

Chapter 1 : Charles Fourier - Wikipedia

*François Marie Charles Fourier* ( / ˈ f ɔː r i eɪ , - i ˈ tʊər /; French: [ʁɑ̃swaʁ mɑʁiʃ ʁaʁl fʁuʁje]; 7 April - 10 October ) was a French philosopher, influential early socialist thinker and one of the founders of utopian socialism.

In the history of nihilism, written by Nietzsche in this chapter, we can distinguish two moments in relation to Platonism. The first of these two phases is a metaphysical way of thinking, created by Plato himself, which is built upon the three categories of purpose, unity or totality and being or truth. The metaphysical splitting of the world into an intelligible or true world and a sensible or apparent world, discredits this world and, therefore, has nihilistic implications for European culture: I think we can distinguish a second phase of Platonism on the road to nihilism, when the belief in the intelligible world has disappeared from European thought. As Heidegger points out commenting on this famous chapter, it is not sufficient to eliminate the intelligible world as the true world, because the empty space of that world remains as something hanging over this world and condemning it, and the cleavage between two worlds in a metaphysical construction is still Platonism. This is my main concern in my contribution, the ontology of value which survives in the last phases of the historical development of nihilism, when the old beliefs in the metaphysical world have already been left behind. Fink has called it. What I am trying to examine is how Platonism determines a way of thinking in the ontology of value which remains after eliminating the metaphysics that presented our world as an apparent world. I am making reference to utopian thinking. I will deal with these three questions. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. Popper [ ] , p. As is well known, Popper accused Plato of being one of the most important seeds of modern totalitarianism. It could be, in his view, only by virtue of having been figured out with a view to justice itself on the one hand and the human all too human on the other. With these words Strauss could give the impression that he thinks that the just city for Plato is a kind of compromise between the ideal and the human condition, as a desirable blueprint to be realized in practice. But for Strauss the just city of the Republic is not even possible or desirable. If at first we are told that the just city would come into being if the philosophers become kings, we finally realise that this will not be possible unless they expel the children and everyone older than ten from the city, in order to make sure that their subjects will not be corrupted by the old traditional ways of life. First of all, it is difficult to reach a consensus about what utopian thought really is. The term utopia was first used by Thomas More in his well-known work entitled *Utopia* and first published in 1516. I believe that the word itself refers us to an essential characteristic of this concept about which I would like to make certain reflections on the present occasion. Others have derived the word from *eu topos*, and then the essential meaning would not be a state which does not exist anywhere but an ideal city. Ricoeur reminds us, 23 one of the essential traits of his concept of utopia was that it should represent the demands of a socially oppressed class. Throughout the Republic Socrates describes three waves which threaten to sweep him away. First of all he refers to the necessity of ordaining that the guardians and the female guardians must have all their pursuits in common. The ontology of value 10 This utopian content, if we can call it so, produces the characteristic inversion of reality which is common in utopias. But the question is the type of metaphysical mechanism which makes it possible as a way of thinking, because the ontology of value which arises from utopia depends on that. What is the meaning of this word in the Republic? First of all, we must say that it has a true and normative character. This is evident when Socrates compares the guardian with the painter. In the second place, and I think that this is very important for the ontology of value which derives from it, the paradigm has a reality whose validity is independent of its existence and even of its possibility in the world of experience. Thomas More, as we know from his *Letters to Erasmus*, gave to his work the tentative title of *Nusquama*, probably it has been suggested by P. Anyway, with these words Plato comes very close to the modern concept of utopia. The Platonists discussed 24 whether this pattern has in itself an ideal character or whether it is a kind of philosophical imitation of ideal forms, which is established in order to organize an empirical reality which will never fully accommodate to it. In whichever case, whether the pattern is a Platonic idea or more modestly the plan of a perfect state inspired by Platonic ideas, I believe that in this way of thinking we have a philosophy of value that is basic in utopia, because here, indeed, normative validity is

