

# DOWNLOAD PDF DESTRUKTION OR RECOVERY? ON STRAUSS CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER

Chapter 1 : Rodrigo Chacon | Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México - [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*The meaning of Heidegger's "radical historicism" was not void of political consequences. Heidegger was not the only thinker but certainly the greatest thinker to embrace Hitler's revolution. The "Heidegger problem" has become something of a public scandal, one that Strauss pointed to long ago.*

Jeffrey Bernstein This article was downloaded by: Bernstein a College of the Holy Cross Version of record first published: To cite this article: Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. University of Chicago Press, engaged in a violent argument: November 1945 such as was spoken by formally un- life. Rather, the memorable political- relationship between the two thinkers. Inside he finds four huge black men ical experience is his interaction with In this review I focus on the importance dressed in faded blue uniforms and covered the workingmen who upset his presup- of Heidegger for Strauss research. The men are living reminders that that there is a direct line leading from Downloaded by [College Of the Holy Cross] at Strip us fellows this means that there is always the possibility to his adoption of National Socialism down and give us some costumes and sibility of an audience who knows the in This, according to Strauss, is we make about the finest damn Egyptian- tradition and standards of the art. The obvious conclusion ing spears or waving things like palm elevates his or her productions. As I required for whatever you set out to per- ities as well as the limits of each. As shall argue, the deeper issue for Strauss form! Thus, readers can expect to find a icaps imposed by the state, ballerinas dance with bags of sand tethered to largely conceptual and textual argument their bodies and bags over their faces. Velkley about the relation of the two thinkers The hero, Bergeron, releases the dancers Heidegger, Strauss, and the Premises with forays into Heideggerian poetic from their bonds and, for a brief moment of Philosophy: On Original discourse and philology and Straussian of freedom, they soar. Art is an escape Forgetting esoteric reading kept to a minimum. This is also in keep- gin of the present condition marked their structured, if imperfect, partic- ing with the primary argument he makes always by loss to transform the ipation in the whole through politi- about philosophy as suchâ€”i. As Velkley states, nal philosophical insight paradoxically gin Political life is thus the nec- tradition despite its intent to recover nity! Hence, the critical aspects sophical career. That Strauss has problems with est themes of the metaphysical as Holzwege pub. If the ques- did not emerge ex nihilo, this means that 2. The intent governing the project tion of being is essentially a practical German philosophy as such was an im- of Destruktion, for both Heidegger question, it is saturated by among portant source of reflection for Strauss. To schools, and sects. On Original crises can therefore only assume a for Strauss? University of Chicago Press cal form. The far as the return to premodern thought is dependent on an intimate acquaintance promise of overcoming the distinc- itself a modern compulsion. Put for the human nomos to lay down pun- comments on these two giants bespeak differently, Heidegger insufficiently ishments except for what is done openly, tremendous insight. But it is not only inoculates philosophy from religious not for what is done secretly. Velkley has ments, Heidegger still construes phi- pected. It now becomes evident that, Theodor Adorno, Critical Models: A Sourcebook, 1st edn. Ralph Lerner and years as a German Jew cf.

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## Chapter 2 : Confronting Mass Democracy and Industrial Technology | Duke University Press

*The famous confrontation between Heidegger and Cassirer at Davos in confirmed this fact for anyone with "sensitivity to greatness."(5) At the same time that Heidegger commanded Strauss's highest respect, he also elicited many of his sharpest criticisms.*

