II. The Unity of Natural and Sociocultural History as a Base for the Unity of The unity of knowledge is one of the grand ideas of intellectual history and the.

Biblical Principles of the Unity of the Church I. The Nature of the Church A. The church is the covenant people of God in all ages and among all nations. The work of the church, in fellowship with and in obedience to Christ, is divine worship, mutual edification, and gospel witness Form of Government II. The Lord governs his church also through the application of his Word to the people by the Spirit as the Word is expounded and applied by the officers of the church Eph. The Unity of the Church A. The church finds its unifying principle in the covenant promise "my dwelling place will be with them; I will be their God, and they will be my people" Ezek. This finds fulfillment in Jesus as Emmanuel "God with us," Matt. The ultimate consummation of the promise is the new Jerusalem, the Bride of Christ Rev. The church must recognize, appreciate, and confess this fundamental unity of the covenant people of God, the body of Christ; which is a God-given creation and not a human achievement. The church, the visible organization, is described in the Bible as one church. God has given only one covenant of love Deut. In the New Testament this teaching of the unity of the people of God is sustained see Eph. Yet the situation is different. No longer are the people of God circumscribed by ethnic, political, or geographical boundaries. All nations are to be discipled. This unity includes those people of God in past ages and also looks to the future and includes the people of God who will believe on his name Jn. The gospel proclaimed by the apostles as the foundation of the church resulted in establishing churches as covenant communities in various locations, churches which were ruled by elders. These churches and these elders were not independent, but were one body united by Christ their head, by the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit, and by the covenant promise of God. The elders at Antioch and Jerusalem resolve a problem, under God, and their decision is binding on the churches Acts 15, The unity of the church is attained unto by growing in spiritual maturity Eph. Unity and maturity are the result of mutual, loving admonition and joint submission to Scripture. Such maturity is manifested by speaking and acting the truth in love Eph. Each member is essential to the body, and the growth of the body depends on the active participation of each part Eph. The work of the officers of the church is to prepare the members for, and assist them in this work Eph. Ecclesiastical Union In ecclesiastical union two denominations join in submitting to one common form of government. Since ecclesiastical jurisdiction includes the maintenance of spiritual discipline, unity in polity requires agreement in the standards of faith and worship which such discipline maintains. Hence unification in polity, when properly sought and achieved, involves also unity in faith, discipline, and worship. As we take account of the diversity that exists between denominations arising from differences of ethnic identity, cultural background, and historical circumstance the most conclusive evidence derived from Scripture is required to support the position that the obliteration of denominational separateness is an obligation resting upon these Churches of Christ. If ecclesiastical union impairs this diversity, then it may be achieved at too great an expense and tends to an impoverishment inconsistent with the witness to Christ which the church must bear. Though the diversity which manifests itself in differentiating historical development might appear to make ecclesiastical union inadvisable or even perilous in certain cases, yet the biblical evidence in support of union is so plain that any argument to the contrary, however plausible, must be false. The New Testament does not suppose that the differences natural to individuals nor those arising from ethnic identity, cultural background, and historical circumstance are to be obliterated by the gospel. But it does mean that the unity of Christ transcends all diversity arising from language, race, culture, history. If we should maintain that the diversity is in any way incompatible with the unity of which the church is the expression, then we should be denying THAT unity which the ethnic universalism of the gospel implies. The Universalism of the Apostolic Church The church of the apostolic days embraces all nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues. There is no evidence in the New Testament for the diversification of distinct denominations and anything tending to such diversification was condemned cf. The emphasis falls upon the oneness of faith cf. Verse 21 must not be dissociated from verse To divorce the unity for which Christ prayed

from all that is involved in believing upon him through the apostolic witness is to sunder what Christ placed together. But while these and other distortions of this text are to be shunned, the prayer of Jesus does bear upon our question in two respects. The fragmentation and consequent lack of fellowship, harmony, and cooperation which appear on the ecclesiastical scene are a patent contradiction of unity exemplified in that to which Jesus referred when he said, "as thou, father, art in me and I in thee. Jesus prays for a visible unity that will bear witness to the world. The mysterious unity of believers with one another must come to visible expression so as to be instrumental in bringing conviction to the world. The Unity of the Body of Christ The church is the body of Christ and there is no schism in the body cf. As in the human body, there is diversity in unity and unity in diversity cf. The point to be stressed, however, is the unity. If there is unity it follows that this unity must express itself in all the functions which belong to the church. Since government in the church is an institution of Christ cf. The necessary inference to be drawn is that the government should manifest the unity and be as embracive in respect of its functioning as the unity of which it is an expression. A concrete illustration of this principle is the decree of the Jerusalem council Acts The Kingdom of Christ, etc. Christ is the head of the church. So ultimately there is the most concentrated unity of government in the church of Christ. He alone is King. Any infringement upon this sovereignty belonging to Christ is a violation of what is basic and central in the government of the church. It follows that all government in the church must adhere to the pattern of a cone which has its apex in Christ. Christ also instituted the apostolate with authority delegated from him Matt. This apostolic authority is exercised now only through the inscripturated Word. But in the sphere of delegated authority the apostolate is supreme and will continue to be so to the end of time. He seals the apostolic witness by his own testimony and illumines the people of God in the interpretation and application of the same. Subordinately, however, in terms of Matt. There is also in the New Testament institution the delegated authority of the presbyterate, always subject to the apostolic institution, to the Holy Spirit who inspired the apostles Jn. Since all office in the church of Christ can be filled only by the gifts of the Spirit, this structural subordination of the government of the church to the rule of Christ functions in living reality as a fellowship of the one Spirit. Everyone who has the Spirit of Christ is thereby called as a good steward of the manifold grace of God to minister his spiritual gifts to all the saints, so far as he is given opportunity. In particular, those whose gifts are for rule in the church must exercise such gifts in the communion of Christ and his church. When these principles of gradation and communion are appreciated, and when coordinated with other considerations already established, especially that of the unity of the body of Christ, we appear to be provided with a pattern that points to the necessity of making the presbyterate as inclusive as is consistent with loyalty to Christ and the faith of the gospel. In a word, we are pointed to the necessity of unity in government, a unity that is violated when churches of Christ adhering to the faith in its purity and integrity are not thus united. Toward Perfecting Biblical Unity A. The unity of the church is in Christ and it is both a given reality and also a requirement. The unity of the faith is both gift and mandate. The church is compelled to give expression to this reality and requirement, this gift and mandate, by actively seeking the promised goal, namely, that of being one body which serves the Lord in perfect peace, purity, and unity. The unity of the church is unity in Christ, unity in the gospel of Christ, "unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God" Eph. This Christ, this gospel, this faith and knowledge, the church must confess. It is summarized for us in our Confession of Faith. The present division into separate denominations is because of unfaithfulness to God as expressed in beliefs, teaching, and living, on the part of both individuals in the church and the churches that are contrary to the Word of God. We find ourselves in this sinful situation as we undertake to pursue the mandate to unity. There exists between us and all other churches a sinful disunity that demands reconciliation in a biblical way. This sin must be faced and removed so that true and full unity and fellowship of the church may be reached. In seeking actively the unity of the church, we must recognize several levels of separateness i. There are presbyterian and Reformed churches that are more or less faithful. There are non-Reformed churches that are more or less faithful. There are also churches that have apostatized, and no longer have the right to be called church. In seeking unity with faithful presbyterian and Reformed churches: There should be mutual agreement on what the gospel is. The churches must confess in their official documents of faith and life the same gospel. There should be a relationship of ecclesiastical

fellowship established in which official interchange may take place including the exchange of delegates at the meetings of the ruling bodies of the church. There will be fellowship and cooperation in organizations, both domestic and international, which give expression to oneness of faith and life. There then may take place the actual steps toward uniting. Reconciliation between the bodies the sin that is involved in the separate existence must be faced and resolved: Self-examination on the part of each church. Agreement that the confession of the united church must be apparent in the life of the church. The offering of each church to the other for examination; willingness to give, receive and respond to reproof 2 Tim 3: Agreement on the same ecclesiology and government of the church. Maintaining the peace, purity, and unity of the churches. There would then be the actual uniting into one organization. There is also responsibility to call all churches, including our own, to faithfulness in order to seek the unity of the whole church.

Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge is a book by biologist E. O. Wilson, in which the author discusses methods that have been used to unite the sciences and might in the future unite them with the humanities.

Early advocate of data collection and its analysis as the basis of sound knowledge Baconian method in fields that include social science and the humanities. Believed that the universe is rational and united and that interconnected truths run from physics to biology to moral reasoning. Descartes unified geometry and algebra see: Unified the laws of falling bodies with the laws of planetary motion see: Origin of social science. The roles of Adolphe Quetelet and Auguste Comte in developing the idea of studying behavior with scientific methods. Unity of purpose for Postmodernism and Science. Wilson argues that humanity is driven forward by the tension between those who upon viewing order create disorder and those who upon viewing disorder create order. Chapter 4[edit] The Greek Atomists. Greeks such as Leucippus and Democritus are credited with the reductionistic idea that matter has fundamental components. Scientific investigation of this idea has resulted in unification across the natural sciences. A modern attempt to unify neuroscience and epistemology. Discussed as a method for clarifying the Evolutionary basis of mismatches between physical reality and our mental models of reality. A method for comparing and unifying knowledge from different disciplines; gives priority to facts which are generated by experiment and objective observation rather than subjective speculations. A method for comparing and unifying knowledge from different disciplines; gives priority to methods and techniques that can be demonstrated to work and have pragmatic value. Chapter 5[edit] Reduction vs. Many examples comparing consilience by reduction dissect a phenomenon into its components and consilience by synthesis predicting higher-order phenomena from more basic physical principles. An example of consilience by reduction in which Wilson tries to account for the prevalence of serpent symbols in human cultures. Incorporates the " activation-synthesis model " of dreaming. Consilience between biology disciplines. Discussion of successes cells explained in terms of their chemical components, embryo development in terms of interactions between the cells of an embryo but also points to the remaining problem of dealing with complex systems as in neuroscience and ecology. A classical example in which the behavior of volumes of gas is explained in terms of the molecules of the gas kinetic theory. Prediction of chemical properties by quantum mechanical calculations. Chapter 6[edit] Explaining consciousness and emotion in terms of brain activity. Wilson describes the neurobiological approach to accounting for consciousness and emotion in terms of brain physiology and how this effort is guided by collaboration between biologists, psychologists and philosophers. Wilson proposes that it will be possible to construct a neurobiological understanding of subjective experiences that are shared and explored by art. Common neural patterns of activity will be found to correspond to fundamental aesthetic experiences. Wilson proposes that human-like artificial intelligence will require the engineering of a computational apparatus for processing an array of rich sensory inputs and the capacity to learn from those inputs in the way that children can learn. Requires consilience between biology, psychology and computer science. Chapter 7[edit] The relationship between genes and culture. Wilson posits that the basic element of culture is the meme. When a meme exists in a brain it has the form of a neuronal network that allows the meme to function within semantic memory. The link from genes to culture is that our genes shape our brains in cooperation with the environment and our brains allow us to work with memes as the basic units of culture.

The unity of knowledge The Center cites John Paul II's Fides et Ratio in which the Pope quotes Paul VI who attributes to the Angelic Doctor 'a new path of.

The Aspiration towards a Unity of Knowledge: Expressions of Contemporary Trends: Difficulties and Perplexities in proposing once more a Synthesis of Knowledge. Attempts to Unify Knowledge: Models in History and Philosophy. Projects of Unification in the Modern Age. The Search for Unity in Reflecting upon the Object: Beyond the Interdisciplinary Approach. The Building of Unity inside the Subject: Faith and Reason in the Unity of the Person. Unity of Knowledge and Unity of Life. The first concerns the integration between scientific and philosophical rationality. Insofar as the above mentioned sources â€"scientific rationality, wisdom, philosophy, and faith in the revealed divine wordâ€" are all acknowledged as different forms of true knowledge, the subject asks for a certain agreement among them. Such an agreement is sought not only to let these ways of understanding coexisting peacefully, for instance noting that they concern different and not overlapping formal objects, but also to provide a kind of synthesis of their common material object, that is, reality. The agreement and the synthesis between different sources of knowledge is required by the subject especially to clarify and better orientate his or her own judgments and choices, in particular those belonging to the existential sphere. It means to acknowledge that there is a reality which is, at the same time, a source of scientific knowledge, of ethical questioning, and of religious experience. In searching for such a synthesis, we must face the world without separating what the world is from what the world means. We must look at ourselves without separating the critical rationality of our own knowing from the responsibility implied in such knowing. I also want to look at the main theoretical difficulties which such an approach brings about, as well as the epistemological and cultural incentives that support it. I will try to suggest which kind of anthropology is capable of inspiring a balanced foundation of such an intellectual synthesis, one meaningful in the contexts of university studies and of scientific rationality, which are experiencing today a highly specialized diversification of disciplines. We must also examine whether access to the religious level of knowing might represent an obstacle to such unification or, on the contrary, whether it might foster it. Grounds and Uncertainties In a number of cultural environments, the discussion of the unity of knowledge has again come up in debate, although in ways quite different from the past. Many authors emphasize the still existing contrast between the unity of knowledge as it was proposed by classical culture and then by the Christian Middle Ages up to Humanism , and the diversification and fragmentation frequently alluded to characterizing the Modern Age. If such a fragmentation became evident with the development of the scientific experimental method, today the agenda of the so-called post-modern culture is precisely that of declaring the end of any unitary view. Science emphasizes the provisional dimension of its knowledge, while contemporary culture willingly endorses a pluralistic and relativist approach to the idea of truth. Following this trend, which very likely started with Francis Bacon , the ideal of wisdom was slowly replaced by the ideal of expertise, and the contemplation of nature by the will to analyze, manipulate and dominate the world. Although such a historical-conceptual picture, at first sight, interprets quite well the common understanding of many, it must be pointed out that the 20th century brought about a new philosophical view. The implicit tendency of human knowledge towards unity takes different shapes. In this latter case, methods and objects of a given discipline are read and understood in the light of a more general and basic language or knowledge, from which they implicitly assume, in a more or less conscious way, principles and models. As experimental progress goes in depth, it may happen that some new objects or properties discovered are recognized as belonging to a discipline other than the one we started with. Take for example what has happened in quantum mechanics, in elementary particle physics, and in the deeper understanding of chemical transformations and biological processes. The need to apply tools such as logic, statistics, or the theory of systems to subject matter which traditionally used heuristic principles, has favored the birth of new fields of research study, as well as the dialogue among already existing disciplines, overcoming, or at least shortening, the distances between the natural and human sciences. At times, the complexity of the object of study has suggested a coordinated

