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Chapter 1 : Izchak Miller - Wikipedia

Husserl's account of temporal awareness, i.e. our perceptual awareness of processes and events, has not received systematic study and he takes it as his task in the second part of the book (Chapters Five through.

And, surely, intentionality is something for which Bergson is not known. So does Husserl spatialize time? Is he a thinker of manifolds? And it is this, I believe, that explains why, in the final analysis, the distinctive position between Bergson and Husserl is that between a monism and a transcendental idealism. This, at any rate, can only be a tentative conclusion. With this my concern is to demonstrate the extent to which Husserl comes close to the conclusions Bergson draws in *Time and Free Will*: The sharp distinction between consciousness and the world is drawn, for Bergson, in terms of the distinction between time and space. Or so I will argue. Let me for the moment turn to Riemann. And how do Bergson and Husserl appropriate this concept? The concept of manifold serves that purpose: The elements are determined by the operations to which they are subject, that is, by the relations into which they can enter. Like the elements of the manifold, these relations are also indeterminate with regard to their content. But they are formally determinate, and so enable certain connections to be established between the indeterminate elements within the manifold. Under these circumstances the elements come to be determined. A discrete manifold contains, then, the principle of its metrical division: The metrical principle of a continuous manifold is located in the relations which act upon it. In the second chapter of *Time and Free Will*, Bergson defines space in terms of three central properties. The elements in space have the property of being *partes extra partes*. If so, then parts of space behave just like numbers. But if parts of space are countable, then they are also divisible. But on dividing space into parts, there obtains greater and smaller quantities of parts. And since between a greater and a smaller sum there is only a difference in degree, divisions in space produce only differences in degree, never in kind. Space is, then, a manifold of juxtaposed elements, which differ only in degree. Duration is a manifold with the contrary properties of space. The elements of duration are then not external to each other, but they interpenetrate. But this change cannot introduce a difference in degree. For if we were to divide a sensation in two we would thereby produce two new sensations, which differ in kind. Duration divides, but each time it does so it changes in kind. Duration is, then, a continuous manifold whose elements vary in kind. In both cases, therefore, in space and in duration, there is no principle transcending the manifold and governing it, as it were, from above. And it is in light of this distinction between duration and space that the essential difference between consciousness and the world transpires: But we should not overlook the difference here, to which I shall return later on, for the passage from the virtual to the actual in Bergson is the passage from memory to perception. In Husserl, by contrast, the inner and outer horizons of an object do not contain recollections, but possible perceptions. And the movement is from an anticipated to an actual perception. The question for now is whether Husserl spatializes time and, also, whether Husserl distinguishes immanence from transcendence, consciousness from the world, in terms of time and space. We can, first of all, distinguish here as we did with Bergson three central properties with which Husserl describes the spatial appearance of an object. The manifold of a spatial thing is, then, one in which an object appears in changing orientations. But, if so, then on perceiving an object from the front side its backside cannot be perceived, or if it is perceived from the far side it cannot be perceived from the near side, and so on. Hence spatial orientations are mutually exclusive. Hence the discreteness of spatial perspectives. So when it comes to drawing the hard and fast distinction between consciousness and reality, Husserl, in *Ideas I*, takes space as his essential clue. Thus a basic and essential difference arises between Being as Experience and Being as Thing. Before I go on to show that and how time underscores the immanence of consciousness, let me briefly note another type of transcendence on the noematic side of experience. This concerns Husserl as a thinker of manifolds. For Husserl, by contrast, this is not so. And this is precisely the way Husserl defines the Object-pole. Admittedly, the reason why Bergson obviates from the use of such prescriptive unities is to affirm duration as a creative and changing manifold.

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Recall, duration is like a manifold of sensations. If sensations constantly change, if, on being divided, they produce new sensations, then duration is essentially creative and open; a new element cannot be inferred from previous elements. All this amounts, therefore, to the following. Is the prize to pay for affirming creation, the novel or the hitherto unseen, the rejection of prescriptive or teleological unities? Conversely, does the affirmation of a teleological unity necessarily entail the rejection of genuine ⁷ change? I do not pretend to be able to give an explicit answer to these questions in the space of this essay, but as will become clear in our later discussion on memory, the burning issue between Husserl and Bergson is played at this level. Now as concerns the immanence of consciousness, we can also note three main elements with which time allows us to ascertain its distinction from the transcendence of the world. Here a being which manifests itself perspectively, never giving itself absolutely, merely contingent and relative; there a necessary and absolute Being, fundamentally incapable of being given through appearance and perspective-patterns. And since experiences cannot be spatial, as Husserl said earlier, this must be a temporal synthesis. Everything amounts to seeing the respective properties of the object of outer perception and the object of inner perception, so far as these objects differ in kind. The object of outer perception is fundamentally different from the act of perception. If it is a real real thing then it appears in a manifold of spatial orientations. But since the act of perception cannot be in space, as we have seen, the act and the object are generically different: But these are of the ⁸ same genus as the act of inner perception: An experience can have no aspects that might present themselves now in this way and now in that. Therefore, time grants the possibility of moving from the natural attitude to the transcendental field of experience. For just as there can be no experience without a subject of experience, so the very presence of my experience to reflection is for it something indubitable. But time is the condition for this reflection. So time, as the permanent form of all my experiences, is a necessary condition for proving the apodictic existence of my Ego: I am, this life is, I live: But, unlike Bergson in *Time and Free Will*, Husserl does not stay with a mere dualism between consciousness and reality. From all that has been said, furthermore, it should already be evident that Husserl cannot be spatializing time, for since consciousness is, in its purity, nothing spatial, and since the form of consciousness is time, Husserl cannot be spatializing time. But the demonstration has not yet been sufficient. In addition, there is still the matter concerning intentionality in Bergson. But so far we can say that time, for Bergson and Husserl, is ¹⁰ definitive of the depth of subjectivity. Consciousness is consciousness of something in virtue of this manifold of temporal phases. But, aside from this radical difference to which I return later, we should not overlook the significant affinities. For Bergson, as for Husserl, memory and perception differ in kind, as we will see. But it is with the concept of perception that Bergson makes room for a concept of intentionality, one whose genesis is accounted for in evolutionary and vital terms. But before seeing this through, let me first demonstrate that Husserl does not spatialize time. Let me draw on several elements of retention so as to show that Husserl does not spatialize time, and so as to map further affinities with Bergsonian duration. If retention is always the retention of something, then retention is a mode of awareness; it is a mode of consciousness. The dynamic of retention is noteworthy not only because it poses a challenge to the linear concept of time made of punctual instants, but also because of the way it generates the subjective time-continuum. Let me go through them in more detail. Firstly, on hearing a sound, retention ensures the indivisible or, at any rate, the undivided continuity between the sound that is heard now and the sounds just soeben heard. It follows that the present, the now, cannot be a punctual instant. Hence, ¹² if a new impression casts a new light on earlier moments, then, if new impressions always emerge, there is a constant recasting of the entire series of earlier retentions. But this is not all. For if any point in the series can be considered as a source-point for earlier ones,⁵⁸ then this modification does not only hold between an impression and earlier retentions, but between a recent retention and all earlier retentions: In this sense, therefore, time- consciousness is an indivisible continuity engaged in constant change. Let me stress at this point that retention is not a reproduction of the past, nor does it involve images or signs. But it is no more an imagistic, reproductive consciousness than it is a mere quasi-physical echo or reverberation. In its capacity to repeat and reproduce the past, recollection is, for Husserl, fundamental for constituting the sense of

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objectivity, for determining the identity of objects through time. In this, Husserl agrees with Kant and Bergson, namely, that in order to recognize an object as the same in a stream of perceptions, the work of recollection is necessary. If I call to mind the past phases of a tune, and, by attending to the real order in which these phases were heard, I reproduce them piecemeal, not once but several times, I can exact the identity of the enduring tune. I cannot now enter into this wealth of analyses on memory. Let me say only 14 three things of note on the matter. One of the crucial features of memory, for Husserl, consists in its being a voluntary memory as opposed to the passive memory of retention, wherein the sphere of our freedom is rooted, that is, the fact that I can recollect, repeatedly, the same experience while I have no choice but to perceive what is there when I open my eyes and ears: Secondly, we would have to assume the work of a memory, which unconsciously records all the elements that escapes our perception of things. Whence, on the occasion that one such recollection penetrates our consciousness, and weds itself to a former experience, the latter could reappear in a splendor hitherto unseen. This is my body, which I know from without through perceptions, but from within through affections; â€” affections that insert themselves between the excitations my body receives from without and the movements I am about to execute.

