry in South Asia is not clear. Some scholars believe dowry was practiced in antiquity, but some do not. Historical eyewitness reports, as discussed below, suggest dowry in ancient India was insignificant, and daughters had inheritance rights, which by custom were exercised at the time of their marriage. Documentary evidence suggests that at the beginning of 20th century bride price, rather than dowry was the common custom, which often resulted in very poor boys remaining unmarried. Tambiah claims the ancient Code of Manu sanctioned dowry and bridewealth in ancient India, but dowry was the more prestigious form and associated with the Brahmanic priestly caste. Bridewealth was restricted to the lower castes, who were not allowed to give dowry. He cites two studies from the early 20th century with data to suggest that this pattern of dowry in upper castes and bridewealth in lower castes has persisted through the first half of the 20th century. The findings of MacDonell and Keith are similar to Witzel, and differ from Tambiah; they cite ancient Indian literature suggesting bridewealth was paid even in brahma - and daiva -types of marriage associated with the Brahmanic priestly upper caste. Dowry was not infrequent when the girl suffered from some bodily defect. Available eyewitness observations from ancient India give a different picture. One of these are the eyewitness records from Alexander the Great conquest ca. Arrian first book mentions a lack of dowry, They these ancient Indian people make their marriages accordance with this principle, for in selecting a bride they care nothing whether she has a dowry and a handsome fortune, but look only to her beauty and other advantages of the outward person. He translated many Indian texts into Arabic, as well as wrote a memoir on Indian culture and life he observed. Al-Biruni claimed, The implements of the wedding rejoicings are brought forward. No gift dower or dowry is settled between them. The man gives only a present to the wife, as he thinks fit, and a marriage gift in advance, which he has no right to claim back, but the proposed wife may give it back to him of her own will if she does not want to marry. It is also unclear when, why and how quickly the practice of dowry demand by grooms began, whether this happened after the arrival of Islam in the late 11th century, or with the arrival of colonialism in the 16th century, or both. Causes of the dowry[edit] Various reasons have been suggested as cause of dowry practice in India. These include economic factors and social factors. Economic factors[edit] There are many economic factors that contribute towards the system of dowry. Some suggestions point to economics and weak legal institutions on inheritance place women in disadvantage, with inheritances being left only to sons. In , India gave equal legal status to daughters and sons among Hindu, Sikh and Jain families, under the Hindu Succession Act India grants its Muslim population the Sharia derived personal status laws. Despite the new inheritance law, dowry has continued as a process whereby parental property is distributed to a daughter at her marriage by a social process, rather than after parents death by a slow court supervised process under Hindu Succession Act This helped prevent family wealth break-up and provided security to the bride at the same time. In addition, brides may have the ability to inherit land, which makes her more valuable in the marriage, decreasing the chance of dowry over the bride price system. A study showed that while attitudes of people are changing about dowry, dowry continues to prevail. It is widespread among Hindus and other religions. For example, Indian Muslims call dowry as jahez, justify the practice in terms of jahez-e-fatimi. Islamists classify jahez into two categories: The first comprises some essential articles for the outfit of the bride as well as for conjugal life. The jahez often far exceeds the cost of the baraat and marriage parties. The jahez is separate from cash payment as Mahr or dower that Sharia religious law requires. There are variations on dowry prevalence based on geography and class. States in the north are more likely to participate in the dowry system among all classes, and dowry is more likely to be in the form of material and movable goods. This system is tied to the social structure of marriage, which keeps marriage inside or close to family relations. Upper-class families are more likely to engage in the dowry system than the lower class. Since marriages in India are a time for big celebrations in each family, they tend to be very lavish. Accordingly, Indian weddings usually involve considerable