Q Politics, Art, and Technology. An Eye Too Few: The present volume preserves something of the substance and spirit of this encounter. The Destruction of the Destruction: I am grateful to Professor Otto Poggeler and to my co-editor Profes- Heidegger and Critical Theory: The First Encounter Cited in Ott, Martin Heidegger, p. Despite the obvious importance of this concept of "destruction," Heidegger never submits it to systematic critique; on the other hand he never revokes or revises the notion in his later writings. It remains something unthought in his thinking. Yet, given the importance that the term would play in the formation of the movement of deconstruction, the term itself obviously requires an extensive elaboration and critique. Ghazali attacks all philosophers by attacking Aristotle because, every philosophical term brings with it, yet his treatment of philosophical he reasons, Aristotle himself had refuted all the other philosophers, terms varies in radical and seemingly arbitrary ways. Some terms-especially including Plato. If metaphysics were to have the certainty Wesen:Ghazali then goes on to examine a destruction. Yet the two terms are by no faith. Rather, destructio is the criticism of reasonably reached opinion means identical and it will be necessary in the course of this paper to when it overreaches itself and claims a totalizing demonstrative scientific disentangle the strands of meaning and of influence. Ghazali has not abandoned philosophy. Thus Heidegger himself is-on his own terms- tation that is implicit in this destruction. Destructio- cept already contains its later history, its aftereffect Nachwirkung. There tion is already operating as critique within the region of philosophy, a is therefore a clear requirement that the term Destruktion itself be examined clearing of the ground already opened up by philosophical questioning. This he tion, the title Destructio philosophorum, "the destruction of the philoso- does through a destruction of the arguments Ghazali borrowing from phers. Again, the destruction of the different ways, but is more accurately rendered as "breakdown, disintegration or incoherence. Here the concept of de- entered into philosophy in northern Europe during the high Middle struction is tied to the discovery of essential truth, but the parameters Ages. Thus the term destructio as a philosophical term itself emerges are those of faith and reason. But if you young ones are afraid, make the experiential technique named in the course of philosophical tradition, but ment on me, as your Carian slave; [ am only an old man, so I am ready to we also have its self-reflexive turning against itself, we have a concept run the risk, and I deliver myself to Dionysodorus here as if he were Medea that by invoking itself invites its other, the destruction of the destruction. Let him destroy me [apolluto me], boil me too if he likes, only let him turn me out good. It has-at least in the reporting of Socrates-an ethical in- term as echoing, resonating, recovering, these medieval meanings. If we follow the Sophistic model of destruction in Plato, then not important in the Heideggerian scheme of reading that the author destruction is indeed primary, it is a kind of production or creation, Heidegger himself be aware of the traditional resonances of the term bringing about the new. For the Sophists, we must destroy before we that he introduces. For Heidegger, the author who is "authentic" is can create. Hence the puzzlement in the text over the provenance of the only able to articulate the text that is "sent" by the history of Being, his concept-is it itself something newly discovered, in which case it has an own personal sensitivity is a secondary matter. Or did the Sophists learn from someone else this "textual" approach to the history of philosophy, then the term "destructio- "kind of death or destruction"? Destruction is both death and origin of tion" already carries with it reference to the other texts in which its life in this text. Destruction is tied to speaking, and indeed, for the meaning is rooted. Sophists, it is tied to the impossibility of saying what is not. The Sophists It is curious that Heidegger does not make use of any Greek terms for have no difficulty with this, because they have abjured temporality by destruction, terms that would have indicated the historical provenance of living totally in the present b.

