

### Chapter 1 : Eternity Quotes - Famous Alpha & Omega Quotations & Sayings

*Eternity and the Existence of God: A Reasoned Exploration of God, Atheism, and Eternal Life [Mark D Taylor] on blog.quintoapp.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. "Eternity and the Existence of God" encourages skeptics to apply all aspects of their minds to search for truth.*

The principles of the laws of nature, the beginning of time, and the first existence of this world are all the result of God, the Creator who possesses never-ending wisdom and power. He was before all time and all worlds. People have sometimes thought that the Eternal God is completely independent or distant from any events or actions that occur in our lives. This doctrine teaches that time does not limit God or change Him in any way. God is timeless in His own being. Man must come to terms with the small number of his days in comparison to a holy, everlasting God. Similarly, in Job The number of his years is past finding out. Even Job laments that his days and months are determined by God, with time limits beyond which he cannot go Job Before the creation of the universe, there was no matter, but then God created all things Genesis 1: The study of physics tells us that matter, time, and space must all occur together. Without matter, there can be neither space nor time. But, before there was a universe or time, God always existed, without being influenced by time. His glorious presence does not progress from one state of existence to another. While it is difficult for us to understand, God is omnipresent, completely existent in His fullness. Therefore, God is able to see all time equally vividly as well as instantaneously. Between a minute and a million years we can establish some proportion, but between time and eternity no such proportion can be fathomed. It is as if that day never ends, but is always being experienced by Him. God is able to see the whole span of history as intensely as if it were a brief event that occurred in any one moment, but any brief event as if it continues forever! He is omniscient, fully knowing Himself and all things in one eternal act. You are the everlasting God. You do not faint. Yet we yearn for our lives and our relationships to last forever. When we choose to have a relationship with Jesus Christ, God gives us an eternal promise that extends beyond the boundaries of time An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine. Inter-Varsity Press and Grand Rapids: Six Step Records, God , the Father, sent His only Son to satisfy that judgment for those who believe in Him. Jesus , the creator and eternal Son of God, who lived a sinless life, loves us so much that He died for our sins, taking the punishment that we deserve, was buried , and rose from the dead according to the Bible. If you truly believe and trust this in your heart, receiving Jesus alone as your Savior , declaring, " Jesus is Lord ," you will be saved from judgment and spend eternity with God in heaven. What is your response?

**Chapter 2 : St. Thomas Aquinas: God, Eternity, and Time**

*The question of the eternity of the world was a concern for both ancient philosophers and the medieval theologians and philosophers of the 13th century. The question is whether the world has a beginning in time, or whether it has existed from eternity.*

Is there only one aeviternity? Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"? It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius De Consol. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found. Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity ; but rather the word "existence. Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole. Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity , days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity " Micah 5: Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous. Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect. Further, duration does not imply "possession. Therefore eternity is not possession. I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time , which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity. Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time , because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end. Thus eternity is known from two sources: Reply to Objection 1. Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts. Reply to Objection 2. What is truly eternal , is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement. Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. Reply to Objection 4. As God , although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession. Reply to Objection 5. Two things are to be considered in time: Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time , and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time. Reply to Objection 6. Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity , we use the word "possession. Whether God is eternal? It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God ; for Boethius says De Trin. Further, what is before eternity , and after eternity , is not measured by eternity. Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal. Further, in eternity , there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity ; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that " God is the author of eternity ," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability. From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity , according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that " intelligence

is equal to eternity. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole. Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [ Douay: Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [ Douay: Therefore God is not the only eternal. Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. On the contrary, Jerome says Ep. Therefore God is the only one eternal. I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above I: Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" Ecclesiastes 1: Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus Psalm Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says De Trin. Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" Job Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for ever" Psalm Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher Metaph. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. Whether eternity differs from time? It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. Further, according to the Philosopher Phys. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

**Chapter 3 : The Eternity of God**

*So I was glad that I had changed my topic from addressing specifically relativity theory to a more general discussion of the topic "God, Time, and Eternity." "God," declares the prophet Isaiah, "is the high and lofty One who inhabits eternity" (Is. ).*