conceived of as a truth which is independent of empirical reality. Herbst , 9 The truth and the being of the pattern depends on its value, and with his procedure he is consecrating the category of the imaginative inversion of reality which will be essential in the nowhere land where utopia resides. In the aforementioned text Nietzsche comments on the boldness of Platonism in his inversion Umdrehen of reality, while P. Ricoeur, speaking of Fourier, the utopian socialist, reminds us of the importance which fantasy, and particularly inversion, has in utopian thinking. It is a philosophical category, typical of nineteenth century, he says, 28 because Marx employs it against Hegel and the utopian socialists against existing society and the real life. The old values with the collapse of the intelligible world have been replaced by new ideals, but the ontology of value survives in utopian thought and in this way we can speak of a legacy of Platonism in the European culture. Utopia and conflict of values 32 K. The clear answer which can be given to this question is that all the different values constitute an indissoluble unity: Nevertheless, I would like to leave aside, in relation to Plato, the problem of the unity of the city, which is very closely related to the present question, but of a different nature, because it has to do with politics, and I will prefer to concentrate on the ontological aspect of values. First of all, we have an ontological aspect. Values cannot contradict one another, because all of them depend metaphysically on the Idea of Good. This ontology, this axiological monism is the metaphysical presupposition of the Platonic utopia of the ideal city: But what is most important to realise is that even when this metaphysical presupposition is abandoned in modern thought, the axiological unity survives in the utopias. This monism is one of the three fundamental traits, perhaps the most important, which I. Berlin attributes to utopian thinking. Nevertheless, we could ask whether Plato, while constructing his project of a perfect city, was so blind that he did not understand the complexity of human motives. As is well known, Plato distinguished in the human soul as well as in the city three basic motives of intellectual, spirited and appetitive character: The desire for pleasure which is achieved in the satisfaction of the biological needs, in the first place, characteristic of the appetitive part of the soul and the productive class of the state, the desire for victory, honour and recognition, which is characteristic of the choleric part and the military class, in the second place, and, finally, the desire for knowledge, of the rational part and the ruling class. At first glance, it could be said that these basic desires are psychological or social motives, but not values which should be harmonized in a perfect state. But this is not so simple, because these motives have to be provided with cognitive counterparts if they have to operate with other factors in the spheres of the soul or the state. I cannot argue at length in favour of my own theory of what we could call a cognitive theory of desire in Plato. So I will give only one example of what I am trying to explain. Plato calls the appetitive part of the soul *philochrematon* or *philokerdes* money-loving or gain-loving part, a , thus indicating that the search for pleasure, which would be derived from the satisfaction of these biological needs, is usually transformed into another drive which does not seek these immediate pleasures, but rather is only an instrument for a future and perhaps safer way of indulging them. This means that what was at first rated only in terms of the search of physiological pleasure is transformed into other cognitive objects, which are capable of appearing as values, as the value of economic stability, prosperity and so on. The same could be said of the basic motive which looks for victory and honour in that choleric part of the soul which Plato calls *philotimos* or *philonikos* for her desire of reputation and victory. And the same applies, needless to say, to the rational part or the ruling class of the state and their corresponding intellectual motivations. What I want to say is that each part of the soul is capable of transforming their desires into representations of the good. Plato speaks of *logoi* and *doxai* that participate in what we could describe as a conflict of values in the realm of soul: But the question is whether this conflict of values is possible in the just city of the Platonic utopia or, what is equivalent to this, in the well-ordered soul of the just individual. All the motives and the corresponding values to which the irrational parts are sensitive can give rise to conflicts due to their irrational character. This means, in my opinion, that the psychological and social harmony which Plato is seeking for his utopia of a just city is possible under the presupposition of a monism of value where no conflicts can arise if reason is in charge of the order to be established by the philosopher king. Virtue is knowledge, in my opinion, means, in relation to utopian thinking, that reason is the way for finding the path to a social whole where all the solutions and the different values are compatible with one another. This Platonic conception of reason is the other foundation of the unity

of values and it is what provides a link between the different assumptions of the utopian thought described by Berlin. Reason cannot contradict itself in its analysis of facts, when it proceeds theoretically. He does not distinguish the order of being from the order of action: In the same manner as reason cannot contradict itself analysing facts, the faculty of the rational will which operates in the practical order cannot desire contrary things. If we apply this conception of praxis to the human faculty of desiring, we need to presuppose a division of the self to explain how a single person desires and rejects the same object. If reason cannot affirm and deny at the same time and in respect to the same thing, it cannot either command and forbid a course of action or desire and reject opposing values at the same time, and this is why he has to divide the faculty of desiring into a rational and an irrational part. Plato does not realise, as I. Writings from the Late Notebooks Simson, London, , vol.

Chapter 2 : The Utopian Â- A Short History of Desire

*Ontology and Utopia Fredric Jameson THE TIME-HONORED FRENCH WAY of introducing a subject like Fourier (the English equivalent is not so pointed) is the forÂ- mula "actualitÂ© de": which sets us in a more historicist and relativÂ-.*

Fourier produced most of his writings between and In , he tried to sell his books again but with no success. He believed that a society that cooperated would see an immense improvement in their productivity levels. Workers would be recompensed for their labors according to their contribution. These buildings were four-level apartment complexes where the richest had the uppermost apartments and the poorest had a ground-floor residence. Fourier considered trade , which he associated with Jews, to be the "source of all evil" and advocated that Jews be forced to perform farm work in the phalansteries. Roth and Richard L. Rubenstein have seen Fourier as motivated by economic and religious antisemitism, rather than the racial antisemitism that would emerge later in the century. In his lexicon civilization was a depraved order, a synonym for perfidy and constraint But the possibility of "attractive labor" travail attrayant derives above all from the release of libidinal forces. Fourier assumes the existence of an attraction industrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. One day there would be six million of these, loosely ruled by a world " omniarch ", or later a World Congress of Phalanxes. He had a concern for the sexually rejected; jilted suitors would be led away by a corps of fairies who would soon cure them of their lovesickness, and visitors could consult the card-index of personality types for suitable partners for casual sex. He also defended homosexuality as a personal preference for some people. Fourier believed that all important jobs should be open to women on the basis of skill and aptitude rather than closed on account of gender. He spoke of women as individuals, not as half the human couple. He felt that children as early as age two and three were very industrious. He listed the dominant tastes in all children to include, but not limited to: Rummaging or inclination to handle everything, examine everything, look through everything, to constantly change occupations; Industrial commotion, taste for noisy occupations; Aping or imitative mania. Industrial miniature, a taste for miniature workshops. Progressive attraction of the weak toward the strong. Fourier saw his fellow human beings living in a world full of strife, chaos, and disorder.

