

Empirical Miracles: Nature's Precedents for Empirical Solutions. Nature's Precedents for Empirical Solutions, in Searching for Molecular Solutions: Empirical.

References and Further Reading 1. Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law. The first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses. First, moral propositions have what is sometimes called objective standing in the sense that such propositions are the bearers of objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can be objectively true or false. Though moral objectivism is sometimes equated with moral realism see, e. Strictly speaking, then, natural law moral theory is committed only to the objectivity of moral norms. The second thesis constituting the core of natural law moral theory is the claim that standards of morality are in some sense derived from, or entailed by, the nature of the world and the nature of human beings. Thomas Aquinas, for example, identifies the rational nature of human beings as that which defines moral law: On this common view, since human beings are by nature rational beings, it is morally appropriate that they should behave in a way that conforms to their rational nature. Thus, Aquinas derives the moral law from the nature of human beings thus, "natural law". But there is another kind of natural law theory having to do with the relationship of morality to law. According to natural law theory of law, there is no clean division between the notion of law and the notion of morality. Though there are different versions of natural law theory, all subscribe to the thesis that there are at least some laws that depend for their "authority" not on some pre-existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they stand to moral standards. Otherwise put, some norms are authoritative in virtue of their moral content, even when there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity. The idea that the concepts of law and morality intersect in some way is called the Overlap Thesis. As an empirical matter, many natural law moral theorists are also natural law legal theorists, but the two theories, strictly speaking, are logically independent. One can deny natural law theory of law but hold a natural law theory of morality. John Austin, the most influential of the early legal positivists, for example, denied the Overlap Thesis but held something that resembles a natural law ethical theory. Indeed, Austin explicitly endorsed the view that it is not necessarily true that the legal validity of a norm depends on whether its content conforms to morality. But while Austin thus denied the Overlap Thesis, he accepted an objectivist moral theory; indeed, Austin inherited his utilitarianism almost wholesale from J. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Here it is worth noting that utilitarians sometimes seem to suggest that they derive their utilitarianism from certain facts about human nature; as Bentham once wrote, "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne" Bentham , 1. Thus, a commitment to natural law theory of morality is consistent with the denial of natural law theory of law. Conversely, one could, though this would be unusual, accept a natural law theory of law without holding a natural law theory of morality. One could, for example, hold that the conceptual point of law is, in part, to reproduce the demands of morality, but also hold a form of ethical subjectivism or relativism. On this peculiar view, the conceptual point of law would be to enforce those standards that are morally valid in virtue of cultural consensus. For this reason, natural law theory of law is logically independent of natural law theory of morality. The remainder of this essay will be exclusively concerned with natural law theories of law. The Project of Conceptual Jurisprudence The principal objective of conceptual or analytic jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical norms. As John Austin describes the project, conceptual jurisprudence seeks "the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are properly so called" Austin , Accordingly, the task of conceptual jurisprudence is to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that

distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world. While this task is usually interpreted as an attempt to analyze the concepts of law and legal system, there is some confusion as to both the value and character of conceptual analysis in philosophy of law. As Brian Leiter points out, philosophy of law is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most other areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn, incorporating the tools and methods of the sciences. To clarify the role of conceptual analysis in law, Brian Bix distinguishes a number of different purposes that can be served by conceptual claims: Bix takes conceptual analysis in law to be primarily concerned with 3 and 4. In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law have traditionally been characterized in terms of their posture towards the Overlap Thesis. Thus, conceptual theories of law have traditionally been divided into two main categories: Classical Natural Law Theory All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is some kind of non-conventional relation between law and morality. According to this view, then, the notion of law cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted. The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis forms the foundation for the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: Eternal law is comprised of those laws that govern the nature of an eternal universe; as Susan Dimock , 22 puts it, one can "think of eternal law as comprising all those scientific physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc. One cannot discover divine law by natural reason alone; the precepts of divine law are disclosed only through divine revelation. The natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern the behavior of beings possessing reason and free will. The first precept of the natural law, according to Aquinas, is the somewhat vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it is worth noting that Aquinas holds a natural law theory of morality: Good and evil are thus both objective and universal. But Aquinas is also a natural law legal theorist. On his view, a human law that is, that which is promulgated by human beings is valid only insofar as its content conforms to the content of the natural law; as Aquinas puts the point: The idea that a norm that does not conform to the natural law cannot be legally valid is the defining thesis of conceptual naturalism. As William Blackstone describes the thesis, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of conceptual naturalism: It should be noted that classical naturalism is consistent with allowing a substantial role to human beings in the manufacture of law. While the classical naturalist seems committed to the claim that the law necessarily incorporates all moral principles, this claim does not imply that the law is exhausted by the set of moral principles. There will still be coordination problems e. Thus, the classical naturalist does not deny that human beings have considerable discretion in creating natural law. Rather she claims only that such discretion is necessarily limited by moral norms: Critics of conceptual naturalism have raised a number of objections to this view. First, it has often been pointed out that, contra Augustine, unjust laws are all-too- frequently enforced against persons. As Austin petulantly put the point: Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity Austin , Another frequently expressed worry is that conceptual naturalism undermines the possibility of moral criticism of the law; inasmuch as conformity with natural law is a necessary condition for legal validity, all valid law is, by definition, morally just. Thus, on this line of reasoning, the legal validity of a norm necessarily entails its moral justice. As Jules