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Chapter 2 : Husserl and bergson on time and consciousness | Rafael Winkler - blog.quintoapp.com

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Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology Published: We apologize for the error. The difficulties of time-consciousness, moreover, do not concern a particularly vexing topic within a defined field and method of philosophical research. Coming to terms with the difficulties of time-consciousness is thus necessary if descriptions of phenomenologically defined themes are not to remain ignorant of the most basic structures inherent in experience itself. This task that Husserl has bequeathed to his followers is complicated by the fact that his on-going efforts to understand time not only trace a course of self-criticism but also attain a dizzying level of abstraction and diagrammatic modeling. The question that was to lead phenomenological investigation into the most intimate core of subjectivity would instead occupy the mind with logical constructions and conceptual puzzles that fail to resonate with our unceasing sense of ourselves as living through time. It identifies the special difficulties posed for phenomenology by the question of time, and traces one path along which Husserl made progress in resolving them. This book is a bold traversal of territory scouted and surveyed by pioneers like Bernet, Brough, Held, Lohmar, Kortooms, Sokolowski and Zahavi. Its lack of encyclopedic breadth in its treatment of Husserl is more than made up for in its direct articulation of a compelling, if contentious, philosophy of time. This suspension, for Husserl, has the capacity to reveal my own experiencing as the dimension in which everything worldly, including myself taken as a psycho-physical organism, acquires whatever meaning and validity it has. As such, experience is shown to be transcendental or world-constituting rather than empirical or mundane. Construed as the fulfillment of a Cartesian impulse, the reduction reveals subjectivity as an indubitable foundation for knowledge. The broadly Kantian formulation focuses on the accomplishments of subjectivity as the condition for world-constitution. In other words, it allows us to view regions of being through the meaning-bestowing acts of consciousness to which they are necessarily correlative. This third formulation is influenced by Brentano. It focuses on subjectivity as concrete, self-aware experiencing. The return to the cogito is not reducible to an axiom because it is rooted in my self-awareness in an act of cogitating. Instead, he indicates the universal importance of temporality through a discussion of the synthetic and intentional character of consciousness largely in terms of Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations. The Husserl specialist will not feel subjected to a rehearsal of accepted doctrine, nor will those somewhat unfamiliar with phenomenology feel overwhelmed by a technical, empty jargon. That said, philosophers from perspectives outside the orbit of transcendental idealism will likely find that the book too easily assents to unlikely theses about the absolute nature of consciousness. De Warren does not introduce or advocate transcendental phenomenology via the problem of time, but rather addresses time as the fundamental problem of transcendental phenomenology. The treatments of Aristotle, Locke and Brentano himself should be read with these aims in mind. They are not full-blown explorations of what these philosophers had to say about time. One must describe the modification through which the past content is apprehended as not still present; additionally, one faces the problem that in reflection we clearly discover our experiencing itself as a temporal event. Because accounting for the consciousness of succession via the succession of consciousness would lead to an infinite regress, it seems that the pre-reflective awareness of succession depends upon the relation of the earlier and the later in a single act of consciousness. It is in working through this initial shortcoming that Husserl will develop what de Warren considers to be his mature position. This position, in turn, will motivate de Warren to considerations and emphases of his own. On the one hand, Husserl explicitly makes use of Stern in critiquing Brentano. Put simply, the dogma of momentary consciousness is the assumption that the act of consciousness that displays succession must contain its contents simultaneously. The modified content, e. This modification is automatic,

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irrepressible, and affects the present sensation in all its qualities. In the immediacy of the perceptual now, I am aware of the just-past as a phantasm. Further, there is no original association attached to self-consciousness. Pre-reflective consciousness in no way experiences itself as a just-past phantasm: The just-past is not an imaginary reproduction that dwells like a shadow in the immediacy of the perceived present, but a modalization within the perception itself. At any given now point, which de Warren emphasizes is a useful abstraction, just-past notes are retained heard as earlier in relation to the actual note. This relation of earlier and later in the unity of what is now and just-past is itself given as running off into a past of continually further displaced pasts, each with its own temporal relata: In every now-phase within the consciousness of a time-object we have a consciousness of the succession of now-phases belonging to the time object as well as a consciousness of the running-off continuity of each now phase, in relation to the actual now-phase of consciousness, but also in relative relation to each elapsing now-phase within the immediate past as a whole. De Warren anticipates that this double continuity will be referred not only to the time-objects displayed in perceptual acts but also, "in some sense yet to be determined", to perceptual acts themselves. It seems evident that my reading of a sentence not only constitutes a phased build-up of words that itself continually contracts and sinks away into the no-longer, but that the reading itself is experienced as somehow enduring and passing. Yet, according to de Warren, even in his effort to avoid the infinite regress that this challenge precipitates, Husserl will at first reintroduce the dogma at the level of absolute consciousness. We can here only bluntly indicate the concerns driving it. The dogma of simultaneity continues to undercut the genuine transcendence of the past if the constitution of temporal modes occurs through the apprehension of contents that are themselves temporally neutral, or, by default, present. If acts and sensa as well as objects enjoy some form of pre-reflective temporal dispersal as unfolding unities, there must be a consciousness that displays this dispersal, and the problem reemerges on a second level. Is the displaying simultaneous with what it displays? De Warren will also object to any account that avoids treating time-constituting consciousness as itself a temporal process at the cost of construing it as a non-dynamic, self-transparent, tripartite faculty of the soul. De Warren suggests that Husserl too would remain captive to dogma if pre-reflective acts are to be arrayed as quasi-objects before the disengaged spectatorship of a time-constituting consciousness that is without internal differentiation and senses itself non-ecstatically in a standing now. His focus remains the problem of retention. De Warren will argue that the way consciousness retends itself lengthwise intentionality in intending its object transverse intentionality justifies the characterization of absolute consciousness as temporal life without reducing the consciousness of succession to the succession of consciousness. In sum, his thesis is that prior to any reflection, recollection, or indeed any discrete act of consciousness, self-awareness is a kind of ur-event involving a retention of myself as absent. In this sense, retention is an original constitution of the past as a not-now without basis in any actually present content. For de Warren, inner time-consciousness constitutes itself as this double differentiation: Husserl now explicitly conceives the original impression as a fulfillment of protentional consciousness. This thoroughgoing self-transcending in time is "the movement of life itself, not the failure of consciousness to coincide with itself but rather the success of missing itself in such a way that consciousness remains open to itself and the world". Let us here introduce two critical considerations. The clarity and vivacity of an unfolding melody or sentence seems to take shape in the thickness of the retentional field itself. Second, and more generally, the reader may wonder whether de Warren gives a satisfactory account of why the original consciousness of inner-time should not entail an experience of ceaseless self-fulfillment or self-becoming as fundamentally as one of self-alteration and missing. And what is this folding and unfolding that would suggest self-possession? As de Warren himself notes, in addition to foreshadowing the content of the almost-now on the basis of retentions, protention also protends the running-off modes as yet further sunken away as well as the abiding openness of the protentional horizon as such. The necessity of retentional modification in consciousness is not a blind law, but itself given in the form of anticipated fulfillment. In the final third of his text, de Warren cashes in his emphasis on the de-presentation at the heart of pre-reflective self-awareness in a number of ways. In a remarkably economic

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critique, he argues that the Derridian deconstruction of transcendental subjectivity in Husserl depends upon a basic misunderstanding of time-consciousness. The link between the problems of time and the Other is that they both engage the basic epistemic goals of phenomenology in regard to the problem of what is irreducible to self-presence. As with time, so with the Other: Because such retentions were never originally present for me, they cannot bear a telos to fulfillment in recollection. Topics here include the constitution of possibility and actuality, potentiality, and associative synthesis. Where it is not systematic, it is suggestive, and will serve as an invitation to further reflection. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Expositions and Appraisals, ed. University of Notre Dame, , pp. Kern refers to the third path as the way through intentional psychology. Hart, *Who One Is, Book 1: A Transcendental Phenomenology* Dordrecht: Springer, , pp. De Warren never seriously entertains the idea that the awareness of time might be founded in an experience of eternity.

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Chapter 3 : Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This book clarifies Husserl's notion of perceptual experience as "immediate" or "direct" with respect to its purported object, and outlines his theory of evidence. In particular, it focuses on Husserl's account of our perceptual experience of time, an aspect of perception rarely noted in', recent.

Varela and van Gelder: More specifically, he suggests that these neuronal ensembles can become synchronized for periods lasting around 1 second, and these transient periods of synchrony are the neural correlates of present-time consciousness. See Thompson chapter 11 for a sympathetic exposition. Neural networks are often assumed to be instances of the sort of chaotic or non-linear systems whose behaviour has come under increasing scrutiny in recent decades. The behaviour of a dynamic system from one moment to the next depends on several factors: How is it possible for experienced succession to be generated by contents that exist only in the momentary present? Commenting on how an artificial neural net can be taught to recognize sounds, he writes: How is the past built in? By virtue of the fact that the current position of the system is the culmination of a trajectory which is determined by the particular auditory pattern type as it was presented up to that point. In other words, retention is a geometric property of dynamical systems: While these analogies are certainly noteworthy, there is a significant difficulty with the central claim. Whether Husserl would have agreed with this verdict is debatable. Rather, Husserlian retention is the presence now of an apparent past experience, the prior Now in all its richness. So if a distributed pattern of activity is the network Now, then retention is achieved only if that pattern is inflected by its own prior Now-state, and not just some aspect of the prior now, but all of it. A very simple feed-forward system will contain an input layer of processing units, a single hidden layer where the computations or processing takes place and an output layer. In each cycle of activity, the units in each layer can only be influenced by units below themselves, they cannot be influenced from above, i. A far more promising candidate, Lloyd suggests. These comprise layers of input units, output units and hidden units as per usual. See Figure 23 for a schematic depiction. The processing layer is simultaneously presented with the new input stimuli and detailed information about its own prior state. A simple recurrent network in which activations are copied from hidden layer to context layer on a one-for-one basis Elman. Then that new internal state, combining present and just prior information, itself recycles. In principle, this neuronal hall of mirrors can keep a pattern alive indefinitely. These signals followed a fixed pattern: With appropriate tweaking of connection weights, the network eventually had no difficulty whatsoever in predicting the timing of a boop after any given beep. Taking things a step further, he set artificial networks the task of analyzing each other. He created a metanet, tuned to respond to the hidden units of the CNVnet. After the usual training several million cycles, the metanet proved able to extract three sorts of information from the hidden units: Moving to real rather than artificial brains, Lloyd, Simplifying a good deal, his working hypothesis is that if our consciousness at any one moment contains a detailed representation of its immediately prior states, this should be reflected in similarities between the conditions of our brain over the relevant short periods: And, broadly speaking, this is what he found. To round things off, he fed the fMRI data to an artificial neural net. Again the results were positive: From the fact that a global brain state bears traces of its recent past it does not automatically follow that any experiences produced by this brain also bear traces of their past. Consequently, before it is legitimate to conclude that such a discovery about the brain vindicates the Husserlian conception a compelling story needs to be told as how or why the temporal features at the neural level transfer to the phenomenal level. The core idea is that a system e. The model can be run off-line in order to produce expectations of what the modelled domain might do in this or that circumstances or if this or that action were taken by the agent; the model can also be run online, in parallel with the modelled domain, in order to help filter noise from sensory signals, and in order to overcome potential problems with feedback delays. What is modelled, rather, is the trajectory of the domain over a short interval of time, i. At each of three distinct times t_1 , t_2 , t_3 a distinct trajectory is modelled, ranging from t_1 - t_5 , t_2 - t_6 ,