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Socrates on the other hand follows this method of ontology, this method that thinks against itself. Learning, for Socrates, is remembering; for the destruction grows out from the old ontology and in order to understand Sophists, it is destroying. Destruction is tied to learning by forgetting, its mechanisms and structure Heidegger would have done well to see by overcoming. In this text of Plato, there is built into the act of destruction an overcoming of time that neither Heidegger nor Derrida articulates: In fact, the verb *apolumi*, unity of the beginning. The two Sophists are experts in arms, in wrestling, and in *tertia*. Is Destruction a Heideggerian *Urwort*? In the Freiburg lecture series "wordy warfare" a *logomachia*, which is the art of debating by the utter routing of *logos*, published as *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger of the opponent. In teaching the young man, Clinias, the Sophists want to deny that metaphysics is an *Urwort*; but that for Heidegger has nothing to say that his former state of ignorance is destroyed. Socrates, to do with the lateness of its appearing in the history of the transmission too, is interested in the game of destroying the ignorant and the bad of the Aristotelian text. It may indeed be late in appearing. But an *Urwort* grounds other kinds of saying. Could Destruction be an *Urwort* in those terms? Who picks My dear Ctesippus, I think we ought to accept from our visitors what they such an essential word? For Heidegger it is the unique thinker and poet, tell us, if they are kind enough to do us this favor, and we shall not quarrel with others who use it are involved in repetition. If they understand how to destroy men creators of this term? Destruction would lose some of the "positive" so as to make good and sensible ones out of bad and foolish ones, whether characteristics that Heidegger insists on. It is clear that Heidegger has this be their own invention, or they learned from someone else a kind of death or destruction such that they can destroy a bad one and produce a not thought out the inner meaning of the term Destruction. We shall have good one instead: For our purposes what is at issue here is not I. I I I I having been gradually forgotten. Philosophy is the way Being itself appears, it is the "thinking his own self-orientation with regard to philosophy. Metaphysics is for Heidegger the irruption of human I I seriously the Heideggerian phenomenological program as articulated essence into the world. Metaphysics is not just a human science,. By specifying that philosophy in its historical development physics is a mirror whereby we can look into and see what is behind us, cannot not be other than it is, Heidegger is reducing the possibility of and paradoxically, by examining what is behind us we can learn what is there being a genuine recovery or reappropriation of philosophy. Only within this overall conception of philosophy does the consequence then will a rethinking of philosophy be possible? Some of the terms seem to be clear: Heidegger's *Urschichte* for Heidegger. We know that around the tension between Heidegger talks of "ontology" in *Being and Time*, but in his lectures published as *Die systematics and history led Heidegger to abandon the neo-Kantianism Grundprobleme* he equates ontology with philosophy as such and he never of Rickert and move toward a phenomenological hermeneutics informed afterward deviates from this position. Despite his neo-Kantian beginning by Husserl and Dilthey. Indeed, he is against this entire *Argumentgeschichte* and with the anthropomorphic understanding of chitectonic of philosophy as is made clear in the *Kantbuch*. Later, in the historicity in Dilthey which could lead only to historicism and relativism. How can history yield is metaphysics, denying the possibility that philosophy has ever been knowledge of being? Heidegger says that "through Nietzsche metaphysics has in a certain From Rickert Heidegger took to seeing epochs in terms of value-sense divested itself of its own essential possibility, other possibilities of determination, as is evident in the *Habilitationschrift*. Heidegger never metaphysics can no longer appear. Through the overturning [Umkehr- abandoned talking of epochs, although in later years he took to interpretation] of metaphysics accomplished by Nietzsche, there remains for meta-ting epoch not so much as era but as *Anzuhalten*, a holding-to-itself, physics nothing but a turning aside into its own inessentiality and from the Greek, *epokhe*. This talk of epochs has been much criticized, disarray. How is truth of what is as such in its entirety, and not as the doctrine of any an epoch determined? What gives an epoch its horizon? For Heidegger particular thinker. The only divergence is his inclusion of Eckhart and Holderlin stand on such a narrow empirical base? Dilthey, and Cassirer before him, had already legitimized historicity itself is not adequately grounded, and is itself in need of the mized discussion of Holderlin as a philosopher; and Eckhart was a rising

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destruction prescribed for ontology. While Heidegger is correct to say that from onward. Thus, Heidegger straightforwardly accepts the neo-Platonists "had their birth certificates displayed" SZ. His rhetoric of doing violence to the text leads to a serious methodological problem here. Using his own terminological violence against the richness of history as the multiplicity of what has distinction between existentiell and existential or the distinction between being recorded as happening. Hegel at least attempted to be comprehensive in terms of the received account, and yet makes it the basis for his own historicity. How does it emerge in history and hence a region or epoch or temporalized meaning of Being. In a letter written to Karl Lowith in 1935 but not published until 1963, Heidegger refers to a phenomena known collectively as the history of philosophy? Of course "geistgeschichtliche Destruktion des Überlieferten," underscored in this accusation has been made before, especially in relation to Heidegger's affirmative sense. Similarly, we must assume that the questions were also the urgent questions of an agitated generation, his rethinking of the history of philosophy takes place within the shaken in its cultural pride by the devastating battles of World War I. The Umkehrung, overturning, overcoming. Yet as Barthes has pointed out about the destructive constituent in its method. Destruction is seen here as a rhetoric of revolutions, the rhetoric is old. As we have seen, the concept of concepts from their tradition-bound contexts back to their original sources. Again, this for him is neither the destruction of philosophers by a mentality guided by faith, some negative nor condemnatory: Heidegger engages with historicity. Now it functions to concretize thinking, and remove it from a kind of scholastic abstraction and reification. He uses various terms to overcome the vague generality and vacuum of traditional philosophizing. It is noteworthy that the turn back to consciousness and its intentional structures.