Coleman and Jeffrey Murphy , 18 put the point: The important things [conceptual naturalism] supposedly allows us to do e. If we really want to think about the law from the moral point of view, it may obscure the task if we see law and morality as essentially linked in some way. Moral criticism and reform of law may be aided by an initial moral skepticism about the law. There are a couple of problems with this line of objection. First, conceptual naturalism does not foreclose criticism of those norms that are being enforced by a society as law. Insofar as it can plausibly be claimed that the content of a norm being enforced by society as law does not conform to the natural law, this is a legitimate ground of moral criticism: Thus, the state commits wrong by enforcing that norm against private citizens. Conceptual jurisprudence assumes the existence of a core of social practices constituting law that requires a conceptual explanation. The project motivating conceptual jurisprudence, then, is to articulate the concept of law in a way that accounts for these pre-existing social practices. A conceptual theory of law can legitimately be criticized for its failure to adequately account for the pre-existing data, as it were; but it cannot legitimately be criticized for either its normative quality or its practical implications. A more interesting line of argument has recently been taken up by Brian Bix Following John Finnis , Bix rejects the interpretation of Aquinas and Blackstone as conceptual naturalists, arguing instead that the claim that an unjust law is not a law should not be taken literally: A more reasonable interpretation of statements like "an unjust law is no law at all" is that unjust laws are not laws "in the fullest sense. Similarly, to say that an unjust law is "not really law" may only be to point out that it does not carry the same moral force or offer the same reasons for action as laws consistent with "higher law" Bix , Like Bix, Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis, the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law. Finnis distinguishes a number of equally valuable basic goods: Each of these goods, according to Finnis, has intrinsic value in the sense that it should, given human nature, be valued for its own sake and not merely for the sake of some other good it can assist in bringing about. Moreover, each of these goods is universal in the sense that it governs all human cultures at all times. The point of moral principles, on this view, is to give ethical structure to the pursuit of these basic goods; moral principles enable us to select among competing goods and to define what a human being can permissibly do in pursuit of a basic good. Thus, Finnis sums up his theory of law as follows: Again, it bears emphasizing that Finnis takes care to deny that there is any necessary moral test for legal validity: Nevertheless, Finnis believes that to the extent that a norm fails to satisfy these conditions, it likewise fails to fully manifest the nature of law and thereby fails to fully obligate the citizen-subject of the law. The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller Like Finnis, Lon Fuller rejects the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive moral constraints on the content of law. But Fuller, unlike Finnis, believes that law is necessarily subject to a procedural morality.

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Chapter 2 : # Garcinia Cambogia Empirical Evidence

A comprehensive look at empirical approaches to molecular discovery, their relationships with rational design, and the future of both Empirical methods of discovery, along with serendipitous and rational design approaches, have played an important role in human history.