In these senses the concept of eternality presents no distinctive philosophical difficulties. Although the interpretation of the definition becomes controversial in its details, it pretty clearly identifies four elements of eternality. First, anything eternal in the Boethian sense has life. In this sense, then, eternality could not characterize numbers, truth or the world. Next, the life of whatever is eternal is illimitable - necessarily beginningless and endless. Sometimes this element has been interpreted as attributing to whatever is eternal a mode of existence that is illimitable in virtue of being absolutely unextended like a single instant and only in that way without a beginning or an end. But a more natural reading and one more consonant with other things Boethius and his successors say about eternity is that it is illimitable in virtue of its infinite duration. Although living temporal persons may be said to possess their life, they do not possess it completely all at once because they live out their life successively. Past parts of their life they possess no longer, future parts not yet. Consequently, whatever is eternal is also not in time. Eternality thus combines atemporality and duration. Eternity, then, is a real, atemporal mode of existence characterized by both the absence of succession and limitless duration. Nothing in that concept denies the reality of time or implies that temporal experiences are illusory. Boethius and others who use the concept suppose that reality includes time and eternity as two distinct modes of real existence, neither of them reducible to or incompatible with the other. Temporal events are instructively ordered in terms of the A-series - past, present and future - and the B-series - earlier than, simultaneous with, later than see McTaggart, J. Because an eternal entity is atemporal, its life cannot be ordered successively in either of those series. Moreover, no temporal entity or event can be past or future with respect to, or earlier or later than, the whole life of an eternal entity, because otherwise the eternal entity would itself be part of a temporal series. Of course, the presentness and simultaneity associated with an eternal entity could not be temporal presentness or temporal simultaneity. A relationship that can be recognized as a kind of simultaneity will of course be symmetric; but, since its relata have relevantly distinct modes of existence, it will be neither reflexive nor transitive. From an eternal standpoint, every time is present to or co-occurrent with the whole infinite atemporal duration; that is, each instant of time as it is actually present temporally is ET-simultaneous with the one enduring present of an eternal entity, so that for an eternal entity all of time is present at once. Difficulties associated with the concept Many of the difficulties in the concept of eternality have been discussed in twentieth-century philosophical literature. The most obvious difficulty arises from the combination of atemporality with duration - the heart of the concept. But the philosophers who developed the concept of eternality were using ordinary terms in extraordinary ways in order to express their theoretical notion of an illimitable life possessed completely all at once. Serious attempts to show that eternity really is an incoherent concept require showing that the apparent incoherence persists when the technical interpretations of its terms are fully taken into account. One attempt at doing just that involves taking atemporal duration as a species of extension and then arguing that any extension must be divisible and so cannot be all at once, or atemporal. The problem with such an attempt is that it uses an inductive survey of temporal and spatial extensions to reach the generalization that all extensions are divisible. But since eternity is neither temporal nor spatial, it will not be surprising if the properties attributed to extension as a result of such an induction fail to apply to what is eternal. Still, this way of avoiding the ascription of divisibility to what is eternal seems to run into an old problem: This sort of problem has become familiar in connection with discourse about God. Analogical predication is the traditionally recognized solution to this dilemma, and it is also what is needed for interpreting the description of the eternal. Eternal duration is fully actualized duration, none of which is already lost or not yet gained: Timeless duration might well be thought of as Plato thought of it, as the genuine duration of which temporal duration is only the moving image. Not all critics of the concept of eternity find such a response adequate, and the most persistent objections to the concept concentrate on the difficulties of

ascribing duration to what is atemporal. In this vein philosophers have objected that a God who is eternal could not act at all, and especially not in time. But this objection is based on a confusion. Of course, there are things an atemporal God could not do - such as remembering, or planning ahead. But not all cognitive and volitional acts require temporal location, and God could engage in those that do not. Furthermore, an atemporal God could not change the past or foreknow the future. Such actions, if possible at all, would require a temporal location, without which there can be neither past nor future. Still, eternal God, present at once to each temporal instant in its temporal presentness, could in the eternal present directly affect events that are past with respect to us and be directly aware of events future with respect to us. He could also act in time. He could, for example, will timelessly that something occur or come into existence at a particular time. By the same token, he could also do things that might appear to require a particular temporal location, such as answering a particular prayer. Because both the time of the prayer and the time at which the answer to it occurs are ET-simultaneous with the whole of eternity, an eternal God could be aware, timelessly, of a prayer prayed at one time, willing ET-simultaneously that the answer to that prayer occur at a later time. Finally, some critics suppose that if God is eternal and creatures are temporal, then God could not be directly aware of creatures or interact with them directly and immediately as he is traditionally said to do. Such criticisms must presuppose that for one being to interact directly with another, the two must share a mode of existence. But traditional theists are already committed to rejecting this presupposition as regards space. If the presupposition is false as regards space, however, it is hard to see why it should be accepted as regards time. Whether or not Aristotle himself accepted the concept of eternity, it is indisputable that the concept came into medieval philosophy through the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition. Boethius seems to have based his definition of eternity on the one Plotinus develops. In the Middle Ages, the concept of eternity was widely used and discussed. But it received its most sophisticated development in the work of Aquinas, who discussed and employed it in several of his works for example, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. In the modern period, with the rejection of the medieval synthesis in theology, the notion of eternity, in the special sense at issue here, was largely abandoned. Applications of the concept to issues in the philosophy of religion Applying the concept of eternity makes a significant difference in considering various issues in philosophy of religion. Here we will concentrate on just two of the most important: It has been argued that omniscience and immutability, two traditional divine attributes, are not compossible. An omniscient knower always knows what time it is or precisely what is going on now, and any knower who always knows what time it is now is a knower whose knowledge is always changing. Consequently, a knower could be omniscient and mutable, or immutable and not omniscient, but there could not be an omniscient, immutable knower see *Immutability*. This argument presupposes that knowers are temporal. If omniscient God is eternal, however, the argument becomes more complicated. The most reasonable interpretation of the claim, on the supposition that the omniscient knower in question is eternal, is that the knower always knows in the eternal present what time it is in the temporal present. But on that interpretation it is much more difficult to show that such a knower could not be immutable. On the view that the whole of eternity is ET-simultaneous with each temporal event as it is actually happening, an eternal omniscient knower will know all the events actually occurring at a particular time as well as the temporal location of that time and its being experienced as present by temporal entities at that time. Such a knower will also know that from the standpoint of eternity every temporal event is actually happening. There is nothing further for an eternal entity to know about what time it is now, for either the eternal or the temporal now; and nothing in what it does know requires constant change or change of any sort. Thus, while the argument may show that no temporal knower can be both omniscient and immutable, it does not make its case if the omniscient, immutable knower is eternal. On the face of it, then, the concept of eternity provides a solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will, as Boethius maintained in introducing the concept. An eternal omniscient knower will be eternally aware of all contingent events as they are occurring, including those that occur in the temporal future, but he will not foreknow them, since nothing eternal can be earlier than anything else. Consequently, arguments purporting to show that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible will not apply to eternal omniscient knowledge, which is evidently compatible with human free will. Consequently, the concept of eternity seems after all unhelpful for resolving the apparent

incompatibility between divine knowledge and human freedom. That is why eternal knowledge is supposed to have the result that the future is somehow fixed and inevitable now. But is there such an entailment? But is it equivalent in a context involving eternality? In that context, God knows that  $p$  in virtue of being ET-simultaneous with the future events he is eternally aware of. But, as has already been pointed out, ET-simultaneity is not transitive. From the facts that the state of affairs that  $p$  is ET-simultaneous with eternity and that eternity is ET-simultaneous with the temporal present, it does not follow that it is now the case that  $p$ . Hence, it seems that the concept of eternity can constitute the basis for an adequate solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will.