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## Chapter 3 : CRB | Being and Tyranny, by Steven B. Smith

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In terms of structure, *Being and Time* remains as it was when it first appeared in print; it consists of the lengthy two-part introduction, followed by Division One, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein," and Division Two, "Dasein and Temporality. Heidegger calls this being Dasein an ordinary German word literally meaning "being-there," i. Dasein is not "man," but is nothing other than "man" – it is this distinction that enables Heidegger to claim that *Being and Time* is something other than philosophical anthropology. From there he raises the problem of "authenticity," that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal Dasein to exist fully enough that it might actually understand being. Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that Dasein is capable of this understanding. Time[ edit ] Finally, this question of the authenticity of individual Dasein cannot be separated from the "historicality" of Dasein. On the one hand, Dasein, as mortal, is "stretched along" between birth and death, and thrown into its world, that is, thrown into its possibilities, possibilities which Dasein is charged with the task of assuming. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction that is, a transformation of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality – these were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project: The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand. Only a later understanding might come to contemplate a hammer as an object. Hermeneutics[ edit ] The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in Dasein. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation, but since there is no external reference point outside being from which to begin this interpretation, the question becomes to know in which way to proceed with this interpretation. This is the problem of the "hermeneutic circle," and the necessity for the interpretation of the meaning of being to proceed in stages: Destruction of metaphysics[ edit ] As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a deconstructing *Destruction* of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the metaphysics of presence. This use of the word *Destruction* is meant to signify not a negative operation but rather a positive transformation or recovery. In later works Heidegger uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. The publication in of the early lecture course, *Platon: Prolegomena*, was something like an early version of *Being and Time*. Although Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in *Being and Time*, later works explicitly addressed the themes and concepts of *Being and Time*. Most important among the works which do so are the following: It was followed by a seminar on the lecture, which took place at Todtnauberg on September 11 – 13, , a summary of which was written by Alfred Guzzoni. Schmidt praises the "range and subtlety" of *Being and Time*, and describes its importance by quoting a comment the writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe made in a different context, "from here and today a new epoch of world history sets forth. University of California Press, , p.

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## Chapter 4 : Leo Strauss Criticism - Essay - [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*situate Heidegger's understanding of ontotheology within the broader context of his thought, outlining the significance of his deconstruction of metaphysical foundationalism for his critique of nihilism.*

