

DOWNLOAD PDF CONVERSIONS, COMPLICITY, AND THE STATE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA BHAGWAN JOSH

Chapter 1 : Shrikant G Talageri: Are Indian Tribals Hindus? - Part 6 The Fundamental Issue

Conversions, complicity, and the state in post-independence India / Bhagwan Josh. Transcending the local: Chinese Indonesians, the state, and Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity / Juliette Koning. Issue of HIV/AIDS in the Philippines: the Roman Catholic Church and the Philippine government / Digna B. Apilado.

Her research has mainly been on colonial Philippines from the 16th to the 19th centuries, and on the Ilocos and Cordillera regions of Northern Philippines. She has written journal articles published in the Philippines, Canada, Spain and Macau on women, the environment, religious movements, and social history. He is an ethohistorian with degrees from the Australian National University and the University of Sydney. He research interests include Christian iconography in Southeast Asia and the theoretical and methodological issues pertaining to the study of religion more generally. Along with his wife, Dr. Shashi Joshi, he is the author of a three-volume history, *Struggle for Hegemony in India*, 1977, published by Sage in Besides writing for scholarly journals he has contributed essays to many edited books. She holds a PhD in social anthropology from the University of Amsterdam. Her recent publications on Chinese Indonesian business, identity and religion have appeared in *East Asia: After earning his Ph. His research interests include religion, globalisation, and tourism, spanning a number of ethnographic areas such as Nepal, Singapore, and China. He is the author of Imagining the Good Life: Technology and Religion in Contemporary Asia Brill He has also published in a number of international refereed journals. His current research examines the predictors of emotional and mental health and the formal and informal institutions that attempt to help with mental well being. Besides this, Mathew has a keen interest in researching Christianity. He has recently published articles and book chapters on how Christianity in Singapore relates to other religions, the state and social service provision. His doctoral thesis was on death rites in modern Korea and it will be published by Continuum in the series of Continuum Advances in Religious Studies 2007 book title: Cultural Blending in Korean Death Rites: New Interpretive Approaches forthcoming, He is a scholar with a diverse background and interests. An intense interest in the disparate relationships between the arts and societies drives his research and teaching today. Between and he held positions with the Ford Foundation in Thailand and Vietnam. Besides, he edited thematic sections in the journals History and Anthropology , Focaal 2007 European journal of anthropology and the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies His current research concerns the revival of religious and ritual practice in everyday life in Vietnam. His current research with Professor Thomas Cushman is on religion and economic recession in the United States. Anthony Reid and Bryan Turner have been great sources of inspiration and support throughout this project. Our gratitude also goes to the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, for providing funds for the preparation of the manuscript. A survey of the relevant literature, however, reveals a relative paucity of comparative studies on Christianity in the region. Thus, one of the main aims of this volume is to examine the experience of being a Christian in Asia, particularly in relation to how the state has either hindered or facilitated the propagation, regulation or maintenance of the Christian faith. There are two aspects to this discussion. Hefner , ; Kaplan ; Horton This has in turn created highly contextualized forms of religious and doctrinal expression that this volume seeks to trace e. In both these themes, a fundamental concern is over the conditions under which Christian religious practices at various times either clash or converge with the mechanism of the state, in light of the challenges brought about by processes of modernization. Yet the fundamental message being promoted in this context is this: This choice becomes particularly important when thought of in relation to how religious belief is articulated and practised in the context of modern state structures. One key focus of this volume is to consider what happens when broader concerns of Christian doctrine are brought to bear on the civic and patriotic responsibilities of Christian citizens. How have Asians responded to the fundamental exhortation to treat the divine will as the ultimate source of authority, and the secular jurisdiction of the state as secondary? And how does the state deal with a religion whose ultimate source of authority both transcends and relativizes state*

