

# DOWNLOAD PDF DISARMAMENT: 1996-DISARMAMENT AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

## Chapter 1 : Dysfunctional Disarmament

*Disarmament: disarmament at a critical juncture: panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament.*

However, it is also a daunting prospect, given his special expertise in foreign affairs and international security policy. I will consider four overarching themes that are likely to affect the ability of the United Nations to deal with these critical issues, rather than attempting to describe the complete international security agenda it is likely to face. The international security and disarmament agenda requires urgent attention. Preserving the non-proliferation regime is critically important. If they continue to do so or deploy nuclear weapons, there may be pressure on other countries in the region to follow suit. Convincing them to step back will require extensive global diplomacy, with economic and political "carrot-and-stick" policies. Even if they desired to join the Treaty, they could only do so as non-nuclear-weapon States. And despite creative proposals to develop a parallel regime for them, they have been reluctant to constrain their nuclear weapons programmes. The non-proliferation regime has been further weakened by the failure of nuclear-weapons States to meet their commitments within the Treaty and those made during the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. These pledges included continuing the ban on nuclear tests, working towards the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, seeking a fissile material cut-off treaty and a renewed agreement to seek nuclear disarmament. While not a panacea, the steps agreed to at the Review Conference still represent a blueprint for progress on nuclear-weapons issues. The NPT and the entire non-proliferation regime are in grave danger because of the failure of nuclear-weapons States to make good on their promises. Small arms and light weapons SALW are also a threat to global security. The Small Arms Survey estimates that more than million firearms are currently in circulation and are being used to kill approximately 1, people each day. Regional initiatives on SALW are moving forward. But action at the global level is also critical. UN support will be necessary in aiding the group of governmental experts that will consider the prospects for a global arms trade treaty, which is an ambitious undertaking, bringing together different efforts to limit the damage done by the uncontrolled transfer of conventional weapons. It could also enhance attention to human rights and humanitarian standards while reducing weapons transfers to regions in conflict. The expert group is charged with establishing "common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms". There is a need for a strong institutional structure for disarmament. Yet despite these benefits, disarmament still faces difficult political and technical challenges that can only be surmounted by deliberate human action, strong institutional support, and understanding among the general public. We call this combined effort sustainable disarmament -- our fundamental goal. The UN disarmament staff provides professional expertise and technical assistance on an enormous range of disarmament and non-proliferation issues, from SALW to major conventional weapons, as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The staff provides the core structure for international security work for the Organization and serves as a valuable source of information for the broader community of analysts and activists working on these issues. This institutional structure must be strengthened, not merely maintained. The international security community is at a critical juncture, and weakening this structure would likely decrease the prospects for achieving disarmament and raise questions about UN commitment to this issue. Consensus should not require unanimity. UN meetings and conferences often proceed on the basis of consensus -- an admirable goal. Unfortunately, many UN fora have effectively defined this consensus as requiring unanimity. This interpretation gives even a single State the opportunity to block progress. In his September report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote that consensus "has become an end in itself" and that "it prompts the [General] Assembly to retreat to generalities, abandoning any serious effort to take action". The risks of this approach have also been shown by the disappointing results of recent international conferences. For example, principally because of United States intransigence, the Small Arms Review Conference ended without even reaching agreement on an outcome document. Even in fora in which

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unanimity is not required, the United States has attempted to obstruct progress, albeit with less effect. Seeking consensus is admirable; seeking unanimity is unrealistic. To make progress, the United Nations will have to move beyond this procedural choke point. Establishing productive relationships with NGOs is important. Another concern is that the United Nations is extremely inconsistent in the extent to which it takes advantage of the assistance offered by NGOs that have significant expertise on issues of UN concern. Many expert groups and conferences have been structured in ways that inhibit the participation of these organizations. In some fora, NGOs have had to struggle to even be part of the proceedings and have often been restricted to making presentations at a single session of weeks-long conferences. In contrast, the collaboration between the United Nations and NGOs on disarmament and non-proliferation education is an example of the enormous rewards that can result from full partnerships with these organizations. The United Nations and NGOs have participated in a fully collaborative effort on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in an impressive example of the potential inherent in this relationship. The Panel received contributions from more than 70 research institutes, educational institutions, NGOs and museums from over 40 countries, and circulated its draft report for outside peer review, with UN staff working intensively to integrate the varied responses and suggestions. This collaboration began while the Panel was still in planning stages and has continued well beyond the submission of its report. NGO representatives were especially concerned that the Panel balanced programmes designed for the short, medium and long term, as well as those requiring a range of resources. This approach was accepted and utilized by panel members to structure their recommendations. Representatives and panel members also stressed the importance of dealing with conventional weapons, as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It was clear from the beginning of the process that the results must be accessible to countries in the global north and south. For example, there has not been sufficient funding for the establishment of an international consortium "of scholars and representatives of civil society, to work in parallel with and as a complement to international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts". To prosper, this and related ventures will also require the financial and institutional support of the United Nations. With his support, I am confident that we can make progress on each of these issues. I join with citizens around the world in wishing him every success in this effort.