So Far There is too much ink spent worrying about this question. What matters are the important questions science is dealing with, from the origin and future of the universe to the origin and future of life. All this talk about science and religion gives the wrong impression, as it suggests reconciling them or not reconciling them is a big issue As I once put it to theologians at a meeting at the Vatican: Howard Gardner Hobbs Professor of Cognition and Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education; Author, Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Reframed Of course, if you believe in the scientific method and the scientific enterprise, you will have little patience for belief in revelation whatever that is. Still, all of us, even the most extreme rationalists, harbor contradictory beliefs in our minds and we somehow muddle through. He had just returned from the inauguration and was filled with enthusiasm and optimism. Like so many young people today, he wants to leave the world a better place. Prior to his acting career he had studied molecular biology and after graduating coordinated science teaching for three middle schools in an urban school system. He described how along with his acting career he would ultimately like to build on his training to start schools worldwide where students can get good science training. But at this point the conversation rounded a bend. His proposed curriculum would include at least one course on religion. I was surprisedâ€”this bright young man had studied biology and in all other respects seemed to have opinions and attitudes grounded in the type of education everyone responding to this question is familiar with. But religion has been a big part of his life and he sensibly said the worst thing that happens in his schools would be that people learn about religion and make their own judgements. But he himself believes in Man descending from Adam as opposed to ascending from apes. He explained how he could learn the science and understand the logic but that it is simply how Man puts things together. Empirically-based logic-derived science and faith are entirely different methods for trying to approach truth. You can derive a contradiction only if your rules are logic. There is no contradiction to be had. He embodied the answer. As an atheist I am untroubled by the fact that I am moved by much of the Christian culture in which I grew up; the art, the music, the buildings, even some of the religious ceremonies. I see no need to apply scientific analysis to aspects of my life that provide great pleasure. How does belief work for them, how did it develop in their own lives, how did it evolve in previous generations and what is it for? These are all questions that we routinely ask of all aspects of biology and psychology. The last question, applied in the sense of what is the current utility of religious belief to an individual, is important. In attempting to provide an answer, I part company with some no-nonsense colleagues who are also atheists. If you live comfortably and are surrounded by good friends and endless opportunities for a stimulating and interesting life, then your need for belief in an omniscient and all-caring being is not great. But if you have a wretched life with nothing to be happy about, you may well want something to cling onto, some conviction that you can look forward to conditions that are never likely to exist in the real world. It seems staggeringly insensitive to tell such people that they are fooling themselves and that, since they only have one life, they should get out there should enjoy it. No amount of science is going to help them to perceive the world in a way that is helpful to them. Science can be applied to relieving the conditions that oppress themâ€”but that is a different matter. Telling them to be rational will only compound their misery. But I should be distressed if a new deal for science led to a form of misplaced triumphalism and an assumption that we can provide psychological solutions for problems that are beyond our grasp. I am an atheist. I believe that theology, which I hold an undergraduate degree in, is a waste of time. However, none of this frees science from the obligation of dialog with religious people. Scientists belong to societies. No one practices science in a vacuum, culturally, financially or, even, religiously. It is important to maintain respectful dialog on what the proper relationship of

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science is to religion if for no other reason than the fact that the National Science Foundation is hugely subsidized by the taxes of religious people. This of course does not give taxpayers veto power over science, but it does mean that scientists neither can nor should regard religion as utterly irrelevant to their practice. When scientists believe that they are marching towards Truth in some platonic sense, they are behaving religiously, not scientifically. Science is a messy business conducted in messy places. Scientists are evolved hominids that have only used toilet paper for a brief period in their existence. Science owes its existence, health and results to the society that supports it. Scientists are not monks, after all, to be freed from worldly constraints for contemplation of their god, Truth. Their patrons include their opponents in modern societies. They must engage in dialog and not act as though only the true believers in science are worthy of dialog. No matter what jokes we tell over cocktails. Dennett Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, From Bacteria to Bach and Back Jerry Coyne nicely dissects the urge of many people to persuade themselves that their religion can coexist peacefully with science in general and evolutionary biology in particular. And he shows just how hopeless this quest is. I can discern more than half a dozen plausible reasons for belief in belief in God, and in some people these reasons are no doubt additive, not exclusive. I list them more or less in order, ranging from abject through feckless to noble-if-misguided: Religious belief puts the fear of God into some who would otherwise behave reprehensibly. Why discard alliances, make enemies, lose the affection of powerful friends and associates by raining on their parade? If I recant, I contribute to the dissolution of an aspect of the world that they truly depend on. I have no right to take away their crutch. They would never tolerate such fuzzy and illogical thinking in their science—or, in the case of philosophers, in their analytic work in ethics or epistemology or metaphysics. They manage not to notice how they have transformed the object of their worship from the original Celestial Bio-engineer into a Divine Nudger of Randomness into an Omniscient Lawgiver into the impersonal, but still somehow benign Ground of All Being. Maybe the process of evolution by natural selection just is God! Each reason for belief in belief in Gd is defensible up to a point, but we need to weigh the indirect side effects of going along with tradition. To see why consider that any attempted reconciliation between a believer of monotheistic religion and a scientist is bedeviled by a troubling asymmetry. But this generosity is not reciprocated. The greatest gift revelatory religions have to offer is the promise of heaven. Were they to practice the brotherhood that they preach this would be offered to all, irrespective of belief. The shame that this deal is offered to children too young to reason through its premises is another piece of evidence of the essential bad faith of the arguments for revelatory religion. The basic ethics of an open and free society are to be prepared to defend what you believe with reasoned argument from public evidence, be prepared to change your mind, and be tolerant of diverse views on questions the evidence does not suffice to decide. Religious faith that promises great gifts in a mythical hereafter as the reward for adherence to unverifiable claims contradicts these ethics. In fact it is science that practices the generosity and inclusiveness that religions teach, and for that reason will triumph, because ultimately human beings prefer to be reasoned with rather than coerced and manipulated. However, many still feel the need for a community that shares their wonder at the existence and beauty of the universe, while offering solace for the pains of life and death. For this reason, the fact that there are liberal forms of religion that are consistent with science and these ethics is not to be denigrated, as Coyne seems to. Many former believers have given up monotheistic religions for the pantheistic or liberal reconciliation offered by Spinoza and Einstein, precisely because they recognize the weakness of the claims of revelation compared to science, but still wants to feel part of a community. We scientists, who are lucky to be members of the most inclusive and diverse community on the planet, should understand the need of others to be bound in communities with people who share their values and hopes, so long as they do not contradict the ethics of the democracy we aspire to build. When President Obama announced that we will restore science to its rightful place in government, the implication is that we will also restore religion to its rightful place--in the Church. Rick Warren was invited to Washington to deliver an invocation, not an opinion on science education or funding for embryonic stem cell research. Robert Boyle,