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authority that is founded upon legalâ€”rational principles? In contrast, Christian communities still often experience repression in places such as China and Vietnam: As an introduction to the volume as a whole, this chapter is less an exhaustive survey of the literature on Christianity in Asia than it is an elucidation of the debates in which the contributors of this volume seek to participate. In this vein, we identify three thematic currents: A key factor in these relationships for acceptance of a new religion is perception by the receiving group of the direction from which threat or domination is coming. If a religion is introduced from a source not perceived as threatening, while at the same time there exists some threat for which the new religion provides a resource for resistance, then a favourable condition is established for reception of the new religion â€” If, on the other hand, a group from which a new religion is being introduced is perceived as threatening the existence or the distinctive identity of a society, then a condition encouraging resistance to the new religion is established. We are not suggesting, of course, that the relationship between colonial authorities and Christian missionaries were unproblematic, and we are certainly not arguing that the colonial states actively supported Christian evangelism. The relationship between imperialism and evangelism was a highly complex one. As Keyes has noted, at the height of colonialism in the nineteenth century, local rulers in Southeast Asia, whose legitimacy to rule was inextricably intertwined with notions of kingship stipulated by non-Christian religions such as Islam and Buddhism, were often hostile towards missionaries. Thus, unlike many other places in Asia where Christianity was associated negatively with colonialism, the religion in fact played an important role in the Korean nationalist movement against Japanese rule and the imposition of Shinto as a civil religion. Meanwhile, many Christian churches and groups in South Korea were actively involved in the prodemocracy movement directed against the dictatorial military regime of Park Chung-hee. Even though burials had been the normal Christian practice, most Catholic and Protestants did not consider the new government policy to be anti-Christian. The role that religion plays in a national culture is another factor that determines the nature of the relationship between Christianity and the state. This is particularly so if Christianity has been associated with foreign powers or threats that can potentially undermine the religious legitimation of state power. In India, many individuals and groups have converted to other religious faiths â€” including Christianity â€” to escape Hindu caste oppression. The majorityâ€”minority nexus also informs the ways in which Pentecostal Christianity is practised among the Chinese minority ethnic group in Indonesia. Political religion, unlike civil religion, is inherently totalitarian, with its precepts governing conduct in all spheres of national life â€” economic, social and political. In this context, all competing sources of authority, including traditional religions, are considered threats and hence to be eradicated. In an important sense, the political religion in China was structurally similar to monotheism: Currently, religion is tolerated, given its perceived usefulness in providing moral ballast to a population experiencing rapid social change. The Pentecostal-charismatic variant of Protestantism has particularly witnessed spectacular growth, with its number of adherents estimated to swell to 90 million by Sanneh. In the coming decades, as China engages in geopolitical wrangling with other powerful countries, will Christianity become a source of contention, or a bridge, between Western countries and China? Internally, will the rapid growth of Christianity in its various forms be seen by the Chinese Communist Party as a threat to its authority? Christendom and the state The issues discussed above lead us to ponder more generally on the global prominence of Christianity. There have been many works that describe, and even extol, the explosive growth of Christianity around the world. In recent years, Christian communities in countries such as India, the Philippines, South Korea and Singapore have become important sources for overseas mission work instead of mere recipients of evangelizing missions originating from Western Europe and the United States. Only two countries in the region are predominantly Christian: There is a large Christian community in South Korea, where Christians comprise around 30 per cent of the population. It must be pointed out that there are many Christian populations in the region that do not have the critical mass necessary to engender the levels of autonomy from the state that Jenkins and Sanneh describe. By erecting crosses and statues of the Virgin Mary, hundreds of Vietnamese Catholics have expressed indignation over the construction of a public park on land that they believe rightly belongs to the Church. However, the Roman

