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"Defying Expectations: Russia's Missing Asian Revisionism" in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon, The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (London: Rowman and Littlefield,).

Wohlforth in modern realism began as a reaction to the breakdown of the post-World War I international order in the 1920s. The collapse of great-power cooperation after World War II helped establish it as the dominant approach to the theory and practice of international politics in the United States. During the Cold War, efforts to displace realism from its dominant position were repeatedly thwarted by the continued salience of the U.S. Suddenly, unexpectedly, and with hardly a shot fired in anger, Russian power has been withdrawn from the Elbe to the Eurasian steppe. A central question faces students and practitioners of international politics. Do the rapid decline and comparatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet state, and with it the entire postwar international order, discredit the realist approach? Scholars have answered this question in two ways. The end of the Cold War, they argue, was "merely a single data point. And many scholars are pessimistic about the capacity of social science theory to explain unique and complex historical events involving revolutionary change. Therefore, our evaluation of theory should look to future patterns rather than past events. Realist theories are not invalidated by the post transformation of world politics. Indeed, they explain much of the story. Realism is rich and varied, and cannot be limited just to structural realism, which deals poorly with change. This is not a fair or convincing approach to the evaluation of theories. But to carry on as if there are no lessons in this series of events for international relations theory in general and realist theories in particular is as indefensible intellectually as the claim that Lebow, eds. Cornell University Press, Other important works in the post-Cold War debate are discussed below. On theory and revolutionary change, see Peter J. Approaches to World Politics for the 21st Century Lexington, Mass.: Lebow attributes the "data point" quotation to a "prominent participant" in a conference on international relations theory in Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," pp. The two most important collections on international theory published after the Cold War look almost entirely to the future especially of the European Union and NATO to evaluate competing theories: Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Columbia University Press, For analyses, see Robert Keohane, ed. Neorealism to Structural Realism New York: Realism and the End of the Cold War 1993 the post transformation single-handedly invalidates any and all realist theories. As critics of realism rightly note, the events of the last half-decade highlight the indeterminacy of realist predictions about state behavior. Realist theories can be made more determinate, but only in ex post explanation rather than ex ante prediction. Realist theories are terribly weak. They are too easy to confirm and too hard to falsify. They do not come close to the ideal of scientific theory. Their strength is only evident when they are compared to the alternatives, which suffer from similar or worse indeterminacy but do not possess comparable explanatory power. The proper attitude toward the realist approach, even on the part of its defenders, ought to be reluctant acceptance conditioned on a determination to improve it, or to dispose of it if something better comes along. I perform four basic tasks in this article. First, I discuss briefly the intellectual challenge presented by the post changes in world politics. What exactly should we expect this series of events to tell us about international relations theories? How much should we expect such theories to tell us about these events? This issue surely ought to lie at the center of any assessment of the Soviet collapse, but thus far it has not. Second, I outline the realist explanation of recent change in world politics that I elaborate upon further throughout the article. Third, I examine the many critiques of realism based on the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse: Finally, I suggest some preliminary lessons that ought to be drawn from the post experience, and outline their implications for further research. Few who took up the study of international politics during the Cold War will be content with the notion that the waning of that conflict is simply a single observation no more important than hundreds of others. And like other complex events in history, the end of the Cold War is unique. The precise set of antecedent conditions and the precise nature of the outcome never occurred before and are

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exceedingly unlikely ever to recur. So the case cannot be explained in the ideal-scientific manner, as an instance of a general International Security. However, if we concentrate on the event itself, we face the familiar problem of too many variables and too few independent observations. International relations theories are almost never monocausal. In the language of statistics, the researcher faces negative degrees of freedom. The solution is twofold. First, it is necessary to disaggregate the event. Different theories may explain different regularities that came together to produce the end of the Cold War. At the very least, disaggregation simplifies analysis and clarifies the 4. The impossibility of applying the "covering-law" model to the explanation of complex or "aggregative" historical events is discussed in Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*: Harcourt, Brace and World, , pp. Free Press, , chap. See Nagel, *Structure of Science*, pp. Degrees of freedom are the number of observations minus the number of independent variables minus one. We are all familiar with this logic. Was it worn spark plugs or a dirty air filter that caused our poor gas mileage? We need at least three observations: one with no change; one with new plugs and old filter; and one with old plugs and new filter. But our confidence in any finding would be increased by further observations, to control for different driving conditions, weather, number of passengers, or types of gasoline used. Realism and the End of the Cold War 95