multidisciplinary approach. This has been the case of physical systems that do not follow plain and predictable laws, of living organisms, of issues related to health, social, economical, or communication dynamics. Here, the interdisciplinary thrust towards unity has taken advantage of a number of meaningful epistemological results, which put in light the limits of scientific observations, incompleteness of logic systems, and unpredictability of many physical phenomena, as something intrinsic to the specific methodology of a given discipline. In this way, interdisciplinarity as such is overcome see below, IV and we get closer to a kind of synthesis. The desire for a form of knowledge that is more unitary also comes from a new image of science, or rather of the way of making science. On the contrary, this activity is now seen as more personal and self-involving cf. Polanyi, ; Cantore, The personal dimension of scientific knowledge obviously deals with the unavoidable relationship between subject and object in most experiment, but it also, and even more deeply, concerns those heuristic and silent factors of unexpressed knowledge cf. These factors are precisely those which allow the acceptance or refusal of a given scientific result, due to the role of a number of philosophical pre-comprehensions belonging to the subject, which determine the way in which many scientific theories are created and expressed, as well as their duration and destiny within a given scientific community. Indeed, scientific activity involves the researcher not only in the sphere of making, but also in that of being and meaning. We must also mention a further way in which the need to develop a more integrated vision of knowledge is recognized today. It is the awareness that all techno-scientific progress must be associated with a cultural progress; that material goods, education, professional training, and intellectual resources are all important for human progress, and they need to be made available all together. It is easy to realize that each aspect of research and development, from the mapping of the human genome to researching new energy programs, from the planning of a new hospital to the design of an urban area, requires a specific vision of mankind and society. Techno-scientific knowledge claims to be integrated with reflection of an ethical nature cf. Gismondi, or, at least, with the collaboration of the human sciences. Issues such as bio-technologies, preservation of the environment or health care, have recently urged attention to this need. The cultural and religious inheritance of people and nations, whose influence on the consciences of billions of men and women, and on many aspects of social life, is, in this respect, crucial. And, as I will try to show below, a renewed reflection on the nature and mission of the University could also offer its specific and very valuable help see below, III. Thus any serious program aiming at establishing a constructive dialogue is considered as illusory or rhetorical. The definitive separation of these fields of knowledge is considered to be a condition necessary to the maintenance of accuracy and rigor of the different methodological approaches. To support this thesis, people used to quote the first edition of the well-known essay by P. According to this view, one should no longer appeal to science in its traditional forms or philosophy, or other forms of wisdom, including religion, in order to regulate human life and guide social choices. The question is not that of asking science and technology for solving all human problems, but rather that of training scientists and technicians to have a humanistic sensitivity. Today, a similar unifying logic can perhaps be found only in the information technology of contemporary cabled societies, or in the increasingly extended logic of the global market. If the stones of the refined architecture of the Gothic cathedrals used to express a patient and meaningful synthesis of faith, geometry, and philosophy, one inspired by the belief in everlasting truths and destined to a perpetual witnessing, today the bricks that make up the information technology network of the new economy simply provide a common language, one made of changing rules and provisional structures which can be built, and quickly razed, according to the needs of the moment. The concept of the unity of knowledge today suffers some disenchantmentand raises a certain skepticism. Present situation is quite different from the past. This also implied the convergence towards a unique deeper truth having universal characteristics. Such a vision should today confront the crisis of the notion of truth , with respect to both the epistemological and the anthropological field. Moreover, the huge growth of the process of the specialization of knowledge caused by scientific progress, seems to have made unreal any attempt towards unification. Once the unity of knowledge is searched for or understood in this way, it seems very difficult to be put into practice. It is as difficult as thinking of the simultaneouspresence of several competencies, corresponding to a variety of scientific fields, in one person, institution or educational project. Search for unity might resemble a kind of approach as that

rooted in the idealistic philosophies, aiming at compelling towards an a priori reading of all of reality, reducing it to an ideal system especially conceived to gain intellectual, political, religious or economic influence and power. All these are quite serious objections that do not allow for an easy way out. However, with respect to the idea of the weakness of truth and the lack of trust in a knowledge that could lead to a unified vision of reality, we have to say that such a distrust also represents nothing but a philosophical vision itself. As such, it must confront reality, be subjected to rational criticism, justify its foundations, and prove it to be more legitimate than a vision which still believes that human knowledge is not wholly conventional nor merely functional, but instead capable of entering the realm of a universal truth. With respect to the impossibility of unifying knowledge in an irreversibly fragmented culture, the presence of some trends, which seem to indicate an evolution of things in the opposite direction as discussed in this Section at nn. Moreover, an important question should be here addressed: And, if so, what could bring back such a center and such awareness? As we have seen, present times are not characterized by philosophical synthesis aimed at proposing a new unity of knowledge. Actually, it is interesting to note that such great, all-encompassing narrations seem to have moved today from the field of philosophy to that of science. Starting from the second half of the 20th century, the tendency has been towards attempting to propose unitary visions of reality, wanting to integrate the results of the natural sciences with the great themes of human existence, including the world of values and of spiritual experiences intended here in a general sense. Scientists and researchers are often interpreters of such a new trend. Fides et Ratio , nn. No wonder, then, that during the 20th century the most important metaphysical questions have been posed by scientists, not by philosophers. Why is it that many of the most renowned scientists belonging to the century of quantum mechanics, of the DNA double helix, and of the Big Bang, have felt the need to face questions on the relationship between philosophy and science, between science and religion? Many of those who opened new scientific horizons also wanted to offer a corresponding philosophical interpretation of their results. Even those contemporary scientists who have generally maintained a critical attitude towards the life of the spirit and towards transcendence, such as Monod, Weinberg or Hawking, have not been able to avoid facing problems which are relevant also from a humanistic, not only scientific, point of view. Many others, whose names are too numerous to list here, have used their books of science popularization to convey reflections which go beyond the field of science to involve philosophical and even existential issues. If, on the one hand, such a state of affairs runs the risk of naive syntheses and often shows lack of theoretically mature proposals absent or rare among scientists, and uncertain among philosophers , on the other hand it tells us about the need to link, in a less instinctive and more convincing way, the knowledge coming from scientific, philosophical and religious thought. The call to mutual listening cf. Haught, , and subsequently towards a meaningful dialogue between disciplines so different from one another seems to indicate the strong desire for a synthesis that would go beyond a simple symbiosis cf. The point is to see whether such a synthesis must rely on an exclusively subjective basis or, rather, whether there exists a common ground on which its research can be carried out. And to ask whether is science the only universal objective language or, instead, a meaningful language capable of involving also our common existential experiences beyond the boundaries of each individual subject may exist, something the canons of scientific formal language and methods are unable to express and disclose by alone. Models in History and Philosophy Many authors have provided presentations and evaluations of the various forms and projects of unity of knowledge throughout the history of thought. Here, my aim is to simply recall some of them within a short historical path. Philosophy has made several attempts to carry out a conceptual unification of reality, which represents a first step towards a possible unification of knowledge. In its rational dimension, reality was unified and reconstructed as if it were a single world of ideas and forms of divine origin. This was done by following the principles of mathematics and geometry, which were thought to belong to the sphere of the divine rather than to the material world. Slowly, classical thought developed this perspective, creating the philosophy of the logos. According to the Platonic approach, the logos was something transcending nature, while Stoicism considered it as a law immanent in nature itself. Thus, objects and knowledge are structured according to a hierarchic model, whose final goal was to maintain the order, proportion, and coherence of the whole. Firmly anchored to the doctrine of creation and providence, already known in the Old Testament, the

writings of the New Testament, especially those of St. John, announced the revelation of a radical source of unification. It is the divine project of God-Father to create and sum up in Christ, his beloved Son, all things in heaven and on earth, and through Him, reconcile all things, making peace by the blood of the cross. Thus, the Christian Logos embraced the categories of creation and alliance, the transcendence of God over everything and His intimate presence in human history. For the first time, the reasons of truth and the reasons of life, the demand of philosophical rationality and the hope of religious expectations were joined together.

Chapter 4 : Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Read "Entropy and the Unity of Knowledge II, Journal of Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics" on DeepDyve, the largest online rental service for scholarly research with thousands of academic publications available at your fingertips.