**Chapter 4 : ETERNITY'S VALUES | ETERNITY'S VALUES**

[5] *So long as God exists, space and time could no more fail to exist than God's ubiquity and eternity, even in a physically empty world. (ii) The propositions "no time exists" and "no temporal things exist" seem to be possibly true.*

His modern version of the kalam cosmological argument—first formulated by the Mutakallimun, the Muslim scholastics of the ninth century—rests on empirical arguments as well as a priori considerations that an actual infinite is impossible. In other words, the universe must have begun to exist. Craig concludes that the historical kalam arguments for the temporality of the universe "demonstrate that the world had a beginning at a point of time. Having demonstrated the temporality of the world, the theologian may then ask why it exists". Thus, the modern version of the kalam cosmological argument is 1 everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; 2 the universe began to exist; therefore 3 the universe has a cause of its existence. Many commentators have insisted that these premises are unsound. Perhaps the most rigorous criticism has come from Quentin Smith, who argues from quantum mechanical considerations that the universe could begin to exist without an efficient cause. Smith also argues that the kalam argument does not preclude the possibility of an infinite past. Craig reiterates that an actual infinite by successive addition is impossible and so the past cannot be infinite either. The principle of determination states that any being or effect requires a particularizer, a being who decides the course of an action between two likely choices Wolfson. The universe may have been larger or smaller than it is, many billions of years older or younger, or it may have even failed to exist; any of these possibilities are admissible in that they are logically possible. Only a sentient being can make the choice to create the universe at the moment that it was created; the Creator could have created the universe an hour earlier or waited several days before doing so. Craig argues that the conclusion to his kalam argument suggests two possibilities: This is because any effect must immediately follow a mechanical cause. The wind that causes a leaf to detach from its branch cannot determine its own course of action. As soon as the set of necessary conditions within nature is present, the wind must blow. A mechanical cause is unintelligent and cannot distinguish one particular moment in time from another. Therefore, a first mechanical cause could not have produced the universe in time. A personal Creator, however, may choose to produce an effect at any time the Creator wishes, just as I may choose to eat an apple now or wait until later to do so. Since the universe began to exist—rather than existing from eternity—it is reasonable to conclude that the cause of the universe was a sentient being who willed from eternity to create a temporal universe. Since an actual infinite is impossible, the universe began to exist and could not have come into existence through a mechanical cause. The fact that the universe began to exist requires a particularizer who ex nihilo created the universe. Thus, Craig concludes that "if the universe began to exist, and if the universe is caused, then the cause of the universe must be a personal being who freely chooses to create the world". To say that the particularizer could have created the universe earlier, assumes that it makes sense for there to have been a time before the universe. On a relational view of time, however, there can be no "earlier" in which events precede the universe. If time is absolute, then we are justified in pondering why the Particularizer chose at that one moment preceding the universe to create it at that time. However, if time is relational, then there can be no time prior to the universe and hence no grounds for concluding that a determination was made in time. Clearly, this problem is aggravated in the kalam argument by an unclear notion of the concept of eternity. Does Craig understand eternity to mean relational atemporality outside of creation, or does he instead view eternity as an infinite duration of time? Craig can mean one of two things in the notion of eternity. Eternity is either a finite causal chain of events within infinite, absolute time, or eternity is a timeless state of affairs that denotes the absence of existence since there are no bodies in motion. Let us consider the possibility that eternity is an infinity of time first. If eternity is infinite duration or "infinite time" per a realist view of time, then we are faced with the difficulty of explaining what events, if any, occurred during the quantity of time preceding the existence of the universe. To put this in a theistic context as Augustine wondered, what was God doing before God created the universe? This same bout of horror vacui led the Mutakallimun to argue that the creation of the universe was the result of a choice made freely by its Creator. Richard Sorabji calls this the problem of "Why not sooner? Craig also

