

Chapter 1 : CiteSeerX " Citation Query Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and

[Dear Carnap, Dear Van] insertions by means of angle brackets (""). This is to distinguish these insertions from Carnap's and Quine's material in parentheses or square brackets.

As a ten-year-old, Carnap accompanied his uncle on an expedition to Greece. From 1914 to 1917, he attended the University of Jena, intending to write a thesis in physics. While Carnap held moral and political opposition to World War I, he felt obligated to serve in the German army. After three years of service, he was given permission to study physics at the University of Berlin, 1918, where Albert Einstein was a newly appointed professor. Carnap then attended the University of Jena, where he wrote a thesis defining an axiomatic theory of space and time. The physics department said it was too philosophical, and Bruno Bauch of the philosophy department said it was pure physics. He accepted the effort to surpass traditional philosophy with logical innovations that inform the sciences. In 1920 and 1921, he attended seminars led by Edmund Husserl, [19] the founder of phenomenology, and continued to write on physics from a logical positivist perspective. Carnap discovered a kindred spirit when he met Hans Reichenbach at a conference. Reichenbach introduced Carnap to Moritz Schlick, a professor at the University of Vienna who offered Carnap a position in his department, which Carnap accepted in 1925. When Wittgenstein visited Vienna, Carnap would meet with him. He with Hahn and Neurath wrote the manifesto of the Circle, and with Hans Reichenbach initiated the philosophy journal *Erkenntnis*. At the same time he worked with the concepts of intension and extension and took these two concepts as a basis of a new method of semantics. Carnap, whose socialist and pacifist beliefs put him at risk in Nazi Germany, emigrated to the United States in 1935 and became a naturalized citizen in 1940. Meanwhile, back in Vienna, Moritz Schlick was murdered in 1938. From 1935 to 1940, Carnap was a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. During the late 1930s, Carnap offered an assistant position in philosophy to Carl Gustav Hempel, who accepted and became one of his most significant intellectual collaborator. Carnap later expressed some irritation about his time at Chicago, where he and Charles W. Morris were the only members of the department committed to the primacy of science and logic. He wrote books on semantics Carnap, 1956, modal logic Carnap, 1951, and on the philosophical foundations of probability and induction Carnap, 1951. He had earlier refused an offer of a similar job at the University of California, because accepting that position required that he sign a loyalty oath, a practice to which he was opposed on principle. While at UCLA, he wrote on scientific knowledge, the analytic " synthetic dichotomy, and the verification principle. His writings on thermodynamics and on the foundations of probability and induction, were published posthumously as Carnap, 1951. Carnap taught himself Esperanto when he was 14 years of age, and remained sympathetic to it. Carnap He later attended the World Congress of Esperanto in 1907 and 1914, and employed the language while traveling. In this dissertation on the philosophical foundations of geometry, Carnap tried to provide a logical basis for a theory of space and time in physics. Considering that Carnap was interested in pure mathematics, natural sciences and philosophy, his dissertation can be seen as an attempt to build a bridge between the different disciplines that are geometry, physics and philosophy. For Carnap thought that in many instances those disciplines use the same concepts, but with totally different meanings. Hence, Carnap characteristically argued that there had to be three separate notions of space. That achievement has become a landmark in modern epistemology and can be read as a forceful statement of the philosophical thesis of logical positivism. Indeed, the *Aufbau* suggests that epistemology, based on modern symbolic logic, is concerned with the logical analysis of scientific propositions, while science itself, based on experience, is the only source of knowledge of the external world, i. In contrast, scientific propositions are factual statements about the external reality. They are meaningful because they are based on the perceptions of the senses. In other words, the truth or falsity of those propositions can be verified by testing their content with further observations. In the *Aufbau*, Carnap wants to display the logical and conceptual structure with which all scientific factual statements can be organized. It is a constructive undertaking that systematizes scientific knowledge according to the notions of symbolic logic. Accordingly, the purpose of this constitutional system is to identify and discern different classes of scientific concepts and to specify the logical relations that link them. In the *Aufbau*, concepts are