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Catholic cause has met with limited success, as evinced by reports of continued surveillance, intimidation and persecution of Christians in the region France 24 International News. This contrasts sharply with the experience of African and Latin American counterparts, which both Jenkins and Sanneh identify as the exemplars of the southern Christendom. For example, emboldened by their majority status, African Anglicans are making strenuous attempts to gain autonomy from state regulation and control. It would be premature to project this autonomy from the state onto the experience of Asian Christians who are, in most cases, negotiating the challenges of existing as the minority faith, particularly in countries with strong traditions of civil or political religion. The contributors to *Spirited Politics* emphasize the point that the state is not merely a governmental entity. The situation in Indonesia provides us with good examples in this regard. More recently, however, with decreasing incidences of violent attacks and improving economic conditions, the Indonesian government has been more accommodating of the building of American-style mega-churches, where Christians are able to assert their faith after more than a decade of persecution. So, while it can be seen that the practice of Christianity is manifested in the public sphere in an overt capacity, this vitality has become possible through some form of state toleration that has emerged from a history of struggle and persecution. It is vital, therefore, that the state be treated as an integral component in understanding the place and persistence of religious belief in the region. In this vein, this volume may be considered a contribution to the growing body of work that points to the resilience of religion in spite of what was thought to be the disenchanting impact of secular nationalism. While we agree that empirical evidence from Christianity in Asia refutes the argument that religion will decline in the face of rationalized state structures if not be relegated to the private sphere entirely, this is not the agenda of this volume per se. A cornerstone of this volume is the methodological claim that it is through the focus on the relationship between states and churches that this issue can more meaningfully be understood. Religion and the modern states of East and Southeast Asia The contributors to that volume collectively argue that far from being irrelevant, religions have become viable alternatives in the face of state control. In seeking to regulate, some states in Asia have provoked people to look to religion as an avenue for criticizing, resisting and challenging those who control state power. However, we contend that it is also important to draw attention to instances of state complicity, indirect or otherwise, in the ongoing activities of Christian communities in the region. While modernization calls for a de-emphasis of primordial loyalties or irrational beliefs that are typically associated with religious sensibility, statesponsored calls for national unity inevitably entail the crafting of shared values and histories which form the bases of an imagined or, as Hobsbawm and Ranger would argue, invented community. In the few countries in Asia where Christianity is predominant, calls for nation-building are often articulated through the idiom of religion, reiterating its continuing relevance and vitality. What this demonstrates is that the state continues to be a critical arbiter of Christian identity, even in places in which it is demographically dominant. Furthermore, such instances demonstrate that the mandate of the state is contingent upon at least the symbolism of Church backing. Indeed, Christian groups have often supported the various agendas of the state, hence wittingly or otherwise further legitimizing state authority. Christians as dual citizens Wilford and George In this parallel society, however, the fundamental truth has always been that the Church is a superior society. While ultimate deference should be paid to God, those working and living in this world should nevertheless abide by secular authority. That said, the case in Asia shows that there are many ways in which such dual citizenship is articulated, practised, expressed and negotiated. In doing so, we respond to some of the more prominent debates about the nature of Christianity and politics in academic discourse. This is not to underestimate the doctrinal heterogeneity of Christianity. It is to emphasize, rather that, the Church, as a common denominator, has the advantage of highlighting most prominently the diversity of state structures in the Asian region itself. University of Chicago Press. Accessed 24 November A case study of Sarawak, East Malaysia, Aldershot:

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Chapter 2 : Osho Â« Sathya Sai Baba Deceptions Exposed

Conversions, Complicity and the State in Post-Independence India Bhagwan Josh 7. Transcending the Local: Chinese Indonesians, the State, and Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity Juliette Koning 8. The Issue of HIV/AIDS in the Philippines: The Roman Catholic Church and the Philippine Government Digna B. Apilado 9.

Is such language warranted, or is it a ridicule-inviting exaggeration? This was his way of making Pinochet internationally accountable for having killed a few Spanish citizens: In the current competition for victim status, all kinds of interest groups are blatantly overbidding in order to get their piece of the entitlement to attention and solidarity. The Nazi Holocaust killed the majority of European Jewry an estimated 5. How many victim groups can say as much? The Partition pogroms killed hardly 0. Partition featured some local massacres of genocidal type, with the Sikhs as the most wanted victims, but in relative as well as absolute figures, this does not match the Holocaust. Among genocides, the Holocaust was a very special case e. The pure form is the complete extermination of every man, woman and child of the group. Examples include the complete extermination of the native Tasmanians and many Amerindian nations from Patagonia to Canada by European settlers in the 16thth century. Though improvised and executed with primitive weapons, the Rwandan genocide made more victims per day than the Holocaust. Hindus suffered such attempted extermination in East Bengal in , when the Pakistani Army killed 1 to 3 million people, with Hindus as their most wanted target. This fact is strictly ignored in most writing about Hindu-Muslim relations, in spite or rather because of its serious implication that even the lowest estimate of the Hindu death toll in makes Hindus by far the most numerous victims of Hindu-Muslim violence in the post-colonial period. It is significant that no serious count or religion-wise breakdown of the death toll has been attempted: In comparing the population figures for and , and taking the observed natural growth rhythm into account, Vyas finds that the Hindu population has remained stable at 9. Of the missing 3. The Hindu refugees at the time of the genocide, about 8 million, all went back after the ordeal, partly because the Indian government forced them to it, partly because the new state of Bangladesh was conceived as a secular state; the trickle of Hindu refugees into India only resumed in , when the first steps towards islamization of the polity were taken. Taking into account a number of Hindu children born to refugees in India rather than in Bangladesh, and a possible settlement of refugees in India, it is fair to estimate the disappeared Hindus at about 2 million. While India-watchers wax indignant about communal riots in India killing up to 20, people since , allegedly in a proportion of three Muslims to one Hindu, the best-kept secret of the post-Independence Hindu-Muslim conflict is that in the subcontinent as a whole, the overwhelming majority of the victims have been Hindus. This has been the Chinese policy in Tibet, killing over a million Tibetans while assimilating the survivors into Chinese culture by flooding their country with Chinese settlers. During the Islamic conquests in India, it was a typical policy to single out the Brahmins for slaughter, after the Hindu warrior class had been bled on the battlefield. Even the Portuguese in Malabar and Goa followed this policy in the 16th century, as can be deduced from Hindu-Portuguese treaty clauses prohibiting the Portuguese from killing Brahmins. In antiquity, such partial genocide typically targeted the men for slaughter and the women and children for slavery or concubinage. Hindus too experienced this treatment at the hands of Islamic conquerors, e. This is why Rajput women committed mass suicide to save their honour in the face of the imminent entry of victorious Muslim armies, e. During the Partition pogroms and the East Bengali genocide, mass rape of Hindu women after the slaughter of their fathers and husbands was a frequent event. At this point, however, we should not overlook a puzzling episode in Hindu legend which describes a similar behaviour by a Hindu conqueror: Parashurama, deified as the 6th incarnation of Vishnu, killed all the adult male Kshatriyas for several generations, until only women were left, and then had Brahmins father a new generation upon them. Just a story, or reference to a historic genocide? Genocide in the Bible For full-blooded genocide, however, the book to consult is the Bible, which describes cases of both partial and complete genocide. The motive was pride of pedigree: Full-scale genocide was ordered by God,