The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy: Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition Published: The notion of analytical philosophy involves mostly a method of doing philosophy, and Russell devoted much effort to developing such an analytical method, an effort not dealt with in this book. That said, let us concentrate on the main objectives of the book. Also, I will occasionally add critical comments concerning the ideas and arguments. After a useful introduction, we find the first chapter, "Russell, Frege, and the analysis of unities". It is not, however, totally clear how the twofold nature of concepts might provide an explanation of the unity of the proposition. Moreover, since many of the points dealt with in the chapter could easily be the subjects of separate chapters or even books as the existing monumental bibliography shows , I take this chapter to be a simple extension of the introduction. The next chapter covers, roughly, the period from Principles to Principia According to Stevens, these stages are linked as follows: However, the links among these theories are much more sophisticated than Stevens suggests; for instance, there was no need of any substitutional theory in order to arrive at a no-classes theory. Moreover, the theory of descriptions showed Russell the difference between apparent entities and genuine entities, leading him to a new, general analytical method of conceptual analysis, and so to a viewpoint according to which some apparent constituents of complexes are not true constituents. This would serve as a clear inspiration for the new multiple-relation theory of judgment even before the abandonment of the substitutional theory. Also, Stevens makes no attempt to consider the mass of unpublished manuscripts Russell wrote between Principles and "On Denoting", which have all been published years ago. The next chapter, "Ramification and Principia Mathematica", seems to me one of the most substantial of the book and contains useful references and quotations from unpublished manuscripts. Also, Stevens follows Landini in maintaining that the substitutional theory is a fundamental element in the theory of types that Russell published in , although the only evidence we are given is the assertion by Russell that ramified functions "may be obtained" from ramified propositions by substitution p. It is difficult to understand that Russell kept the substitutional theory as an essential element of the theory of types when he knew that the former had been destroyed by an insurmountable contradiction. Moreover, substitution involved an ontology of propositions, as the author clearly admits p. So it is reasonable to wonder whether by that time Russell had already renounced propositions as entities, which is incompatible with substitution. His paper was no place to do philosophy, so it is understandable that Russell did not mention a new no-propositions ontology. As we shall see below, this is compatible with the claim, which can be defended with abundant textual evidence, that Russell accepted a multiple-relation theory of judgment already in , and even before. Here the author seems to me quite convincing. Finally, there is a discussion of the role of functions in Principia, through which Stevens offers a linguistic interpretation of functions, although he again maintains that there is an important ontological difference with the paper. This seems reasonable in view of the fact that Russell introduced propositional functions through propositions, which he did not, at that time, recognize as true entities. However, the repeated assertion that the rejection of propositions as entities was due to the appearance of the multiple-relation theory of judgment only in Principia, but not in , seems to me unconvincing, for the reason I mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Despite these criticisms, the chapter is important as a whole; the arguments are clear and the objectives proposed are covered with ease. The fourth chapter, entirely devoted to the rise and fall of the multiple-relation theory of judgment, is also important, but much shorter than the preceding chapter, despite its being very ambitious in scope. These are all well known subjects, much discussed in the literature. This is why the author believes the devastating character of these criticisms must lie elsewhere, i. Yet the reasons alleged by Russell are very briefly explained and can be summarized by saying that for him verbs can occur just as verbs, not as separate, independent entities, as is supposed in the multiple-relation theory, where verbs i. The author seems to share the received view that the theory just appeared in As I pointed out above, there is much evidence in earlier writings, published and

unpublished, that the theory was known to Russell at least from , if not before. Besides, in several still unpublished manuscripts Russell actually defends the theory, clearly before the theory of types, so it must underlie that theory. In my view, when Russell rejects the multiple-relation theory of judgment based on the function of the verb the relation as verb, he was thinking of the relational nature of the form, an entity which the theory claims is needed to "glue" the rest of the components taken into consideration by our judging mind. Since I have developed these arguments in detail in three recent publications, I must limit myself to referring the interested reader to them. Chapter 5 examines the new theory of propositions, appearing in , according to which propositions are complex mental images, so that the unity of the proposition is achieved by the fact that in an image-proposition the formerly conflicting relation is now represented by another relation, an image-relation, and no longer by a term designating a relation. Thus, the unity of the proposition is achieved in a totally different, subjective manner. The new theory is, moreover, convenient since false propositions do not need to correspond to anything, so they proceed just from false mental representations. However, this theory gives rise to a new problem: A final, global judgment on this book is difficult, since the work is uneven. The two first chapters are mostly expository, and perhaps too ambitious, given the many different theories that are examined in a very small number of pages. The next two chapters seem to me to be the kernel of the book, since they explain and discuss very important, classical matters for the Russell scholar, and do so in a critical way, both for Russell and for a good part of the secondary literature. From this standpoint, the problem with the book is its lack of unity, which may have something to do with the fact that most of the materials have been previously published as separate papers. For the Russell scholar a reading of the two central chapters and a light look at the last two would probably be enough. Peter Lang, , pp. In Godehard Link ed. Philosophia Verlag, , pp.

Chapter 5 : Consilience (book) - Wikipedia

He invokes Mary, Mother of Unity, to help heal what divides Christians in today's world. Ever since the time of the 12 apostles, there has been some sort of division among the Christian faithful.

For most students, college is a time for self-discovery, for developing passionate interests, and for trying to weave them into a meaningful career. Studies bear this out: Instead of helping students learn and grow as individuals, find meaning in their lives, or understand their role in society, college has become a chaotic maze where students try to pick up something useful as they search for the exit: In fact, mass higher education is heading toward what I call the Home Depot approach to education, where there is no differentiation between consumption and digestion, or between information and learning, and no guidance â€" or even questioning â€" about what it means to be an educated and cultured person. Colleges are becoming academic superstores, vast collections of courses, stacked up like sinks and lumber for do-it-yourselfers to try to assemble on their own into a meaningful whole. The fundamental problem underlying the disjointed curriculum is the fragmentation of knowledge itself. Higher education has atomized knowledge by dividing it into disciplines, subdisciplines, and sub-subdisciplines â€" breaking it up into smaller and smaller unconnected fragments of academic specialization, even as the world looks to colleges for help in integrating and synthesizing the exponential increases in information brought about by technological advances. The trend has serious ramifications. Understanding the nature of knowledge, its unity, its varieties, its limitations, and its uses and abuses is necessary for the success of our democracy. After all, political empowerment and economic opportunity stem from the same root: That is especially true now when so many questions are being raised about the ascendancy of mass society, technological anonymity, and the loss of a sense of place in a world that increasingly lacks human scale. We must reform higher education to reconstruct the unity and value of knowledge. While that may sound esoteric, especially to some outside the academy, it is really just shorthand for saying that the complexity of the world requires us to have a better understanding of the relationships and connections between all fields that intersect and overlap â€" economics and sociology, law and psychology, business and history, physics and medicine, anthropology and political science. As a society, we tend to pay lip service to the complexity of problems and then continue to gamble on simplistic solutions, such as building prisons to solve the crime and drug problems. But as Bela H. Banathy, a systems theorist, writes: Can we really draw a boundary? When we ask to improve a situation, particularly if it is a public one, we find ourselves facing not a problem, but a cluster of problems â€¦ and none of these problems can be tackled using linear or sequential methods. One reason is that, although the process of both growth and fragmentation of knowledge has been under way since the 17th century, it has snowballed in the last century. The scope and the intensity of specialization are such that scholars and scientists have great difficulty in keeping up with the important yet overwhelming amount of scholarly literature related to their subspecialties, not to mention their general disciplines. Nowhere is this trend better reflected than in our evolving concept of literacy. Today, however, there is a profusion of required literacies; we have proponents of technological literacy, civic literacy, mathematical literacy, geographical literacy, scientific literacy, ethical literacy, artistic literacy, cultural literacy, analytical literacy, and so on. Information â€" of all varieties, all levels of priority, and all without much context â€" is bombarding us from all directions all the time. The total amount of collected information doubles every two or three years. Of course, the same information technologies that have been the driving force behind the explosion of information and its fragmentation also present us with profoundly integrative tools. Electronic communication networks like the Internet2 project provide new tools and opportunities for scholars to make connections among disciplines and share resources. It cannot tell us what questions are worth asking. Failing to do so is a missed opportunity of staggering dimensions, for history shows that humanity has a craving for wholeness. And when people do not know how to question deeply, to separate fact from fiction, and to give coherence and meaning to life, they can feel a deeply unsettling emptiness in their lives. Sometimes that vacuum is filled by esoteric ideas, cults, and extremist programs â€" which are very appealing because they provide answers for absolutely everything. In the last century we have seen this hunger for