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## Chapter 2 : Disarmament Diplomacy: - Suspect Underground Site Undermines Framework Agreement

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By Ban Ki-Moon T Whereas countries and civil-society initiatives are on the move, the Conference has stagnated. Its credibility – indeed, its very legitimacy – is at risk. Much of this progress was achieved during the Cold War, proving that it is possible to create global legal norms even in times of deep political division. Yet today, all is not well at the CD. It operates under a consensus rule, and its member states have different priorities. Some want negotiations on nuclear disarmament; others want to ban the production of fissile material for weapon purposes; and still others insist that such a treaty should also cover existing stocks. Some want a treaty on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states to assure them against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; others want a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. But, instead of compromise and the give-and-take of good-faith discussions, there has been paralysis. There was a brief glimmer of hope in , when the sense of paralysis led the Conference to consensus on a program of work. Unfortunately, that agenda was never implemented. As a result, the CD has failed to make any substantive progress for 15 years. We simply must not let one lost decade turn into a second. But the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda is too important to let the CD lapse into irrelevancy as states consider other negotiating arenas. The participants – who included dozens of foreign ministers – were unanimous in stressing that membership of the CD is a privilege. So is the consensus rule. The message was clear: Continued stalemate increases the risk that some like-minded countries might take up the matter elsewhere. After all, the deadlock has ominous implications for international security; the longer it persists, the graver the nuclear threat – from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons, and from their possible acquisition by terrorists. I have urged the CD to adopt an agenda based either on the consensus that was forged in , or on an alternative arrangement. Prior agreement on the scope or outcome should not be a precondition for talks – or an excuse to avoid them – but rather a subject of the negotiations themselves. With the world focused so intently on advancing disarmament goals, the CD should seize the moment. And it will sink unless it fulfills its responsibility to act.

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## Chapter 3 : The Secretary-General's Agenda: Progress On Disarmament Required For Global Security

*The world was at a critical juncture in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. While broad agreement existed on the overall objective of fully eliminating those weapons, there were clearly.*

Opinion A dysfunctional disarmament The UN process of nuclear disarmament remains stalled, prompting plans to reorganise the voting system of member states. Whereas countries and civil-society initiatives are on the move, the Conference has stagnated. Its credibility - indeed, its very legitimacy - is at risk. Much of this progress was achieved during the Cold War, proving that it is possible to create global legal norms even in times of deep political division. Yet today, all is not well at the CD. It operates under a consensus rule, and its member states have different priorities. Some want negotiations on nuclear disarmament; others want to ban the production of fissile material for weapon purposes; and still others insist that such a treaty should also cover existing stocks. Some want a treaty on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states to assure them against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; others want a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. But, instead of compromise and the give-and-take of good-faith discussions, there has been paralysis. There was a brief glimmer of hope in , when the sense of paralysis led the Conference to consensus on a program of work. Unfortunately, that agenda was never implemented. As a result, the CD has failed to make any substantive progress for 15 years. We simply must not let one lost decade turn into a second. But the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda is too important to let the CD lapse into irrelevancy as states consider other negotiating arenas. The participants - who included dozens of foreign ministers - were unanimous in stressing that membership of the CD is a privilege. So is the consensus rule. The message was clear: Continued stalemate increases the risk that some like-minded countries might take up the matter elsewhere. After all, the deadlock has ominous implications for international security; the longer it persists, the graver the nuclear threat - from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons, and from their possible acquisition by terrorists. I have urged the CD to adopt an agenda based either on the consensus that was forged in , or on an alternative arrangement. Prior agreement on the scope or outcome should not be a precondition for talks - or an excuse to avoid them - but rather a subject of the negotiations themselves. With the world focused so intently on advancing disarmament goals, the CD should seize the moment. Shakespeare once wrote that "there is a tide in the affairs of men". The tide of disarmament is rising, yet the CD is in danger of sinking. And it will sink unless it fulfills its responsibility to act. A version of this article appeared previously on the Project Syndicate website.