### Chapter 3 : Charles Fourier

*Fourier was born in Besançon, France on April 7, [4] The son of a small businessman, Fourier was more interested in architecture than in his father's trade.[4] He wanted to become an engineer, but the local military engineering school accepted only sons of noblemen.[4].*

Fourier is, for instance, credited with having originated the word feminism in Later Fourier inspired a diverse array of revolutionary thinkers and writers. Fourier died in Paris in He believed that a society that cooperated would see an immense improvement in their productivity levels. Workers would be recompensed for their labors according to their contribution. Fourier considered trade, which he associated with Jews, to be the "source of all evil" and advocated that Jews be forced to perform farm work in the phalansteries. In his lexicon civilization was a depraved order, a synonym for perfidy and constraint But the possibility of "attractive labor" travail attrayant derives above all from the release of libidinal forces. Fourier assumes the existence of an attraction industrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. Beacon Press, Boston, MA, One day there would be six million of these, loosely ruled by a world "omniarch," or later a World Congress of Phalanxes. He had a touching concern for the sexually rejected; jilted suitors would be led away by a corps of fairies who would soon cure them of their lovesickness, and visitors could consult the card-index of personality types for suitable partners for casual sex. He also defended homosexuality as a personal preference for some people. Fourier believed that all important jobs should be open to women on the basis of skill and aptitude rather than closed on account of gender. He spoke of women as individuals, not as half the human couple. Education and the liberation of human passion. He felt that children as early as age two and three were very industrious. He listed the dominant tastes in all children to include, but not limited to: Rummaging or inclination to handle everything, examine everything, look through everything, to constantly change occupations; Industrial commotion, taste for noisy occupations; Aping or imitative mania. Industrial miniature, a taste for miniature workshops. Progressive attraction of the weak toward the strong. Fourier saw his fellow human beings living in a world full of strife, chaos, and disorder.

**Chapter 4 : Nihilism and Utopia : Plato, Nietzsche, Isaiah Berlin and utopian thinking**

*"Fourier insists that this transformation requires a complete change in the social institutions: distribution of the social product according to need, assignment of functions according to individual faculties and inclinations, constant mutation of functions, short work periods, and so on.*

Translated by Thomas Meaney. But what if our sexual needs are satisfied and our spiritual needs take over? Never have we had less intention of quitting it. More seriously, we might ask ourselves whether the metaphysical state, far from being a transitory phase that dissolves all preceding theologies, does not instead keep them artificially alive by means of the uncertainty inherent in all metaphysics. The astonishing scientific and technical progress of the Renaissance was accomplished in a sort of philosophical innocence, without any guiding thought to structure it. Charting his own course through the ruins, Descartes made a major innovation when, for the first time, he decisively separated physics from metaphysics. By putting the useless categories of matter and spirit in opposition to each other, he at one stroke created the conditions for most of the philosophical errors that followed. Designed expressly to quarantine problems without content God, the human soul, etc. Some attempts, like Kantianism, were grandiose; others, like psychology, were miserable. The category of matter, for its part, seemed to enjoy success after success. Demagogic and simplistic, Cartesian thought still imposes itself on us today. We still occasionally confuse it with the scientific method, or with positivism – a pitiful mistake that only encourages its progress. At the outset, Cartesianism was tempted to oppose Newtonian physics. For a materialist, the idea that an action can take place in a vacuum seems inconceivable. Only experimental evidence made it see reason in the end. The 20th-century arguments concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics can only be explained by a similar desire to safeguard this materialist, causal ontology. From the positivist point of view, after all, neither Newtonian mechanics nor quantum mechanics posed particular problems. They both produce laws that permit us to model phenomena and predict results based on experience. Entities are not multiplied beyond necessity. Where is the problem? Pascal had already warned us he had scientific fluency before he sank into his night of mysticism: But to say what these are, and to compose the machine, is ridiculous. It is useless, uncertain, and painful. Matter, no more than God, finds grace in the eyes of positivist thinking. Ontological modesty; submission to the march of experimental science; willingness first to predict, and to explain only if possible: But, while it has allowed the scientific discoveries of the past five centuries, it has not yet seduced a more widespread public. If even the scientific community has not completely abandoned the search for all metaphysical phantoms, what can we expect of the rest of society? A Belief that Society Can Be Reorganized on an Entirely New Basis in the Space of a Few Years Since Auguste Comte wrongly assumed that the positivist stage of the physical and life sciences had already been reached, he proposed to extend positivism to the social sciences. All of his philosophy, in other words, is made possible only by a giant failure of historical understanding. With his premises not yet realized – and not about to be realized, either – the solutions he proposed have to be relegated to an indefinite future. It is certainly true of the literature of the period. Such activity had its equivalent in philosophy. This is well-known about Germany, but much less appreciated about France. It may seem surprising to compare Comte and Fourier, as their systems stand in radical opposition to each other. They both believed with certainty that society could be reorganized on an entirely new basis in the space of a few generations – in a few years even, after the necessary social interest had been established. The great subject of Fourier – the one at which he excels, where he promises dazzling improvements over the mere time span of a human life – is what we could call the motivation of the producers. Here too, Comte if we can except his strange anticipation of the Virgin Mother is content to reproduce old ideas. The omissions of Charles Fourier, for his part, are considerable in other areas. Above all, he barely deals with religion at all. At a time when the religious foundations of society were collapsing in France, Fourier contents himself with vague proclamations against atheism. He and Comte also both wrote too much, too quickly – and treated even the most fundamental stylistic conventions with complete disdain. Today both authors are considered unreadable, except by certain perverse types, who have come to love their oddities, which they take as a sign