points out that al-Kindi felt that time was finite because an actual infinite is impossible and time is a quantitative thing that must be finite in measure, Saadia also felt that the concept of infinite time is reduced to absurdity because of the problem of regressing an actual infinite. Craig, Hayyat and Saadia argue, in the spirit of Zeno before them, that beginningless time is impossible since an infinite distance cannot be traversed and an infinite succession of events would never be able to arrive at the present. Wolfson: If time is finite then, what do we call that state of affairs that precedes time? Al-Ghazali argued that we are deceived if we believe that there existed a "time" before time. In his *Confessions*, Augustine calls the timeless void outside of creation "true eternity" XI, 9 and Aziz Ahmad, in his study of the *Mutakallimun*, refers to the timeless void as "contact with eternity". Ahmad admits that Muslim thought with respect to time is in conflict with Newtonian absolutism, and so he defines time in the Aristotelian sense of motion among entities. Thus, in Muslim thought time is not absolute, but rather "it is the succession of entities which gives rise [sic] to the notion of time [and] coming and going are acts which mark division in an otherwise static eternity. If this is so, then it is reasonable to conclude that the kalam argument allows eternity to mean a changeless, timeless void apart from the existence of the universe. Craig seems to agree with the relational view of eternity. However, if eternity is a timeless void, then the universe is eternal in the sense that there were no moments in which the space-time continuum did not exist. Yet in order to effectively employ the argument for a particularizer who decides a course of action at a given moment, Craig finds it is necessary to revert to an absolutist view of time. It is either that or he must beg the question for absolute time under the implicit assumption that a Creator exists prior to the universe. Similarly, in his discussion of big bang cosmology, Craig asks, "if the big bang occurred in a super dense pellet existing from eternity, then why did the big bang occur only 15 billion years ago? Why did the pellet of matter wait for all eternity to explode? However, Craig wrongly presupposes an ontological view of time that conflates timeless eternity with temporal infinity—an infinity that is supposed to be a priori impossible in the kalam argument. In other words, if the super dense pellet exists "from eternity" how can it "wait for all eternity" before producing its explosion? Yet, we have already seen that Craig relies upon a relational view of time in his argument to prove that the universe cannot be infinite in time. The kalam argument becomes entangled in this conflated notion of eternity when it argues that God was a particularizer who freely chose to create the universe in time. Cannot the universe begin to exist in time and its cause be infinite in the sense that the Creator is everlasting? Let us suppose for a moment that time is ontologically real. If this is so, then necessarily the Creator must also exist in time. However, if the Creator produced the universe in time then there is no reason to think that it was the first cause or that God is that cause. We might apply the principle of sufficient reason to ask whether God is a first cause or one of many possible intermediate causes in time. Why should He be an uncaused cause? But if eternity is timelessness, then his reply is insufficient because it excludes anything outside of space-time as requiring a sufficient reason for its existence. In other words, we would have no means of determining whether the efficient cause of the universe was naturalistic or supernaturalistic. One could press the principle of sufficient reason to argue that, despite its timeless nature, an initial singularity is still a positive fact that requires a reason and, therefore, must be an intermediate cause rather than the first cause. If an initial singularity did produce the universe and was itself efficiently caused by God, then God might be that elusive first cause. In a relational view of time, a predicate other than "eternal" must be our criterion of correctness for determining a first cause, since an initial singularity and the Creator are otherwise synonymous in this regard. Craig argues that the efficient cause of the universe must be God because only God can produce a temporal effect from an eternal cause. However, if Craig understands eternity to be timelessness, this argument loses much of its force because we have seen that an initial singularity can also produce a temporal effect from an eternal cause. Since Craig presupposes that God necessarily exists prior to the universe, his argument generates an equivocation between eternity as an infinite duration of time and eternity as relational timelessness. Yet, this maneuver is unwarranted. Craig realizes that there is a problem with speaking about events in this manner, and so reduces the problem of an eternal universe to the notion of a permanent universe: This is a curious argument. Yet, if the universe must have begun to exist because it is not possible for a thing such as the universe to exist infinitely, then it follows that God is a being who also cannot exist infinitely. Clearly, the use of "permanence" in this argument is lacking because under his criterion of the

impossibility of an actual infinite, everything to include God must owe its existence to something else. If time is a necessary component of the universe and is nonexistent in an initial singularity of infinite density and curvature, we cannot meaningfully inquire into events that exist outside of that singularity. It is our grammar in the verb "to cause" that is the real culprit here. When considering causation, we think that there must be a prior action acting upon the object taking the verb. Even if there can be no temporal events outside of the universe, we want to say that the universe must have a prior cause to its existence. Our depth grammar with respect to the notions of "God" and "eternity" has produced intractable problems because we are unsure of what these utterances really mean. In the absence of clarity, we stumble around with these words and attempt to use them in a way that lacks sense or purpose. In conclusion, I find that the kalam argument is a very convincing proof for the notion that the universe began to exist. But further than this I cannot go. There are limits to human reason and the desire to push beyond those limits will produce only confusion. However, the universe and God are both eternal in the weak sense that no temporal moments precede either being. To say that the universe fails the test in a strong sense is really saying that the universe is a positive fact that requires a sufficient reason for its existence. However, that the principle of sufficient reason can be employed against everything that exists, including God, should make us suspicious of the usefulness of this principle in the argument. Simply put, the kalam argument carries too heavy of a burden in its task to show God as the first cause. It must assume that time is real and infinite in order to generate the puzzle of why the Creator chose to create it "now" rather than "later. Since time is finite, all of Creation must be finite and an eternal Creator must have willed the universe into existence. Plato and Newton held an absolute view of time. On this view, time is a substratum that provides a "stage" for the actors to strut across. All states of affairs occur within the substratum of time and even if nothing else existed, time would still exist. On the other hand, Leibniz and Einstein held a relational view of time. On this view, the metric of time is ontologically nothing without states of affairs, which relate to each other in space. In short, time does not exist unless there are bodies in motion. However, this is not to say that Craig has not advanced support for some kind of absolutism. In contrast to an Augustinian "absolute timelessness," Craig states that there exists an ontological time experienced only by God called "true temporality" "God and Real Time," *Religious Studies* 26 []: At some point, the proponent must stop asking for causes of causes and resort to a concept of God as something than which nothing greater can be conceived. This is the only way to stop the chain of causation from running backward ad infinitum.