dependent variable. Having posited a cause, and shown a correlation, it will still be necessary to show empirically the mechanism that connects cause to effect. These events do not constitute the entire story, but they are an important part of it that is particularly relevant to international relations theory. Realist theories of all stripes highlight a single independent variable: They describe recent international change primarily as the result of declining relative Soviet power conditioned by the global distribution of power. For the purpose of evaluating realism, then, much post international change can be defined as a single series of events, linked by a single generative cause. A causal analysis of that link implies close examination of the influence of power on great-power decision-making during the Cold War endgame. For a single series of events to constitute a critical test of a theory, it must not only be inconsistent with the theory but be unambiguously ruled out by it. David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations: The "scientific" status of analyzing causal mechanisms is disputed among philosophers and methodologists of social science. George and Timothy J. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: Princeton University Press, , who maintain that causality can only be understood statistically, and therefore that "process tracing" is merely another method of increasing the sample. But the importance of the exercise goes beyond formal arguments about theory-testing. And a rigorous search for the causal mechanisms at work in important cases adds to our historical understanding. The clash of theories over the explanation of important events leads to a better understanding of those events. An Outline of a Realist Explanation Recent changes in world politics can be explained by realist hypotheses, derived from classical realism and from theories of hegemonic rivalry and power-transition, which have been obscured in recent years by the more influential structural variant. Its power derives from the fact that it captures central causal relationships and is connected to a set of theories that have proven their utility in a great many different instances. The Cold War was caused by the rise of Soviet power and the fear this caused in the West. The end of the Cold War was caused by the relative decline in Sov. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev may have had many reasons for competing with the United States, ranging from genuine fear to ideological conviction, but a necessary condition for competition was their perception that they had the capability to do so. Gorbachev may have had numerous reasons for seeking to withdraw from the rivalry with the United States, but a necessary precondition was the perception of reduced capability to continue competing. Realists of all kinds view change in state behavior as adaptation to external constraints conditioned by changes in relative power. The best way to make Realism and the End of the Cold War 97 sense of the recent international change and to think about the future of world politics is to view the Cold War as a credible but ultimately failed Soviet challenge to U. The great popularity of structural realism was very largely due to the fact that it seemed to explain this state of affairs. This was a novel situation, and it came to an end in novel ways. For any balance-of-power theory to explain state behavior, it must specify the mechanism through which capabilities are translated into actions. That mechanism can only be the assessments of the people who act on behalf of states. One reason

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balance-of-power theories cannot make deterministic predictions about state behavior is that so many factors can influence assessments of capabilities. As Hans Morgenthau argued almost a half century ago, power is composed of a complex combination of material and non-material factors. Even if, unlike Morgenthau, we distinguish carefully between power as influence and power as capabilities, the basic insight holds. Distinguishing features of works on hegemonic rise and decline include a focus on hierarchy as an ordering principle, hegemonic rivalry and power transitions. Cambridge University Press, ; A. Organski, *World Politics* New York: Harvard University Press, , chap. For an effort to formalize and test power-transition theory, see Woosang Kim and James D. For theoretical analyses of balance-of-power theory that powerfully explicate this view, see R.

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Chapter 2 : The United States and Northeast Asia : debates, issues, and new order (Book,) [blog.quintoap

Since World War II, the United States has played a crucial role in shaping Northeast Asian politics and economics. However, as this authoritative book shows, the Cold War's demise, September 11, and America's major strategic realignments have unleashed seismic changes in the region.