of their genius: But the public at large, they say, now has a new spiritual thirst. The proclamation seems to me a bit premature: But suppose the former are satisfied, and that, as a result, the spiritual needs take over? Then we will have an interest in plunging back into Comte. For that was his real subject — religion. And here at least we can say he was an innovator. The Establishment of Religion Man is a social animal. This fact is at the root of Comtian thought, and we must never lose sight of it if we want to understand its branches. In examining the social formations of the human species, along with its diverse organizations, Comte is nearly exhaustive: But of all the structures a society produces - and on which it is, in turn, founded — religion strikes him at once as the most important, the most characteristic, and the most threatened. Before Comte, religion, above all else, was seen as a system for explaining the world — the rest more or less followed from it. As one of the first to sense that this system was irremediably outdated, Comte was also among the first to realize that the foundations of the social world would collapse. As one of the first to see that the rational explanation of the universe would, therefore, have to limit itself to a more modest form of discourse from now on, he was the very first to attempt to give the social world a new religious basis. To say the least, Comte failed. The positivist religion had only a few followers, very few, and then it disappeared. He went ahead and planned the sacraments, along with the religious calendar. Suppose that all theisms are extinguished, that materialism is debunked, that positivism reigns supreme as the only mode of thought in the scientific age. Suppose that this fact was not the subject of polemics or broadsides, but rather regarded as objective fact, beyond doubt as the postulates of genetics are today. In what respect would we then have made progress towards the establishment of a communal religion? And how could they — conscious of their individual disappearance — take satisfaction from their participation in this new theoretical fetish? Only the promise of physical immortality, made possible by technology, could once again make religion possible. What Comte helps us see is that such a religion — a religion for immortals — is still necessary. He lives in Ireland.

Chapter 5 : Table of contents for Archaeologies of the future

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Fourier is, for instance, credited with having originated the word feminism in Later Fourier inspired a diverse array of revolutionary thinkers and writers. Contents 1 Life 2 Ideas 2. Fourier produced most of his writings between and In , he tried to sell his books again but with no success. He believed that a society that cooperated would see an immense improvement in their productivity levels. Workers would be recompensed for their labors according to their contribution. These buildings were four-level apartment complexes where the richest had the uppermost apartments and the poorest had a ground-floor residence. Fourier considered trade, which he associated with Jews, to be the "source of all evil" and advocated that Jews be forced to perform farm work in the phalansteries. Roth and Richard L. Rubenstein have seen Fourier as motivated by economic and religious antisemitism, rather than the racial antisemitism that would emerge later in the century. In his lexicon civilization was a depraved order, a synonym for perfidy and constraint But the possibility of "attractive labor" travail attrayant derives above all from the release of libidinal forces. Fourier assumes the existence of an attraction industrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. One day there would be six million of these, loosely ruled by a world "omniarch", or later a World Congress of Phalanxes. He had a concern for the sexually rejected; jilted suitors would be led away by a corps of fairies who would soon cure them of their lovesickness, and visitors could consult the card-index of personality types for suitable partners for casual sex. He also defended homosexuality as a personal preference for some people. Fourier believed that all important jobs should be open to women on the basis of skill and aptitude rather than closed on account of gender. He spoke of women as individuals, not as half the human couple. He felt that children as early as age two and three were very industrious. He listed the dominant tastes in all children to include, but not limited to: Rummaging or inclination to handle everything, examine everything, look through everything, to constantly change occupations; Industrial commotion, taste for noisy occupations; Aping or imitative mania. Industrial miniature, a taste for miniature workshops. Progressive attraction of the weak toward the strong. Fourier saw his fellow human beings living in a world full of strife, chaos, and disorder.

Chapter 6 : Fredric Jameson: The Politics of Utopia. New Left Review 25, January-February

*Life. Fourier was born in Besançon, France on April 7, The son of a small businessman, Fourier was more interested in architecture than in his father's trade. He wanted to become an engineer, but the local military engineering school accepted only sons of noblemen.*