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and executed by his faithful, during the conquest of Canaan by Moses and Joshua. In the defeated cities outside the Promised Land, they had to kill all the men but keep the women as slaves or concubines. Inside the Promised Land, by contrast, the conquerors were ordered to kill every single man, woman and child. All the Canaanites and Amalekites were killed. Here, the stated reason was that God wanted to prevent the coexistence of His people with Pagans, which would result in religious syncretism and the restoration of polytheism. As we only have a literary record of this genocide, liberal theologians uncomfortable with a genocidal God have argued that this Canaanite genocide was only fiction. To be sure, genocide fiction exists, e. Yet, the narrative of the conquest of Canaan is full of military detail uncommon in fiction; unlike other parts of the Bible, it is almost without any miracles, factual through and through. And even if we suppose that the story is fictional, what would it say about the editors that they attributed genocidal intentions and injunctions to their God? If He was non-genocidal and good in reality, why turn him into a genocidal and prima facie evil Being? On balance, it is slightly more comforting to accept that the Bible editors described a genocide because they wanted to be truthful and relate real events. After all, the great and outstanding thing about the Bible narrative is its realism, its refusal to idealize its heroes. Against that background, it would be inconsistent to censor the Canaanite genocide as merely a fictional interpolation. Indirect genocide A third type of genocide consists in preventing procreation among a targeted population. Till recently, it was US policy to promote sterilization among Native American women, even applying it secretly during postnatal care or other operations. The Tibetans too have been subjected to this treatment. In the Muslim world, male slaves were often castrated, which partly explains why Iraq has no Black population even though it once had hundreds of thousands of Black slaves. The practice also existed in India on a smaller scale, though the much-maligned Moghul emperor Aurangzeb tried to put an end to it, mainly because eunuchs brought endless corruption in the court. A fourth type of genocide is when mass killing takes place unintentionally, as collateral damage of foolish policies, e. Unlike the deliberate genocide of Native Americans in parts of the USA or Argentina, the death of millions of Natives in Central America after the first Spanish conquests was at least partly the unintended side-effect of the hardships of forced labour and the contact with new diseases brought by the Europeans. In contrast with Nazi and Soviet work camps, where forced labour had the dual purpose of economic profit and a slow but sure death of the inmates, there is no evidence that the Spanish wanted their Native labourers to die. After all, their replacement with African slaves required a large extra investment. The Atlantic slave trade itself caused mass death among the transported slaves, just as in the already long-standing Arab slave trade, but it is obvious that purely for the sake of profit, the slave-traders preferred as many slaves as possible to arrive at the slave markets alive. Likewise, the Christian c. Islamic contempt for Pagans made them rather careless with the lives of Native Americans, Africans or Hindus, so that millions of them were killed, and yet this was not deliberate genocide. Of course they wanted to annihilate Pagan religions like Hinduism, but in principle, the missionary religions wished to convert the unbelievers, and preferred not to kill them unless this was necessary for establishing the power of the True Faith. That is why the mass killing of Hindus by Muslims rarely took place in peacetime, but typically in the fervour immediately following military victories, e. Once Muslim power was established, Muslim rulers sought to exploit and humiliate rather than kill the Hindus, and discourage rebellion by making some sort of compromise. Cruelty was the norm – burnings, summary executions, crucifixions or impalements, inventive tortures. Hindu temples were destroyed to make way for mosques. On occasion there were forced conversions. If ever there were an uprising, it was instantly and savagely repressed: One constraint on Muslim zeal for Holy War was the endemic inter-Muslim warfare and intrigue no history of a royal house was bloodier than that of the Delhi Sultanate , another the prevalence of the Hanifite school of Islamic law in India. This is the only one among the four law schools in Sunni Islam which allows Pagans to subsist as zimmi, dis-empowered third-class citizens paying a special tax for the favour of being tolerated; the other three schools of jurisprudence ruled that Pagans, as opposed to Christians and Jews, had to be given a choice between Islam and death. Staggering numbers also died as collateral damage of the deliberate impoverishment by Sultans like Alauddin Khilji and Jahangir. As Braudel