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t3-t7 respectively. These trajectories extend a short way into the past, but also include projections or expectations about the likely future course of experience, and in this manner reflect the protentional aspect of Husserlian specious presents. As for the temporal scope of these retentions and protentions, Grush suggests around a msec in either direction is a plausible estimate. As in previous cases of diagrams of this sort, for the sake of clarity only a small sample of the actual representations is depicted; in reality the representations are being produced continually, generating a gap-free continuum of trajectories. When producing their internal models of their environments, many controlling systems "e. Our brains are typical in this respect: To help circumvent these obstacles, engineers build a variety of sub-systems into control systems whose task it is to make the best of the imperfect information available. For example, these sub-systems will smooth out irregularities that are likely to be due to imperfect sensory data rather than sudden and dramatic alterations in the external environment, or fill-in holes or gaps by extrapolating from the available data in the most plausible way. To accomplish this, the relevant sub-systems will often themselves possess internal models of likely courses of events and likely external environments. In effect, in modelling current trajectories, these control systems rely on models they already possess. As a consequence of this active or interpretive stance, there is no guarantee that the trajectories generated by a system will remain constant or consistent over time. Since each trajectory represents a temporal interval, it is quite possible that later trajectories will re-write or supersede earlier trajectories, simply because the relevant control systems have more and perhaps better information to work with. The experiment involved devices capable of delivering controlled brief 2 msec pulses to the skin being fitted along the arms of subjects. Surprisingly, when the devices were clustered in just three tight configurations " and the wrist, the elbow and in-between " and five pulses were delivered to each location, rather than experiencing three tight clusters of pulses one at the wrist, one at the elbow and one in-between subjects report feeling a succession of evenly spaced pulses starting at the wrist and terminating at the elbow and often seeming continue a bit further. There are several questions that can be asked about this, but perhaps the most puzzling is: When two differently coloured spots were flashed on and off for msec each " with a 50 msec gap " subjects reported not only seeing a single spot moving back and forth rather than two distinct spots flashing on and off, they also saw the first spot suddenly changing in colour mid-way along its path. But how is the brain able to impose this interpretation of events on experience before the second flash even occurs? In the case of the rabbit, the second pulse is initially represented as occurring at the wrist. But as the brain updates its models in the light of subsequent sensory information and its own expectations as to the likely scenario confronting it, it alters its verdict and starts representing the second pulse as occurring further along the arm, as part of an evenly spaced succession. And when subjects are subsequently queried as to what they experienced, it is the later representations or trajectories which get reported " the earlier representations are not remembered. The colour phi phenomenon is susceptible to an analogous interpretation and explanation: But what conclusions should we draw from this? Grush was right to criticize Varela, van Gelder and Lloyd for paying insufficient attention to the distinction between brains and the properties possessed by or represented in the experiences brains produce. From the fact that momentary global brain states retain traces of their recent past, we cannot conclude " without further argument " that momentary phases of experiences do likewise. A precisely analogous point can be made with regard to information processing models. Suppose our brains do contain what are in effect data-structures representing in quite detailed ways their environments external and bodily over short intervals. Let us further suppose that these data-structures are embodied in momentary phases of our brains, and are updated on a moment-to-moment basis or at least, at time-scales shorter by far than the specious present. Should we conclude that our the contents of momentary or very brief phases of our streams of consciousness also reflect intervals of time, the same intervals as are represented in the data-structures? Not without a good deal of further argument. After all, the relationship between the phenomenal and the computational levels is as unclear and disputed as the relationship between the phenomenal and the physical or neuronal levels. Some realists about the phenomenal " e. Searle " reject any significant link between computation and experience; even those who think there is some significant

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relationship between information processing and experience may resist the claim that all instances of information processing are associated with experience. It is thus an option for the Extensional theorist to say: Yes, our brains may well contain continually updated representations in informational or computational form of our internal and external environments; it may well be that at any one time it is possible to find in the brain data-structures corresponding to courses of events over brief periods of time; it may also be the case that these data-structures impact on our behaviour. But since we cannot conclude from this that our experience at any one moment embodies the data found in these structures, it may well be that our experience of change and persistence is itself temporally extended, in the way that Extensional models predict. Until the relationship between matter, information processing and phenomenal consciousness is settled, this response cannot be dismissed.

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Chapter 4 : Temporal Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

It clarifies Husserl's theory of perception in a very clear and well organized way, and presents an interpretation of Husserl that is both lucid and based upon careful reading of the texts. The book is suitable as a text for courses on various main theories of perception and on Husserl's phenomenology."

From the vantage point of ordinary life and common sense, consciousness plainly seems to exist in time. When we hear the clock strike twelve, our auditory experience of it so doing also occurs at twelve or at most a few moments later. Watching a minute action movie results in a two hour stream of auditory and visual experiences along with accompanying thoughts and feelings, and this stream runs concurrently with the playing of the movie. Quite generally, our conscious states, irrespective of their kind or character, seem to occur in the same temporal framework as the events in the wider world – even if their precise timing is not easy to ascertain. But this is by no means the whole story. Our consciousness may be located within time, but there are also ways in which time or temporality might be regarded as manifest within consciousness. While watching a two hour movie, we will generally remain aware how much of the two hour period remains, even if we are paying no attention to the plot. We can judge the duration of temporal intervals, particularly short ones, with reasonable accuracy – an ability that psychologists have investigated in considerable detail see Wearden for an overview. Our episodic or autobiographical memories supply us with access to our own pasts; thanks to such memories our earlier states of consciousness are not altogether lost to us: And of course there are past-oriented emotions, such as remorse or regret or shame: While there is no future-directed counterpart of memory, we can anticipate future happenings more or less accurately, more or less eagerly, and experience future-directed emotions: The story is still by no means complete, for temporality is manifest in consciousness in a further and more intimate way. In our ordinary experience, over brief intervals, we seem to be directly aware of temporally extended phenomena such as change, persistence and succession. When we see a friend waving goodbye, do we infer that their arm is moving, on the basis of having observed a motionless arm occupying a sequence of adjacent spatial locations? We do make such inferences of this kind: But the case in question is not at all like this: The same applies in other sensory modalities. When listening to a melody, we hear each note giving way to its successor; when we hear a sustained violin tone, we hear the tone continuing on, from moment to moment. If temporally extended occurrences such as these can feature in our immediate experience, it is natural to conclude that our awareness must be capable of embracing a temporal interval. While this may seem obvious, it can also seem problematic. We can remember the past and anticipate the future, but we are only directly aware of what is present – or so it is natural to say and suppose. But the present, strictly speaking, is momentary. So if our awareness is confined to the present, our awareness must itself lack temporal depth. Hence we are led swiftly to the conclusion that our direct awareness cannot possibly encompass phenomena possessing temporal extension. We are thus confronted with a conundrum: Simplifying somewhat, the most commonly favoured options fall into three main categories: Our streams of consciousness are composed of continuous successions of these momentary states of consciousness. In this respect they are analogous to movies, which as displayed consist of rapid sequences of still images. These episodes thus have a complex structure, comprising momentary phases of immediate experience, along with representations or retentions of the recent past. Our streams of consciousness are composed of successions of these momentary states. These labels are not standard – in this field there is little by way of terminological uniformity – but for present purposes they will serve see Kon and Miller for a more fine-grained categorization. All three models are depicted in Figure 1 below. In each of the diagrams the horizontal line represents ordinary clock-time. Although the Retentional and Cinematic models both trade in momentary or very brief states of consciousness – in the diagrams such states are represented by thin vertical lines – these states are construed very differently. In his influential writings on these matters William James argued that to make sense of our temporal experience we need to distinguish the strict or mathematical present from