wholeness manipulated by radical ideologies and militant theologies â€" Nazism, the Khmer Rouge, Al Qaeda. Often they practice hatred and intolerance while proclaiming superiority and exclusivity. In fact, students have much less time than four years. In addition, almost 60 percent of students attend two or more colleges, and many students have family or work responsibilities. In 74 percent of full-time students worked while attending college, and nearly half of them worked at least 25 hours a week. Unfortunately, many of those student workers say that holding a job hurts their grades, as well as limits their choice of courses. By one estimate, college students typically spend less than half the time on their studies than the faculty expects. Clearly we have to re-evaluate our entire system of education for what it is: We must rid it of unnecessary and wasteful duplication, and create coherence and integrity in our curricula. In particular, higher-education reform must focus on a revival of the liberal arts. Yet, paradoxically, liberal education is in decline just when we need it the most. In more than half of the baccalaureate degrees awarded were in a liberal-arts discipline. By that proportion had shrunk to closer to 40 percent, while about 60 percent of the degrees were in preprofessional or technical fields. The largest number of B. But a liberal education is needed to integrate learning and provide balance â€" otherwise students will graduate into a world in which dependence on experts of every kind will be even more common than it is today. Unless we help our students acquire their own identity, they will end up at the mercy of experts â€" or worse, at the mercy of charlatans posing as experts. Without liberal arts to provide a context for technical training, young people cannot be expected to understand the general nature and structure of our society, the role of the university, or the importance of values. What should be done? First, we must help teach the teachers. Colleges must develop strategies to enable their faculty members, who are steeped in different disciplines, to have opportunities for multidisciplinary work as they continue their own lifelong learning. An example might be internal fellowships or sabbaticals like those I instituted at the University of Pennsylvania, which encourage professors to spend a semester or a year with colleagues in another discipline. We must also help students gain knowledge of multiple disciplines and their interconnectedness. Team teaching is one obvious way to do that. The undergraduate science program at Princeton University â€" in particular, courses that present engineering as a liberal art, taught by David Billington and his colleagues in the department of civil and environmental engineering over the past 15 years â€" is one outstanding example of this approach. Within disciplines, of course, teaching should encourage students to draw knowledge together from many sources. The renewal and transformation of the liberal arts, however, remain the key to providing students with a rich and wide-ranging body of knowledge that will equip them to be both problem solvers and communicators and to assess situations and make effective, balanced, and timely judgments â€" skills that are essential in a knowledge-based, globalizing world. Many novel approaches to revitalizing the liberal arts on campuses have been proposed, among them: A reform agenda must also include the creation of a balance between specialists and generalists. It is clear that we cannot abandon specializations or subspecializations or sub-subspecializations. After all, the division of labor has greatly advanced the cause of civilization. But for greater understanding, we also need generalists, trained in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences, who can help create a common discourse, a common vocabulary among the various disciplines. Unfortunately generalists are not held in high regard on campus or in our society unless they are big names, or else because they became generalists after first earning credibility as specialists. Since our society respects specialists and suspects generalists, perhaps the way to solve the shortage of generalists is by creating a new specialty in synthesis and systems. Of necessity, this means specialization, as all creative effort does, but this time, the [person] will be specializing in the construction of the whole. At Brown University, for example, Carlos Fuentes has served as professor at large, team teaching within the department of Hispanic studies. Also while at Brown, Martha C. Nussbaum was a professor of philosophy, classics, and comparative literature. Now, at the University of Chicago, she is affiliated with the law school, the divinity school, and the departments of philosophy, classics, and political science. She thereby enriches the perspective on each subject that she brings to students with knowledge drawn from the others and offering an example of another approach: As a people, we need to understand where we were, where we are, and where we are going. The challenge for higher education, then, is not the choice between pure research and practical application but, rather, the integration

and synthesis of compartmentalized knowledge. On our campuses, we must create an intellectual climate that encourages faculty members and students to make connections among seemingly disparate disciplines, discoveries, events, and trends â€" and to build bridges among them that benefit the understanding of us all.

Chapter 6 : Unity of Knowledge - Oxford Scholarship

A summary of Part II: The Discursive Regularities Chapter 1: The Unities of Discourse in Michel Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of The Archaeology of Knowledge and what it means.

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truthâ€"in a word, to know himselfâ€"so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves cf. In both East and West, we may trace a journey which has led humanity down the centuries to meet and engage truth more and more deeply. It is a journey which has unfoldedâ€"as it mustâ€"within the horizon of personal self-consciousness: This is why all that is the object of our knowledge becomes a part of our life. Moreover, a cursory glance at ancient history shows clearly how in different parts of the world, with their different cultures, there arise at the same time the fundamental questions which pervade human life: Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life? These are the questions which we find in the sacred writings of Israel, as also in the Veda and the Avesta; we find them in the writings of Confucius and Lao-Tze, and in the preaching of Tirthankara and Buddha; they appear in the poetry of Homer and in the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles, as they do in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle. They are questions which have their common source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human heart. In fact, the answer given to these questions decides the direction which people seek to give to their lives. The Church is no stranger to this journey of discovery, nor could she ever be. It is her duty to serve humanity in different ways, but one way in particular imposes a responsibility of a quite special kind: Men and women have at their disposal an array of resources for generating greater knowledge of truth so that their lives may be ever more human. Philosophy emerges, then, as one of noblest of human tasks. Born and nurtured when the human being first asked questions about the reason for things and their purpose, philosophy shows in different modes and forms that the desire for truth is part of human nature itself. It is an innate property of human reason to ask why things are as they are, even though the answers which gradually emerge are set within a horizon which reveals how the different human cultures are complementary. Every people has its own native and seminal wisdom which, as a true cultural treasure, tends to find voice and develop in forms which are genuinely philosophical. One example of this is the basic form of philosophical knowledge which is evident to this day in the postulates which inspire national and international legal systems in regulating the life of society. Nonetheless, it is true that a single term conceals a variety of meanings. Hence the need for a preliminary clarification. Driven by the desire to discover the ultimate truth of existence, human beings seek to acquire those universal elements of knowledge which enable them to understand themselves better and to advance in their own self-realization. These fundamental elements of knowledge spring from the wonder awakened in them by the contemplation of creation: Here begins, then, the journey which will lead them to discover ever new frontiers of knowledge. Without wonder, men and women would lapse into deadening routine and little by little would become incapable of a life which is genuinely personal. In different cultural contexts and at different times, this process has yielded results which have produced genuine systems of thought. Yet often enough in history this has brought with it the temptation to identify one single stream with the whole of philosophy. In effect, every philosophical system, while it should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization, must still recognize the primacy of philosophical enquiry, from which it stems and which it ought loyally to serve. Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there exists a body of knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we had come upon an implicit philosophy, as a result of which all feel that they possess