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## Chapter 4 : Conference on Disarmament - Wikipedia

*The member, consensus-ruled body has only negotiated one treaty related to nuclear disarmament over the past 30 years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Widely considered to be a milestone towards nuclear disarmament, the CTBT would prohibit all nuclear testing.*

These five states had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was negotiated in This "exemption" is, however, countered with a legal obligation in Article VI of the NPT for the five nuclear weapon states to fully disarm. Three other nuclear armed states— India , Israel , and Pakistan —have never joined the NPT, but possess nuclear weapons. North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons, but unlike India, Israel, and Pakistan, was previously a member of the NPT obliged not to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in , and has tested nuclear devices multiple times since despite international condemnation and sanctions. Other countries, including Brazil and Argentina , considered acquiring nuclear weapons, but abandoned their programs before accepting binding restraints on nuclear weapons development. Many NNWS are party to nuclear weapon-free zones NWFZs , and have thereby accepted additional legal obligations not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess, or control any nuclear explosive devices on their territories. Today, more than countries belong to NWFZ treaties. At the same time, NNWS are legally required not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons, and to place all their peaceful use nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards. As such, this obligation is one of the three main "pillars" of the treaty, the other two being nuclear nonproliferation and the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, state parties agreed to indefinitely extend the treaty based on a package of decisions that included Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. This package called for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty CTBT , negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. Further building on this action plan, the NPT Review Conference, laid out 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, including an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. State parties failed to adopt further substantive recommendations. Many NNWS, and mainly the Non-Aligned Movement NAM countries, strongly supported the idea of negotiating a nuclear weapons convention that would delegitimize nuclear weapons and eliminate them within a clear timeframe. The discussion on the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament drew a wide range of support, but was also a source of tension and disagreement. While disarmament issues prompted the most contentious debates among states parties, in the end, the disagreement over convening a conference on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone prevented the Review Conference from adopting a final document. Gauging progress towards nuclear disarmament is complicated because shifts both in numbers of weapons and in the overarching policies governing these weapons are relevant. In terms of quantitative reductions, measurable steps have been undertaken by key NWS both unilaterally and bilaterally. The NWS collectively reduced the size of their nuclear arsenals from over 70, warheads at the height of the Cold War to approximately 14, by SORT provided for a significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in each arsenal to 1, - 2, The United Nations established the Conference on Disarmament CD as the sole multilateral disarmament-negotiating forum in The member, consensus-ruled body has only negotiated one treaty related to nuclear disarmament over the past 30 years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty CTBT in Widely considered to be a milestone towards nuclear disarmament, the CTBT would prohibit all nuclear testing. Nineteen years after it opened for signature the CTBT has yet to enter into force. Eight of these countries, including the United States and China, have yet to ratify. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty FMCT have not commenced even 18 years after agreement on the Shannon Mandate a mandate adopted by the CD in that proposed the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material [28]. Many consider an FMCT ripe for negotiation and the next logical step toward nuclear

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disarmament. Pakistan fears its national security will be at risk if its rival and neighbor, India, is left with a larger existing fissile material stockpile, and therefore has the capability to continue to produce nuclear weapons after the implementation of the treaty. Moreover, unilateral and U. Perhaps most notably, all nuclear weapon states are pursuing some degree of nuclear modernization. Time for a New Agenda. Around the same time, the Middle Powers Initiative was established in support of NNWS efforts to reduce and eliminate worldwide nuclear weapons arsenals. Following the failure of the NPT Review Conference, the Middle Powers Initiative launched the "Article VI Forum" in October to examine the legal, technical, and political requirements to fulfill nonproliferation and disarmament commitments for a nuclear weapon-free world. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission was established in amidst stagnation on nuclear disarmament and serious challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. An initiative undertaken by four former high-ranking U. The Humanitarian Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has increasingly drawn attention. The NPT Review Conference final document expressed concern about the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. For that purpose, at the Review Conference each of the P5 states submitted its national report, and completed a first edition of a glossary of key nuclear terms. However, most of the NNWS, especially NAM countries and civil society members, are critical about the P5 process since it is generally perceived that this process has not contributed to the actual reduction of nuclear weapons. Over the course of three sessions in , an Open-Ended Working Group OEWG of states recommended that the UN General Assembly convene a conference in to "negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading toward their total elimination. Opponents, including nuclear possessing states and states under extended nuclear deterrence, boycotted the negotiations with the exception of the Netherlands. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, U. Department of Defense, www. Kristensen and Robert S. The latest to ratify was Indonesia in February Could do Better," Disarmament Diplomacy 91 Summer , www. Functionality over Forum," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Web Edition, 19 September , www. Ray Acheson New York: Reaching Critical Will, , pp. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, 4 January I , May , www. August 7, Table of Contents:

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### Chapter 5 : Disarmament Diplomacy: - The Search for a Work Programme: the CD Fighting a Losing Battle

*Arms Control Today Compiled by James Perez OF SPECIAL INTEREST Disarmament at a Critical Juncture: Panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on.*

The Search for a Work Programme: Reaching agreement on a mandate to tackle the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space PAROS is so far proving an impossible task, with deliberations dominated and complicated by the hot topic of ballistic missile defences. Furthermore, recent discussions show that there are different interpretations as to how the Conference should "deal with" the question of nuclear disarmament. As agreement on the work programme once again slips away, the CD is debating what it should do in the current, depressing circumstances, with calls being made for alternative working methods to be considered. Although the mandate in the Amorim proposal has generally been considered as acceptable, except by a few countries, it has provoked dissatisfaction among some non-nuclear-weapon states in light of the nuclear disarmament pledges made at the NPT Review Conference. Reportedly, a number of countries, from different groups, expressed support for the New Zealand proposal. Pearson recalled two agreed NPT undertakings that bore particular significance with respect to the CD: New Zealand and South Africa attached "very great importance" to the full implementation of both commitments. Although New Zealand and South Africa felt that the Amorim proposal on nuclear disarmament, under which an ad hoc committee would "exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective", was "far from perfect", and indeed "significantly weaker" than the NPT had mandated, they were prepared to work with it. Moreover, calls for thematic discussions, "however well intentioned, run the risk of providing convenient cover for those who do not want to engage in real negotiations". Pearson further cautioned that the time might soon arrive when "we have to take a hard look at how this Conference is delivering on its mandate," stressing that at "a time when there are disturbing signs of a preference for unilateral solutions or options, it is essential for the continuation of multilateralism that this body reengages in real work". Disarmament was "not an optional extra" but a security-building process. He stressed that the pledges made at the NPT Review Conference were far-reaching and that a disinclination to act seriously upon them would undermine and discredit the non-proliferation regime. In this connexion, it was time for the nuclear-weapon states to settle their differences and jointly start the implementation of their commitments "with purpose and determination. Consequently, Westdal had reviewed the mandate together with some "key parties", but they had been "variously unwilling to consider any change or consider any isolated change whatever". Salander said the current stalemate did nothing to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, preventing as it did the CD from negotiating the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FMCT , to which the EU continued to attach the utmost importance. The EU considered that an immediate launch of FMCT negotiations, alongside an engagement with both nuclear disarmament and PAROS "within subsidiary bodies whose mandates shall need to be both pragmatic and substantial", constituted the basis for an agreement to begin work in the CD. Salander felt that the Amorim proposal contained "elements for a rapid agreement, if all members of the Conference display a spirit of openness and pragmatism". Continuing attempts to weave an international legal fabric for arms control were taking place at a especially complex time, with challenges to the non-proliferation regime and the rapid evolution of strategic visions that constrained, if not impeded, global disarmament. Despite these difficulties, positive events also needed to be recalled, such as the NPT Review Conference. He also noted the speeding up of the negotiations on a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention BWC , and welcomed the increasing attention being given to aspects of conventional disarmament. Notwithstanding such progress and potential for meaningful discussion, however, the CD continued to be deadlocked. He warned that the Conference risked exclusion and marginalisation if the current stalemate continued, an outcome which would have "very serious consequences for the entire system of multilateral cooperation". China was deeply worried that the United States had single-handedly obstructed