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pioneering experimental chemist and a founder of the Royal Society, helped launch the current trend in with his delightful "Christian virtuoso: That an incessant stream of books attempting to reconcile Science and Religion keeps rolling off the assembly line is more a testament to the success of the Templeton Foundation than to the failure of Boyle and his followers to make their case. Derman is best known for his work on the Black-Derman-Toy interest-rate model and for developing local volatility models of the implied volatility smile. His research interests include quantitative finance, financial engineering, derivatives valuation, volatility models, and risk management. Giberson Scholar of Science and Religion I enter this conversation feeling vaguely like a wishbone being stretched. On the one hand, I believe that the world is the creation of transcendent God that I perceive dimly behind the almost opaque curtain of my experience; but I also believe in the extraordinary power of science to unfold the nature of that world with astonishing clarity and conviction. Discussions like this that juxtapose "empirical science" with "revealed religion" rarely seem like appropriately balanced encounters to me. When Ken Ham and his merry band of biblical literalists talk disparagingly about science, I can barely recognize it. This seems unfair to me. The great unwashed masses of these "faithful" should be juxtaposed with the great masses of people who "believe" in science but are not professionals. Most Americans and the rest of the world, for that matter are attached to both iPods and a belief that medical science is their best hope when they are sick. They "believe" in science. What do you suppose "science" would look like, were it defined by these "believers"? The physics would be Aristotelian; astrology and aliens would be accepted as real; General Relativity would be unknown; quantum mechanics would be perceived as a way to influence the world with your mind. And yet all of these people would have had far more education in science than the typical religious believer has in theology. Science as "lived and practiced by real people" is quite different than the science promoted by the intellectuals in this conversation. Empirical science does indeed trump revealed truth about the world as Galileo and Darwin showed only too clearly. But empirical science also trumps other empirical science. It was, rather, a glorious and appropriately celebrated advance for science, albeit one not understood by most people. How is it that "science" is allowed to toss its historical baggage overboard when its best informed leaders decide to do so, even though the ideas continue to circulate on main street, but religion must forever be defined by the ancient baggage carried by its least informed? The world disclosed by science is rich and marvelous, but most people think there is more to it. Our religious traditions embody our fitful and imperfect reflections on this mysterious and transcendent intuition—an intuition that, as articulated by some of our most profound thinkers, seeks an understanding of the world that goes beyond the empirical. Coyne would say there is no such peaceful overlap. But there are many well-informed believers who have come to peace with science, and who live happily on the rich, but thinly populated, turf where the magisteria overlap.