expenditure and accompanying wedding presents from relatives in both sides of the family. This is normal expenditure which is done willingly and varies from one family to another depending on the wealth, status, etc. Some of these offences include physical violence, emotional abuses, and even murder of brides and young girls prior to marriage. Cruelty[edit] Cruelty in the form of torture or harassment of a woman with the objective of forcing her to meet a demand for property or valuable security is a form of dowry crime. Such cruelty could just be in the form of verbal attacks or may be accompanied by beating or harassment in order to force the woman or her family to yield to dowry demands. Where as cruelty towards newly wed women is well recognized and defined by law, the same actions when committed on husbands do not constitute Cruelty. However often this is not the case. Domestic violence in India Domestic violence includes a broad spectrum of abusive and threatening behavior which includes physical, emotional, economic and sexual violence as well as intimidation, isolation and coercion. Abetment to suicide[edit] Continuing abuse by the husband and his family with threats of harm could lead to a woman committing suicide. In such situations, the dowry crime even extends to abetment of suicide, which includes all acts and attempts to intentionally advise, encourage, or assist in committing suicide. Dowry deaths also include bride burning where brides are doused in kerosene and set ablaze by the husband or his family. Sometimes, due to their abetment to commit suicide, the bride may end up setting herself on fire. Bride burnings are the most common forms of dowry deaths for a wide range of reasons like kerosene being inexpensive, there being insufficient evidence after the murder and low chances of survival rate. Daughters are often seen as economic liabilities due to the dowry system. Laws against dowry[edit] The first all-India legislative enactment relating to dowry to be put on the statute book was The Dowry Prohibition Act, and this legislation came into force from 1 July To further strengthen the anti-dowry law and to stop offences of cruelty by the husband or his relatives against the wife, new provisions were added to the Indian criminal law " section A [57] to Indian Penal Code and section A to the Criminal Procedure Code in In , the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was passed, which added an additional layer of protection from dowry harassment. Although the changes in Indian criminal law reflects a serious effort by legislators to put an end to dowry-related crimes, and although they have been in effect for many years now, they have been largely criticised as being ineffective. Dowry agreements are void ab initio and if any dowry is received by anyone other than the woman, it should be transferred to the woman. Additionally, the judiciary also includes a murder charge under Section IPC as this allows courts to impose death penalty on perpetrators of the offence. Section IPC, pertaining to offences for the criminal breach of trust, applies in cases of recovery of dowry as it is supposed to be for the benefit of the woman and her heirs. Further, Section A IPC was specifically included in to protect women from cruelty and harassment. The constitutionality of Section A was challenged before the Supreme Court of India on grounds of abuse, on grounds that it gave arbitrary power to the police and the court. However, it was upheld in *Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India* India is a party to several international human rights instruments which provide theoretical remedies to the dowry problems. CEDAW codifies the rights most relevant to the discussion of dowry-related violence: However, there are issues of non-intervention and cultural relativism which impede the use of international law to combat dowry deaths. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. October Learn how and when to remove this template message There is growing criticism that the dowry laws are often being misused, particularly section A IPC which is observed by many in India as being prone to misuse because of mechanical arrests by the police. And in most cases, the capacity of the wife or her parents and the source of the funds are never tracked. The Nisha Sharma dowry case was an anti-dowry lawsuit in India. It began in when Nisha Sharma accused her prospective groom, Munish Dalal, of demanding dowry. Nisha Sharma was portrayed as a youth icon and a role model for other women. On 19 April , the Indian government sought to introduce a bill to amend Section A IPC based on the suggestions of the Law Commission and Justice Malimath committee on reforms of criminal justice.

This paper is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia. The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to explain the rise of dowries in South Asia.