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the from the experiential or specious present: Ascertaining where the truth lies among the differing accounts of the temporal contents of our immediate experience is interesting and intriguing in itself. The interest and importance of the debate does not end here, for each of the accounts of temporal awareness on offer has significant, and very different, implications for our understanding of the general structure of consciousness. In this entry we will be exploring the principle features and motivations of the competing accounts, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. One significant divide is between those who believe that temporally extended phenomena really do figure in our immediate experience, and those who deny this. To coin some terminology: Phenomeno-temporal Realism PT-realism, sometimes further abbreviated to realism: Phenomeno-temporal Antirealism PT-antirealism, sometimes further abbreviated to antirealism: The Extensional and Retentional models are the two principle forms of PT-realism. Proponents of the Cinematic model can subscribe to realism, but most do not. The task facing PT-antirealists is in one respect the easier of the two: But in another respect their task is the more difficult. For realists it is important to distinguish the experience of succession from a mere succession of experiencings. An experience of succession involves a temporal spread of contents being presented together in consciousness, albeit in the form of a perceived succession rather than simultaneously. Hence both Extensional and Retentional theorists agree that a temporal spread of contents can be apprehended as a unity. To introduce some further terminology: The Diachronic Unity Thesis: Contents which are apprehended as unified in this way belong to a single specious present. This is needed to accommodate Retentional specious presents: Extensional theorists, by contrast, regard specious presents as extending a short distance through ordinary clock-time, in just the way they seem to. Augustine subscribed to the doctrine of Presentism as it has latterly become known, i. What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come or past are. If our consciousness is confined to the momentary present, how is it possible for us to know as much as we do about the duration of events or processes we live through? For illustrative purposes he envisages himself on the verge of reciting a familiar Psalm. Before starting to speak all the verses are laid out before him in the form of expectations concerning what he is about to say; when part-way through his performance, the reciting of some verses is transferred from expectation to memory; as he continues to speak this transfer continues until the whole of the Psalm passes into memory: As we shall see, this reliance on a combination of momentary perceptual experience, memory and expectation in explaining our experience of temporality is typical of PT-antirealists. And generally speaking, albeit with certain complications, this is what we find. In the Enquiry Locke writes: It is evident to anyone who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession: If reflection simply means introspection “ i. Other passages from the Enquiry tend to confirm the introspective construal. I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned, viz. For, first by observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of succession. Secondly, by observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of duration. The case for taking Locke to subscribe to realism looks strong. For Hume, “ the idea of duration is always derived from a succession of changeable objects, and can never be conveyed to the mind by any thing steadfast and unchangeable”. For Locke succession is a more basic concept than duration “ since we arrive at the concept of duration by reflecting on the distances between parts of successions “ but Reid argues the reverse is the case. For a succession to exist at all, its parts “ either particular impressions or the intervals between them “ must themselves already have duration: Hence succession presupposes duration, and not vice-versa. The latter is of particular relevance, for Reid goes on to argue without memory to inform us of what we have already experienced, we could never arrive at a concept of succession. In arguing thus Reid is evidently assuming that our direct awareness is incapable of spanning even a brief temporal interval: His argument for this assumption is succinct, and on the face of it, quite plausible: It may here be observed that, if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses or of consciousness; because the operations of both are

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confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time; and on that account the motion of a body, which is a successive change of place, could not be observed by the senses alone without the aid of memory. Intellectual Powers, Essay III, chapter V Since the claim that we are immediately aware only of what is present can seem common sense of the plainest sort, it is not surprising to find Reid endorsing it, and hence rejecting realism in favour of the antirealist alternative. Reid recognizes that it seems equally common sensical to say that we see bodies move “ after all, we often talk in such terms: In response he argues that such talk is perfectly legitimate, provided it is construed in loose or popular sense, and not taken strictly and literally. Endorsing the plausible-seeming Augustinian doctrine that consciousness is confined to the present point of time does not oblige one to reject the equally plausible claim that change and succession feature prominently in immediate experience. These claims are quite compatible with one another provided the experience of change occurs within the confines of the momentary present. Indeed, in the eyes of some “ but not all “ this confinement is a necessary precondition for contents to be experienced together. For according to one influential line of thinking regarding phenomenal unity, in order for contents to be experienced as unified, they must be presented simultaneously to a single momentary awareness. The obvious way of developing an account along these lines is to hold that momentary episodes of sensory consciousness are accompanied by a simultaneously existing array of representations or retentions of immediately preceding conscious states, and our awareness “ at a single moment of time “ of this combination of ingredients provides us with what we take to be a direct awareness of change and succession. When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented , and did not reproduce them while advancing to those which follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination. Anyone who inclines to realism, but also follows Augustine in confining consciousness to the momentary present, faces the difficulty of explaining how we can have an awareness of succession if our consciousness consists of nothing more than a succession of momentary snapshot-like experiences. Kant solves this problem by offering a richer account of these momentary states of consciousness. In the visual case, momentary episodes of visual experiencing are accompanied by representations of recently experienced visual contents. More generally, these representations or retentions allow us to be aware that our presently occurring experience is a part of an ongoing process. More needs to be said, but Kant supplies at least the beginnings of one plausible-looking account of how it might be possible for us to be aware of change and succession in the way we seem to be. He also recognized that a mere succession of experiences does not, in and of itself, add up to an experience of succession. The latter Brentano referred to as *proteraesthesia*. Brentano on hearing a melody. The horizontal line a-b-c-d corresponds to a continuous flow of ongoing auditory sensations; the vertical lines correspond to the *proteraestheses* which accompany these sensations at three particular points b, c and d. As can be seen, as we move from b to c to d, the *proteraestheses* gradually increase in complexity, with the result that the hearing of d is accompanied by representations of preceding tone-phases stretching right back to a, but no further:

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Chapter 5 : Phenomenology and Time-Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Lloyd does not claim that his simple networks are actually conscious, but he does see points of similarity with Husserl's tripartite analysis of temporal awareness. Taking things a step further, he set artificial networks the task of analyzing each other.

Life and work Husserl was born in Prossnitz Moravia on April 8th, In the years he studied mathematics, physics and philosophy in Leipzig. Among other things, he attended philosophy lectures by Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of the first institute for experimental psychology. In Husserl continued his studies in mathematics and philosophy in Berlin. His mathematics teachers there included Carl Weierstrass and Leopold Kronecker. However, Husserl took his PhD in mathematics in Vienna, with a thesis on the theory of variations Jan. When Weierstrass got seriously ill, Masaryk suggested that Husserl go back to Vienna, to study philosophy with Franz Brentano, the author of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* Husserl followed this advice and studied in Vienna from This recommendation enabled Husserl to prepare and submit his habilitation dissertation *On the Concept of Number* with Stumpf. In this work, Husserl combined his mathematical, psychological and philosophical competencies to attempt a psychological foundation of arithmetic see Willard , pp. The book was, however, criticized for its underlying psychologism in a review by Gottlob Frege. In any case, he turned away from psychologism and developed the philosophical method he is nowadays famous for: Husserl now adheres to a version of platonism that he derived from ideas of Hermann Lotze and especially Bernard Bolzano, where he embeds platonism about meaning and mental content in a theory of intentional consciousness see Beyer His influences here include Descartes, Hume and Kant. As Husserl explains in detail in his second major work, *Ideas* , the resulting perspective on the realm of intentional consciousness is supposed to enable the phenomenologist to reconstruct his or her basic views on the world and himself and explore their rational interconnections from scratch. It is here that he made his most important philosophical discoveries cf. Mohanty , such as the transcendental-phenomenological method, the phenomenological structure of time-consciousness, the fundamental role of the notion of intersubjectivity in our conceptual system, the horizon-structure of our singular empirical thought, and more. In he received a call to Berlin, which he rejected. In he accepted an invitation to Paris. His lectures there were later published as *Cartesian Meditations*. In Hitler took over in Germany. In the same year, Husserl received a call to Los Angeles but rejected. Because of his Jewish ancestors, he became more and more humiliated and isolated. In he gave a number of invited lectures in Prague. Edmund Husserl died on April 27, in Freiburg. His manuscripts about pages in total were rescued by the Franciscan Herman Leo Van Breda, who brought them to Leuven Belgium , where the first Husserl archive was founded in Pure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality As a philosophically-minded mathematician, Husserl was interested in developing a general theory of inferential systems, which following Bolzano he conceived of as a theory of science, on the ground that every science including mathematics can be looked upon as a system of propositions that are interconnected by a set of inferential relations. Mill, he argues in *Logical Investigations* that the best way to study the nature of such propositional systems is to start with their linguistic manifestations, i. How are we to analyse these sentences and the propositions they express? These units of consciousness he labels intentional acts or intentional experiences, since they always represent something as something " thus exhibiting what Brentano called intentionality. According to Husserl, there are non-intentional units of consciousness as well. He quotes pain as an example. In the case of propositional acts, i. In the case of their non-propositional but still intentional parts, he identifies the corresponding intentional content with a sub-propositional meaning. Accordingly, the judgement can be looked upon as an act of ascribing the property of being French to the referent of that name. Inconsistent meanings can be singled out and studied by means of reflection upon corresponding experiences of intuitive conflict, like for instance the discrete switching back and forth between a duck-head-imagination and a rabbit-head-imagination in the case of an attempted intuitive imagination of a duck-head that is at the