Returning to Plato through Kant Published: Returning to Plato through Kant, Palgrave Macmillan, , pp. The letters thus reveal the problems Jewish scholars in Germany faced even before the Nazis took power. Seeking an eternally valid truth, both thought it was necessary to take the claim of revelation to be true seriously. Both thus studied theology as well as philosophy, but they studied different religious traditions from opposed viewpoints. Strauss presented himself in these letters as an avowed atheist seeking the possibility of living without faith. Understanding his Jewish identity in political rather than pious terms, he declared that if he were asked which nation he belongs to, he would answer Jew, and not German. Both agreed that it was impossible to understand modern philosophy except in the context of its opposition to revealed religion, especially Christianity. Both agreed that it was necessary to study the history of philosophy in order to understand the roots of the contemporary crisis. For Strauss, however, the need to study the history of philosophy was a necessary propaedeutic to overcome the obstacle modern philosophy posed to recapturing "the ancient freedom of philosophizing. The question that fundamentally divided them was, therefore, whether the coming of Christ constituted a revelation of a truth that was unavailable to the ancients, but had been incorporated by modern philosophy -- or not. Since both understood truth to be the goal of philosophy and not simply or entirely a matter of faith, their correspondence presents a rare example of the way in which philosophers who disagree on the answers to fundamental questions can nevertheless discuss those questions as well as their preferred responses usefully and respectfully. However, he warns, "it is nevertheless important not to disregard its unfinished and sometimes completely experimental character. Pangle seeks to answer one of the first questions a reader might raise. Even more important, the letters show how it began to dawn on Strauss that what is most profound and valuable in the medieval Judeo-Arabic thinkers is the guidance they give back to Plato -- as above all a political philosopher: And this is possible only on the basis of a direct confrontation of modern with ancient philosophy. So much on the legitimation of my project as regards Hobbes -- I mean, the direct confrontation with Plato" In "The Example of Socrates: In order to overthrow traditional natural right, Strauss argues, Hobbes was compelled "to return to its foundations, that is, to Socrates, whom he acknowledged to be the founder of traditional political philosophy. More precisely, he was compelled to try and repeat the Socratic foundation, in order to be able to criticize it and prove a new and better foundation" However, "Hobbes was prevented from genuinely repeating the Socratic foundation because he failed to perceive the radically untraditional question underlying traditional natural right" Hobbes thought that the Socratic question concerning the right order of humans living together, as determined by reason, had been answered by the Aristotelian tradition and its definitions of justice and virtue. It was, therefore, no longer a question, as it had been for Socrates and Plato. In other words, Hobbes mis understood Plato because he read the ancient philosophy in light of the traditional Christian interpretation of his thought. In "Moral Finitude and Ontology of Creation: By the same token, in his view, only the philosophical horizon afforded by natural theology afforded an elucidation of the essence of Christian existence. The Kant Motif, "one of the persistent puzzles of Strauss scholarship is the absence in any of his published works of a thematic treatment of Immanuel Kant" By limiting the scope of reason through his critiques, Strauss argued, Kant had not defended religion so much as he had placed faith and reason on different planes so that they could peacefully coexist. Now there are two ways of conceiving this natural frame of reference. Kant says there is a natural frame of reference which is given by the structure of the human mind. This implies the distinction between the thing in itself and the phenomenon. This whole perception or understanding. This natural frame of reference is identical with the inner order of the whole. We are by nature dimly aware of the essential structure of the whole. Plato showed Strauss that Hobbes was wrong. Under these circumstances, only a natural right

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understood as a legitimate subjective claim can be affirmed. But in seeking to re-open the ancient philosophical quest for knowledge of what is truly good as a quest, Strauss did not take a "decisionist" stance against liberalism the way Schmitt had. Nor did he exhibit any sympathy for the Nazis. I have only two slight criticisms to make of the book. First, the subtitle is misleading.

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## Chapter 5 : Project MUSE - Scatter 1

*Title "Destruktion" or Recovery?: Leo Strauss's Critique of Heidegger Created Date: Z.*