these principles, albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some measure by all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different philosophical schools. She sees in philosophy the way to come to know fundamental truths about human life. At the same time, the Church considers philosophy an indispensable help for a deeper understanding of faith and for communicating the truth of the Gospel to those who do not yet know it. Therefore, following upon similar initiatives by my Predecessors, I wish to reflect upon this special activity of human reason. I judge it necessary to do so because, at the present time in particular, the search for ultimate truth seems often to be neglected. Modern philosophy clearly has the great merit of focusing attention upon man. From this starting-point, human reason with its many questions has developed further its yearning to know more and to know it ever more deeply. Complex systems of thought have thus been built, yielding results in the different fields of knowledge and fostering the development of culture and history. Anthropology, logic, the natural sciences, history, linguistics and so forthâ€"the whole universe of knowledge has been involved in one way or another. Yet the positive results achieved must not obscure the fact that reason, in its one-sided concern to investigate human subjectivity, seems to have forgotten that men and women are always called to direct their steps towards a truth which transcends them. Sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice, and their state as person ends up being judged by pragmatic criteria based essentially upon experimental data, in the mistaken belief that technology must dominate all. It has happened therefore that reason, rather than voicing the human orientation towards truth, has wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by little has lost the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the truth of being. Abandoning the investigation of being, modern philosophical research has concentrated instead upon human knowing. Rather than make use of the human capacity to know the truth, modern philosophy has preferred to accentuate the ways in which this capacity is limited and conditioned. This has given rise to different forms of agnosticism and relativism which have led philosophical research to lose its way in the shifting sands of widespread scepticism. Recent times have seen the rise to prominence of various doctrines which tend to devalue even the truths which had been judged certain. Even certain conceptions of life coming from the East betray this lack of confidence, denying truth its exclusive character and assuming that truth reveals itself equally in different doctrines, even if they contradict one another. On this understanding, everything is reduced to opinion; and there is a sense of being adrift. While, on the one hand, philosophical thinking has succeeded in coming closer to the reality of human life and its forms of expression, it has also tended to pursue issuesâ€"existential, hermeneutical or linguisticâ€"which ignore the radical question of the truth about personal existence, about being and about God. With a false modesty, people rest content with partial and provisional truths, no longer seeking to ask radical questions about the meaning and ultimate foundation of human, personal and social existence. In short, the hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers to these questions has dwindled. Sure of her competence as the bearer of the Revelation of Jesus Christ, the Church reaffirms the need to reflect upon truth. In reaffirming the truth of faith, we can both restore to our contemporaries a genuine trust in their capacity to know and challenge philosophy to recover and develop its own full dignity. There is a further reason why I write these reflections. For it is undeniable that this time of rapid and complex change can leave especially the younger generation, to whom the future belongs and on whom it depends, with a sense that they have no valid points of reference. The need for a foundation for personal and communal life becomes all the more pressing at a time when we are faced with the patent inadequacy of perspectives in which the ephemeral is affirmed as a value and the possibility of discovering the real meaning of life is cast into doubt. This is why many people stumble through life to the very edge of the abyss without knowing where they are going. At times, this happens because those whose vocation it is to give cultural expression to their thinking no longer look to truth, preferring quick success to the toil of patient enquiry into what makes life worth living. With its enduring appeal to the search for truth, philosophy has the great responsibility of forming thought and culture; and now it must strive resolutely to recover its original vocation. This is why I have felt both the need and the duty to address this theme so that, on the threshold of the third millennium of the Christian era, humanity may come to a clearer sense of the great resources with which it has been endowed and may commit itself with renewed courage to implement the plan of salvation of which its history is part. The knowledge which the

Church offers to man has its origin not in any speculation of her own, however sublime, but in the word of God which she has received in faith cf. At the origin of our life of faith there is an encounter, unique in kind, which discloses a mystery hidden for long ages cf. As the source of love, God desires to make himself known; and the knowledge which the human being has of God perfects all that the human mind can know of the meaning of life. This obliged the Council to reaffirm emphatically that there exists a knowledge which is peculiar to faith, surpassing the knowledge proper to human reason, which nevertheless by its nature can discover the Creator. This knowledge expresses a truth based upon the very fact of God who reveals himself, a truth which is most certain, since God neither deceives nor wishes to deceive. The First Vatican Council teaches, then, that the truth attained by philosophy and the truth of Revelation are neither identical nor mutually exclusive: With regard to the source, because we know in one by natural reason, in the other by divine faith. This plan of Revelation is realized by deeds and words having an inner unity: The truth about himself and his life which God has entrusted to humanity is immersed therefore in time and history; and it was declared once and for all in the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth. The Constitution Dei Verbum puts it eloquently: For he sent his Son, the eternal Word who enlightens all people, so that he might dwell among them and tell them the innermost realities about God cf. To see Jesus is to see his Father Jn For this reason, Jesus perfected Revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of making himself present and manifesting himself: History therefore becomes the arena where we see what God does for humanity. God comes to us in the things we know best and can verify most easily, the things of our everyday life, apart from which we cannot understand ourselves. In the Incarnation of the Son of God we see forged the enduring and definitive synthesis which the human mind of itself could not even have imagined: Now, in Christ, all have access to the Father, since by his Death and Resurrection Christ has bestowed the divine life which the first Adam had refused cf. Through this Revelation, men and women are offered the ultimate truth about their own life and about the goal of history. Reason before the mystery It should nonetheless be kept in mind that Revelation remains charged with mystery. It is true that Jesus, with his entire life, revealed the countenance of the Father, for he came to teach the secret things of God. Faith alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery in a way that allows us to understand it coherently. Faith is said first to be an obedient response to God. This implies that God be acknowledged in his divinity, transcendence and supreme freedom. By the authority of his absolute transcendence, God who makes himself known is also the source of the credibility of what he reveals. By faith, men and women give their assent to this divine testimony. This means that they acknowledge fully and integrally the truth of what is revealed because it is God himself who is the guarantor of that truth. They can make no claim upon this truth which comes to them as gift and which, set within the context of interpersonal communication, urges reason to be open to it and to embrace its profound meaning. This is why the Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to God to be a moment of fundamental decision which engages the whole person. In that act, the intellect and the will display their spiritual nature, enabling the subject to act in a way which realizes personal freedom to the full. Indeed, it is faith that allows individuals to give consummate expression to their own freedom. Put differently, freedom is not realized in decisions made against God. For how could it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to be open to the very reality which enables our self-realization? Men and women can accomplish no more important act in their lives than the act of faith; it is here that freedom reaches the certainty of truth and chooses to live in that truth. To assist reason in its effort to understand the mystery there are the signs which Revelation itself presents. Yet these signs also urge reason to look beyond their status as signs in order to grasp the deeper meaning which they bear.

Chapter 7 : Heraclitus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The road of knowledge to the unity of the musical meaning led our intellect systematically to the experience of pure self-consciousness, because the musical insight into the world of the harmony is automatically linked with the experience of pure self-consciousness.