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same time a rabbit-head. Some meanings are inconsistent for formal-logical reasons. According to Husserl, all analytically false propositions belong to this category. Meanings generally and propositions in particular exist independently of their actually functioning as intentional content. Thus, true propositions such as the Pythagorean theorem can be discovered. Propositions and their components are abstract, i. However, what does it mean to grasp a proposition or, more generally, a sense? How can an abstract object become the content of an intentional act? Combining ideas of Bolzano and Lotze, Husserl answers this question by taking recourse to the notion of an ideal *i*. Propositions and other meanings are ideal species that can be but do not have to be instantiated by certain particular features, *i*. Thus, an experience of pleasure about a given event is one-sidedly founded, relative to the stream of consciousness it belongs to, in a particular belief-state to the effect that this event has occurred. Like all foundation relations, this one holds in virtue of an essential law, to the effect that conscious pleasure about some state of affairs requires a corresponding and simultaneous belief. Quite generally, a given object *a* of type *F* is founded in a particular object *b* of type *G* where *a* is different from *b* if and only if there is an essential law in virtue of which it holds that for any object *x* of type *F* there is an object *y* of type *G* and a whole *z* of type *H*, such that both *x* and *y* are proper parts of *z*, and *ii* both *a* and *b* are proper parts of *c*. Of course, the notion of an essential law needs further clarification. Indexicality and propositional content However, as Husserl was well aware, the species-theory of content faces at least one serious objection. If the intentional content of an indexical experience is to serve as a sub- propositional content, it must uniquely determine the object if any that the respective experience refers to. That is to say: It seems, though, that the moments of matter of two such experiences can instantiate the same ideal matter "the same type of particular content" whilst representing different objects. However, it is doubtful whether this distinction really helps Husserl overcome the difficulty the phenomenon of context-sensitivity poses for his species-theory of content. And this content does not appear to be an ideal species. It may be argued, however, that even sub- propositional contents of indexical utterances can be instantiated multiply in thought and speech, thus qualifying as ideal species after all. But the crucial question is whether this holds true in complete generality: And at least in the case of indexical experiences he seems to identify their intentional contents with these two-factored contents, for he holds that intentional content uniquely determines reference, *i*. Singularity and horizon-intentionality Husserl sees quite clearly that indexical experiences just as experiences given voice to by means of genuine proper names are characterized, among other things, by their singularity: Thus, for instance, in sec. Smith and McIntyre For example, if you consciously see something as a table, you will expect it to appear to you in certain ways if you go around and observe it. What binds together the intentional horizon of a given indexical experience? According to Husserl, all of the actual or potential experiences constituting that horizon share a sense of identity through time, which sense he labels as the determinable *X* they belong to. As a first approximation, two experiences of a given subject belong to the same determinable *X* if and only if the subject believes them to represent the same object. For a related criterion of intersubjective identity of determinable *X*, see Beyer , sec. Hence, experiences belonging to a determinable *X* must be accompanied by at least one higher-order belief not necessarily a conscious one. This latter act of awareness can be looked upon as actualizing a corresponding higher-order belief. The determinable *X* a given indexical experience belongs to, with respect to certain other experiences, helps us answer the question of what determines the reference of that experience, if not its ideal meaning species alone. In order to take the role played by the determinable *X* into account properly, we have to employ a Husserlian research strategy that could be called the dynamic method. In a more recent terminology, one may say that in this perceptual situation the subject has opened a mental file about a particular object *cf.* The same goes for cases of perceptual judgements leading to, or taken by the respective subject to be confirming, entries into an already existing file. See Beyer , sec. Externalism about content is understood here as the claim that at least some intentional contents, or respective meanings, depend on particular extra-mental objects which they represent, where the identity conditions of these objects may, however, in turn be partly a function of the general meaning function involved in, or determining, the

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respective content. Husserl can thus be read or at least be rationally reconstructed as both an early direct reference theorist headword: It may be regarded as a radicalization of the methodological constraint, already to be found in *Logical Investigations*, that any phenomenological description proper is to be performed from a first person point of view, so as to ensure that the respective item is described exactly as is experienced, or intended, by the subject. Now from a first-person point of view, one cannot, of course, decide whether in a case of what one takes to be, say, an act of perception one is currently performing, there actually is an object that one is perceptually confronted with. For instance, it is well possible that one is hallucinating. From a first-person point of view, there is no difference to be made out between the veridical and the non-veridical case – for the simple reason that one cannot at the same time fall victim to and detect a perceptual error or misrepresentation. That is to say, the phenomenological description of a given act and, in particular, the phenomenological specification of its intentional content, must not rely upon the correctness of any existence assumption concerning the object s if any the respective act is about. It is merely the assumption that there are other subjects having intentional acts, and its logical consequences, that have to be put into brackets here – so as to allow the phenomenologist to make explicit his reasons for the bracketed existence assumptions, or for assumptions based upon them, such as, in the present example, the presupposition that a given creature is a subject undergoing such-an-such an experience. In Section 7 we shall see that Husserl draws upon empathy in this connection. By contrast, there may be some such contents, even many of them, without indexical content generally having to be dependent on a particular extra-mental object. The phenomenologist is supposed to perform his descriptions from a first-person point of view, so as to ensure that the respective item is described exactly as it is experienced. If one is hallucinating, there is really no object of perception. However, phenomenologically the experience one undergoes is exactly the same as if one were successfully perceiving an external object. Therefore, the adequacy of a phenomenological description of a perceptual experience should be independent of whether for the experience under investigation there is an object it represents or not. Either way, there will at least be a perceptual content if not the same content on both sides, though. It is this content that Husserl calls the perceptual noema. Thanks to its noema, even a hallucination is an intentional act. Phenomenological description is concerned with those aspects of the noema that remain the same irrespective of whether the experience in question is veridical or not. However, this lands him in a methodological dilemma. This is the first horn of the dilemma. For, as Husserl himself stresses cf. This is the second horn. There are at least three possible ways out of this dilemma. First, the phenomenologist could choose the first horn of the dilemma, but analyse an earlier perceptual experience of his, one that he now remembers. He just has to make sure here not to employ his earlier and perhaps still persisting belief in the existence of a perceptual object. Secondly, he could again decide in favour of the first horn and analyse a perceptual experience that he merely intuitively imagines himself to have.

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Chapter 6 : Project MUSE - Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable

Edmund Husserl's phenomenological analysis of internal time consciousness has a reputation for being complex, occasionally to the point of approaching impenetrability. The latter applies in particular to his remarks about what he calls the 'absolute time-constituting flow',¹ some

A sensorimotor approach to vision and visual consciousness. Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Consciousness, color, and content. Experience of the world in time. Husserl and Heidegger on human experience. Husserl, perception and temporal awareness. Husserlian meditations; How words present things. Making sense of phenomenal unity: An intentionalist account of temporal experience. Must an appearance of succession involve a succession of appearances? On the experience of time. Perception and iconic memory: Perception and its objects. Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception -or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. Retention and the schema. An essay in revisionary metaphysics. Experience, thought and their relations. Unity and continuity in conscious experience, 2nd edition. Temporal experiences and their parts. Temporality and the presence of language: The contents of perception. The images of time: An essay on temporal representation. The inordinance of time. The intrinsic quality of experience. The limits of self-awareness. The nature of existence, The paradox of subjectivity. The self in the transcendental tradition. The puzzle of temporal experience, The silence of the senses. The wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality. Zur psychologie der zeitanschauung.

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Chapter 7 : Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience - CORE

The Phenomenology of Perception: Husserl's Account of Our Temporal Awareness. About us. Editorial team.

Friedman also contrasted two theories for a sense of time: This posits a memory trace that persists over time, by which one might judge the age of a memory and therefore how long ago the event remembered occurred from the strength of the trace. This conflicts with the fact that memories of recent events may fade more quickly than more distant memories. The inference model suggests the time of an event is inferred from information about relations between the event in question and other events whose date or time is known. This theory alleges that the brain can run multiple biological stopwatches at one time depending on the type of task one is involved in. The location of these pulses and what these pulses actually consist of is unclear. Specious present The specious present is the time duration wherein a state of consciousness is experienced as being in the present. Clay in E. Robert Kelly , [9] [10] and was further developed by William James. In "Scientific Thought" , C. Broad further elaborated on the concept of the specious present and considered that the specious present may be considered as the temporal equivalent of a sensory datum. There is some evidence that very short millisecond durations are processed by dedicated neurons in early sensory parts of the brain [14] [15] Professor Warren Meck devised a physiological model for measuring the passage of time. He found the representation of time to be generated by the oscillatory activity of cells in the upper cortex. His model separated explicit timing and implicit timing. Explicit timing is used in estimating the duration of a stimulus. Implicit timing is used to gauge the amount of time separating one from an impending event that is expected to occur in the near future. These two estimations of time do not involve the same neuroanatomical areas. For example, implicit timing often occurs to achieve a motor task, involving the cerebellum , left parietal cortex , and left premotor cortex. Explicit timing often involves the supplementary motor area and the right prefrontal cortex. The brain must learn how to overcome these speed disparities if it is to create a temporally unified representation of the external world: To accomplish this, it must wait about a tenth of a second. In the early days of television broadcasting, engineers worried about the problem of keeping audio and video signals synchronized. Then they accidentally discovered that they had around a hundred milliseconds of slop: He goes on to say that "This brief waiting period allows the visual system to discount the various delays imposed by the early stages; however, it has the disadvantage of pushing perception into the past. There is a distinct survival advantage to operating as close to the present as possible; an animal does not want to live too far in the past. Therefore, the tenth-of-a-second window may be the smallest delay that allows higher areas of the brain to account for the delays created in the first stages of the system while still operating near the border of the present. This window of delay means that awareness is postdictive, incorporating data from a window of time after an event and delivering a retrospective interpretation of what happened. Tachypsychia A temporal illusion is a distortion in the perception of time. Time perception refers to a variety of time-related tasks. Short list of types of temporal illusions: People tend to recall recent events as occurring further back in time than they actually did backward telescoping and distant events as occurring more recently than they actually did forward telescoping. Shorter intervals tend to be overestimated while longer intervals tend to be underestimated Time intervals associated with more changes may be perceived as longer than intervals with fewer changes Perceived temporal length of a given task may shorten with greater motivation Perceived temporal length of a given task may stretch when broken up or interrupted Auditory stimuli may appear to last longer than visual stimuli [23] [24] [25] [26] Time durations may appear longer with greater stimulus intensity e. The kappa effect can be displayed when considering a journey made in two parts that take an equal amount of time. Between these two parts, the journey that covers more distance may appear to take longer than the journey covering less distance, even though they take an equal amount of time. Eye movements and "Chronostasis"[edit] The perception of space and time undergoes distortions during rapid saccadic eye movements [29] Chronostasis is a type of temporal illusion in which the first impression following the