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put it: Mass killing accompanied the christianization of Saxony by Charlemagne ca. In , French Catholics massacred the heretical Cathars. Wars between Muslims and Christians, and between Catholics and Protestants, killed millions both in deliberate massacres and as collateral damage, e. Though the Turkish government which ordered the killing of a million Armenians in was motivated by a mixture of purely military, secular-nationalistic and Islamic considerations, the fervour with which the local Turks and Kurds participated in the slaughter was clearly due to their Islamic conditioning of hatred against non-Muslims. This ideological killing could be distinguished from genocide in the strict sense, because ethnicity was not the reason for the slaughter. While this caution may complicate matters for the Ukrainians or Cambodians, it does not apply to the case of Hinduism: Attempts to kill all Hindus of a given region may legitimately be termed genocide. For its sheer magnitude in scope and death toll, coupled with its occasional though not continuous intention to exterminate entire Hindu communities, the Islamic campaign against Hinduism, which was never fully called off since the first naval invasion in CE, can without exaggeration be termed genocide. It is a discouraging tale, for its evident moral is that civilization is a precious good, whose delicate complex of order and freedom, culture and peace, can at any moment be overthrown by barbarians invading from without or multiplying within. A first glance at important testimonies by Muslim chroniclers suggests that, over 13 centuries and a territory as vast as the Subcontinent, Muslim Holy Warriors easily killed more Hindus than the 6 million of the Holocaust. The biggest slaughters took place during the raids of Mahmud Ghaznavi ca. The Moghuls , even Babar and Aurangzeb, were fairly restrained tyrants by comparison. Lal once estimated that the Indian population declined by 50 million under the Sultanate, but that would be hard to substantiate; research into the magnitude of the damage Islam did to India is yet to start in right earnest. Note that attempts are made to deny this history. In Indian schoolbooks and the media, an idyllic picture of Hindu-Muslim harmony in the pre-British period is propagated in outright contradiction with the testimony of the primary sources. Like Holocaust denial, this propaganda can be called negationism. Thus, it is routinely alleged that Hindus persecuted and destroyed Buddhism; in reality, Buddhist monasteries and universities flourished under Hindu rule, but their thousands of monks were killed by Ghori and his lieutenants. Apart from actual killing, millions of Hindus disappeared by way of enslavement. After every conquest by a Muslim invader, slave markets in Bagdad and Samarkand were flooded with Hindus. Slaves were likely to die of hardship, e. Hindu slaves were converted to Islam, and when their descendants gained their freedom, they swelled the numbers of the Muslim community. It is a cruel twist of history that the Muslims who forced Partition on India were partly the progeny of Hindus enslaved by Islam. Karma The Hindu notion of Karma has come under fire from Christian and secularist polemicists as part of the current backlash against New Age thinking. Allegedly, the doctrine of Karma implies that the victims of the Holocaust and other massacres had deserved their fate. A naive understanding of Karma, divorced from its Hindu context, could indeed lead to such ideas. Worse, it could be said that the Jews as a nation had incurred genocidal karma by the genocide which their ancestors committed on the Canaanites. Likewise, it could be argued that the Native Americans had it coming: These questions should not be taken lightly. An individual can incarnate in any community, even in other species, and need not be reborn among his own progeny. If Canaanites killed by the Israelites have indeed reincarnated, some may have been Nazi camp guards and others Jewish Holocaust victims. That is the difference between karma and genetics: More fundamentally, we should outgrow this childish and in this case, downright embarrassing view of karma as a matter of reward and punishment.