Attempts to realize Utopia, however, have been historically more intermittent, and we need to limit them even further by now insisting on everything peculiar and eccentric about the fantasy production that gives rise to them. Daydreams, in which whole cities are laid out in the mind, in which constitutions are enthusiastically composed and legal systems endlessly drafted and emended, in which the seating arrangements for festivals and banquets are meditated in detail, and even garbage disposal is as attentively organized as administrative hierarchy, and family and child care problems resolved with ingenious new proposals – such fantasies seem distinct enough from erotic daydreams and to warrant special attention in their own right. The Utopians, whether political, textual or hermeneutic, have always been maniacs and oddballs: Indeed, I want us to understand Utopianism, not as some unlocking of the political, returning to its rightful centrality as in the Greek city-states; but rather as a whole distinct process in its own right. On a first approach, I want even those dealings with the political which it seems to presuppose to retain an awkward and suspect character. We must accustom ourselves to think, in our societies in which the political has so successfully been disjoined from the private, of the political as a kind of vice. Why else should those prototypical political thinkers par excellence, Machiavelli and Carl Schmitt, be forever surrounded with an aroma of scandal? But what they dared to enunciate publicly, in a heroism indissociable from cynicism, our Utopians grasp more furtively, in forms more redolent of perversion than of paranoia, and with that passionate sense of mission or calling from which jouissance is never absent. It is however not a psychological account we now seek, but rather a more historical one, which theorizes the conditions of possibility of these peculiar fantasies. Utopias seem to be by-products of Western modernity, not even emerging in every stage of the latter. We need to get some idea of the specific situations and circumstances under which their composition is possible, situations which encourage this peculiar vocation or talent at the same time that they offer suitable materials for its exercise. The Utopian calling, indeed, seems to have some kinship with that of the inventor in modern times, and to bring to bear some necessary combination of the identification of a problem to be solved and the inventive ingenuity with which a series of solutions are proposed and tested. The Utopian vocation can be identified by this certainty, and by the persistent and obsessive search for a simple, a single-shot solution to all our ills. And this must be a solution so obvious and self-explanatory that every reasonable person will grasp it: Yet it is the social situation which must admit of such a solution, or at least of its possibility: The view that opens out onto history from a particular social situation must encourage such oversimplifications; the miseries and injustices thus visible must seem to shape and organize themselves around one specific ill or wrong. For the Utopian remedy must at first be a fundamentally negative one, and stand as a clarion call to remove and to extirpate this specific root of all evil from which all the others spring. This is why it is a mistake to approach Utopias with positive expectations, as though they offered visions of happy worlds, spaces of fulfillment and cooperation, representations which correspond generically to the idyll or the pastoral rather than the utopia. Indeed, the attempt to establish positive criteria of the desirable society characterizes liberal political theory from Locke to Rawls, rather than the diagnostic interventions of the Utopians, which, like those of the great revolutionaries, always aim at the alleviation and elimination of the sources of exploitation and suffering, rather than at the composition of blueprints for bourgeois comfort. The confusion arises from the formal properties of these texts, which also seem to offer blueprints: This first basic step does not disappear in later Utopias, but is often improved by additional concerns, which prompt new motifs and new embellishments. So it is that Campanella emphasizes the order to be realized by a generalization of the space of the monastery. Fourier and desire; Saint-Simon and administration; Bellamy and the industrial army; Morris and that non-alienated labor he called art – all were able to offer Utopian programs that could be grasped with a single slogan and seem relatively easy to put into effect. Yet despite what has been said about the eccentricities of the Utopian analyst,

these themes and social diagnoses are neither random nor willfully invented out of obsession or personal whim. But nothing guarantees that a given Utopian preoccupation will strike the mark, that it will detect any really existing social elements, let alone fashion them into a model that will explain their situation to other people. There is therefore, alongside seemingly random biographical chapters, a history of the Utopian raw material to be projected: And as with the Alien itself, it is conceivable that each moment of representation will seem radically different from its predecessors: Yet in order for representability to be achieved, the social or historical moment must somehow offer itself as a situation, allow itself to be read in terms of effects and causes, or problems and solutions, questions and answers. It must have reached a level of shaped complexity that seems to foreground some fundamental ill, and that tempts the social theorist into producing an overview organized around a specific theme. The social totality is always unrepresentable, even in the most numerically limited groups of people; but it can sometimes be mapped and allow a small-scale model to be constructed on which the fundamental tendencies and the lines of flight can more clearly be read. At other times, this representational process is impossible, and people face history and the social totality as a bewildering chaos, whose forces are indiscernible. For good or ill, this second type of Utopian precondition "the material" would seem to distinguish itself from the first "the vocation" as object to subject, as social reality to individual perception: Yet the traditional opposition is little more than a convenience, and we are more interested in the mysterious interaction of both in Utopian texts in which they in fact become inextricable. To separate them inevitably involves a figural process, even in objective disciplines like sociology. Laws, labor, marriage, industrial and institutional organization, trade and exchange, even subjective raw materials such as characterological formations, habits of practice, talents, gender attitudes: We may think of these systems in any form we like: That these are ongoing and increasingly complex differentiations is a matter of empirical history: Meanwhile the political system itself hives off the jurists, who become a separate profession governed by a distinct field of knowledge in its own right, from its administrators and bureaucrats, elective officials, state, municipal and federal employees, along with the multiplications of the welfare state, the appearance of social workers, and the various branches of public medicine as well as scientific research; and so on and so forth. Luhmann defines modernity by way of the onset of this process; postmodernity could then be seen as a dialectical saturation in which the hitherto semi-autonomous sub-systems of these various social levels threaten to become autonomous tout court, and generate a very different ideological picture of complexity as dispersed multiplicity and infinite fission than the progressive one afforded by the preceding stage of modernity. What does this interesting picture of social differentiation have to offer a theory of Utopian production? I believe that we can begin from the proposition that Utopian space is an imaginary enclave within real social space, in other words, that the very possibility of Utopian space is itself a result of spatial and social differentiation. But it is an aberrant by-product, and its possibility is dependent on the momentary formation of a kind of eddy or self-contained backwater within the general differentiation process and its seemingly irreversible forward momentum. This pocket of stasis within the ferment and rushing forces of social change may be thought of as a kind of enclave within which Utopian fantasy can operate. This is a figure which then usefully allows us to combine two hitherto contradictory features of the relation of Utopia to social reality: The court, for example, offers a figure of a closed space beyond the social from which power distantly emanates, but which cannot itself be thought as modifiable except in those rare moments in which revolutionary politics shakes the whole edifice. For the earlier Utopias, then, the figure of the court as an ahistorical enclave within a bustling movement of secularization and national and commercial development offers a kind of mental space in which the whole system can be imagined as radically different. But clearly, this enclave space is but a pause in the all-encompassing forward momentum of differentiation which will sweep it away altogether a few decades later or at the very least reorganize it and plunge it into secular society and social space as such. Such enclaves are something like a foreign body within the social: The enclave radiates baleful power, but at the same time it is a power that can be eclipsed without a trace precisely because it is confined to a limited space. A similar inversion takes place in Bacon, where the enclave emergence of secular science and its episodic transnational networks, foreshadowing the founding of the Royal Society, determine the fantasy of a whole world organized along the new research principles. Both these models, which