For the most part, that is not so. At worst, most of what he said about the mind and consciousness can be detached from his idealism. Though often viewed as a quintessentially German philosopher, Kant is said to have been one-quarter Scottish. It is noteworthy, however, that his work on epistemology, which led him to his ideas about the mind, was a response to Hume as much as to any other philosopher. Central elements of the models of the mind of thinkers otherwise as different as Sigmund Freud and Jerry Fodor are broadly Kantian, for example. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science. The mind is a complex set of abilities functions. As Meerbote and many others have observed, Kant held a functionalist view of the mind almost years before functionalism was officially articulated in the s by Hilary Putnam and others. The functions crucial for mental, knowledge-generating activity are spatio-temporal processing of, and application of concepts to, sensory inputs. Cognition requires concepts as well as percepts. These functions are forms of what Kant called synthesis. Synthesis and the unity in consciousness required for synthesis are central to cognition. These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. To study the mind, infer the conditions necessary for experience. Arguments having this structure are called transcendental arguments. Translated into contemporary terms, the core of this method is inference to the best explanation, the method of postulating unobservable mental mechanisms in order to explain observed behaviour. He thought that he could get a priori experience independent knowledge out of them. Kant had a tripartite doctrine of the a priori. He held that some features of the mind and its knowledge had a priori origins, i. That mind and knowledge have these features are a priori truths, i. And we can come to know these truths, or that they are a priori at any rate, only by using a priori methods, i. Kant thought that transcendental arguments were a priori or yielded the a priori in all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection fell out of favour about years ago, the alternative approach adopted was exactly this approach. Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major method used by experimental cognitive scientists. Far from his model having been superseded by cognitive science, some important things have not even been assimilated by it. Since the Anthropology was worked up from notes for popular lectures, it is often superficial compared to CPR. Kant aimed among other things to, Justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth. Insulate religion, including belief in immortality, and free will from the corrosive effects of this very same science. As he saw it and very fortunately, science cannot touch these questions. Laying the foundation for pursuit of the first aim, which as he saw it was no less than the aim of showing why physics is a science, was what led Kant to his views about how the mind works. He approached the grounding of physics by asking: What are the necessary conditions of experience A96? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that physics says that objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be like. In CPR, Kant discussed the mind only in connection with his main projects, never in its own right, so his treatment is remarkably scattered and sketchy. Indeed, Kant offers no sustained, focussed discussion of the mind anywhere in his work except the popular Anthropology, which, as we just said, is quite superficial. They contain some of the most impenetrable prose ever written. Kant completely rewrote the main body of both chapters for the second edition though not the introductions, interestingly. In the two editions of CPR, there are seven main discussions of the mind. The first is in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the second is in what is usually called the Metaphysical Deduction for this term, see below. Then there are two discussions of it in the first-edition TD, in parts 1 to 3 of Section 2 A98 up to A and in the whole of Section 3 AA [2] and two more in the second-edition TD, from B to B and from B to B, the latter seemingly added as a kind of supplement. What little was retained of these remarks in the second edition was moved to the completely rewritten TD. For understanding Kant on the mind and

self-knowledge, the first edition of CPR is far more valuable than the second edition. Here Kant advances one of his most notorious views: The mind has two pure forms of intuition, space and time, built into it to allow it to do so. These claims are very problematic. For example, they invite the question, in virtue of what is the mind constrained to locate a bit of information at one spatial or temporal location rather than another? Kant seems to have had no answer to this question Falkenstein ; Brook It is not entirely clear how the two discussions relate. The chapter leading up to the Transcendental Deduction, The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding but generally called the Metaphysical Deduction because of a remark that Kant once made, B is totally unlike this. Starting from and taking for granted the logic of Aristotelian syllogisms and the Aristotelian categories, Kant proceeds by analysis to draw out the implications of this logic for the conceptual structure within which all thought and experience must take place. The structure in question is the system of the forms of judgment; the resulting theory is the theory of what Kant called the Categories. Kant seems to have thought that he could deduce the conceptual structure of experience from the components of the Aristotelian system. The first is a move up from experience of objects to the necessary conditions of such experience. The second is a move down from the Aristotelian forms of judgment to the concepts that we have to use in judging, namely, the Categories. One is inference up from experience, the other deduction down from conceptual structures of the most abstract kind. Recall the two movements just discussed, the one from experience to its conditions and the one from the forms of valid inference to the concepts that we must use in all judging the Categories. It reflects an important question: How is it that the world as we experience it conforms to our logic? In briefest form, Kant thought that the trick to showing how it is possible for the Categories to apply to experience is to show that it is necessary that they apply A He once called them the objective and the subjective deductions Axvii. The objective deduction is about the conceptual and other cognitive conditions of having representations of objects. Exactly how the objective deduction goes is highly controversial, a controversy that we will sidestep here. The subjective deduction is what mainly interests us. Kant argues as follows. Our experiences have objects, are about something. The objects of our experiences are discrete, unified particulars. To have such particulars available to it, the mind must construct them based on sensible input. To construct them, the mind must do three kinds of synthesis. It must generate temporal and spatial structure Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition. It must associate spatio-temporally structured items with other spatio-temporally structured items Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination. And it must recognize items using concepts, the Categories in particular Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept. We will consider it in more detail in the next Section. Strangely enough, the chapter has only nicely got started. In the first edition version, for example, we have only reached A, about one-third of the way through the chapter. At this point, Kant introduces the notion of transcendental apperception for the first time and the unity of such apperception, the unity of consciousness. Evidently, something is happening something, moreover, not at all well heralded in the text. We can now understand in more detail why Kant said that the subjective deduction is inessential Axvii. From this point of view, anything uncovered about the nature and functioning of the mind was a happy accident. In the first edition, he seems to have achieved a stable position on self-consciousness only as late as this chapter. Certainly his position was not stable in TD. His target is claims that we know what the mind is like. The chapter on the Paralogisms contains most of what he has to say about consciousness of self. In the course of doing so, he moved the topic of consciousness of self from the chapter on the Paralogisms to the second discussion of the mind in the new TD. The new version of the Paralogisms chapter is then built around a different and, so far as theory of mind is concerned, much less interesting strategy. The relationship of the old and new versions of the chapters is complicated Brook , Ch. Here we will just note that the underlying doctrine of the mind does not seem to change very much. CPR contains other discussions of the mind, discussions that remained the same in both editions. Kant asserts this many times earlier but assertion is not argument. In the Antinomies, the discussion of the Second Antinomy contains some interesting remarks about the simplicity of the soul and there is a discussion of free will in the Solution to the Third Antinomy. The mind also appears a few times in the Doctrine of Method, particularly in a couple of glosses of the attack mounted against the Paralogisms. In other new material prepared for the second edition, we find a first gloss on the topic of self-consciousness as early as the Aesthetic B The mind also appears in a new passage called

the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant attempts to tie the possibility of one sort of consciousness of self to consciousness of permanence in something other than ourselves, in a way he thought to be inconsistent with Berkeleian idealism. This new Refutation of Idealism has often been viewed as a replacement for the argument against the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition. There are problems with this view, the most important of which is that the second edition still has a separate fourth Paralogism B Whatever, though the new passage utilizes self-consciousness in a highly original way, it says little that is new about it. Elsewhere in his work, the only sustained discussion of the mind and consciousness is, as we said, his little, late Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Though Kant sometimes contrasted anthropology as a legitimate study with what he understood empirical psychology to be, namely, psychology based on introspective observation, he meant by anthropology something fairly close to what we now mean by behavioural or experimental psychology.

Chapter 8 : The Unity of Perception - Susanna Schellenberg - Oxford University Press

A summary of Part II, Chapter 2: Discursive Formations in Michel Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of The Archaeology of Knowledge and what it means.