**Chapter 5 : Eternity and Immortality – Exactly What Is Time?**

*Existence is voided and eternity has indeed died. Honestly this would probably happen in any situation, because time cannot exist within a singularity, much like it is hypothesized to not exist within Black holes either.*

Share via Email Pope Francis delivers his Easter blessing. To say that hell does not exist is clearly not a statement about geography or cosmology. Neither Francis nor any other sane and educated person believes that a space probe will come back with a report of heaven, or that an overenthusiastic fracking company will tap into a source of heat much larger than any survey had estimated, shortly before all the management and shareholders are sucked down inside it by ravening demons. Supposing that hell is something that exists only in the imagination, it will still have a physical manifestation somewhere in the brains of believers. It would do nothing at all to our understanding of ideas to read about them from inside a brain scanner. Arguing about the existence of hell, or even the existence of God, is a little like arguing about the existence of the number zero. The use of the concept is obvious and irresistible. The problem is not just that the universe has no place for hell: He tells his daughter: To be the place where the falling angel meets the rising ape – Take the universe and grind it down to the finest powder and sieve it through the finest sieve and then show me one atom of justice, one molecule of mercy – and yet you act as if there is some ideal order in the world, as if there is – some rightness in the universe by which it may be judged. The real difficulty for Christians is the idea that hell entails eternal conscious torment, which is the jargon for something almost unthinkable. That seems to have been what Francis was actually discussing. It seems entirely disproportionate to the sins it punishes. The sufferings of hell are by definition worse than anything we can experience in this life: All those can be unendurable, but the sufferings of hell, in the traditional doctrine, endure for ever. Death cannot end them: To inflict such endless agony does not seem in the nature of a loving and merciful God; it seems disproportionate even to the demands of justice. In fact the early and influential theologian St Origen believed that even Satan would be released from hell at last, although this was later judged a heresy. The real difficulty comes with the concept of eternity. The universe, which had a beginning in the big bang, and will have an end, cannot contain eternity. Only our minds can experience eternity and I suspect that suffering, like bliss, can be eternal in that sense – while it lasts. But no one who has experienced real bliss, or real anguish, could doubt that they exist.

**Chapter 6 : What do you think about my point of view on: Time, Eternity, and Existence? | Yahoo Answers**

*Eternity. The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time.*

Western theists agree that God is eternal; the task is to formulate and assess conceptions of what this eternality might amount to. On the first, God is timeless divine timelessness ; on the second, God is in time divine temporality. Methodology This discussion inherits the complexities of two very intricate philosophical debates about God, and about time. Given the nature of the topic, it is perhaps not unreasonable to wonder what methodology can be fruitfully employed here. As the topic is the God of Western theism, there are constraints arising from relevant passages in Western Scripture. Much of the discussion focuses on the Judeo-Christian, especially the Christian, tradition. But note that specific Christian doctrines such as the doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, while closely related, are not the focus here. A third approach might involve giving equal weight to both poles and seeking to come to a coherent and adequate conception of both time and God as part of the same endeavor. There probably exist a variety of stances across the philosophical and theological landscapes for explicit reflection on related methodological questions see, e. Brief Historical Remarks Until recently, the timelessness view dominated in both philosophy and theology. For that reason, much of the historical discussion revolves around that view. The extent to which the Platonism of Philo of Alexandria [c. However, the styles of these two thinkers are very different. Boethius presents the idea of timeless eternity as straightforward and relatively problem-free. Augustine wrestles with the idea and expresses continual puzzlement at the idea of time itself and with it the contrasting idea of timeless eternity. In Boethius, the contrast is between timeless eternity, which only God enjoys, and everlastingness, which following Plato the world itself possesses. It is the common judgement, then, of all creatures that live by reason that God is eternal. So let us consider the nature of eternity, for this will make clear to us both the nature of God and his manner of knowing. Eternity, then, is the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life; this will be clear from a comparison with creatures that exist in time. Watts Boethius uses his view of eternity to address the problem of divine foreknowledge see section 6. If God knows beforehand what we will do then how can we act freely? His answer is that this problem dissolves in the face of the fact that God does not know anything beforehand but has an immediate, atemporal knowledge of all things. In Boethius, we find several analogies for timeless eternity. One is that between timeless eternity and the centre of a circle. The thought is that the centre bears the same relation to any point on the circumference of the circle, and in the same way timeless eternity bears the same relation to anything in time. Aquinas develops this analogy later. What times existed which were not brought into being by you? Or how could they pass if they never had existence? Since, therefore, you are the cause of all times, if any time existed before you made heaven and earth, how can anyone say that you abstained from working? It is not in time that you precede times. Otherwise you would not precede all times. In the sublimity of an eternity which is always in the present, you are before all things past and transcend all things future, because they are still to come. In you it is not one thing to be and another to live: You are being in a supreme degree and are immutable. In you the present day has no ending, and yet in you it has its end: They would have no way of passing away unless you set a limit to them. In the *Timaeus* 37E6â€”38A6 Plato contrasts the eternal forms with the time-bound created world, the world of change and becoming. Time was created along with the heaven 38B5 â€”meaning at least that time is the measure of change, and perhaps that it is identical with the movements of the heavenly bodies a view later critiqued by Augustine *Confessions*, Book XI. One can trace a similar idea of timeless eternity back to Parmenides though exactly what he means is the subject of scholarly dispute. While in some places at least Plato connects the necessary character of the Forms to timelessness, in Aristotle the connection is between necessity and everlastingness. What is necessary is what exists at all times. What is contingent is what at some time is not. God, being necessary, is everlasting. It may be said that the everlasting is not bounded by time though it is unbounded in a weaker sense than Plato ascribes to the Forms in that what exists everlastingly cannot age *Physics* b Philo of Alexandria is thought to be the first to ascribe timelessness to God, to the God of the Jewish