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Chapter 3 : India Government Urged To Tackle Deadly Violence

Christianity and the state in Asia: complicity and conflict. and the state in post-independence India / Bhagwan and the state in post-independence India.

It is based on research conducted from January to March and July to August. More than Dalit men and women were interviewed. Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their willingness and ability to speak freely with Human Rights Watch; no interviews were conducted under circumstances that presented the risk of retaliation. Human Rights Watch also spoke with more than one hundred government officials, social workers, Dalit activists, and attorneys. Human Rights Watch would like to thank the following people and organizations for their generous assistance: We also thank the many people who prefer, for their own well-being and that of their organizations, that their names not be mentioned - an unfortunate indicator of the volatility surrounding the issue of caste conflict in India. We would like to express our gratitude to the many Dalit men, women, and children who spoke with us, recounting their personal experiences of hardship and violence. They made this report possible. Finally, we acknowledge with appreciation the support of the Ford Foundation, which provided funding that has enabled Human Rights Watch to pursue caste and gender-related research and advocacy in India. The recommendations for this report were drafted in consultation with over forty activists during two sets of meetings convened by Human Rights Watch in July and August in Bangalore and New Delhi, respectively. We wish to thank them for their participation and invaluable contributions. Vinoth, Athi Tamilar Viduthalaiyyakkam; P. Chandrabose, Dalit Liberation Movement. In December, the police raided my village. The superintendent of police [SP] called me a pallachi, which is a caste name for prostitute. He then opened his pant zip. I told the collector that the SP had opened his zip and used a vulgar word. I also told him that they had broken my silver pot. The SP was angry. I had pointed him out. The next morning the police broke all the doors and arrested all the men in the village. The SP came looking for me. My husband hid under the cot. My mother was with me at the time. I was in my night clothes. The police started calling me a prostitute and started beating me. The SP dragged me naked on the road for one hundred feet. I was four months pregnant at the time. A sixty-year-old woman asked them to stop. They beat her too and fractured her hands. They brought me to the police station naked. Fifty-three men had been arrested. One of them took off his lungi [wrap-around cloth] and gave it to me to cover myself. I begged the police officers at the jail to help me. I even told them I was pregnant. They mocked me for making such bold statements to the police the day before. I spent twenty-five days in jail. I miscarried my baby after ten days. Nothing has happened to the officers who did this to me. Central Reserve Police Force, the largest of the paramilitary forces in India. Deputy General of Police. Dalit Panthers of India. Deputy Superintendent of Police. The First Information Report, the first report, recorded by police, of a crime. A habitual criminal, usually associated with a criminal gang. A police baton, frequently carried by Indian police. It is approximately one meter in length, two to five centimeters in diameter, and usually made of wood. Other Backward Classes, see above under "backward castes. Protection of Civil Rights Act, The schedule of castes was intended to increase representation of scheduled-caste members in the legislature, in government employment, and in university placement. The term is also used in the constitution and various laws. State Human Rights Commission. State Reserve Police Force, an armed branch of the police that is called in during times of emergency. Terrorism and Anti-Disruptive Activities Act. Administrative parlance now employs the term "scheduled castes" while rights activists and the population more generally employ the term "Dalits. Those interviewed for this report, however, often use the term to refer to all non-Dalit Hindus. Summary When we are working, they ask us not to come near them. At tea canteens, they have separate tea tumblers and they make us clean them ourselves and make us put the dishes away ourselves. We cannot enter temples. We cannot use upper-caste water taps. We have to go one kilometer away to get water. When we ask for our rights from the government, the municipality officials threaten to fire us. This is what happens to people who demand their rights. They have