Indeed, as both a Republican and a political realist, I am not only untroubled by his election, I look forward to the next four years with great expectations. The short answer is that the world is becoming more competitive and tightly coupled as it transitions from unipolarity to emerging multipolarity—which, if and when it arrives, will be the first truly global multipolar system in history. They insist on a President who unabashedly puts American interests first; who, as a billionaire businessman with highly touted deal-making skills, will fight as an economic nationalist to keep manufacturing jobs in the United States rather than letting the vagaries of markets and globalization decide the fates of working class Americans. Since , but most especially since the end of the Cold War, U. The overwhelming majority of Americans possess a Hobbesian world view of international relations. International structure provides a powerful explanation. This shift can be explained by the differing structural incentives of bipolar and unipolar systems. Likewise, the current movement from unipolarity to a system of more diffused power has sparked yet another, more dramatic shift in American grand strategy. Now, after decades of extroverted U. To achieve this goal, Trump must override a generation or more of U. Let me, instead, start at the beginning. Under bipolarity, the motivation was to contain and, if possible, defeat the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, the United States bestrode the world as an institution builder, providing public goods in the form of, inter alia, security guarantees, trade liberalization, and monetary stability to its allies. Because the Cold War was fueled by both the bipolar distribution of power and a deep rift between two universalistic ideologies, realist and liberal prescriptions mostly overlapped. When there were contradictions—for instance, whether to support an anti-Communist but otherwise repugnant regime or, instead, promote human rights and democracy—realist power politics usually triumphed over American ideals. Put differently, the social purpose of American hegemony and power politics tended to complement each other. After the Cold War, the U. As an unchallenged Mr. Big, America would now endeavor to remold large swaths of the world to fit its image of international order. All states, including authoritarian major powers such as Russia and China, would become supplicants in an American-dominated world order. The shift from a status-quo to a revisionist power is easily explained by structural realist theory in both its Waltzian and Gilpinian variants. From a Waltzian perspective, the structural incentives of unipolarity—unchecked power—provided powerful external compulsion for the United States to pursue grand revisionist policies on a global scale, even though it was free to choose a foreign policy of retrenchment and restraint and such a strategy would have better served its national interests. It did, however, concentrate enormous power in the hands of one dominant state possessing the capabilities, will, and legitimacy to transform the world and enforce its preferred order. There is no good reason, however, why it should not apply equally well to a hegemon that outlasts a rising challenger in a failed power transition. This explains not only why the U. First, the misuse of power follows inevitably from its concentration; a unipolar power is, therefore, prone to take on too many tasks beyond its own borders, weakening it in the long run. Second, excessive power, no matter how it is wielded, is inherently dangerous to others: William Wohlforth argued that the enormous disparity in relative power between the United States and other major powers prevented the return of a global balance of power. Unlike prior hegemonies that were in business only to enrich themselves, the United States provides global public goods that not only project American power and influence but also serve the needs of others. American leaders have understood that the proper maxim for an unchallenged number one is: Then came the global financial and economic crisis of The world no longer seemed unipolar as far as the eye could see. It has become commonplace to claim that the unipolar era is over or fast winding down. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and