His native Ephesus was a prominent city of Ionia, the Greek-inhabited coast of Asia Minor, but was subject to Persian rule in his lifetime. He is generally considered to have favored aristocratic government as against democracy, based on his own political observations. His city lies close to Miletus, where the first thinkers recognized in later tradition as philosophers lived; but there is no record of his having made the acquaintance of any of the Milesian thinkers Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes or having been taught by them, or of his ever having traveled. He is said to have written a single book papyrus roll , and deposited it in the great temple of Artemis at Ephesus. The story is plausible enough: It could have consisted of a relatively coherent and consecutive argument. On the other hand, the numerous fragments over one hundred that have come down to us do not easily connect with each other, even though they probably constitute a sizable fraction of the whole. Thus it is possible and even likely that the book was composed more of sayings and epigrams than of continuous exposition. In its form, then, it might have looked more like a collection of proverbs such as were ascribed to the seven sages than like a cosmological treatise of the Milesians. Diogenes Laertius reports that the work was divided he does not say by whom into three sections, one on cosmology, one on politics and ethics , and one on theology 9. All these topics are treated in the extant fragments of Heraclitus, though it is often difficult to see what boundaries the work might have drawn between them, since Heraclitus seems to see deep interconnections between science, human affairs, and theology. Unlike most other early philosophers, Heraclitus is usually seen as independent of the several schools and movements later students somewhat anachronistically assigned to the ancients, and he himself implies that he is self-taught B He has been variously judged by ancient and modern commentators to be a material monist or a process philosopher; a scientific cosmologist, a metaphysician, or a mainly religious thinker; an empiricist, a rationalist, or a mystic; a conventional thinker or a revolutionary; a developer of logic or one who denied the law of non-contradiction; the first genuine philosopher or an anti-intellectual obscurantist. No doubt the sage of Ephesus will continue to remain controversial and difficult to interpret, but scholars have made significant progress in understanding and appreciating his work. Method Heraclitus made every effort to break out of the mold of contemporary thought. Although he was influenced in a number of ways by the thought and language of his predecessors, including the epic poets Homer and Hesiod, the poet and philosopher Xenophanes, the historian and antiquarian Hecataeus, the religious guru Pythagoras, the sage Bias of Priene, the poet Archilochus, and the Milesian philosophers, he criticized most of them either explicitly or implicitly, and struck out on his own path. He treated the epic poets as fools and called Pythagoras a fraud. In his fragments Heraclitus does not explicitly criticize the Milesians, and it is likely that he saw them as the most progressive of previous thinkers. He does tacitly criticize Anaximander for not appreciating the role of injustice in the world B80 , while he might have expressed some admiration for Thales B His views can be seen to embody structural criticisms of Milesian principles, but even in correcting the Milesians he built on their foundations. While he continues many of the physical and cosmological theories of his predecessors, he shifts his focus from the cosmic to the human realm. We might well think of him as the first humanist, were it not for the fact that he does not seem to like humanity very well. From the outset he makes it clear that most people are too stupid to understand his theory. He may be most concerned with the human relevance of philosophic theories, but he is an elitist like Plato, who thinks that only select readers are capable of benefitting from his teachings. And perhaps for this reason he, like Plato, does not teach his philosophical principles directly, but couches them in a literary form that distances the author from the reader. In any case he seems to regard himself not as the author of a philosophy so much as the spokesman for an independent truth: Having harkened not to me but to the Word Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one. B50 Heraclitus stresses that the message is not his own invention, but a timeless truth available to any who attend to the way the world itself is. He announces it at the beginning of his book: For although all things happen according to this Word, they are like the unexperienced

experiencing words and deeds such as I explain when I distinguish each thing according to its nature and show how it is. Other men are unaware of what they do when they are awake just as they are forgetful of what they do when they are asleep. B1 He begins by warning his readers that most of them will not understand his message. Yet like sleepers his readers will not understand the world around them. As this implies, in his book Heraclitus does have some things to say about the natural world, but much more to say about the human condition. The former is his ability to pack multiple meanings into a single word or phrase, the latter his ability to use one expression to evoke another. To take a simple example: Deaths that are greater greater portions gain. B25 Heraclitus uses alliteration four m-words in a row and chiasmus an ABBA pattern to link death and reward. The latter appears as a mirror image of the former, and in sound and sense they fuse together. Another fragment consists of three words in Greek: The character of man is his guardian spirit. Because of its double role, the word forms a kind of syntactic glue between the otherwise diverse subjects, joining them together in a unity. Ultimately, Heraclitus loads his words with layers of meaning and complexities that are to be discovered in insights and solved like riddles. As he implies in the second sentence of his introduction, B1, his logoi are designed to be experienced, not just understood, and only those who experience them in their richness will grasp his message. Philosophical Principles Although his words are meant to provide concrete vicarious encounters with the world, Heraclitus adheres to some abstract principles which govern the world. Already in antiquity he was famous for advocating the coincidence of opposites, the flux doctrine, and his view that fire is the source and nature of all things. In commenting on Heraclitus, Plato provided an early reading, followed tentatively by Aristotle, and popular down to the present sharpened and forcefully advocated by Barnes , ch. The coincidence of opposites, thus interpreted, entails contradictions, which Heraclitus cannot avoid. On this view Heraclitus is influenced by the prior theory of material monism and by empirical observations that tend to support flux and the coincidence of opposites. In a time before the development of logic, Barnes concludes, Heraclitus violates the principles of logic and makes knowledge impossible. Obviously this reading is not charitable to Heraclitus. There are, moreover, reasons to question it. Third, there is evidence that his view of the coincidence of opposites is weaker than that attributed to him here. Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things pass and nothing stays, and comparing existing things to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same river. On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow. Cleanthes from Arius Didymus from Eusebius B49a. The third is patently a paraphrase by an author famous for quoting from memory rather than from books. That B12 is genuine is suggested by the features it shares with Heraclitean fragments: But it specifies the rivers as the same. The statement is, on the surface, paradoxical, but there is no reason to take it as false or contradictory. It makes perfectly good sense: There is a sense, then, in which a river is a remarkable kind of existent, one that remains what it is by changing what it contains cf. Heraclitus derives a striking insight from an everyday encounter. Further, he supplies, via the ambiguity in the first clause, another reading: With this reading it is people who remain the same in contrast to changing waters, as if the encounter with a flowing environment helped to constitute the perceiving subject as the same. B49a, by contrast, contradicts the claim that one can step into the same rivers and also asserts that claim , and B91[a], like Plato in the Cratylus, denies that one can step in twice. Yet if the rivers remain the same, one surely can step in twice—not into the same waters, to be sure, but into the same rivers. Thus the other alleged fragments are incompatible with the one certifiably genuine fragment. In fact, Marcovich has succeeded in showing how a misreading of B12 could lead to an interpretation such as that embodied in A6 and B91[a]. It is possible to see Cratylus, a late follower of Heraclitus, supplying the wayward reading, and then adding his famous rejoinder that one cannot step into the same river even once although the reading may go back earlier to Hippias: If this interpretation is right, the message of the one river fragment, B12, is not that all things are changing so that we cannot encounter them twice, but something much more subtle and profound. It is that some things stay the same only by changing. One kind of long-lasting material reality exists by virtue of constant turnover in its constituent matter. Here constancy and change are not opposed but inextricably connected. A human body could be understood in precisely the same way, as living and continuing by virtue of constant metabolism—as Aristotle for instance later understood it. On this reading, Heraclitus believes in flux, but not as destructive of constancy; rather it is, paradoxically, a necessary

condition of constancy, at least in some cases and arguably in all. In general, at least in some exemplary cases, high-level structures supervene on low-level material flux. The Platonic reading still has advocates e. He depicts two key opposites that are interconnected, but not identical. Heraclitus sometimes explains how things have opposite qualities: Sea is the purest and most polluted water: B61 Barnes thinks Heraclitus gets his doctrine of the universal coinstantiation of contraries through fallaciously dropping qualifiers such as: But B61 shows he is perfectly aware of them, and we might rather say that he understands them tacitly even when he does not utter them. When he says, Collections: There are perfectly good contexts in which everything he says is true. One can divide a collection into its parts or join the parts into a unified whole. Most tellingly, Heraclitus explains just how contraries are connected: As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these. We are asleep and we wake up; we are awake and we go to sleep. Thus sleep and waking are both found in us, but not at the same time or in the same respect. Indeed, if sleeping and waking were identical, there would be no change as required by the second sentence. Contraries are the same by virtue of constituting a system of connections: Subjects do not possess incompatible properties at the same time, but at different times. In general, what we see in Heraclitus is not a conflation of opposites into an identity, but a series of subtle analyses revealing the interconnectedness of contrary states in life and in the world. There is no need to impute to him a logical fallacy. Opposites are a reality, and their interconnections are real, but the correlative opposites are not identical to each other. According to Aristotle the Milesians in general were material monists who advocated other kinds of ultimate matter: Thales water, Anaximander the boundless, Anaximenes air Metaphysics b6â€"a8.

Chapter 9 : The unity and scope of knowledge

The boundary between thermodynamics and astrophysics is considered by tracing some consequences of the fact that the black hole entropy is not extensive. It is inferred that there are eight.