Scriptures. *Nous* is eternal and beyond time, enjoying duration without succession. Suppose, on the other hand, that it exists as a whole in individual times severally and distinctly. A human being, for instance, exists as a whole yesterday, today and tomorrow. In this case we should, properly, say that it was, is and will be. In which case its time-span is not simultaneously a whole. Rather it is stretched out in parts through the parts of time. But its time-span is its eternity and its eternity is precisely itself. The supreme essence, therefore, would be cut up into parts along the divisions of time. In the medieval period, the discussion embraces not only Christian but also Jewish and Islamic thinkers. It is a correlate of divine simplicity see the SEP entry on divine simplicity, and it is incapable of being defined or fully grasped by a creature. Since God is timelessly eternal it does not make any sense to ask how many years God has existed, or whether he is growing old, or what will he be doing later on in the year. In general, it would seem that commitment to divine simplicity, widespread if not universal in the medieval period, entails a commitment to divine timelessness Mullins Note that this is the terminology not employed here. At first sight, this distinction can seem to leave the second issue somewhat mysterious: What then are times—are they not somehow to be understood in terms of spacetime, ultimately? But there are two distinct issues in the vicinity. Whether or not a being experiences succession, and more generally, what the temporal features of its experience are, is distinct from whether or not that being is located in spacetime. However, there are also connections between these issues. The beings we are most familiar with, such as ourselves, are spatiotemporal and experience temporal succession; and for us, these facts are related. It is partly because we are located in spacetime that we experience succession, and there are interesting questions about the details of this connection. This section outlines some views on God and time, with a focus on the contemporary literature; further reading suggestions appear at the end of this section. This is a natural first gloss of the timelessness position. However, few defenders of divine timelessness sign up to this view. Recall Boethius *Consolation*, V. Or again, eternity is the complete possession all at once of illimitable life. Stump and Kretzmann distill four ingredients from this claim. Neither would the world, even if it was sempiternal. It cannot begin or end. It is impossible for it not to have infinite duration. This, according to Stump and Kretzmann, is what makes it the case that a timeless being is outside of time. By contrast, a living being in time experiences succession, only ever possessing one moment of its life at a time. Each involves only one mode of existence, namely either the temporal or the eternal. ET-simultaneity, by contrast, relates items in different modes of existence, one temporal, and one eternal. Imagine two parallel horizontal lines. The lower line represents time, and the upper one represents timeless eternity. Presentness is represented by light. The temporal present is represented by a light that moves steadily along the lower line, while the eternal present is represented by the upper line being lit all at once. Each dot in the lower line, when it is temporally present, is ET-simultaneous with the whole of the upper line. Or at least this is so from the viewpoint of that time. Since, by definition, two items can only be ET-simultaneous if one is temporal and the other eternal, and since any given item is only one of these, ET-simultaneity is not reflexive; in fact, it never holds between an entity and itself. Nor is it transitive; in fact, when *x* and *y* are ET-simultaneous and *y* and *z* are too, *x* and *z* never are. The non-transitivity of ET-simultaneity is needed to solve a pressing problem. So, all times collapse into one: Again, on his view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on. Here are three questions that have been raised. First, is the notion of an atemporal duration coherent? See Fitzgerald; also Craig; Nelson; Helm What licenses speaking of a duration here? The eternal present is supposed not to be pointlike, but to involve an infinite stretch or extension of some kind. This suggests that it should possess some of the formal features of extension. For example, it should be possible for two particulars to have the same or different amounts of the extension. If this is not the case with atemporal duration, then how is it a duration? And if it is the case, then how is it not a temporal duration?

**Chapter 7 : Eternity of the world - Wikipedia**

*\* In philosophy, the common use of eternity' to refer to an infinite time is considered incorrect, ' eternity referring to existence outside of time; existence within time but of an infinite temporal duration is called everlastingness or sempiternity.*

Part One 1 Thomas Aquinas made a categorical distinction between eternity and forever. Eternity, he said, is timelessness; forever is endless time. The former is not rooted within a temporal framework whereas the latter is. Norman Geisler and H. Wayne House described it this way: Endless time is not eternity: Eternity differs in essence, not merely accidentally in quantity. Endless time is an elongation of time. More of the same thing is essentially the same thing. There is a crucial difference between the "now" of time and the "now" of eternity. The "now" of time moves; the "now" of eternity does not move in any way. Numbers Before examining the more complex concept of time we will examine the less complex concept of numbers. Numbers are potentially infinite. Theoretically speaking there is no end to the amount of possible numbers. While numbers have the potential for infinity, it would be impossible to arrive at an infinite number by adding one number to another, even if we continue counting forever. Why is this so? It is because "no amount of finite parts [can] add up to an infinite. While our number will constantly increase in size, it will never become an infinite number no matter how large it gets, because an enormously large number is still not an infinite number. An infinite number has no terminus, and yet any number we may be able to count to always terminates with the number we are presently at. When counting numbers, going from ,, to ,, our counting terminates at ,, While the number is very large, and could grow even larger, it is still a finite number, describing a finite count, not an infinite count. Infinity, by definition is innumerable. Time, like numbers, is measurable. We measure the passing of time through seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, years, etc. That which is measurable cannot be infinite, because infinity is without limits, and therefore not measurable. Time consists of a series of nows. These nows, when added together equal seconds, minutes, years, etc. We arrive at the future by passing through a series of nows. Likewise we conceive of the past by subtracting a certain series of nows from the standpoint of the present. In the same way that we cannot arrive at infinity by adding one number to another, we cannot arrive at eternity by adding one moment to the next. The impossibility of an eternal past is extremely important as it relates to the issue of origins, so it will be explored in a little more depth. It is impossible to have an infinite amount of time before the present because the present would be the terminus of that infinite amount of preceding time. Because infinity has no terminus, however, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of an infinite amount of time before the present. There cannot be an infinite amount of moments before today, for if there was we would never arrive at today. We agreed you cannot get to any infinite point in the future by adding events one to another. Time has proceeded forward from the past as one event is added onto another to get us to today. Which means that there is no infinite number of events that goes backward from this point in time, only a finite number of events. He said that if an infinite amount of dominoes had to fall before domino X would fall, domino X would never fall because the infinite chain of dominoes could never reach the terminus of domino X. It is simply impossible to "complete an infinite number of events. Simply put, while we will live forever with Christ, we will not live for an eternity. Only God has a timeless existence. Creation cannot be eternal because creation is temporal, existing in time. Time consists of parts, or moments. We cannot arrive at eternity by adding one moment of existence to another. No matter how long we live how many moments we could always calculate the amount of moments we have been in existence, beginning at a certain point and ending in what will then be the present. Origin of the Universe The question of origins is often thought of as a difficult issue with no easy answers. In all reality the question turns out to be fairly straightforward when broken down into three simple questions. The three questions we must ask to determine the origin of the universe are as follows: Did the universe have a beginning? If the universe had a beginning, did it have a cause? If the universe is caused, was that cause personal or impersonal? Did the Universe Have a Beginning? Understanding the distinction between eternity and forever argues strongly in favor of a personal, divine creator, and against naturalistic evolution. Some individuals, when asked what