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emerging multipolarity. Joffe may indeed be correct that the proper maxim for an unchallenged number one is to do good for others in order to do well by yourself. They realize what many of their leaders seem unable to accept: Simply put, the American era is over, and Washington must devise a new grand strategy to deal with the new situation. Americans rightly see emerging multipolarity as a more competitive realm than the unipolar world that the United States has enjoyed since A majority of Americans now say that the U. Americans are rejecting hard power and high politics; in their eyes, history is shaped more by networks of peoples spontaneously gathering in squares than by the military capabilities of powerful states. But selfishness is not always a shameful thing, as Adam Smith pointed out in *The Wealth of Nations* After all, the United States suffers from massive accumulated debt, enormous trade and current-account deficits the U. It is high time that America devoted more attention to getting its own house in order. The shift from deep engagementâ€”in both its liberal internationalist and neoconservative incarnationsâ€”to a more realist U. In terms of his general foreign-policy philosophy, President Obama proved to be a bit of a compromise between realism and liberal internationalism, which explains why his foreign policy often fell between two stools. His administration was split between realists and idealists, and their debates tended to break down along gender lines: On most issues, the realist camp triumphed, but Obama often seemed to want to have it both ways. Thus, in a June speech at Cairo University, he said: So let me be clear: No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other. In his last State of the Union speech, he said: He believes that political factors should determine economic relations; that globalization does not foster harmony among states but rather creates yet another arena of interstate conflict; that economic interdependence increases national vulnerability, and constitutes a mechanism that one society can employ to dominate another; and that the State should intervene when the interests of domestic actors diverge from its own. We see it in his intended use of tax policy to support particular companies e. Build plant in U. It is not surprising, however, that economic nationalism resonates with middle and working class Americans, who think that China, among other countries, has taken advantage of U. The issue now is about Americans looking to not get fâ€”ed over. At various times during the campaign, he not only showed disdain for the European Union by supporting Brexit but called into question the very relevance of the NATO alliance itself as well as the U. When NATO was formed many decades ago we were a different country. There was a different threat. Because it really helps them more so than the United States, and we pay a disproportionate share. How, they wondered, did Trump have the temerityâ€”along with ignorance and reckless judgment that befitted someone clearly lacking the temperament to be commander-in-chiefâ€”to call into question the Atlanticist consensus that has been supported by U. Epitomizing the appalled reaction of the political punditry, James Kirchick of *The Daily Beast* responded: Trump fails to grasp that while you can certainly put a price tag on military commitments to our allies, the value of preserving the liberal world orderâ€”which the United States built after World War II and has sustained ever sinceâ€”far outweighs the numbers on any balance sheet. Indeed, even if our allies in Europe and Asia paid substantially less, or even nothing, toward their own defense, our alliances with them would still be worthwhile. The problem is not Western encroachments in the past two decades that necessarily threaten Russia, and that such a beleaguered former superpower can be expected to aggressively push back, even if it means war. In contrast, realists immediately decried NATO expansion as monumentally imprudent and dangerous. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves. We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. On this point, Mearsheimer and Walt remark: Even with the most skilled leadership, we can expect a very bumpy ride. He is Editor-in-Chief of *Security Studies*. What Would He Do? National Security in the 21st Century Princeton: Princeton Project for National Security, State Department, Washington, D. Will It Resemble the Past? Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos*: Harvard University Press, That said, Waltz also claims that bipolarity, though not plagued by the danger of miscalculation, encourages the danger of overreactionâ€”because, in a two-power competition, a loss for one appears as a corresponding gain

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for the other. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* Reading: Complexity in Political and Social Life
Princeton: Princeton University Press, , *Essays on International Politics* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
, Cambridge University Press, Schweller and William C. See also William C. *Political Science and Politics*
The Future of the Balance of Power Ithaca: Cornell University Press, , *A Transformed World* Washington, D.
Alternative Worlds Washington, D. Government Printing Office, Mearsheimer and Stephen M. *Global*
Discord in the New Millennium Baltimore: Columbia University Press, , chap.

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Chapter 3 : Realism and the End of the Cold War | William C. Wohlforth - blog.quintoapp.com