The present paper shows this explanation to be internally inconsistent. This excess supply is resolved by some women postponing marriage, so that the average age of brides increases. In previous studies the argument is stated informally. Here, a matching model of marriage is developed to formally analyze the link between dowry payments and population growth. Population change is therefore not a promising explanation for the observed increases in dowry payments. J11; J12; J16; D10 Keywords: Dowry; Population growth; Marriage 1. Introduction Income transfers from the family of the bride to the groom, or his parents dowry, have existed for many centuries. The dowry system dates back to at least the ancient Greco-Roman world [11]. With monogamous marriage customs, this excess supply of brides can be resolved in one of two ways: Another possibility is a narrowing in marriageable ages between grooms and brides. This can occur by either the average marrying age of brides increasing some postpone marriage, or that of grooms falling some grooms marry younger, so that the difference between the ages of spouses declines. It is generally found that population growth has little effect on the proportions of women and men ever marrying but it does substantially alter the age composition within marriages. Though not formally explored, it is conjectured that older brides will outbid those who are younger, so that younger brides will match in later periods when they themselves are older, so that the marriage squeeze is relaxed by a reduction in the average age difference between spouses [14]. In fact, Aristotle put forward a form of the argument to explain the rise in the value of dowries in ancient Sparta, as explained by Hughes [11]. Herlihy and Quale similarly advance this hypothesis to explain rising dowries in Medieval Europe [10,13]. Refer to [2] for further references. They demonstrate that very large changes in cohort size can be absorbed by relatively modest adjustments in the age difference between spouses with no necessary adjustments in the proportions of men and women marrying. This paper develops a matching model of marriage to formally analyze the relationship between dowry payments and population growth. There are three indisputable features of the marriage market on which this result is based: When a marriage squeeze occurs, as in point 1, some brides are delaying marriage to re-enter the marriage market when older. Given that delay is costly, point 3, brides are only willing to do so if they anticipate lower prices in future. Therefore, point 3 implies that older brides make lower dowry payments than they would have as younger brides in the previous period, in order to be willing to delay. But point 2 implies they must make higher payments than younger brides marrying contemporaneously, in order for grooms to accept them. As a result, the prices paid by brides of equal ages across periods must be falling. Therefore, the only time path of dowry payments consistent with preferences on both sides of the market is downward sloping. The next section demonstrates this result in two-sided matching framework where an increase in population leads to a marriage squeeze and a reduction in the marriage age gap. Preferences Time is discrete and in each period an equal number of males and females are born. Agents of each sex all eventually reach marrying age. There exists an exogenously given optimal marrying age for brides, b , and grooms, g . There are costs associated with delaying marriage beyond the desirable age, represented by c_{ab} and k_{ag} , which are increasing and convex: Bergstrom and Bagnoli propose a theory to explain this marriage age difference between spouses exactly along these lines [3]. More indirectly there are social costs associated with marrying beyond the socially acceptable age levels for both brides and grooms, however the rules are far more stringent for women [7]. We refer to conditions 2. No population growth Suppose there is a constant population of marriageable individuals through time. With constant population there cannot be a marriage squeeze and the marriage age gap remains constant. With constant population, the unique equilibrium pattern of matching between brides and grooms involves marrying at ages b and g , respectively. A marriage squeeze cannot occur and the marriage age gap is constant. All proofs are in Appendix A. An equilibrium here is a pattern of matching for brides and grooms in each period t , with accompanying payments $d_0, 0, t$. In the constant population case, equal numbers of brides