caused the universe to come to be, will assert that the universe is eternal, not having or needing a cause. Not only does such a response contradict popular scientific opinion as will be discussed shortly, but it is logically impossible as well. If we cannot arrive at an eternal past by subtracting moments from the present, the universe cannot be eternal. It had to come into being at a certain point in time, and have been in existence for a certain, measurable amount of time. Any claim that the universe is eternal is unfounded, and contrary to sound philosophical reasoning. This observation alone would rule out Hinduism and many other Eastern religions which maintain that the universe is eternal. The overwhelming majority of the scientific community is convinced that the universe had a beginning as well. They believe in what is called the Big Bang theory of origins. In essence the Big Bang theory states that there was a point in time at which nothing existed, including matter, space, and time. Then, without any prior cause, an explosion of matter occurred from non-matter, bringing matter, space, and time into existence simultaneously for the first time referred to as the point of singularity, fully charged with energy. Astrophysicist, Hugh Ross, noted that time is that dimension in which cause and effect phenomena take place. It tells us that the Creator is transcendent, operating beyond the dimensional limits of the universe. It tells us that God is not the universe itself, nor is God contained within the universe. Pantheism and atheism do not square with the facts. Now that we have established the temporality of the universe we must ask Did the universe have a cause, or was it uncaused? This is a very simple question to answer. Every physical event has a prior cause. The beginning of the universe was a physical event, and therefore it must have a cause. There is nothing in the known universe that is uncaused. At times we be unaware of what the particular causes are to a known effect, but we do not question whether or not the cause exists. If we were to argue that the universe came into being without a productive cause, it would be the only known example of such in our universe. The one who wishes to claim that the universe is the result of a causeless effect is making a statement of pure faith, not of science, because there is no scientific or philosophic support in its behalf. We cannot even comprehend the concept of a causeless effect. The former sentence is an example of this. I had to speak of the universe as a "result of a causeless effect. There can be no question that the universe has a productive cause, but what was that prior productive cause? Some would attribute the cause of the universe to the Big Bang, but the Big Bang is not the cause of the universe; it is itself an effect. Besides, to argue that the Big Bang was the cause of the universe only pushes the problem back one step farther because we would still have to ask What caused the Big Bang? Something cannot be its own cause. The only other option is to argue that the Big Bang was without a cause. But how can there be an effect without a cause? Furthermore, how can something come from nothing, time come from timelessness, and space from spacelessness? There must be a First Cause that is itself uncaused in order to account for the origin of the universe. Others may argue that an infinite amount of causes preceded the effects we see today, and thus there need not be a first cause at all. But an infinite amount of causes is impossible for the same reason it is impossible to count to infinity, or to have an infinite past. Because infinity has no terminus, it would be impossible to have an infinite amount of causes before today. There must be a First Cause that is itself uncaused, that caused all the effects we see today. What we must seek to discover is who or what that First Cause is. Evolutionary theory ignores the issue by denying a First Cause altogether, or by taking the agnostic position that it is impossible to know what it was. A universe bound to time is temporal, and that which is temporal cannot be eternal, and cannot cause itself. It had to be caused by something non-temporal, for it would be a contradiction to think of a temporal something creating time when it is itself temporal. It is impossible to bring into existence something that already exists. I find it interesting that people are willing to believe matter is eternal in contradiction to known laws of science such as the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and in contradiction to logic rather than caused, and yet find it foolish to believe in an eternal God. The cause of something is always greater than the effect. If the universe shows traces of personality and intelligence, it must follow that the cause of the universe possesses personality and intelligence as well. An intelligent, personal, and eternal being can explain how the universe came to be, why it shows evidence of design, and why elements of creation are personal and possess intelligence.

**Chapter 8 : Eternity and Time in William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument**

*The word eternity, which stretches its import to eternal existence or something that is not bound by time, stands for something that is endless. God is usually referred to as eternity for He exists out of time and space.*