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Chapter 3 : Hume, David: Religion | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Searching for Molecular Solutions covers several major areas of modern research, development, and practical applications of molecular sciences. This text offers empirical-rational principles of broad relevance to scientists, professionals, and students interested in general aspects of molecular discovery, as well as the thought processes behind.

It provides a comprehensive and logical look at experimental methods for discovery of biologically relevant molecules, and includes sections on pragmatic molecular discovery, finding useful natural molecules, empirical methods, directed evolution, high-throughput synthesis and screening, rational molecular design, empirical versus rational design, and the limits of empirical methods. Scientists, professionals, and students interested in general aspects of molecular discovery will find this book extremely useful. Three Ways of Discovery. How to be a Librarian. Demonstrating the Power of Empirical Screening and Selection. Mode of Molecular Discovery. The Borderland of Rational Design. To Opine on Design. Natural Evolution at Work. Diversity Enough and Time. Doubling Up and Reassorting. Old Ideas and Newer Wrinkles. The Marks of Lamarck? The Arrow of Complexity? Complexity and Molecular Discovery. Molecules of Evolution and Design Boundaries. Combinatorial Catalysis and Its Helpers. Enzymes to the Limit. Absent by Irreducibility, or Lack of an Access Route? Food for Evolutionary Thought. Natural Somatic Diversification and Molecular Design. The Xenobiotic "Immune System" and Beyond. How to Shoot Moving Targets. The Range and Utility of Adaptive Immunity. Antibodies and Molecular Recognition in General. Antibody Libraries and Iterative Selection: The Largesse of Immune Systems. Smelling a Rat, and Many Other Things. Putting Evolution to Work. Levels of Selectable Replicators. The Score and Implementation of Evolution as a Workhorse. GOD in the Laboratory. Evolution on the Laboratory Bench. A Highly Rational Empirical Process. Crossing the Valley of the Shadow of Low Fitness: Journeys across Molecular Spaces. Punctuating Sequence Space, Naturally or Otherwise. The Power of Display. Show Me Your Coat: Doing it In Vitro. Test it, Replicate It, Evolve It. Applying Natural Protein Evolution Principles. Productively Playing with Enzymes. Altered and Novel Enzymes. Return to the Fold. Finding and Evolving Folds. Natural and Unnatural Acts. New codes In Vivo. Unnatural Rewards and Limits. Functional Nucleic Acids and their Directed Evolution. Ribozyme Replication and Other Things. Still Good for RNA? Folding in Two Worlds. Working with the Ribozyme Repertoire. Angling for Aptamers with Aptitude. Natural Aptamers and Riboswitches. Allosteric Ribozymes and Aptamers. Payoffs from Functional Nucleic Acids. Moving Aptamers Toward the Clinic. Extending the Functional Range of Nucleic Acids. The Virtual Molecular Museum. The Best of Both Worlds? The Immune System in a Bottle and on a Leash. New Wrinkles on the Old Way to Antibodies. Other Protein Scaffolds for Molecular Recognition. Finding and Designing Proteins for Diversification. As Small as Possible, but No Smaller. Small and Natural, Small and Useful. How to Find New Drugs. Aiming in the Right Direction. High-throughput Put Through High Loops. Generalities, and the Natural Approach. Make Your Own Library. Codes for Small Molecules. Marrying Chemistry and Biology with Tags. From Small to Large and Back Again. Scope of Rational Design. Pathways to Rational Design. Quantum Chemistry and Rational Design. Small Molecules the Rational Way. The De Novo Ultimate? Proteins by the Book. Systems, Pathways, and Networks. The Limits of Rational Design. Rational Design and Determinism. Reverse-engineering Biocomplexity for Design Insights. Time, Knowledge, and Molecules. Patterns for the Future. The Universal Power of Combinatorics. References in Figure Legends.

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Chapter 4 : Examples of Empirical Evidence

"Empirical methods of discovery, along with serendipitous and rational design approaches, have played an important role in human history. Searching for Molecular Solutions compares empirical discovery strategies for biologically useful molecules with serendipitous discovery and rational design, while also considering the strengths and limitations of empirical pathways to molecular discovery.