On *Original Forgetting*, by Richard Velkley, a contemporary philosopher who has thought more deeply about what it is to be a philosopher than Leo Strauss. Strauss distinguished between the true philosopher and the scholar. Philosophers are those like Plato, Spinoza, and Nietzsche who confronted the greatest problems "without being overpowered by any authority. While the scholar stands with his feet planted firmly on the ground, the philosopher often becomes lost in "inaccessible heights and mists. Like all great thinkers, Strauss left a legacy that is still widely debated. His books and articles extended over an extraordinarily wide range of topics for someone who described himself as a mere scholar. His studies of Plato, Maimonides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza remain permanent contributions to the life of the mind. The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, the tradition of esoteric writing, and the challenge of Biblical revelation to philosophical thought "Jerusalem and Athens" have become, due to his influence, standard themes in the discussion of great thinkers. But the questions remain: The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. There are at least three schools that claim to interpret and speak for him. The first and perhaps most obvious regards Strauss as the direct inheritor of ancient political philosophy in its Socratic form carrying on the tradition of "classical political rationalism" against a range of modern and postmodern alternatives. This is the approach most widely associated with Allan Bloom, Seth Benardete, and their disciples. The second regards Strauss as the defender of the natural law tradition in its Thomistic, Lockean, and ultimately Jeffersonian and Lincolnian forms that have done battle in the American regime against the twin forces of progressivism and historicism. This is the view of Harry V. Jaffa and his students. And finally, there is Strauss the inheritor of the German philosophical tradition beginning with Kant and Hegel and culminating in Nietzsche and Heidegger. This is a book that all serious students of Strauss will have to consider. This new book is an attempt to begin a conversation between Strauss and Heidegger, a conversation that was begun by Strauss but so far as anyone knows was never reciprocated by Heidegger. As Gershom Scholem once quipped about the famous "German-Jewish dialogue," it was largely a one-way conversation among German Jews about Jews in Germany. So too has the Strauss-Heidegger relation been a monologue initiated by Strauss and some of his followers but never seriously broached by the other side. Strauss recalled his association with Heidegger with tantalizing brevity. As a recently minted Ph.D. at Freiburg University with the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl, Strauss embarked on a year of post-doctoral study at Freiburg University with the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl. Accordingly, "the primacy of the political" was no more for Strauss than a starting point for philosophic inquiry. Strauss explicitly condemned Heidegger for lacking the courage to face up to the problem of tyranny. Nevertheless, one could say of Velkley what Strauss says of Heidegger, namely, that he is too enamored of the problem of Being. There is an apolitical, even anti-political, character to his reading of Strauss. From the outset he announces that his book will not be about "politics in the narrow sense. These hardly seem like narrow or peripheral themes. For Strauss, it led to a recovery of Socratic philosophy in its original open-ended, skeptical, and erotic sense. Unlike his often painstakingly detailed interpretations of such figures as Plato, Maimonides, and Spinoza, his discussions of Heidegger occur mainly in occasional pieces and remain at a very high level of generality. The young Strauss was clearly drawn to Heidegger whom he treated as far surpassing in depth and profundity any other thinker of his generation. He confessed to Franz Rosenzweig that in comparison with Heidegger even the great Max Weber appeared an "orphan child. His reflections often wavered between admiration and contempt. He referred to Heidegger as the "highest self-consciousness" of modern philosophy and "the only great thinker in our time" before whom "[a]ll rational liberal philosophic positions have lost their significance and power. Stanley Rosen once told me that when he was about to go to Germany, Strauss looked him in the eye and made him promise that if he were to meet Heidegger he would not shake his hand. While denying that his is a political reading of the Heidegger-Strauss relation, Velkley nevertheless claims to

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discover some hidden affinities between the two thinkers on political matters. On the practical and political plane Strauss was deeply critical of Heidegger not simply for his embrace of National Socialism but for his neglect of those "permanent characteristics of humanity" that led to that embrace. Strauss worries that democracy does not educate non-conformists, "rugged individuals," who are prepared to stand alone. But nowhere in Heidegger can one find sentiments in praise of liberal democracy of the kind for which Strauss is well known.

### Chapter 6 : Being and Time - Wikipedia

*Moreover, in Reading Leo Strauss, Smith shows that Strauss's defense of liberal democracy was closely connected to his skepticism of both the extreme Left and extreme Right. Smith asserts that this philosophical skepticism defined Strauss. Print version record 1 online resource (xi, pages).*

### Chapter 7 : Olin Center, Lecture Series. The Legacy of Strauss.

*within the well-known Strauss' critique of the historicistic vision, accordingly to which every philosophy is conditioned from its historical time. An accurate, i. e., a critical read-*

### Chapter 8 : Destruktion or Recovery? On Strauss's Critique of Heidegger - Chicago Scholarship

*Destruktion or Recovery? Leo Strauss's Critique of Heidegger. Spontaneous Recovery of the Galvanic Skin Response as a Function of the Recovery Interval. D. G.*

### Chapter 9 : Steven B. Smith, Destruktion or Recovery? - PhilPapers

*"In Heidegger, Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy, Velkley analyzes the crisis of Western philosophical traditions in the twentieth century and the different ways in which, in their epoch-making works, Heidegger and Strauss grappled with it. In this penetrating study, Velkley offers an original perspective on both Heidegger's critique.*