introduction of a new event or task demand to the brain appears to be extended in time. This elicits an overestimation in the temporal duration for which that target stimulus is perceived. This effect can extend apparent durations by up to 100 ms and is consistent with the idea that the visual system models events prior to perception. One common example is a frequent occurrence when making telephone calls. After grasping a new object, subjects overestimate the time in which their hand has been in contact with this object. Oddball effect [edit] The perception of the duration of an event seems to be modulated by our recent experiences. The effect seems to be strongest for images that are expanding in size on the retina, in other words, that are "looming" or approaching the viewer, [39] [40] [41] and the effect can be eradicated for oddballs that are contracting or perceived to be receding from the viewer. Awe can be characterized as an experience of immense perceptual vastness that coincides with an increase in focus. Events appear to have taken longer only in retrospect, possibly because memories were being more densely packed during the frightening situation. It is argued that fear prompts a state of arousal in the amygdala, which increases the rate of a hypothesized "internal clock". This could be the result of an evolved defensive mechanism triggered by a threatening situation. One study assessed this concept by asking subjects to estimate the amount of time that passed during intervals ranging from 3 seconds to 65 seconds. This difference was hypothesized to be because depressed subjects focused less on external factors that may skew their judgment of time. The authors termed this hypothesized phenomenon "depressive realism. This often causes people to increasingly underestimate a given interval of time as they age. This fact can likely be attributed to a variety of age-related changes in the aging brain, such as the lowering in dopaminergic levels with older age; however, the details are still being debated. A child will first experience the passing of time when he or she can subjectively perceive and reflect on the unfolding of a collection of events. This helps to explain why a random, ordinary day may therefore appear longer for a young child than an adult. Children have to be extremely engaged in. Adults however may rarely need to step outside mental habits and external routines. When an adult frequently experiences the same stimuli, they seem "invisible" because already sufficiently and effectively mapped by the brain. This phenomenon is known as neural adaptation. Thus, the brain will record fewer densely rich memories during these frequent periods of disengagement from the present moment. Effects of drugs [edit] Stimulants produce overestimates of time duration, whereas depressants and anaesthetics produce underestimates of time duration. Psychoactive drugs can alter the judgment of time. These include traditional psychedelics such as LSD, psilocybin, and mescaline as well as the dissociative class of psychedelics such as PCP, ketamine and dextromethorphan. At higher doses time may appear to slow down, speed up or seem out of sequence. In a study, psilocybin was found to significantly impair the ability to reproduce interval durations longer than 2. Stimulants can lead both humans and rats to overestimate time intervals, [68] [69] while depressants can have the opposite effect. Effects of body temperature [edit] Time perception may speed up as body temperature rises, and slow down as body temperature lowers. This is especially true during stressful events. Experiments have shown that sensory simultaneity judgments can be manipulated by repeated exposure to non-simultaneous stimuli. In an experiment conducted by David Eagleman, a temporal order judgment reversal was induced in subjects by exposing them to delayed motor consequences. In the experiment, subjects played various forms of video games. Unknown to the subjects, the experimenters introduced a fixed delay between the mouse movements and the subsequent sensory feedback. For example, a subject may not see a movement register on the screen until milliseconds after the mouse had moved. Participants playing the game quickly adapted to the delay and felt as though there was less delay between their mouse movement and the sensory feedback. Shortly after the experimenters removed the delay, the subjects commonly felt as though the effect on the screen happened just before they commanded it. This work addresses how the perceived timing of effects is modulated by expectations, and the extent to which such predictions are quickly modifiable. The experimenters then showed the flash of light instantly after the button was pressed. In response, subjects often thought that the flash the effect had occurred before the button was pressed the cause. Additionally, when the experimenters slightly reduced the delay, and shortened the spatial distance between the button and the flash of light, participants had

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often claimed again to have experienced the effect before the cause. Several experiments also suggest that temporal order judgment of a pair of tactile stimuli delivered in rapid succession, one to each hand, is noticeably impaired. However, congenitally blind subjects showed no trace of temporal order judgment reversal after crossing the arms. These results suggest that tactile signals taken in by the congenitally blind are ordered in time without being referred to a visuospatial representation. Unlike the congenitally blind subjects, the temporal order judgments of the late-onset blind subjects were impaired when crossing the arms to a similar extent as non-blind subjects. These results suggest that the associations between tactile signals and visuospatial representation is maintained once it is accomplished during infancy. Some research studies have also found that the subjects showed reduced deficit in tactile temporal order judgments when the arms were crossed behind their back than when they were crossed in front.

Flash lag illusion In an experiment, participants were told to stare at an "x" symbol on a computer screen whereby a moving blue doughnut-like ring repeatedly circled the fixed "x" point. However, when asked what was perceived, participants responded that they saw the white flash lagging behind the center of the moving ring. In other words, despite the reality that the two retinal images were actually spatially aligned, the flashed object was usually observed to trail a continuously moving object in space – a phenomenon referred to as the flash-lag effect. In the attempt to disprove the first hypothesis, David Eagleman conducted an experiment in which the moving ring suddenly reverses direction to spin in the other way as the flashed object briefly appears. If the first hypothesis were correct, we would expect that, immediately following reversal, the moving object would be observed as lagging behind the flashed object. However, the experiment revealed the opposite – immediately following reversal, the flashed object was observed as lagging behind the moving object. A recent study tries to reconcile these different approaches by approaching perception as an inference mechanism aiming at describing what is happening at the present time.

Neuropharmacological research indicates that the internal clock, used to time durations in the seconds-to-minutes range, is linked to dopamine function in the basal ganglia. In his book *Awakenings*, the neurologist Dr. Oliver Sacks describes a patient, Mr. E, who was asked to clap his hands steadily and regularly, did so for the first few claps before clapping faster and irregularly, culminating in an apparent freezing of motion. When he finished, Mr. E asked if his observers were glad he did it correctly, to which they replied "no". Mr. E was offended by this because to him, his claps were regular and steady. Specifically, dopaminergic systems are involved in working memory and inhibitory processes, both of which are believed central to ADHD pathology. This was first described in psychology by Minkowski in 1952. It has been suggested that there is usually a delay in time perception in schizophrenic patients compared to normal subjects. These defects in time perception may play a part in the hallucinations and delusions experienced by schizophrenic patients according to some studies. Some researchers suggest that "abnormal timing judgment leads to a deficit in action attribution and action perception."

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Chapter 8 : Edmund Husserl (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer Edition)

Husserl also finds it 'most extraordinary that Brentano does not take into consideration the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time' (17) In effect, the charge is that by building retentions out of mental images generated by the imagination, Brentano is unable to do adequate justice to the perceptual.