Works in the History of Philosophy 1. His very first work had the charge of atheism leveled against it, and this led to his being passed over for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He leveled moral, skeptical, and pragmatic objections against both popular religion and the religion of the philosophers. These run the gamut from highly specific topics, such as metaphysical absurdities entailed by the Real Presence of the Eucharist, to broad critiques like the impossibility of using theology to infer anything about the world. Hume wrote the Natural History roughly in tandem with the first draft of the Dialogues, but while the former was published during his lifetime as one of his Four Dissertations, the latter was not. In the introduction to the Natural History, Hume posits that there are two types of inquiry to be made into religion: While the Dialogues investigate the former, the task of the Natural History is to explore the latter. In the Natural History, he focuses on how various passions can give rise to common or false religion. It is an innovative work that brings together threads from philosophy, psychology, and history to provide a naturalistic account of how the various world religions came about. Though Hume began writing the Dialogues at roughly the same time as the Natural History, he ultimately arranged to have the former published posthumously. In the twenty-five years between the time at which he first wrote them and his death, the Dialogues underwent three sets of revisions, including a final revision from his deathbed. The Dialogues are a rich discussion of Natural Theology, and are generally considered to be the most important book ever written on the subject. Divided into twelve parts, the Dialogues follow the discussion of three thinkers debating the nature of God. The work is narrated by Pamphilus, a professed student of Cleanthes. In the Dialogues, all the characters make good Humean points, even Pamphilus and Demea. The difficulty comes in determining who speaks for Hume when the characters disagree. The most popular view, though not without dissent, construes Hume as Philo. Philo certainly has the most to say in the Dialogues. His arguments and objections often go unanswered, and he espouses many opinions on both religion and on other philosophical topics that Hume endorses in other works, such as the hypothesis that causal inference is based on custom. There remain three positions open to Hume: The first position has Hume denying any form of supernaturalism, and is much more popular outside of Hume scholarship than within. It has him making a firm metaphysical commitment by allowing an inference from our having no good reason for thinking that there are supernatural entities, to a positive commitment that in fact there are none. These considerations against a full-fledged atheist position motivate the skeptical view. While atheism saddles Hume with too strong a metaphysical commitment, the skeptical view also holds that he does not affirm the existence of any supernatural entities. This view has Hume doubting the existence of supernatural entities, but still allowing their possibility. It has the advantage of committing Hume to the sparse ontology of the naturalist without actually committing him to potentially dogmatic metaphysical positions. Hence, Hume can be an atheist for all intents and purposes without actually violating his own epistemic principles. Many scholars tend to steer clear of the former for several reasons. First, while it was true that, early in his career, Hume edited his work to avoid giving offense, this was not the case later. For example, Hume excised the miracles argument from the Treatise, but it later found its way into print in the Enquiry. Second, Hume arranged to have the Dialogues published after his death, and therefore had no reason to fear repercussions for himself. Further, Hume did not seem to think that the content would bring grief to his nephew who brought it to publication, as he revealed in a letter to his publisher L2, Appendix M. Third, it is not only in the Dialogues that we get endorsements of a deity or of a design argument. Lastly, it is generally considered hermeneutically appropriate to invoke disingenuousness only if an alternative interpretation cannot