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The new geopolitics of pipelines Eurasia: The new geopolitics of pipelines Posted in Other Sep Author: Imran Khan "Natural gas pipelines will become feasible as soon as gas markets mature" The end of the Cold War was epochal: A half-century of polarization passed, leading to a new geopolitical maneuvering in Eurasia. Energy pipelines now have a new influence on history, one of the core variables of post-Cold War geopolitics. Consequently, this has culminated into a new paradigm in the geopolitical history of Eurasia—the new geopolitics of pipelines. Notwithstanding the shift in variables, the geopolitical landscape is constant, and Central Asia is at its core. The region has promising potential for energy supplies, and due to its geographic isolation, it straddles the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Boarding the lifeblood of the mechanized, modern scale economy, energy pipelines are roadmaps to development—energy being the recipe for growth, wealth and survival. Political scientists, economists, strategists and lobbyists proclaim pipelines the missing link to building peace or denounce them as the fault lines of waging wars. This newsletter highlights two different scenarios—war or peace, cooperation or contention, coordination or confrontation. What factors render pipelines geopolitical forces? How do pipelines affect the geopolitical parameters of Eurasia? How does the new geopolitics affect the intricate balance of war and peace? And how do pipelines lure states into cooperation or catalyze them into confrontation? It was the first pipeline network ever built in Eurasia. It was a saga of intrigues, corruption and kickbacks involving government, labor forces, lobbying groups and investing companies with interests at stake [[http:](http://) The pipeline gambit coincided with the imperial war of wits and wills between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain - the Great Game - over trade routes and turf. Arthur Connolly, an officer in the Bengal cavalry and an avid chess player, coined the terminology in his Narrative of an Overland Journey to the North of India in Rudyard Kipling, a veteran great gamer, adopted the phrase in his novel Kim in The geopolitics of pipelines began anew with the end of the Soviet Union, referred to as the New Great Game thereafter. Ahmad Rashid, in an interview with Steve Curwood, explicated: Because Central Asia is totally landlocked, distances are huge, and the U. It is actually a watchword of the ongoing new geopolitics in and around Central Asia. The great game analogy, whatever, is derogatory, rendering the new geopolitics, that is, part of the overall power politics in Eurasia. Notwithstanding, several variances and versions of the great game have been reproduced and constructed: Collins and William C. Fragility and Crisis, Eds. Friedberg and Michael Wills, September A New Great Game? This is however a replay of the epic quest of pipelines for energy security and service once took place in the Caucasian-Caspian hinterland, that is, the new geopolitics of pipelines. The new geopolitics is dynamic, relating geography, geology, geo-economics and above all, politics and geo-strategy, manifested in building-and-banning pipelines. Given the power package at hand, routing pipelines turned into a geopolitical fixation, inducing gruesome power suction in Eurasia. By nature, the new geopolitics is seamless and fluid. It is non-zero sum, too: Every one maneuvers to secure a disproportionate share of the prize, notwithstanding what means and measures they improvise—legislative methods of monopoly, prohibitory regulations, regime changes, joint ventures, economics sanctions, commercial aloofness, or pipeline wars. A pipeline is not the sole end in neo-geopolitics but rather the means to several ends. Thus, it is a great gambit for energy security, economic development and power outreach. Energy and Sustainable Development, First Magazine, J. Transportation via pipelines is swift, persistent and frequent, except in case of disruptions in times of war and acts of terrorism, contrary to railway-and-road trunks or naval ships. Also, pipelines establish an end-to-end supply line, imminently resulting in economic integration: The consumer is depends upon the producer for energy and the producer depends upon consumer for encashment of hydrocarbons. Frequency of movement is another aspect of pipeline-based energy

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transmission, and there is always the chance of disruption, particularly in Eurasia. In addition, pipelining energy is economically feasible, technologically possible, technically preferable, logistically efficient and commercially cost-effective. Dmitry Mendelejev, a Russian engineer and proponent of the pipeline as an energy transportation agent, pontificated pipelines to be the most feasible and reliable medium for supplying crude oil over long swathes and stretches of territory. Pipeline infrastructure develops and delivers energy from regions to countries that would otherwise remain rather inaccessible both commercially and technically. However the first ever pipeline snaked in America, appreciating the idea: Russia too followed the American footsteps, stretching out a network of pipelines across Eurasia by the late s [http: By delivering energy resources, pipelines drive economic growth. Energy is the incubator of economic development, source of peace and prosperity. Efficient, sufficient and inexpensive energy supply is an essential part of civilized living. A pipeline is actually a steel-cobbled cobweb, giving leverage on the one end over the economy on the other, a stake in politics and monopoly control over energy resources and flow-lines [http: Dmitry Mendelejev, well ahead of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford John MacKinder, propounded in that pipeline means to neutralize geographic inaccessibility and narrow down physical isolation. Pipelines cohere with the MacKinderite and Mahanite modules of offsetting geographic immobility, spearheading a new transportation system. Being the mode of energy transportation, steel-gilded pipelines are stretchable across landmass, across waterways, even both overland, inland or underwater. This factor is prominent in Eurasia, providing a foundation for global leadership and command economy. At the crossroads of Eurasia, Central Asia is the hinterland - essentially the chessboard - upon which the struggle for Eurasian primacy continues to be played. And pipelines are the gateways to landlocked Central Asia. Therefore, besides other things, pipelines draw contours of geopolitics anew, constituting fault lines of war and peace, cooperation and confrontation. Partly for its geology, partly for its geography. The wealth of energy accounts for about billion barrels Bbbl oil reserves: Natural gas reserves are trillion cubic feet tcf with tcf proven and tcf possible reserves. Kyrgyz and Tajik energy reserves are nominal and commercially not viable. With this stock of energy reserves, a geopolitical, geo-economic rush occurred to explore, expropriate and export oil and gas throughout the world. The energy reserves of Central Asia must be transported through pipelines, since they would otherwise remain geographically stranded in a part of the world that has no seashores and waterways. This is why neo-geopolitics quickly started at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the cast of actors is multiple. There are the geographic bridgeheads or transit states like Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Afghanistan that intermediate the energy poor and rich regions; the geopolitical pivots such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, China, Russia, Japan, the US, the EU and Britain that have the prowess and will of pipeline and energy supremacy; then there are the pawns and peripheries that complicate the geopolitics through shifting sides and balances. These are non-state actors, ranging from national and multinational companies to ethnic-nationalist separatist groups, autonomous regions, warlords, drug barons and terrorist outfits. For the stranded energy reserves of Central Asia, the perceivable ramifications of the new geopolitics are twofold atavistic and optimistic. Stauffer in his article Caspian Fantasy: Multiplication of pipelines is the second likely prospect of geopolitics, increasing energy transportation manifold. The competition that would result might open up the stranded wealth of natural reserves to international markets and investors. Cooperation or Confrontation, War or Peace? As the geopolitics of energy has been a great determinant of world history and even civilizations, the new geopolitics of pipelines has had a great influence on the geopolitical dispensation of Eurasia, Central Asia in particular. These cross-border, crosscutting transportation networks have spurred two divergent geopolitical paradigms: There is either cooperation leading to lasting peace, or confrontation culminating in war. The two paradigms are based upon on a clash of interests. The succeeding paragraphs of the newsletter describe the new geopolitics as a source of war and peace. As pipelines are built in cooperation, states and multinational companies collaborate on pipeline projects to transit energy resources to their economies. As energy security is an act in coherence, states coordinate policies and plans to execute pipelines and related energy development projects. Pipelines thus stand for the collective security of energy, because these are multilateral