The Philosophy of Perception: Phenomenology and Image Theory Published: Reviewed by Nico Orlandi, University of California, Santa Cruz Looking at the history of analytic philosophy of perception we can easily find two recurring issues. One is the investigation of the objects of perception -- for example, whether they are ordinary objects or sense data. The other is the investigation of what the subject needs to do in order to perceive. In this book, Lambert Wiesing proposes that we switch paradigms. Rather than focusing on the object or on the subject of perception or on both , we should focus on perception itself and on its significance for perceivers. Wiesing understands perception as a "mental state or experience" in which subjects take "a particular, describable object to be present and extant" p. Given this characterization, he proposes that we focus on what consequences the reality of perception has for a subject, or more pointedly, that we focus on what perception condemns us to. The answer, according to Wiesing, is that perception condemns us to a physical and embodied existence p. Just as the birth of a child makes one a father, the existence of perception makes one a perceiver -- a spatio-temporal and embodied entity that is part of the physical world p. Importantly, perception condemns us to be more than mere spectators. Perceiving involves participating p. As perceivers we are public, visible actors p. The world of perception is itself present and real, in the sense of being a material cause of our experiences that is independent of our consciousness pp. Thinking of perception as a mere objectless sensation is, according to Wiesing, like thinking of triangles that do not have three corners. He maintains that his outlook on perception guarantees a genuine and unmediated being-in-the-world. This makes the book a stimulating contribution. The proposal of focusing on the reality of perception -- and on its consequences for perceivers -- is discussed primarily in Chapter 3, which is central to the book. Chapter 1 identifies a critical target. In it, Wiesing presents what he calls the Myth of the Mediate. According to this Myth, "being-in-the-world is a mediated being-in-the-world" p. A human being possesses points of access to the world, but nothing, either in perception, action or imagination is immediately present to her. Although subjects are not aware of this mediation, their contact with the world of objects is always filtered p. The myth of the mediate is widespread in philosophy, according to Wiesing, held in various forms by Hegelians, Kantian, pragmatists, deconstructivists and analytic philosophers of various stripes p. Its causes are to be found in an attempt to model how perception comes about -- that is, in an attempt to trace the genesis of perception p. This, according to Wiesing, is misguided and, in fact, all philosophy that attempts to build third-personal models -- in a similar fashion to how science builds models -- is engaging in a dubious enterprise. He argues that such philosophy unreflectively uses the assumptions embedded in its models, when the assumptions should be questioned p. To the third-person methodology of scientific or quasi-scientific models, Wiesing contrasts phenomenology. Phenomenology consists roughly in self-reflecting. When a subject self-reflects on her perceptual experience, she is unaware of the genesis of her experience, but she can uncover fundamental and necessary truths about it. Self-reflection brings phenomenal knowledge. This knowledge is better described as certainty p. Using phenomenal knowledge means concerning oneself only with what is certain. Anything else, according to Wiesing should not be addressed in philosophy at all p. Of particular interest is a specific phenomenological method that Wiesing inherits from Husserl and Kant: In the next step, one fantasizes or imagines variations to this situation as in a thought experiment. Could one, for example, imagine the tomato to be differently colored, differently shaped, not present at all, not in space and time? The goal of this imaginative enterprise is to find the limits of the variation, and presumably, the limits and essences of the notions in play. Central to this method is that subjects are encouraged to experience for themselves. After applying this methodology to trace what perception condemns us to in chapter 3, chapter 4

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closes the book with an interesting discussion of image perception. While ordinary perception forces us to be real participants in the world, viewing images is not as demanding. It allows a pause in participation, where we can afford a more contemplative stance p. In looking at images, we are the kind of detached spectators that we cannot afford to be when we perceive. It is as if Husserl met Merleau-Ponty in this poignant work. By engaging in phenomenological reflection we find ourselves as fully embodied, active participants in the real world. While I find the positive claims of the book interesting, some of the polemical points are a bit hard to follow and, in my opinion, not sufficiently justified. For example, in chapter 1, Wiesing suggests that philosophers who engage in modeling are doing something that is not just questionable, but also contradictory p. It is unclear, however, why this is the case, and it is further unclear why modeling a certain mental process -- or trying to understand its origins -- is in any way bad, or to be contrasted with a phenomenological approach. It is also not clear why philosophy should concern itself only with what is certain. Even granting that phenomenology, self-reflection and eidetic variation deliver indubitable certainty -- something that it would have been interesting to problematize -- I am unsure as to why philosophers should restrict their interest only to this type of certainty. Is any paradigm that thinks of perception as involving mental representations, an instance of this myth? Because it is not clear what kind of positions count as belonging to the myth of the mediate, it is also not clear how the shift in paradigm proposed by Wiesing helps. Consider, for example, the common idea in cognitive science that perceptual processing involves an unconscious interpretation. As Wiesing concedes, proponents of interpretationism tend to admit that interpreting is not something that perceivers are aware of. As a result, interpretationism seems to be compatible with the conclusions Wiesing draws about perception by using phenomenological self-reflection. That an unconscious interpretation is needed for us to reconstruct the appearance of an object from retinal stimulation is compatible with the fact that, in first-person awareness, the object is immediately present. Without some further explanation of what the Myth of the Mediate consists in, it is not clear that the shift in paradigm proposed by Wiesing helps to avoid it. In addition to finding the polemical points in the book somewhat under-argued, I have questions concerning the method employed by Wiesing. First, it seems that experiential self-reflection and eidetic variation allow him to draw conclusions that are either compatible with some of the positions that he wants to criticize, or orthogonal to some traditional debates in the philosophy of perception. The debate on the nature of the objects of perception, for example, concerns -- at least in part -- whether perceptual objects are the ordinary, physical and material entities that we seem to encounter in perceptual experience. Yet what is questioned is whether this appearance is correct. It is not clear how a phenomenological approach would help in this context. Further, it is dubious that the ordinary nature, and the physicality and materiality of objects would even be what we find when we simply reflect on the reality of perception -- even when perception is understood as a state of taking an object to be present and extant p. A second question about the method employed by Wiesing concerns the status of the conclusions that are drawn from it. That we are embodied and existing subjects in a real, material world is supposed to be a phenomenally necessary truth. It is an a priori truth and not a mere empirical finding p. When first reading this, I thought that this kind of position evoked the synthetic a priori that we find in Kant. The idea would be that, by engaging in eidetic variation and in self-reflection, we uncover the conditions for the possibility of perception. But this is not quite consistent with what Wiesing says. Wiesing talks of the various claims he makes about perception as if they were logical necessities p. This is puzzling because the phenomenological method Wiesing uses is tangled up with experiences. The method seems incapable of delivering purely conceptual truths. Self-reflection in perception involves reflecting on experiences. The presence of an object in perception, for example, is a truth based on the manner in which an object is given. The method of eidetic variation has similar experiential elements, as it employs imagination. It seems to then follow that truths derived by these means are not logical or analytic. Indeed, the more general question is how the phenomenological method and the method of eidetic variation relate to pure conceptual analysis. Further clarification would be helpful here. Chapter 4, which has been neglected for reasons of space, should be of interest to anyone studying aesthetics and image theory. More

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generally, philosophers interested in phenomenology and in the situatedness of perception -- particularly from a historical point of view -- should find this book useful and stimulating. Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. *Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process*. Oxford University Press, *The body in mind*: Cambridge University Press, *The Problems of Philosophy*. Home University Library, Harvard University Press, *Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences-Cognition*. Wiesel discusses this interpretationist idea on p.

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Chapter 9 : Time perception - Wikipedia

Edmund Husserl and Phenomenology. Chapter sense of perception, the role of temporal awareness in the structure. of perceiving, the dynamic nature of perceptual content, the nature.

Husserl, Phenomenology, and Time-Consciousness Phenomenology maintains that consciousness, in its very nature as activity, is intentional. In its care for and interest in the world, consciousness transcends itself and attends to the world by a myriad of intentional acts, e. Although the notion of intentionality includes the practical connotations of willful interest, it fundamentally denotes the relation conscious has to objects in the world. Put differently, time-consciousness underscores these other intentional acts because these other intentional acts presuppose or include the consciousness of internal time. All experience entails a temporal horizon, according to phenomenology. This claim seems indisputable: To highlight the difficulty and importance of explaining the structures of consciousness that make possible the experience of time, Husserl, like his contemporaries Henri Bergson and William James, favored the example of listening to a melody. For a melody to be a melody, it must have distinguishable though inseparable moments. And for consciousness to apprehend a melody, its structure must have features capable of respecting these features of temporal objects. But this scientific and psychological account of time, which, following Newton, considers time as an empty container of discrete, atomistic nows, is not adequate to the task of explaining how consciousness experiences a temporal object. In this case of Newtonian time, each tone spreads its content out in a corresponding now but each now and thus each tone remains separated from every other. Newtonian time can explain the separation of moments in time but not the continuity of these moments. Since temporal objects, like a melody or a sentence, are characterized by and experienced as a unity across a succession, an account of the perception of a temporal object must explain how we synthesize a flowing object in such a way that we i preserve the position of each tone without ii eliminating the unity of the melody or iii relating each tone by collapsing the difference in the order between the tones. Bergson, James and Husserl realized that if our consciousness were structured in such a way that each moment occurred in strict separation from every other like planks of a picket fence, then we never could apprehend or perceive the unity of our experiences or enduring objects in time otherwise than as a convoluted patchwork. Phenomenological Reduction and Time-consciousness Husserl believed that every experience for intentional conscious has a temporal character or background. We experience spatial objects, both successive e. We do not, on the other hand, experience all temporal objects e. For the phenomenologist, even non-temporal objects e. To this point, common sense views of time may find Husserl agreeable. Such agreement ceases, however, for those who expect Husserl to proclaim that time resembles an indefinite series of nows like seconds passing from the future through the present into the past as a river flows from the top of a mountain into a lake. This common sense conception of time understands the future as not-yet-now, the past as no-longer-now, and the present as what now-is, a thin, ephemeral slice of time. Put less technically, one could consider phenomenology a critical rather than habitual or dogmatic approach to understanding the world. Hence, the phenomenological reduction enables Husserl to examine the structures of consciousness that allow us to apprehend and thus characterize the modes of temporal objects appearing as now, past or future. As Husserlians often express it, Husserl concerns himself not with the content of an object or event in time e. We can make assessments and measurements, e. Our awareness of objective time thus depends upon our awareness of subjective time. We are aware of subjective time, however, as a unity across succession of mental states because the consciousness of internal time provides a consciousness of succession that makes possible the apprehension and unification of successive mental states PCIT No. Moreover, since we believe that natural time precedes and will outlast our existence, we tend to consider 3 more fundamental than 1. Of course, such a passively received attitude or belief about time and our place therein amounts to cultural prejudice in favor of the scientific view of human beings as mere physical entities subject to the relentless march of time. When listening to a fifty minute lecture level 3, one may