and grooms reach marriageable age each period, despite the fact that marriageable ages differ. All individuals prefer marrying at these ages to marrying later, and marrying earlier is, by construction, not possible. Since numbers are equal, all individuals marrying at the earliest ages is thus feasible, and is so for a range of equilibrium payments. The proof demonstrates that, given the equilibrium sequence 13 Conditions 2. Intuitively, this follows from the costs of delay. The uniqueness of the matching pattern then follows for similar reasons. Any posited equilibrium matching pattern in which at least one side delays can be undermined by one party marrying early and offering a mutually improving transfer to a potential spouse. Given there is a range of equilibrium prices under which both sides of the market strictly prefer marriage with no delay, transfers supporting the matching pattern in Proposition 1 are not unique. Given a $d(0, 0, 0)$, condition 3. The change in payments through time is limited by the total utility costs of delay: However, there does exist a unique division of the marriage surplus for which the time path of dowry payments is constant. Population growth Here we analyze the effects of a one shot increase in the population. It turns out that most of the effects on the marriage market in such a case also apply for more general increases in population which are slightly more complicated to analyze. Equal numbers, N , continue to reach marriageable age in each 14 The results pertaining to equilibrium dowry payments do not require these costs to be convex, only that they are increasing. The assumption of convexity does determine possible patterns of marriage delay. In particular, with convexity, brides and grooms never optimally consider delaying marriage more than one period. Without convexity, the possible deviations of bridal and groom delay will be more complex but do not change anything qualitative in the results. Refer to an earlier working paper version for details. Such a construction was necessary to analyze the marriage squeeze argument which is predicated on population growth inducing a narrowing of the marriage age gap while all continue to marry. At this point, brides would prefer to offer a higher payment rather than remain unmarried, since their participation constraints are not binding. But such an upward movement in dowry payments is inconsistent with Proposition 4, and consequently a marriage squeeze cannot be equilibrated by a reduction in the marriage age gap. When population growth cannot lead to a change in marrying ages, marriage market clearing conditions require that the consequent excess supply of brides must remain unmarried. Thus the two empirical facts to be explained: Proof of Proposition 1. The prices of matches off the equilibrium path can take any value subject to the requirement that they are weakly preferred by both deviating parties. Since q , c , and m are increasing, the right-hand side of A. Analogously for grooms, 2. The right-hand side of A. This pattern of matching also ensures that the marriage market clearing condition, 2. Note that the equilibrium is only unique upto the matching pattern, as shown above, many payments can support this matching pattern. We now demonstrate that this is the unique matching pattern with no population growth. First note that equilibria where only brides delay but grooms do not, or vice versa, are not possible given that the marriage market clearing condition, 2. Lindenbaum, Implications for women of changing marriage transactions in Bangladesh, Stud. Rao, The rising price of husbands:

Chapter 5 : Dowry system Essay Example | Graduateway

This article is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia. The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to explain the rise of dowries in South Asia.

Definition[edit] A dowry is the transfer of parental property to a daughter at her marriage i. This fund may provide an element of financial security in widowhood or against a negligent husband, and may eventually go to provide for her children. This practice differs from the majority of Sub-Saharan African societies that practice "homogenous inheritance" in which property is transmitted only to children of the same sex as the property holder. These latter African societies are characterized by the transmission of the " bride price ," the money, goods or property given by the groom or his family to the parents of the bride not the bride herself. In sparsely populated regions where shifting cultivation takes place, most of the work is done by women. These are the societies that give brideprice. Boserup further associates shifting horticulture with the practice of polygamy , and hence bridewealth is paid as a compensation to her family for the loss of her labour. Close family are the preferred marriage partners so as to keep property within the group. They argue that a major factor in determining the type of marriage transaction is the type of property controlled by the household. Bridewealth circulates property and women, and is typical of societies where property is limited. Dowry concentrates property and is found in property owning classes or commercial or landed pastoral peoples. Instead, with marriage, they got a dowry from her parents, which was intended to offer as much lifetime security to the bride as her family could afford. However, bride price almost always became part of the dowry. The return of dowry could be disputed, if the divorce was for a reason allowed under Babylonian law. He had no say, however, in its ultimate disposal; and legally, the dowry had to be kept separate for it was expected to support the wife and her children. If she died childless, her dowry reverted to her family, that is her father if he was alive, otherwise her brothers. If she had sons, they would share it equally. In addition, the wife might bring to the marriage property of her own, which was not included in the dowry and which was, as a result, hers alone. This property was "beyond the dowry" Greek parapherna, the root of paraphernalia and is referred to as paraphernal property or extra-dotal property. A dowry may also have served as a form of protection for the wife against the possibility of ill treatment by her husband and his family, [25] providing an incentive for the husband not to harm his wife. In contemporary Greece, dowry was removed from family law through legal reforms in All the property of the wife which was not dowry, or was not a donatio propter nuptias, continued to be her own property, and was called Parapherna. Two types of dowry were knownâ€”dos profectitia and dos adventitia. All other dos is adventitia. Some scholars believe dowry was practiced in antiquity, but some do not. Historical eyewitness reports discussed below suggest dowry in ancient India was insignificant, and daughters had inheritance rights, which by custom were exercised at the time of her marriage. Documentary evidence suggests that at the beginning of 20th century, bride price , rather than dowry was the common custom, which often resulted in poor boys remaining unmarried. Tambiah claims the ancient Code of Manu sanctioned dowry and bridewealth in ancient India typically in Rohtak and especially in Kadia families, but dowry was the more prestigious form and associated with the Brahmanic priestly caste. Bridewealth was restricted to the lower castes, who were not allowed to give dowry. He cites two studies from the early 20th century with data to suggest that this pattern of dowry in upper castes and bridewealth in lower castes persisted through the first half of the 20th century. The findings of MacDonell and Keith are similar to Witzel, and differ from Tambiah; they cite ancient Indian literature suggesting bridewealth was paid even in brahma- and daiva-types of marriage associated with the Brahmanic priestly upper caste. Dowry was not infrequent, when the girl suffered from some bodily defect. Available eyewitness observations from ancient India give a different picture. He translated many Indian texts into Arabic, as well as wrote a memoir on Indian culture and life he observed. Al-Biruni claimed, The implements of the wedding rejoicings are brought forward. No gift dower or dowry is settled between them. The man gives only a present to the wife, as he thinks fit, and a marriage gift in advance, which he has no right to claim back, but the proposed wife may give it back to him