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delivery systems and transportation agents built in coherence of varying interests of various stakeholders. A pipeline network links together producer and consumer and often transit states that intermediate the two ends with multinational corporations in an energy development consortium, consequently evolving a pipeline-based energy economy—the energy-revenue fix. Founded on legal contracts and political conventions and financed jointly, pluralist liberalists assert that pipeline projects are the bedrocks of cooperation. Emphasizing the pervasiveness of economics in political calculations, the constructivist theorists second high politics a fusion of military and security issues to low politics a confluence of politics and economics with other social considerations. Based on collective security and mutual gain, pipeline economy orients state relations from conflict to cordiality: Goldstein in *International Relations*. The element of mutual gain overrides individual gain in pipelining energy, thereby putting economic nationalism on the backburner. The *Principles of Political Economy* by John Stuart Mill is a valuable reference for explaining pipeline routing and the pipelining of energy as factors that can pacify politics: The great extent and rapid increase of international trade. The European Coal and Steel Community ECSC of is a notable precedent of commerce and trade as politically integrative forces, which set the stage for the once-warring states to confederate in the European Union. Pipelines can also boost regionalism, relegating outmoded, primal conflicts. This could also be so for the pan-Eurasian energy corridors and blocs. The new geopolitics is thus an aberration rather than a continuation of history. Impending energy insecurity and the potential for economic depression as energy resources reach their peak, states jointly pursue energy security projects—and accomplish the security margins of energy. Identifying national interests and concerns reduces the likelihood of confrontation, thereby consolidating the security regime: A regime in which the security of pipelines, taking off energy from wellhead to threshold, is a primary objective. A coordinated security mechanism and strategy consequently becomes the cornerstone of a pipeline-based security nexus, interfacing Central, Southern and Western Asia with the Far East, Eastern and Central Europe, Caucasus and Siberia. Besides exercising the niceties and nuances of diplomacy, the collective energy security concept harmonizes instruments of military security to neutralize plots of terrorism.

Chapter 4 : Brooks Wohlforth-Perspectives | Cut Farrah saraswati - blog.quintoapp.com

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Chapter 5 : Project MUSE - Hard Times for Soft Balancing

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Chapter 6 : The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order - Google Books

William C. Wohlforth World Out of Balance is the most comprehensive analysis to date of the constraints on the United States' use of power in pursuit of its security interests.

Chapter 7 : The United States and Northeast Asia : debates, issues, and new order in SearchWorks catalog

Bureau of Asian Research). For an overview on the perceived lack of balancing against the United States, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'Hard.

Chapter 8 : Transition Theory Essays and Research Papers - blog.quintoapp.com

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