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Chapter 1 : Avalon Project - Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States

Foreign Relations of the United States, , Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges Foreign Relations of the United States, , Volume VI.

The economy will continue to expand, but probably not at the remarkable rate of recent years. US bases in Japan will be particularly edgy about their use in connection with hostilities which Japan did not see as an immediate threat to itself. As economic prosperity increases and national self-esteem reasserts itself, Japan may have greater interest in such issues as national defense and impressive military establishment. Strong anti-Communist sentiment will, however, prevail among the Japanese for some time to come, and it appears unlikely that professional military opinions will have significant influence on governmental policies for many years. The entire legal and institutional framework of government has been fundamentally liberalized; the role of political parties has been expanded, and the position of the opposition protected and strengthened: Traditionally, such divisions between left and right in Japanese politics have been rooted firmly in functional distinctions; Japan now appears to be approaching a stage in which such distinctions are becoming much less significant. Industrialization continues to spread into rural areas, and former social, economic, and political distinctions. Moreover, in the postwar period, not only the youth, but of Japanese society have been exposed to the predominantly leftist intellectual community which from past suppression has emerged. Nevertheless, the left has found it difficult to exploit its opportunities. Prosperity under capitalism, higher distribution of income, and the growth of confidence in the future have lessened the appeal of the leftist shibboleths of "exploitation" and "oppression" and have, to some extent, satisfied rising expectations. Japan is also currently undergoing a recovery of national self-esteem which renders it increasingly advantageous for all elements to think in terms of national rather than class goals. Such revisionist trends as exist, however, are limited in scope and do not appear to pose any immediate threat to basic advances made to date. Many of its leaders realize that it must strive to replace the widely held view that the LDP of "old-guard" politicians, steeped in corruption, enervated by factionalism, and to the wishes of big business. These leaders recognize that the LDP must make the transition from a party based primarily on class to one based on broad popular appeal and gain the support of the body of independent voters who support whatever party offers the most attractive programs and candidates. The LDP has proven adept at exploiting favorable economic and social conditions in postwar Japan and will probably continue to do so for some time. The party appears to understand what steps it must take to improve its political prospects and. The international status of Japan has improved to the point where a considerable amount can be made to work for the conservatives, as Prime Minister Ikeda is seeking to do with his theme of Japan as the "third along with the US and West the Free World. On balance, we believe the LDP will probably be able to hold power for the rest of this decade. The Japanese Socialist Party JSP will almost certainly continue to be the only major opposition party during this decade. If this trend continues at the present rate, the JSP will pose a serious challenge to conservative rule by the end of the decade. However, the JSP may find it difficult to continue to advance at recent rates unless it overcomes certain obstacles to broad appeal to the whole nation. Many Japanese fear that the JSP would follow radical economic policies which might jeopardize continued economic growth and prosperity. The party will have to adjust its presently neutralist foreign policy to the main trends of Japanese nationalism and political life: The degree to which the Socialists will have moderated by the end of the decade cannot be estimated precisely. Long-term forces undoubtedly favor moderation, and some perceptible changes in JSP orientation are likely to occur over the next several years. However, the Socialists' capacity to cling tenaciously to anachronistic doctrines, and temporary returns to more radical policies cannot be ruled out. Thus far, there is little sign the JSP is the same process of moderation which has characterized many Western socialist parties. The DSP has had a steady decline in popular support and parliamentary influence. Many supporters are returning to the JSP with its superior organization and

resources. The DSP may at best partner in some coalition. Over the next few years, the Japanese Communist Party JCP will probably continue to attract attention disproportionate to its size. When it seems politically it will act with other leftist groupings in demonstrations, directed primarily against US bases and the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan and for closer relations with the Communist states. Its proven ability to get out the crowds for demonstrations will encourage the other leftist parties, particularly the JSP. It seems unlikely that there will be any significant increase in popular support for the JCP or in its parliamentary strength. Its increasing association with the anti-Soviet split will probably further aggravate internal party dissension and could lead to another defection of party members similar to that in an important JCP official. In the main, are unsympathetic to Chinese attitudes on such issues as nuclear testing and coexistence. This partly religious, partly political movement has a considerable measure of influence now has probably several million followers. Its avowed objective is the elimination of corruption through the establishment of its militant Buddhist creed as the state religion, and it pursues this goal by aggressive proselytizing at home and abroad and, to an increasing degree, by political activity. Dissatisfaction with present conditions, personal frustrations, and poverty have a large part in its growth, but many have joined because they see in the propagation of its creed the salvation of the nation when they believe Japan to be riddled with political corruption and engulfed by alien influences. However, its strong and efficient organization, militant recruitment tactics, continued exploitation of antiwar opposition to political corruption, and the championing of popular causes point to a probable increase in its growth and political power over the next few years. Its leaders are young and dynamic, but do not as yet appear to be power-hungry or self-seeking. For the short run. Its elected representatives have demonstrated neither great political responsibility nor initiative. Greater legislative strength, however, could lead them to a more comprehensive political action program. The number of right extremists is small and they are divided into several hundred groups. There is widespread use of the tactics of assassination and terror which some pursue and they are viewed with distrust by the government. They will be a disruptive element on the political scene. However, barring an unlikely coalescence of their forces, they will almost certainly not have significant influence in government, military, or business circles over the next few years. Japan has a higher rate of economic growth than any country of the industrial West; it exceeded that of any other country in the world. Postwar have followed policies which have favored economic development and stability and have taken prompt remedial action to offset periodic downturns in the economy. There has been a high rate of domestic savings and investment. The Japanese still work hard and adapt quickly to scientific and technological advances. US aid and offshore procurement were important boosts to the economy, particularly in the early years. Many of these factors will continue to operate and will assist in maintaining the current prosperity. Most of the useable hydroelectric power sources have been developed; Japanese coal, though plentiful, is generally not of high grade and production costs are high. Oil deposits are small, scattered, and difficult to exploit, and Japan will have to continue to import well over 90 percent of its crude oil. The development of the Japanese oil concessions in the Persian Gulf will eventually reduce the foreign costs of oil. The cost of developing these concessions and royalty payments are now, however, resulting in a drain on Japanese foreign exchange resources. Japan is pushing ahead in the development of nuclear power as an energy source, but the effort has been hampered to some extent by a lack of funds for both basic and applied scientific research. It imports the bulk of its requirements of iron ore and coking coal. Deposits of nonferrous minerals, with the possible exception of zinc, are insufficient to meet needs. All aluminum ore and minerals to support the chemical industry are generally inadequate. Japan must turn to outside sources for all its cotton and most of its wool, and faces critical shortages in timber for construction and industrial purposes. The ratio of qualified job-seekers to available jobs has been declining in recent years, and the chief labor difficulty in the near future will be to train enough workers in the proper skills to meet rapidly changing needs. At the same time, rapid modernization and rationalization in industry will create troublesome pockets of unemployment, especially in the coal mining and other older industries. Consumer prices are also on the rise. In part because of support prices for rice and in part because of increasing productivity in some industries producing consumer goods primarily for domestic use and in the distribution