of her own will if she does not want to marry. Al-Biruni , Chapter on Matrimony in India, about AD [44] Al-Biruni further claims that a daughter, in 11th century India, had legal right to inherit from her father, but only a fourth part of her brother. It is also unclear when, why and how quickly the practice of dowry demand by grooms began, and whether this happened after the arrival of colonialism in the 16th century. Mann [17] and others [47] [48] [49] find that dowry was a form of inheritance to daughters. In traditional China, the property owned by a family, if any, was earmarked for equal division or inheritance by sons only. Dowry was the only way assets were transferred to a daughter. It included immovable property such as land, and movable property like jewelry and fine clothing. The dowry she brought with her was typically sequestered from the property of her husband and other male members in a joint family. She would often sell this property for cash to overcome hard economic times or needs of her children and husband. In a few cases, she may transfer the property she brought as dowry to her daughter or daughter-in-law. Dowry assets once transferred in turn constituted separate wealth of the woman who received it *sifang qian*, etc. Though throughout the history of China, the practice of using a brideprice has largely been used instead of dowries, but has slowly diminished in modern times. Folklorists often interpret the folk tale Cinderella as the competition between the stepmother and the stepdaughter for resources, which may include the need to provide a dowry. Until the late 20th century this was sometimes called *wreath money* , or the breach of promise. Providing dowries for poor women was regarded as a form of charity by wealthier parishioners. The custom of Christmas stockings springs from a legend of St. Nicholas , in which he threw gold in the stockings of three poor sisters, thus providing for their dowries. Elizabeth of Portugal and St. Martin de Porres were particularly noted for providing such dowries, and the Archconfraternity of the Annunciation, a Roman charity dedicated to providing dowries, received the entire estate of Pope Urban VII. In , the Republic of Florence created a public fund, called the *Monte delle doti* , to provide dowries to Florentine brides. Vast inheritances were standard as dowries for aristocratic and royal brides in Europe during the Middle Ages. In some cases, nuns were required to bring a dowry when joining a convent. It was commonly given with the condition that he take the surname of his bride, in order to continue the family name. England[edit] Dowry was used in England, however, the right of daughters to inherit and of women to hold property and other rights in their own name made it a different instrument than on the Continent. The Salic law , which required females to be disinherited and disenfranchised from land ownership, did not apply in England. Single women held many rights men did. The most famous example of this English female inheritance and agency right is perhaps Elizabeth I of England , who held all rights a male monarch did. While single women held rights to hold property equivalent to those of men, marriage and married women were affected by the Norman Conquest changes to the law in the 12th Century. The Normans also introduced the dowry in England replacing the earlier custom of the new husband giving a morning gift to his bride. At first the husband publicly gave [or received? This concept is included in the Great Charter , and along with the recognition of female inheritance and absence of the Salic law , and women, particularly single women, holding many rights equivalent to those men held, manifests English law differing fundamentally from the law of the Continent, especially the law of the Holy Roman Empire. Thirteenth-century court records are filled with disputes over dowries, and the law became increasingly complex. Marriageable daughters were a valuable commodity to ambitious fathers, and the English aristocracy sent few of their eligible daughters to convents. William Shakespeare made use of such an event in *King Lear*: In some instances, daughters who had not received their dowries were the only female heirs entitled to part of the estate when their parents died. This effectively ended the concept of dowry as the property of a single woman was either retained by her after marriage or its income became marital property under joint control with a husband not under his sole control as in *coverture*. Dowry was a common practice in Russia through the 19th century. In some parts of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, land dowries were common. The *Domostroy* , a Russian advice book of the 16th century for upper classes, includes advice to set aside property for purposes of a dowry, and use it to accumulate linens, clothing, and other things for it, rather than have to suddenly buy it all for the wedding; if the daughter should happen to die, the dowry should be used to give alms and for prayers for her soul, although some might be set aside for other daughters. Her relatives could prosecute the husband for squandering a dowry; wives gained some ability to leave an abusive marriage. The long-term result was a