taken to denote objects, relations, properties, classes and states. Carnap argues that all concepts must be ranked over a hierarchy. In that hierarchy, all concepts are organized according to a fundamental arrangement where concepts can be reduced and converted to other basic ones. Carnap explains that a concept can be reduced to another when all sentences containing the first concept can be transformed into sentences containing the other. In other words, every scientific sentence should be translatable into another sentence such that the original terms have the same reference as the translated terms. Most significantly, Carnap argues that the basis of this system is psychological. These basic elements consist of conscious psychological states of a single human subject. In the end, Carnap argues that his constitutional project demonstrates the possibility of defining and uniting all scientific concepts in a single conceptual system on the basis of a few fundamental concepts. Indeed, he discusses how, in many cases, metaphysics is made of meaningless discussions of pseudo-problems. For Carnap, a pseudo-problem is a philosophical question which, on the surface, handles concepts that refer to our world while, in fact, these concepts do not actually denote real and attested objects. In other words, these pseudo-problems concern statements that do not, in any way, have empirical implications. They do not refer to states of affairs and the things they denote cannot be perceived. According to him, philosophy should not aim at producing any knowledge transcending the knowledge of science. In contrast, by analyzing the language and propositions of science, philosophers should define the logical foundations of scientific knowledge. Using symbolic logic, they should explicate the concepts, methods and justificatory processes that exist in science. Carnap believed that the difficulty with traditional philosophy lied in the use of concepts that are not useful for science. For Carnap, the scientific legitimacy of these concepts was doubtful, because the sentences containing them do not express facts. Indeed, a logical analysis of those sentences proves that they do not convey the meaning of states of affairs. In other words, these sentences are meaningless. Carnap explains that to be meaningful, a sentence should be factual. It can be so, for one thing, by being based on experience, i. For another, a sentence is factual if one can clearly state what are the observations that could confirm or disconfirm that sentence. After all, Carnap presupposes a specific criterion of meaning, namely the wittgensteinian principle of verifiability. Indeed, he requires, as a precondition of meaningfulness, that all sentences be verifiable, what implies that a sentence is meaningful only if there is a way to verify if it is true or false. To verify a sentence, one needs to expound the empirical conditions and circumstances that would establish the truth of the sentence. As a result, it is clear for Carnap that metaphysical sentences are meaningless. Because those sentences cannot be verified in any way, Carnap suggests that science, as well as philosophy, should neither consider nor contain them. The logical analysis of language[edit] At that point in his career, Carnap attempted to develop a full theory of the logical structure of scientific language. Moreover, the theory of logical syntax expounds a method with which one can talk about a language: In the end, because Carnap argues that philosophy aims at the logical analysis of the language of science and thus is the logic of science, the theory of the logical syntax can be considered as a definite language and a conceptual framework for philosophy. The logical syntax of language is a formal theory. It is not concerned with the contextualized meaning or the truth-value of sentences. In contrast, it considers the general structure of a given language and explores the different structural relations that connect the elements of that language. Hence, by explaining the different operations that allow specific transformations within the language, the theory is a systematic exposition of the rules that operate within that language. In fact, the basic function of these rules is to provide the principles to safeguard coherence, to avoid contradictions and to deduce justified conclusions. It is to be noted that Carnap sees language as a calculus. This calculus is a systematic arrangement of symbols and relations. The symbols of the language are organized according to the class they belong to and it is through their combination that we can form sentences. The relations are different conditions under which a sentence can be said to follow, or to be the consequence, of another sentence. The definitions included in the calculus state the conditions under which a sentence can be considered of a certain type and how those sentences can be transformed. We can see the logical syntax as a method of formal transformation, i. It is in the logical syntax that Carnap introduces his notable principle of tolerance. This principle suggests that there is no moral in logic. When it comes to using a language, there is no good or bad, fundamentally true or false. In contrast, philosophers should seek general agreements over the relevance of

certain logical devices. According to Carnap, those agreements are possible only through the detailed presentation of the meaning and use of the expressions of a language. In other words, Carnap believes that every logical language is correct only if this language is supported by exact definitions and not by philosophical presumptions. It is to be noted that Carnap embraces a formal conventionalism. That implies that formal languages are constructed and that everyone is free to choose the language it finds more suited to his purpose. There should not be any controversy over which language is the correct language; what matters is agreeing over which language best suits a particular purpose. Carnap explains that the choice of a language should be guided according to the security it provides against logical inconsistency. Furthermore, practical elements like simplicity and fruitfulness in certain tasks influence the choice of a language. Clearly enough, the principle of tolerance was a sophisticated device introduced by Carnap to dismiss any form of dogmatism in philosophy. Inductive logic[edit] After having considered problems in semantics, i. His views on that subject are for the most part exposed in Logical foundations of probability where Carnap aims to give a sound logical interpretation of probability. Carnap thought that according to certain conditions, the concept of probability had to be interpreted as a purely logical concept. In this view, probability is a basic concept anchored in all inductive inferences, whereby the conclusion of every inference that holds without deductive necessity is said to be more or less likely to be the case. In fact, Carnap claims that the problem of induction is a matter of finding a precise explanation of the logical relation that holds between a hypothesis and the evidence that supports it. An inductive logic is thus based on the idea that probability is a logical relation between two types of statements: Accordingly, a theory of induction should explain how, by pure logical analysis, we can ascertain that certain evidence establishes a degree of confirmation strong enough to confirm a given hypothesis. Carnap was convinced that there was a logical as well as an empirical dimension in science. He believed that one had to isolate the experiential elements from the logical elements of a given body of knowledge.

Chapter 2 : Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work by Willard Van

Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length—and over a long period of time—on matters personal, professional, and philosophical.

Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science Published: These giants of analytic philosophy probed their different understandings of language and the differences they saw among logic, mathematics, and science. It would have been amazing to have been there as a fly on the wall. Now, thanks to this excellent book, we can be. This is because Carnap took extensive shorthand notes on the conversations, and because Frost-Arnold has edited and translated those notes so that we have them here in both German and English. That by itself would have been a major contribution to our historical understanding of twentieth century analytic philosophy. But Frost-Arnold gives us much more. A bit more than the first half of the volume is a thoughtful essay that illuminates the various issues under discussion and sets them in the context of the evolving views of the three participants. Where the book particularly shines is in connecting these ideas of with our ongoing philosophical concerns today. The result is a book that will be of major interest to historians and to current philosophers, whether the latter think they have historical interests or not. What little independent evidence there is seems to corroborate them, but perhaps the strongest evidence is internal. The notes attribute to both Tarski and Quine subtle and powerful views that certainly seem to be "living thoughts" rather than caricatures. Of course, that argument goes only so far, but it will have to do. Because they are conversations rather than finished works, the participants can try out ideas and revise them as the argument warranted. For reasons of space I will touch on only three of those issues here: Carnap resisted the demands, though he took an active part in the discussions. The project was to formulate certain demands on the language of science and defend them with the ultimate aim of constructing a language that meets these demands. The demands are roughly that the universe of discourse should contain only finitely many entities and these should all be concrete, that is, physical objects. On a more liberal version, the language choice should not rule out the possibility either that there are only finitely many objects or that these are physical objects. I have to admit that I do not find any version of the demands or the defenses of them at all compelling. I find some of what Carnap says in resisting the demands equally puzzling. But this is not the place to argue against either the demands or the justifications for them. Happily, Frost-Arnold brings a wide knowledge of what Tarski, Quine, and Carnap have written elsewhere and is able to tie the various bits together so that they illuminate each other. We come to see that these issues really do bear on the problems we care about now, even if there is much left to be learned. If all entities are physical objects and there might be at most a finite number of those, then the mathematics we construct would seem to be synthetic. For example, if there are numbers at all, there would be a largest prime number, but what that number is could be learned only empirically. In any case, issues surrounding analyticity were raised directly in the Harvard discussions. Quine certainly remembers himself as having challenged Carnap forcefully. But as Frost-Arnold says, "Interestingly, the discussant who manifests the most sustained and direct animosity toward analyticity is not Quine but Tarski. But the evidence from the forties is equivocal. Paolo Mancosu challenged this timeline, saying that Quine had explicitly raised arguments against analyticity in the discussions and by the time of a letter to J. In this I think he largely succeeds. First, he recognizes that the situation is complex and the evidence pulls in both directions. There is the letter to Woodger of in which Quine pretty baldly states that the "cleavage between the analytic and synthetic is an empty phrase" p. We have real problems here, meaningful problems worth working on. Indeed, he sometimes seems the most reluctant of the three to abandon all hope of clarifying the notion of analyticity. At the end of the correspondence and thereafter this hesitancy seems entirely gone. This is because he conceives of himself as making proposals rather than as engaging in empirical linguistics. But Quine can rightly argue that unless there is some empirical notion of analyticity, or synonymy, or semantical rule, etc. Quine offers no such proof. Here the idea is to pull the various themes together into a larger whole, not only relating the themes of the discussions, but also putting them in the context of ongoing philosophic developments. All of the discussants had voiced anti-metaphysical sentiments

at Harvard, so this is the focus of the chapter. Since Carnap and Otto Neurath are the philosophers most associated with an anti-metaphysical stance, Frost-Arnold concentrates on them. For Neurath the link between the anti-metaphysical stance and the unity of science is even closer. Indeed, it would seem to be virtually definitional identity. In general terms, almost certainly. And it is illuminating too, but only up to a point. But Frost-Arnold does use the linkage to throw light on why Tarski and Quine might call infinitary or Platonistic concepts and claims metaphysical and unintelligible, namely, they cannot be incorporated into what they envision as the language of science. Along the way Frost-Arnold touches on a number of interesting questions that it would be fascinating to pursue more fully than either he can in the chapter or than I can here. Does this mean that in the late twenties Carnap rejects the sort of account of explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim presented so beautifully in the late forties? But that would be a discussion for another day. Carnap is concerned to ensure that philosophers not try to limit the concepts that scientists can employ and that philosophers not themselves engage in "wearisome controversies" that have no hope of resolution. Moreover, many metaphysicians think of their enterprise as conceptual analysis or explication of a sort that Carnap could easily embrace. So when Frost-Arnold insists that what is central to the anti-metaphysical stance is the connection to the language of science, he is onto something revealing about what Carnap and Neurath are doing. And it is helpful to use this connection to tie together the various concerns that come out in the discussions at Harvard and tie those in turn to ongoing philosophic developments. Of course, there is more to say. University of California Press ,

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