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system has not kept pace with rising wage costs. The government has not as yet acted to check these inflationary trends and may be forced to unpopular measures in order to do so. In many cases, underselling these traditional Japanese products in the Far East and in other world markets. Japan is acutely aware of its economic and political interdependence with the US and the Free World, and concern for its Western markets will remain the paramount factor in its policy for at least this decade. Further removal by Japan of restrictions on imports should increase US sales to Japan and Japan will probably continue to be the leading purchaser of US farm products and an important customer for coking coal, iron ore, and capital goods, particularly heavy equipment. Over the past few years, Japan has had serious balance of payments problems, an important imbalance in its trade with the US. So long as the US faces similar problems of its own, it will be difficult for Japan to increase its exports to the US visible and invisible so as to reduce the Japanese import surplus. Trade with mainland China has considerable appeal to the Japanese, who recall the large trade with this area up to World War II. The Sino-Japanese trade agreement of 1952 marked the renewal of quasi-official economic relations between the two countries, broken off by Peking for essentially political reasons. Japan will continue generally wary of dependency on Communist Chinese sources of supply and will be unwilling to jeopardize its US and non-Communist Asian markets. Any urgent trade with mainland China during the next few years would require the granting by Japan of extensive medium- and long-term credits which the government would probably be reluctant to do. Japan is also well aware of the political pitfalls in dealing with Peking and the propensity of the Communist Chinese to inject politics into commercial relations. The present limited arrangement appears useful to the government: until the end of this decade, however, it seems likely that Japan will move only gradually toward improving its position in the mainland China market, exercising caution and avoiding unacceptable economic risks in its relations with the US. Even if this imbalance were Japan would face difficulties in absorbing greater quantities of Soviet materials such as coal, iron ore, timber, and oil. The Soviets have dangled such perspectives before the Japanese but so far have imposed conditions unacceptable to the Japanese. There is still talk of the Japanese participating in the construction of a Siberian oil pipeline, between Irkutsk and Nakhodka on the Pacific coast. The five-year credit to Peking for a nylon fiber plant, however, may be a loosening of Japanese credit to Communist countries for certain kinds of industrial development. France, and the powers have agreed to discontinue discriminatory trade measures against Japanese products. Japanese exports still high Common Market tariff, wall and increased trade within the market will be at least partly at the expense of trade with other countries including Japan. These relations have not been hampered by such special factors as the wartime bitterness that affects relations with many Asian states, or the fear of Japanese competition that influences many countries. Japan is also involved in a number of joint ventures in the region. Japan is making greater publicity efforts and Latin American leaders are visiting Japan - with greater frequency, and it appears likely that these and other factors should open the way to a steady if not spectacular increase in trade. In its search for markets and raw materials, Japan will continue to interest itself in south and southeast Asia. Trade with Australia may substantially increase over the next few years. Foreign trade is the critical element in the Japanese economy. This will require more doubling of foreign trade. In the first three years of the plan, Japan surpassed the planned goals, averaging percent growth of ONP per annum. As has been pointed out above there are difficulties in the path of continued growth at the planned rate, particularly in the cases of the two most important markets for Japanese exports, the US and non-Communist Asia. While the government will probably retain the power to offset periodic economic downturn by monetary and other measures, it could not prevent the difficulties which would result in a serious deterioration in foreign trade.

Chapter 2 : Foreign Relations of the United States, , Vietnam «Há» sÆj má⁰-t VN «CVD

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For text of Rostow's memorandum, see Foreign Relations, , volume I, pages As it turned out, Kennedy and Khrushchev scarcely mentioned Viet-Nam during their meetings in Vienna on June