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to take the death message to Thevars. These are all unpaid services. They enjoy Thevar community men having them as concubines They cannot afford to react, they are dependent on us for jobs and protection She wants it from him. If he has power, then she has more affection for the landlord. National legislation and constitutional protections serve only to mask the social realities of discrimination and violence faced by those living below the "pollution line. They may not use the same wells, visit the same temples, drink from the same cups in tea stalls, or lay claim to land that is legally theirs. Dalit children are frequently made to sit in the back of classrooms, and communities as a whole are made to perform degrading rituals in the name of caste. Most Dalits continue to live in extreme poverty, without land or opportunities for better employment or education. Dalit children make up the majority of those sold into bondage to pay off debts to upper-caste creditors. Dalit men, women, and children numbering in the tens of millions work as agricultural laborers for a few kilograms of rice or Rs. Dalit women face the triple burden of caste, class, and gender. Dalit girls have been forced to become prostitutes for upper-caste patrons and village priests. Sexual abuse and other forms of violence against women are used by landlords and the police to inflict political "lessons" and crush dissent within the community. According to a Tamil Nadu state government official, the raping of Dalit women exposes the hypocrisy of the caste system as "no one practices untouchability when it comes to sex. Public outrage over large-scale incidents of violence or particularly egregious examples of discrimination fades quickly, and the state is under little pressure to undertake more meaningful reforms. Laws granting Dalits special consideration for government jobs and education reach only a small percentage of those they are meant to benefit. Laws designed to ensure that Dalits enjoy equal rights and protection have seldom been enforced. Instead, police refuse to register complaints about violations of the law and rarely prosecute those responsible for abuses that range from murder and rape to exploitative labor practices and forced displacement from Dalit lands and homes. Political mobilization that has resulted in the emergence of powerful interest groups and political parties among middle- and low-caste groups throughout India since the mid-1980s has largely bypassed Dalits. Dalits are courted by all political parties but generally forgotten once elections are over. The expanding power base of low-caste political parties, the election of low-caste chief ministers to state governments, and even the appointment of a Dalit as president of India in July 2002 all signal the increasing prominence of Dalits in the political landscape but cumulatively have yet to yield any significant benefit for the majority of Dalits. Laws on land reform and protection for Dalits remain unimplemented in most Indian states. Lacking access to mainstream political organizations and increasingly frustrated with the pace of reforms, Dalits have begun to resist subjugation and discrimination in two ways: Particularly since the early 1990s, Dalit organizations have sought to mobilize Dalits to protest peacefully against the human rights violations suffered by their community. These movements have quickly grown in membership and visibility and have provoked a backlash from the higher-caste groups most threatened—both economically and politically—by Dalit assertiveness. Dalit activists are jailed under preventive detention statutes to prevent them from holding meetings and protest rallies, or charged as "terrorists" and "threats to national security. Dalits who dare to challenge the social order have been subject to abuses by their higher-caste neighbors. Dalit villages are collectively penalized for individual "transgressions" through social boycotts, including loss of employment and access to water, grazing lands, and ration shops. For most Dalits in rural India who earn less than a subsistence living as agricultural laborers, a social boycott may mean destitution and starvation. In some states, notably Bihar, guerrilla organizations advocating the use of violence to achieve land redistribution have attracted Dalit support. Such groups, known as "Naxalites," [8] have carried out attacks on higher-caste groups, killing landlords, village officials and their families and seizing property. Such attacks on civilians constitute gross violations of international humanitarian law. Naxalite groups have also engaged in direct combat with police forces. In response, police have targeted Dalit villagers believed to be sympathetic to Naxalites and have conducted raids in search of the guerrillas and their weapons. While there is no question that the Naxalites pose a serious security threat and that the police are obliged to counter that threat, the behavior of the police indicates that the purpose of the raids is often to terrorize Dalits as a group, whether or

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not they are members of Naxalite organizations.

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Chapter 4 : History of Malaysia - Wikipedia

Bhagwan Josh, by comparison, re-visits the often vexed politics of conversion in India in legislative terms. He examines tensions that surfaced during the crafting of the Indian Constitution, in particular to clauses pertaining to the profession, practice and propagation of religion (Clause 16), and of unlawful conversion (Clause 17).

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Chapter 5 : Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict, 1st Edition (Hardback) - Routledge

CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE IN ASIA Complicity and Conflict An International Conference Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.