deploy ideologies of the old and the new forms of the intellectual, remain attractive to intellectuals in various modern versions, it being understood that the intellectual is quintessentially the dweller in just such enclave spaces. In essence our brains grew to their current configuration in response to the realities of that life. So as a result people grow powerfully attached to that kind of life, when they get the chance to live it. That is utopia, John, especially for primitives and scientists, which is to say everybody. So a scientific research station is actually a little model of prehistoric utopia, carved out of the transnational money economy by clever primates who want to live well. Yet with the bourgeois era and Fourier something new begins to appear: It is characteristic of this production of the new individualism and its subjectivities that the latter should now be felt to be incommensurable with the dry and more seemingly objective issues of social construction and Utopian statecraft. Other potentially Utopian enclaves appear at this point: Unlike Morris, these efforts show the renewed influence on the concept of Utopian secession: Indeed, it is precisely the closing of those loopholes and the advent of the perspective of a concrete World Market which is now called postmodernity or globalization and spells an end to this type of Utopian fantasy. At the same time, a kind of dedifferentiation already begins to reappear in the modern era which is registered in the conflation, from Bellamy onwards, of Utopia and socialism. But the history of the communist adventure is not co-terminous with the history of socialism as such; and it is hard to see how the problems of a modernizing industrial society could be resolved without the Utopian solutions afforded by socialism. Those ways, however, cannot but be collective albeit in unrecognizable new forms as well, and we will try, in a final chapter, to reidentify the vital political function Utopia still has to play today. Even from the outset, however, we have a decision to make which will confront us with two distinct interpretations, inasmuch as the second Book, the properly Utopian part of the text, is known to have been written first. Or should we let the present order continue to dictate a processual dynamism in which the Utopian vision emerges dialectically from the very contradictions of both Part One and of the historical present? The best method is always to turn such a problem into a solution in its own right, and to make of this objective and incompatible alternation an interpretive phenomenon at some higher meta level. Here reading and interpretation confront the fundamental ethical binary with a vengeance; and are at once asked to take a position on that ideological question par excellence which is also the fundamental political one, namely whether Utopias are positive or negative, good or evil. Yet this is not to be asked first but rather last of all: But they are not, I think, those proposed above between Utopia taken seriously as a social and political project and Utopian thought ridiculed as a pipe-dream. Nor does that opposition correspond to Robert C. For what Elliott meant by satire was not the anti-political rejection of the unrealistic and fanciful Utopian programs such as the abolition of money and private property, but rather the passionate and prophetic onslaught on current conditions and on the wickedness and stupidity of human beings in the fallen world of the here and now. Thus, if we posit the priority of Book One, we will want to foreground satire and its generic structure; if Book Two and insofar as Utopia as a genre does not yet exist, it will be travel narrative that sets the generic agenda. Whatever else it does, travel narrative marks Utopia as irredeemably other, and thus formally, or virtually by definition, impossible of realization: These contradictions are clearly modified when Utopia is set in a temporal future rather than at a geographical distance, but after all today space is once again on the postmodern agenda. As with the imaginary construction of the chimera, however, even a no-place must be put together out of already existing representations. Indeed the act of combination and the raw materials thereby combined themselves constitute the ideological message. We cannot try to read Book Two as a generic travel narrative without making an effort to see the place and to sense that exoticism it uniquely offers. I think myself of the figures in Dante or Giotto: Yet the Utopians will have to learn about both these family likenesses from their visitor Hythloday, who brings with him both the Greek classics and the Christian gospels. They confirm the family likeness by recognizing Christianity as their ethos, and also by way of the revelation that in fact they are descendents of shipwrecked Greeks, many generations earlier. Nor must we omit a final cultural association here: But this flavor of Protestantism, although registered in some practical details the priests marry, for example, is rather to be understood in the cultural sense, as a return to that spirit of primitive Christianity which is also a discovery and a new intellectual enthusiasm very much like the Humanism with which it is at first intimately related. Greece, the medieval, the Incas, Protestantism: Utopia is