be plausibly endorsed. Norman Kemp Smith, in his commentary on the Dialogues, argues in favor of just such an alternative interpretation. Though he interprets Hume as Philo, he has the Reversal as insincerely made, not from fear, but as a dialectical tool. In his Ciceronian dialogue, Hume does not want the reader, upon finishing the piece, to interpret any of the characters as victorious, instead encouraging them to reflect further upon these matters. We should instead look for reasons to take the Reversal as genuine. There is, therefore, support for interpreting Hume as a deist of a limited sort. However, scholars that attribute weak deism to Hume are split in regard to the source of the belief. Hence, Hume does not reject all design arguments, and, provided that the analogs are properly qualified, might allow the inference. This is different than the picture suggested by Butler and discussed by Pike in which the belief is provided by a natural, non-rational faculty and thereby simply strikes us, rather than as the product of an inferential argument. Therefore, though the defenders of a deistic Hume generally agree about the remote, non-moral nature of the deity, there is a fundamental schism regarding the justification and generation of this belief. Both sides, however, agree that the belief should not come from special revelation, such as miracles or revealed texts. The section is divided into two parts. While Part I provides an argument against believing in miracles in general, Part II gives four specific considerations against miracles based on particular facts about the world. Though the Evidential Arguments are fairly straightforward in and of themselves, there are two major interpretive puzzles: Some see the two parts as entirely separable, while others insist that they provide two parts of a cohesive whole. The following reconstructions attempt to stay interpretively neutral on these disputes. Hume begins Part I with rules for the appropriate proportioning of belief. First, he divides arguments that justify beliefs regarding cause and effect into proofs and probabilities. Proofs are arguments supported by evidence in which the effects have been constant, such as the sun rising every day. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. In a letter to Blair, Hume indicates that, as an empirical fact, miracles always have religious content: A Humean miracle is, therefore, a violation of a law of nature whose cause is an agent outside of nature, though the incompatibility with a law of nature is all that the Categorical Argument requires. Laws, therefore, admit of no empirical counterexamples. Secondly, laws of nature are matters of fact, not relations of ideas, as their denial is always coherent. Indeed, like any other matter of fact, they must have some empirical content. Utilizing this conception of the laws of nature, Hume draws his conclusion: There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as the uniform experience amounts to a proof, then there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior to it. Call this the Caricature Argument. The Caricature Argument faces three major obstacles, two of which are insurmountable. However, considering the inaccuracies of the Caricature Argument will help us to arrive at a more accurate reconstruction. First, the Caricature Argument is an a priori, deductive argument from definition. Nonetheless, both the argument of Section X and the letter in which he elucidates it repeatedly appeal to the evidence against miracles as constituting a proof. If the Caricature Argument were correct, then the argument against miracles could not be labeled as such. A second, related problem is that, if one accepts the Caricature Argument, then one must accept the entailed modality. From the conclusion of the a priori deductive argument, it follows that the occurrence of a miracle would be impossible. If this were the case, then no testimony could persuade a person to believe in the existence of a miracle. However, many take Hume to implicitly reject such an assumption. Therefore, there are hypothetical situations in which our belief in a miracle could be established by testimony, implying that the conclusion of the Caricature Argument is too strong. This reply, however, is incorrect. However, we must note that the passage that immediately precedes the example contains an ambiguous disjunct: From this passage alone, it is not clear whether Hume means for the darkness scenario to count as an example of the former, the latter, or both. For instance, the absence of the sun during 48 hours; but reasonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe

was disordered during this time. L1, Letter The conclusion Hume draws is that, even if testimony of a strange event were to amount to a full proof, it would be more reasonable to infer a hiccup in the natural regularity of things on par with an eclipse, where apparent, but not the disturbance of a higher level regularity, rather than to conclude a miracle. It is the business of history to distinguish between the miraculous and the marvelous; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human; to doubt the second; and when obliged by unquestionable testimony to admit of something extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances. He therefore never grants a proof of a miracle as a real possibility, so the Caricature Argument may surmount at least this objection. However, a final difficulty related to the modality of the conclusion concerns the observation that Hume couches his argument in terms of appropriate belief. This gives us reason to reject the metaphysical conclusion of the Caricature Argument. Hume does not say that violations are impossible, only unknowable. Of course, it could be that Hume grants this merely for the sake of argument, but then the stronger conclusion would still have a problem. For whether or not Hume grants the occurrence of miracles, he certainly allows for their conceivability, something the Caricature Argument cannot allow since, for Hume, conceivability implies possibility. Finally, there is the fact that Part II exists at all. The proper conclusion is, therefore, the epistemic one. In overcoming the weaknesses of the Caricature Argument, a more plausible Humean argument takes form. Beliefs about matters of fact are supported only by proofs stronger or probabilities weaker that come in varying degrees of strength. The first clause is true by definition for probabilities, but Hume also establishes it more clearly in Part II. There is much to be said for this reconstruction. First, in addition to Humean axioms, we have empirical premises rather than definitions that support the key inferences. Hence, the reconstruction is a proof, not a demonstration. Second, given that Hume has ancillary arguments for these empirical premises, there is no question-begging of the form that the Caricature Argument suggests. However, there is a separate worry of question-begging in 4 that needs to be addressed before moving on to the arguments of Part II. However, there are people that do testify to miracles. The worry is that, in assigning existence to laws of nature without testimonial exception, Hume may beg the question against those that maintain the occurrence of miracles. This worry can be overcome, however, if we follow Don Garrett in realizing what Hume is attempting to establish in the argument: This is, of course, compatible with there actually being exceptions to it, so long as one of those exceptions has, for the judge, the status of experiments within his or her experience. To believe in a miracle, the witness must believe that a law of nature has been violated.