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experience it as slow or as fast level 2. This structure in 1 functions in such a way that each listener can agree about the objective duration of the lecture while disagreeing about their subjective experience of it. If 1 changed subjectively as 2, then we never could reach a consensus or objective agreement about 3. Concerned with how temporal phenomena manifest themselves to conscious perceivers, the phenomenologist examines 1, namely the structures of intentional consciousness that make possible the disclosure of time as a worldly or psychological phenomenon. To begin to explain the priority of 1, Husserl highlights how the now and past are not a part of time considered according to the natural attitude view of 3 or 2. Conversely, he considers the present, past, and future as modes of appearing or modes by which we experience things and events as now, no longer past or not yet future. This does not mean that Husserl views time as something that flows willy-nilly, or that the time of the Columbia shuttle tragedy is contemporaneous with the time of your reading this entry. Phenomenology helps to clarify the common sense understanding of time as a container—a metaphysical placeholder—that contains events. This common sense understanding of time as a container persists because we forget that we first understand these fixed temporal relations and position thanks to the modes of appearing, namely now, past and future. Brough, Since the now and past are not a part of time but the modes by which things appear to me as temporal, each now that becomes past can accommodate many events simultaneously, e. Moreover, I can remember what events preceded and succeeded this tragedy, e. These reflections on temporal objects and experienced time indicate that the flow of our conscious life is the condition for the possibility of the disclosure of temporal objects and experienced time, a condition that begins from the privileged standpoint of the now, which, again, nevertheless occurs in an interplay with past and future rather than in isolation from them. Indeed, our preliminary reflections on time depend upon a series of successive events but a succession of experiences or perceptions is not yet an experience or perception of succession. Husserl turns his attention toward 1—the transcendental level of internal time-consciousness—in order to explain how 2 and 3 become constituted conscious experiences. This explanation begins, for Husserl, by confronting the paradox of how to account for the unity of a process of change that continues for an extended period of time, a unity that develops in succession, e. To unravel this theoretical knot, Husserl believed, philosophy must realize that, beyond the temporality of the object, the act of perceiving has its own temporal character PCIT No. Husserl contends that insofar as a temporal object such as a sentence occurs across time in a now that includes what is no longer, consciousness too must extend beyond the now; indeed, if all I heard were different words in each new now without connecting them to past related words, then I never would hear a sentence but only a barrage of sounding words. Consciousness not only must extend beyond the now, but it also must extend in such a way that it preserves the determinate temporal order of the words and modifies their orientation to the now. Indeed, if I preserved the words in a simultaneous or haphazard order, then I never would hear a sentence but only a jumble of words. Memory gives not the perception of a temporal object but always only what it is capable of giving: With respect to this problem of conflating memory and perception, Husserl indicates two consequences. Indeed, something quite different occurs when I hear a sentence and when I remember the event of the Columbia shuttle tragedy. The problem of the consciousness of time becomes properly phenomenological when Husserl asks how one explains the original consciousness of the past upon which one can recognize an object as past rather than remembering a past moment. Put differently, the problem of time becomes phenomenological when Husserl begins to seek an account of the generation of a sense or consciousness of pastness upon which the perception of a temporal object and memory depend. Indeed, to claim that we remember something presupposes the very sense of the past we are trying to explain Sokolowski An adequate account of the perception of a temporal object first requires a discussion of how consciousness extends beyond the now, i. Phenomenology and the Consciousness of Internal Time: Living-Present Unlike previous theories addressing the consciousness of time, Husserl shifts his attention from an account of what is perceived as temporal to an account of the temporality of that which does the perceiving. Put differently, he tightens his focus, so to speak, recognizing that when one perceives a temporal object one also experiences the flow of the intentional act of perception

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Brough In order to solve the aforementioned paradox of how to account for the unity of a temporal object over the succession of its parts e. Rather than attempt to explain the unity of a succession of discrete consciousnesses correlated with a succession of discrete moments in a temporal object, Husserl attempts to explain the consciousness of succession that makes possible the apprehension of a succession of consciousnesses. This tripartite form or intentional structure of the living-present should not be thought of as discrete, independently occurring pieces in a process or procession. Were the moments of the living-present thought as such, we would have to remember or re-present each past state of consciousness. Consciousness is no longer a punctual box with several acts functioning in it simultaneously and directing themselves to the appropriate instances of the object. In this life of consciousness, Husserl maintains, consciousness apprehends itself and that which flows within it. As Husserl describes it, retention perceives the elapsed conscious phase of experience at level 1 and thereby the past of the experience at level 2 and the past of the object at level 3. This distinction does not mean that memory differs from retention merely as a matter of temporal distance, the former reaching back further into time. Rather, Husserl draws a structural distinction between memory and retention: The former is an active, mediated, objectifying awareness of a past object, while the latter is a passive, immediate, non-objectifying, conscious awareness of the elapsed phase of conscious experience. First, memory reveals itself to be an act under the voluntary auspices of consciousness, whereas retention occurs passively. Third, remembering re-produces a completed temporal object, whereas retention works at completing the consciousness of a temporal object, unifying its presence and absence. Fourth, as the representation of a new intentional object, memory is an act of presenting something as past, as absent, whereas the retention that attempts to account for the perception of an object over time constitutes an intuition of that which has just passed and is now in some sense absent, an act of presenting something as a unity in succession. To be sure, the words do not occur simultaneously; each word passes and yet remains relevant to the presently lived experience. The interpreter of Husserl must take care at this point not to read the turn to consciousness as entailing a loss of the perceived; rather, what is retained is precisely the impressionable moment as experienced in that moment and having been retained in this experience. As an absolute flowing identity in a manifold of primal impression, retention and protention the stream of conscious life in the living-present constitutes the procession of words in the sentence that appears and is experienced sequentially in accordance with the temporally distinct position of each word. That I hear the words of the fifty-minute lecture and feel myself inspired or bored is possible only on the basis of my self-awareness or consciousness of internal time. That the living-present temporalizes means that it grasps its past and future as absent without reducing its past and future to the present, thus freezing consciousness temporal flow. As Husserl himself admits that we have no words for this time-constituting phenomenon, the image of shimmering seems a more appropriate descriptor, for Husserl understand the living-present paradoxically as a standing-streaming PCIT No. Husserl must characterize the flow as non-temporal. If that which makes possible the awareness of a unity in succession itself occurred in succession, then we would need to account for the apprehension of the succession unique to the living-present, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum PCIT, No. An infinite regress of consciousness, however, would mean that we never would achieve an answer to the question of what makes possible the consciousness of time. This argument in favor of the non-temporal character of the living-present brings us to the two senses in which the special form of intentional consciousness is an absolute consciousness. First, Husserl characterizes the living-present as absolute because a non-temporal consciousness that needs no other consciousness behind it to account for its self-apprehension is just that, absolute, the bottom line. If philosophy construes all awareness according to an object-intentionality model of awareness, i. For example, when I am writing this entry, I am conscious of the computer on which I am typing, as well as myself as the one typing. To explain, philosophically, however, how I apprehend myself as the one typing, the dyadic object-intentionality model of awareness will not suffice. Locke establishes this account by distinguishing i simple ideas of sense directed toward iia objects from i simple ideas of reflection directed toward iib the self. In both cases, i knows iia and iib in the same manner insofar as i takes iia and iib

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as objects while i itself goes unnoticed or unaccounted for. Even if a simple idea of reflection directs itself toward the self, one self the reflecting self remains subject while the other self the reflected self becomes the object. In self-awareness, however, no difference, distance or separation exists between the knower and the known. Forced to apprehend itself as an object in an exercise of simple sense reflection, the Lockean subject never coincides with itself, caught as it is in a sequence of epistemic tail chasing Locke, I; Zahavi, Such tail chasing, moreover, entails an infinite regress of selves themselves never self-aware. Still, even those who accept its legitimacy disagree about how best to explain the relation between levels 1 and 2 of time-consciousness see Zahavi, ; Brough In any event, we can begin by identifying a fundamental difference between Husserl and Heidegger: According to Heidegger, the essence of absolute time-constituting consciousness amounted to a subject divorced and isolated from the world because Husserl construed absolute consciousness as a theory only about the a priori, presuppositionless and essential structures of consciousness that made possible the unified perception of an object occurring in successive moments. Instead, we must understand the human being as being-in-the-world, Dasein, literally there-being; we only can understand what the world contributes to us and what we contribute to the world if we consider each as co-dependent without reducing one to the other. For Heidegger, Dasein is being in the world, a being with goals and projects toward which it comports itself or toward which it stretches out. The projects toward which it stretches itself makes Dasein fundamentally futural in its intentional directedness toward the world. Or, better, Heidegger concluded that the performance of the reduction adulterates the view of the subject and thus should be abandoned. Hence, one might claim, Heidegger introduces the movement of existential phenomenology, a development in phenomenology concerned with the very existence of the human being, which we have seen is termed Dasein by Heidegger.