a synthesis of these four codes or representational languages, these four ideologemes, but only on condition it be understood that they do not fold back into it without a trace, but retain the dissonances between their distinct identities and origins, revealing the constant effort of a process which seeks to combine them without effacing all traces of what it wishes to unify in the first place. For these four reference points include superstructure and base, that is to say, contemporaneous or even modern intellectual movements and passions along with social institutions barely surviving from the past. Their combination is a whole political program and in effect implicitly identifies those still existing social spaces in which the new ideological values might be incarnated. Thus Greece clearly means humanism and the conceptual enthusiasm aroused by the rediscovery of the linguistic possibilities of the classical languages; it stands for a unique perspective in which language and thought are once again for one long moment inseparable, in which the philosophical richness of the ancient texts is grasped as being at one with the stylistic and syntactical richness of the culture languages of antiquity. Norbert Elias has observed that this extraordinary revival is comparable to nothing quite so much as to the rediscovery of Marxism and the great dialectical texts and traditions in the s The style of classical Greek is thus at one with the discovery of an alternate conceptual universe even the very modern notion of a language revolution is faintly present in More, in the theme of the old and the new languages spoken by the Utopian population<sup>50</sup> ; and this glimpse of the fleeting unity between thinking and syntax will rapidly generate the first new image of the role of the intellectual since the Augustinian vision of the priesthood and the emergence of the various orders. Indeed, these new humanistic intellectuals will, Max Weber tells us, lay their own claim to political power and entertain a brief but intense ambition to become a new ruling class comparable to that of the Chinese mandarins, equally text-oriented and prepared to assume the functions of a heroic bureaucracy Ironically, More himself prematurely fills just such a role, and his tragic end offers at least one figure for the collapse of the humanist political project generally who are replaced by the more familiar and more successful grande bourgeoisie. Paradoxically, although Utopia can in that sense be read as a kind of manifesto for just such humanist intellectuals, the society it represents does not contain any, for its realization is meant to spell the end of all such Utopian political projects. This is then the point at which a humanist ideology gives way to a protestant one, and in which the description of the political and economic features of the Utopian system if one may call them that give way to an account of its relationship to religion pluralist and deist, but excluding atheism and of its priests and lay orders. In effect, Protestantism adds a third language Hebrew to the twin arsenal of humanism; and it is crucial to grasp the way in which both these revivals of the classics and of primitive Christianity are felt to be avant-garde causes. Together they constitute the Novum of the day: These are then the superstructural impulses of Utopia. In addition, the second set of options has the advantage of offering an already existent and fully realized world empire on the one hand, and an enclave structure on the other, which can persist locally within a social space of a wholly different type. As for what we have called the medieval element, however, it is to be understood as a uniquely European social institution, namely the monastery as such. At any rate, the kinship of the Utopian structure with the monastery has often been noted, and the great Utopian experiments of the Jesuits in eighteenth century Paraguay come as a belated confirmation of this common spirit when they were not indeed themselves inspired by the example of the textual predecessor aztec.

Chapter 7 : Herbert Marcuse - Wikipedia

*Thoughts on utopia Saint Simon and Fourier. Nevertheless, the definition remains tight in that he is the problem of ontology therefore needs to be understood.*

For instance, Fourier is credited with having originated the word "feminism" in Fourier later inspired a diverse array of revolutionary thinkers and writers. Fourier produced most of his writings between and In , he tried to sell his books again but with no success. He believed that a society that cooperated would see an immense improvement in their productivity levels. Workers would be recompensed for their labors according to their contribution. These buildings were four-level apartment complexes where the richest had the uppermost apartments and the poorest had a ground-floor residence. Fourier considered trade , which he associated with Jews, to be the "source of all evil" and advocated that Jews be forced to perform farm work in the phalansteries. Roth and Richard L. Rubenstein have seen Fourier as motivated by economic and religious antisemitism, rather than the racial antisemitism that would emerge later in the century. In his lexicon civilization was a depraved order, a synonym for perfidy and constraint But the possibility of "attractive labor" travail attrayant derives above all from the release of libidinal forces. Fourier assumes the existence of an attraction industrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. One day there would be six million of these, loosely ruled by a world "omniarch", or later a World Congress of Phalanxes. He had a concern for the sexually rejected; jilted suitors would be led away by a corps of fairies who would soon cure them of their lovesickness, and visitors could consult the card-index of personality types for suitable partners for casual sex. He also defended homosexuality as a personal preference for some people. Fourier believed that all important jobs should be open to women on the basis of skill and aptitude rather than closed on account of gender. He spoke of women as individuals, not as half the human couple. He felt that children as early as age two and three were very industrious. He listed the dominant tastes in all children to include, but not limited to: Rummaging or inclination to handle everything, examine everything, look through everything, to constantly change occupations; Industrial commotion, taste for noisy occupations; Aping or imitative mania. Industrial miniature, a taste for miniature workshops. Progressive attraction of the weak toward the strong. Fourier saw his fellow human beings living in a world full of strife, chaos, and disorder. Bidding him goodnight, Sally Fowler says, "Good luck with your furrierism. He calls it limonade a cedre. It is positively a fact! Just imagine the city docks filled, every day, with a flood tide of this delectable beverage! Theory of the four movements and the general destinies , appeared anonymously in Lyon in Le Nouveau Monde amoureux. Written 18, not published widely until Jones, Gareth Stedman, and Ian Patterson, eds. The Theory of the Four Movements. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Studies in the Libertarian and Utopian Tradition. Selected Writings of Charles Fourier. Beecher, Jonathan and Richard Bienvenu, eds. The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier:

**Chapter 8 : Ecological humanities - Wikipedia**

*Utopia had become a synonym for Stalinism and had come to designate a program which neglected human frailty and original sin, and betrayed a will to uniformity and the ideal purity of a perfect system that always had to be.*