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Chapter 5 : DOES THE EMPIRICAL NATURE OF SCIENCE CONTRADICT THE REVELATORY NATURE

Contents: If it works, it works: pragmatic molecular discovery -- Empirical miracles: nature's precedents for empirical solutions -- Evolution's gift: natural somatic diversification and molecular design -- Evolution while you wait -- The blind protein-maker -- The Blind shaper of nucleic acids -- Evolving and creating recognition molecules.

Empirical Arguments For the existence Teleological Moral Trancendental David Hume was one of the great empiricists, especially in the area of the philosophy of religion. The ability for empiricism to produce sceptic conclusions that concern our knowledge of God was greatly apparent in the work of Hobbes in which he holds on to similar empiricist principles concerning the foundations of human knowledge. One of the most apparent aspects of the position that Hobbes takes on this subject is his claim that we have no idea of God and this can make our comprehension of him difficult. In his writing "Leviathan" he states: Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor concieve infinite swiftness, infinitie time, or infinite force, or infinite power And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us concieve him for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconcievable but that we may honor him. If no impression can be produced, we must conclude that the term altogether is therefore deemed insignificant. Given the significance of the "copy-principle" in the phylosophical system that Hume presents, and it clear revelance to the debate of the idea of God that we have, it is suprising to find that in the Treatise, Hume rarely mentions our idea of God, or even provides any kind of a detailed account of the nature and the origin of this idea. In this context Hume seems to use the idea of God to describe or illustrate his copy- principle. When we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutinty to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and Good Being, arises from the reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. Our idea of the existence of God is very complex and comes from very simple ideas steeped in the reflections on the way of operations of our own mind which upon we argue without limit. Hume continues on to show that the "optimists" of God in trying to deal with these difficulties actually are degrading God with the implication that God resembles them in any way to strive to make him more understandable or "comprehensible". What is more important than this, is that in the Enquiry XI Hume presents a critique of our conjectures about the nature of God and the attribute he may have, based in the evidence of design in the world. The Diety is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him A basic or fundamental point trhat seems to emerge from all of this , is that Hume seems to agree with Hobbes that in our idea of God tends to follow the same path of that of a blind man trying to obtain the idea of fire. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence, it being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself, or to be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite sucesion, without any ultimate cause at all, or must have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent D,90 It is also essential to his argument to prove that the necessarily-existen being cannot be of unintelligent inactive matter matter. Ant particle of matter, it is said, "may be concieved to be annihilated; and any form may be concieve to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore is not impossible. D91 Clarke provides another argument that is not mentioned by Hume in the Dialogues to show that it is quite impossible for matter to truly be "the final and original being" it states that we cannot explain the origin of motion and intelligence in the world if matter is the first, original self existing being. The basic principle idea that Clarke is relying on to come to this conclusionis,once again that "nothing can come from nothing". The principle in this case is seems to be interpreted that it is inplying "in order of causes and effects, the cause must always be more excellent that the

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effect" Demonstrations,³⁸ On this account, it is virtually impossible that "any effect could have such perfection, which was not in the cause" Clarke and other like-minded thinkers, using the basis of this principle described as the causal-adequacy principle these thinkers attempt to maintain that it is possible to demonstrate for certain that matter and motion are not able to produce thought and intelligence. So therefore, the self-existent being must be intellectually, immaterial being, they claimed that to suppose the contrary would be just plain contradiction. Hume on Miracles- Miracles are an essential and even a fundamental part of many of the monotheistic religions i. Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc. The observance or the account of miracles as presented in the scriptures of elsewhere in religious writings, are supposed to confirm the authenticity and even the authority of scripture and the prophets, but most importantly, establish that God has revealed himself to humans beings through the demonstration of these special acts or events. To doubt or question the validity or truth of this event is fundamentally to doubt the very core and distinct meaning and the doctrine of the Christian religion. It would be to cast doubt on the claim that Christ is God and the saviour of human kind. A major concern that Hume has, as is presented in Section X of the first Enquiry, was to discredit these miracle claims if this kind. Hume adds that a miracle is not only a violation law of nature, but also requires the direct activity of God or some "invisible agent" is a significant requirement. Hume seems to interpret a law of nature must involve a uniform regularity of events. We discover or "experience" laws of nature on the basis of our "experience on constant conjunctions of events or objects. Empirical Arguments Against the existence [edit] The problem of evil.

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About Author Ian S. Dunn, PhD, is the Director of Research at Cytocure, LLC, in Beverly, Massachusetts. In keeping with the scope of this book, he has a diverse background in immunology, cell and molecular biology, and biotechnology.

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