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PAROS negotiations "by denying the risk of the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space". Hu said his country also supported the early negotiation and conclusion of an FMCT "on the premise that global strategic stability is maintained and the nuclear disarmament process further pursued". He rejected double standards in non-proliferation, characterising the accusation by the United States that China was holding the CD hostage as a "distortion of facts". China supported the Amorim proposal "as the basis for further consultation[s]. Ambassador Robert Grey read a long list of work that had been done in preparation for FMCT negotiations, juxtaposing this with outer space where there was "no arms race" nor any prospect of one. The United States was ready for "organized discussion aimed at examining" proposals related to confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments, or certain other aspects with respect to outer space, as stated in the Amorim proposal. However, the United States could not understand why "those who do not share our views are unwisely and unrealistically insisting on immediate negotiations," a stance he described as "a diplomatic tactic which [had] the net effect of blocking discussion of the very issues they say they care about. What are [they] afraid of? Regardless of its doubts about this, the United States was ready to agree on such a committee "to discuss issues related to nuclear disarmament". Grey then questioned Russian readiness with regard to nuclear disarmament and the CD. He challenged the Russian delegation to clarify the February 1 statement by Ivanov: Grey said he believed that the CD was "as close as we can ever expect to be to agreement on an overall programme of work", warning that it would be "exceedingly unwise to let the moment slip away". As it began to appear virtually certain that the moment for agreeing a work programme would indeed slip away yet again from the Conference, discussion grew about what the CD could still usefully do. As the statement by New Zealand and South Africa shows, there is cautiousness about having the CD engage in work that falls short of actual disarmament negotiations. But there are also others who feel that all possible avenues for meaningful work should be explored. Delegations would be encouraged to submit papers, working papers and non-papers and put forward concrete proposals. Than said the main thrust of his proposal was to make the optimum use of the plenary meetings, and stressed that it was not meant to replace current efforts to reach agreement on the work programme, but rather to facilitate and prepare for this outcome. Since the opening of the year, the CD had learned that "the tight linkages with which we have bound subject to subject and mandate to mandate Furthermore, given that current major power relations were "dominated by Thus, the CD "may well decide that the time has come to address the role and work of the Conference in the absence of an agreed work programme". Westdal said the search for a formal work programme needed to address and credibly answer a series of questions, which he left as a heritage to his successors: What are the prerequisites for success, for valuable work in such treatments of elements of our substantive agenda? What is the political role of the Conference? How might its platform be enhanced to increase the influence of its work and the extent of effective engagement it provides? What is the public, informational and educational role of the Conference - as distinct from the outreach of its assembled delegations? What value do we recognise in the obvious CD function of assembling and cross-germinating a unique concentration of NACD [non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament] expertise? For that role alone, what benefits - for the UN, for treaty bodies and other endeavours - ought [to] be credited to this house? Might our group system be made more transparent lest it hide cheap, anonymous vetoes and fruitful with wider sharing of the benefits of group consideration? Though they would not likely promise to be decisive, might procedural and structural reforms be usefully pursued to facilitate negotiations once our global context permits their resumption? Finally, does it have to be all or nothing around here? Need fallow seasons be such hard times? The rule of consensus is congenital and forever, we know that; major players will not forsake the brake its veto gives them. How might they be enhanced? In sum, if the CD is not to be used for negotiations for a while, what would constitute a reasonable CD stewardship programme? Vega, who is the first Chilean Ambassador to take over the Presidency since Chile joined the Conference in , said it would be very difficult for him "to be original" as President, as the problems the CD faced had been with it for quite some time. Vega characterised the situation regarding the deadlock over the programme of work as one in which CD member

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states knew that positions on the programme depended on the broader international environment, and at the same time wondered what, if any, power the Conference itself had over that environment. Regardless of any doubts and concerns, however, the CD was there to take collective decisions on disarmament and member states had the primary responsibility over its fate. Vega would proceed with consultations on the programme of work on the basis of the Amorim proposal. The result is a near total paralysis that appears to be harder to shake off as time goes by. If the current deadlock continues much longer, they will soon be undermined.

### Chapter 6 : U.S. envoy confident about N. Korea nuclear disarmament | The Asahi Shimbun

*A comprehensive and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty would contribute greatly to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.*

### Chapter 7 : Joseph Rotblat | Open Library

*As the United Nations Conference on Disarmament begins a seven-week session in Geneva, its future is on the line. Whereas countries and civil-society initiatives are on the move, the Conference has stagnated.*

### Chapter 8 : A dysfunctional disarmament | | Al Jazeera

*The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a multilateral disarmament forum established by the international community to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements based at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Conference meets annually in three separate sessions in Geneva.*

### Chapter 9 : Nuclear Weapon Reduction | Disarmament of Nuclear Weapons | NTI

*Disarmament at a Critical Juncture: Panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York: United Nations, , pp. Ph: () , Email: [email protected] Price, Richard M.*