See the List of Scholars and Activists link, below. Among those who critiqued him from the left were Marxist-humanist Raya Dunayevskaya , fellow German emigre Paul Mattick , both of whom subjected One-Dimensional Man to a Marxist critique, and Noam Chomsky , who knew and liked Marcuse "but thought very little of his work. He characterizes tolerance of repressive speech as "inauthentic". Instead, he advocates a form of tolerance that is intolerant of repressive namely right-wing political movements: Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right and toleration of movements from the Left. Surely, no government can be expected to foster its own subversion, but in a democracy such a right is vested in the people i. This means that the ways should not be blocked on which a subversive majority could develop, and if they are blocked by organized repression and indoctrination, their reopening may require apparently undemocratic means. They would include the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements that promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or that oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc. He wrote An Essay on Liberation in , in which he celebrated liberation movements such as those in Vietnam , which inspired many radicals. In he wrote Counterrevolution and Revolt , which argues that the hopes of the s were facing a counterrevolution from the right. His efforts brought him attention from the media, which claimed that he openly advocated violence, although he often clarified that only "violence of defense" could be appropriate, not "violence of aggression". He continued to promote Marxian theory, with some of his students helping to spread his ideas. He published his final work The Aesthetic Dimension in on the role of art in the process of what he termed "emancipation" from bourgeois society. His first wife was mathematician Sophie Wertheim " , with whom he had a son, Peter born His third wife was Erica Sherover " , a former graduate student and forty years his junior, whom he married in His son Peter Marcuse is professor emeritus of urban planning at Columbia University. His granddaughter is the novelist Irene Marcuse and his grandson, Harold Marcuse , is a professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Death[ edit ] On July 29, , ten days after his eighty-first birthday, Marcuse died after suffering a stroke during a visit to Germany. If people are preoccupied with inauthentic sexual stimulation, their political energy will be "desublimated"; instead of acting constructively to change the world, they remain repressed and uncritical. Marcuse advanced the prewar thinking of critical theory toward a critical account of the "one-dimensional" nature of bourgeois life in Europe and America. His thinking could, therefore, also be considered an advance of the concerns of earlier liberal critics such as David Riesman. Both of these features of his thinking have often been misunderstood and have given rise to critiques of his work that miss the point of his targets. Objectification, [34] which under capitalism becomes Alienation. Marx believed that capitalism was exploiting humans; that by producing objects of a certain character, laborers became alienated and this ultimately dehumanized them into functional objects themselves. Marcuse took this belief and expanded it. He argued that capitalism and industrialization pushed laborers so hard that they began to see themselves as extensions of the objects they were producing. Affluent mass technological societies, he argues, are totally controlled and manipulated. In societies based upon mass production and mass distribution, the individual worker has become merely a consumer of its commodities and entire commodified way of life. Modern Capitalism has created false needs and false consciousness geared to consumption of commodities: Most important of all, the pressure of consumerism has led to the total integration of the working class into the capitalist system. Its political parties and trade unions have become thoroughly bureaucratized and the power of negative thinking or critical reflection has rapidly declined. As a result, rather than looking to the workers as the revolutionary vanguard, Marcuse put his faith in an alliance between radical intellectuals and those groups not yet integrated into one-dimensional society, the socially marginalized, the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other ethnicities and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable. These were the

people whose standards of living demanded the ending of intolerable conditions and institutions and whose resistance to one-dimensional society would not be diverted by the system. Their opposition was revolutionary even if their consciousness was not. Featherstone criticized his portrayal of modern consumerism: He supported students he felt were subject to the pressures of a commodifying system, and has been regarded as an inspirational intellectual leader. Marcuse wrote just over pages in this page study.

### Chapter 9 : Charles Fourier - Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core

*Booktopia has Archaeologies of the Future, The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions by Fredric Jameson. Buy a discounted Hardcover of Archaeologies of the Future online from Australia's leading online bookstore.*

Fourier died in Paris in 1830. He believed that a society that cooperated would see an immense improvement in their productivity levels. Workers would be recompensed for their labors according to their contribution. Fourier considered trade, which he associated with Jews, to be the "source of all evil" and advocated that Jews be forced to perform farm work in the phalansteries. In his lexicon civilization was a depraved order, a synonym for perfidy and constraint. But the possibility of "attractive labor" travail attrayant derives above all from the release of libidinal forces. Fourier assumes the existence of an attraction industrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1964. One day there would be six million of these, loosely ruled by a world "omniarch," or later a World Congress of Phalanxes. He had a touching concern for the sexually rejected; jilted suitors would be led away by a corps of fairies who would soon cure them of their lovesickness, and visitors could consult the card-index of personality types for suitable partners for casual sex. He also defended homosexuality as a personal preference for some people. Fourier believed that all important jobs should be open to women on the basis of skill and aptitude rather than closed on account of gender. He spoke of women as individuals, not as half the human couple. Education and the liberation of human passion. He felt that children as early as age two and three were very industrious. He listed the dominant tastes in all children to include, but not limited to: Rummaging or inclination to handle everything, examine everything, look through everything, to constantly change occupations; Industrial commotion, taste for noisy occupations; Apeing or imitative mania. Industrial miniature, a taste for miniature workshops. Progressive attraction of the weak toward the strong. Fourier saw his fellow human beings living in a world full of strife, chaos, and disorder.