greater legal empowerment of women, while providing economic security to divorced women, widows, and children. The exchange was somewhat reciprocal. The husband might be given funds from the dowry to invest for the mutual benefit of the couple and their children, but wives also often used funds from their dowries to operate their own businesses, as grocers, tavern keepers, and shop owners in urban areas. By that time, less wealthy daughters were often marrying without any dowry. As the French crown provided dowries for many of the women persuaded to travel to New France for marriages and settlement there, they were known as filles du roi daughters of the king. Convents in Quebec, as in Europe, required a dowry from the parents of girls becoming nuns, much as the dowry was expected in the marriages of upper class brides. The Catholic Church intended for this requirement to be used to maintain some control over the new members of religious communities. Girls without a dowry were often supported by benefactors, however, and occasionally convents lowered the sum required to enter the convent. The 15th-century painting relates to the story of a poor man with three daughters. Without a dowry, a woman was unlikely to marry. Mysteriously, on three occasions, so goes the story, a bag of gold appeared in their home, for the dowries, courtesy of St Nicholas. Later, St Nicholas came to be known as Santa Claus. Hull is said to have set his year-old daughter onto one side of the large scales in his warehouse. He piled shillings into the other side of the scale until he reached her weight in silver, and that was her dowry. An example is found in the marriage of Virginia settler John Rolfe to Pocahontas, who brought a dowry to the marriage that included a large amount of land. The mutual exchange of title and wealth raised the status of both bride and groom. Colonial economics meant that families had a great stake in inheritances of land in particular. As in Europe, the eldest daughter was usually granted the largest dowry by her father. Inheritance laws were complex in colonial Brazil. According to Portuguese law, an estate was to be divided among children who had not already received a dowry. In the early colonial period, married daughters receiving a large dowry would refuse to accept a further inheritance after the death of their father. In the 18th century, as inheritances and dowries gradually became smaller, this custom disappeared. During the 18th century, as inheritances decreased in size, litigation among siblings became more common.

Chapter 6 : Logan: Is There Dowry Inflation in South Asia?

Abstract. This paper is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia. The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to explain the rise of dowries in South Asia.

Chapter 7 : Dowry and Bride Price | blog.quintoapp.com

Is There Dowry Inflation in South Asia? Raj Arunachalam and Trevon Logan. No, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Abstract: This paper is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia.

Chapter 8 : Dowry system in India - Wikipedia

Abstract. This article is the first systematic attempt to measure the existence and degree of dowry inflation in South Asia. The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to.

Chapter 9 : EconPapers: Is There Dowry Inflation in South Asia?

The popular press and scholarly literature have assumed dowry inflation in South Asia for some time, and there are now a number of theoretical papers that have attempted to explain the rise of.