Aristotle[ edit ] The ancient philosopher Aristotle argued that the world must have existed from eternity in his *Physics* as follows. In Book I, he argues that everything that comes into existence does so from a substratum. Therefore, if the underlying matter of the universe came into existence, it would come into existence from a substratum. But the nature of matter is precisely to be the substratum from which other things arise. Consequently, the underlying matter of the universe could have come into existence only from an already existing matter exactly like itself; to assume that the underlying matter of the universe came into existence would require assuming that an underlying matter already existed. As this assumption is self-contradictory, Aristotle argued, matter must be eternal. Option B is also unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, if the world began at a state of rest, the coming into existence of that state of rest would itself have been motion. Second, if the world changed from a state of rest to a state of motion, the cause of that change to motion would itself have been a motion. He concludes that motion is necessarily eternal. Aristotle argued that a "vacuum" that is, a place where there is no matter is impossible. Material objects can come into existence only in place, that is, occupy space. Were something to come from nothing, "the place to be occupied by what comes into existence would previously have been occupied by a vacuum, inasmuch as no body existed. The Greek philosopher Critolaus c. There is no observed change in the natural order of things; humankind recreates itself in the same manner according to the capacity given by Nature, and the various ills to which it is heir, though fatal to individuals, do not avail to modify the whole. Just as it is absurd to suppose that humans are merely earth-born, so the possibility of their ultimate destruction is inconceivable. The world, as the manifestation of eternal order, must itself be eternal. Philoponus originated the argument now known as the Traversal of the infinite. If the existence of something requires that something else exist before it, then the first thing cannot come into existence without the thing before it existing. Something cannot come into existence if this requires an infinite number of other things existing before it. Therefore the world cannot be infinite. The Aristotelian commentator Simplicius of Cilicia and contemporary of Philoponus argued against the Aristotelian view. If time were infinite, then as the universe continued in existence for another hour, the infinity of its age since creation at the end of that hour must be one hour greater than the infinity of its age since creation at the start of that hour. But since Aristotle holds that such treatments of infinity are impossible and ridiculous, the world cannot have existed for infinite time. Philoponus argues that the second premise is not controversial since the number of events prior to today would be an actual infinite without beginning if the universe is eternal. The first premise is defended by a *reductio ad absurdum* where Philoponus shows that actual infinities can not exist in the actual world because they would lead to contradictions albeit being a possible mathematical enterprise. Since an actual infinite in reality would create logical contradictions, it can not exist including the actual infinite set of past events. The second argument, the "argument from the impossibility of completing an actual infinite by successive addition", states: The second skirts around this; the analogous idea in mathematics, that the infinite sequence of negative integers "... The possibility of the thing must therefore in some sense have its own existence. Possibility cannot exist in itself, but must reside within a subject. If an already existent matter must precede everything coming into existence, clearly nothing, including matter, can come into existence *ex nihilo*, that is, from absolute nothingness. An absolute beginning of the existence of matter is therefore impossible. According to Maimonides, to argue that "because I have never observed something coming into existence without coming from a substratum it cannot occur" is equivalent to arguing that "because I cannot empirically observe eternity it does not exist. According to Aquinas the possible eternity of the world and its creation would be contradictory if an efficient cause were precede its effect in duration or if non-existence precedes existence in duration. But an efficient cause, such as God, which instantaneously produces its effect would not necessarily precede its effect in duration. God can also be distinguished from a natural cause which produces its effect by motion, for a cause that produces motion must precede its effect. God could be an

instantaneous and motionless creator, and could have created the world without preceding it in time. To Aquinas, that the world began was an article of faith.

**Chapter 9 : Eternity is Not Forever: An Argument for Theism**

*Eternity, for its part, has rarely shown any interest in the pieces that make it up, though if given sufficient threat (on the level of the Beyonder, for example) would willingly sacrifice part of its infinite existence (and the planets, stars, and lifeforms that make up that existence) to foil such a foe.*

If you say no, you are buying into predestination. If you say yes, it seems like God is not a god. Is it true that a million years is like a second to you? Is it true that a million dollars is like a penny to you? Can I have a penny? Traveling at 10 miles per second, 3 seconds Provo to SLC at this rate. Would take 70, years to get to the nearest star, Alpha Centari. If you could travel the speed of light, your mass would become infinite, you would be omnipresent, and time would stop. God, a being of Light, lives this impossibility. A blind man to find out the reality of a room would need to spend a couple of hours to see what the room was like. A seeing man in a dark room, lights are turned on, immediately sees the room, perceives it all at once. You and I perceive time the way a blind man perceives space. It is like a trigonometry problem when you have the angle of 2 points of a triangle and the line between them, you can figure out the other point, you can only understand doctrines of the gospel when they are linked together. If you try to understand them singly as in the first paragraph of this note , you can get way off base. Lewis wrote, Time is just the way this life comes to us. God does not live in time. He has all eternity in which to listen to prayers. Mere Christianity This doctrine of time affects how we understand the doctrine of the creation The purpose of the creation accounts in the scriptures are not to teach us about the creation, but to teach us about the atonement of Jesus Christ, according to Bruce R. The three approaches to the creation: So each day of creation could have been 7, years. In fact, the creation did not happen linearly, which explains why Elder McConkie said that it was simple to understand why the three or four different accounts of the creation put things in different orders. Before the fall, linear time had not yet come into existence on this earth. We are uncomfortable here with linear time. Elder Maxwell said we are like a fish out of water here in time. It also affects how we see the doctrine of the atonement: Gethsemane did not just last for a half hour or an hour in one lump suffering for us all. He did it one person at a time. Lewis Linear time being only a thing of this life explains why Joseph Smith saw his own father in a vision of the Celestial Kingdom while his father was standing next to him, why Elder Groberg was visited by his fiancée in a dream when he was near death, and while I was visited by Savannah in the temple while she was still an unborn baby kicking in my belly. I have some more things I want to share. Benson, Come Unto Christ, p. Specifically they all say that number 1 is our first priority. Elder Holland said that, in reality, number 1 is putting God first, your relationship with Him, being able to feel the Spirit. McLellin was an apostle three years, then apostacized. He was a school teacher. He died without coming back to the church. His mission call is revoked, he is chastised for his sin, he is re-called to the Southern States mission. God gave him a second chance. Kimball as a little boy had to stitch up a bleeding horse. Sooner or later, such a religion will emerge. Could birth into human life have been an ordinance? It can only mean the time after the Judgment and Resurrection. Each individual can also be saved from spiritual death as well by the grace of God, through faith in Jesus Christ. So the scriptures tell us two types of spiritual death occur at two different times. The other is a permanent separation from God after the Judgment and Resurrection. The day of Judgment is the only point of no return.