Prehistoric Malaysia The discovery of a skull which estimates say is around 40,000 years old on Niah Caves in Sarawak, has been identified as the earliest evidence for human settlement in Malaysian Borneo. Stone hand-axes from early hominoids, probably *Homo erectus*, have been unearthed in Lenggong. They date back 1. It was excavated from a deep trench uncovered by Barbara and Tom Harrisson a British ethnologist in The landscape around the Niah Caves was drier and more exposed than it is now. Prehistorically, the Niah Caves were surrounded by a combination of closed forests with bush, parkland, swamps, and rivers. The foragers were able to survive in the rainforest through hunting, fishing, and gathering molluscs and edible plants. Scholars suggest they are descendants of early Austroasiatic -speaking agriculturalists, who brought both their language and their technology to the southern part of the peninsula approximately 4,000 years ago. They united and coalesced with the indigenous population. Anthropologists support the notion that the Proto-Malays originated from what is today Yunnan, China. In the first millennium CE, Malays became the dominant race on the peninsula. The small early states that were established were greatly influenced by Indian culture. South Indian culture was spread to Southeast Asia by the south Indian Pallava dynasty in the 4th and 5th century. In ancient Indian literature, the term *Suvarnadvipa* or the "Golden Peninsula" is used in *Ramayana*, and some argued that it may be a reference to the Malay Peninsula. The ancient Indian text *Vayu Purana* also mentioned a place named *Malayadvipa* where gold mines may be found, and this term has been proposed to mean possibly Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. He referred to the Straits of Malacca as *Sinus Sabaricus*. In the 5th century, the Kingdom of Pahang was mentioned in the *Book of Song*. Chinese chronicles of the 5th century CE speak of a great port in the south called *Guantoli*, which is thought to have been in the Straits of Malacca. In the 7th century, a new port called *Shilifoshi* is mentioned, and this is believed to be a Chinese rendering of *Srivijaya*. Between the 7th and the 13th century, much of the Malay peninsula was under the Buddhist *Srivijaya* empire. The empire was based around trade, with local kings *dhatu*s or community leaders swearing allegiance to the central lord for mutual profit. *Kedah*—known as *Kedaram*, *Cheh-Cha* according to *I-Ching* or *Kataha*, in ancient Pallava or Sanskrit —was in the direct route of the invasions and was ruled by the *Cholas* from A second invasion was led by *Virarajendra Chola* of the *Chola* dynasty who conquered *Kedah* in the late 11th century. The coming of the *Chola* reduced the majesty of *Srivijaya*, which had exerted influence over *Kedah*, *Pattani* and as far as *Ligor*. During the reign of *Kulothunga Chola I* *Chola* overlordship was established over the *Sri Vijaya* province *Kedah* in the late 11th century. *Pattinapalai*, a Tamil poem of the 2nd century CE, describes goods from *Kedaram* heaped in the broad streets of the *Chola* capital. A 7th-century Indian drama, *Kaumudhimahotsva*, refers to *Kedah* as *Kataha-nagari*. The *Agnipurana* also mentions a territory known as *Anda-Kataha* with one of its boundaries delineated by a peak, which scholars believe is *Gunung Jerai*. Stories from the *Katasaritasagaram* describe the elegance of life in *Kataha*. The Buddhist kingdom of *Ligor* took control of *Kedah* shortly after. Its king *Chandrabhanu* used it as a base to attack *Sri Lanka* in the 11th century and ruled the northern parts, an event noted in a stone inscription in *Nagapattinum* in *Tamil Nadu* and in the *Sri Lankan* chronicles, *Mahavamsa*. At times, the *Khmer* kingdom, the *Siamese* kingdom, and even *Cholas* kingdom tried to exert control over the smaller Malay states. Wars with the *Javanese* caused it to request assistance from *China*, and wars with *Indian* states are also suspected. In the 11th century, the centre of power shifted to *Malayu*, a port possibly located further up the *Sumatran* coast near the *Jambi* River. By the late 13th century, the *Siamese* kings of *Sukhothai* had brought most of *Malaya* under their rule. In the 14th century, the *Hindu* Java-based *Majapahit* empire came into possession of the peninsula. It is possible that *Santubong* was an important seaport in *Sarawak* during the period, but its importance declined during the *Yuan* dynasty, and the port was deserted during the *Ming* dynasty. The *Islam* in *Malaysia* was

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influenced by previous religions and was originally not orthodox. Admiral Zheng He called at Malacca and brought Parameswara with him on his return to China, a recognition of his position as legitimate ruler of Malacca. In exchange for regular tribute, the Chinese emperor offered Melaka protection from the constant threat of a Siamese attack. According to one theory, Parameswara became a Muslim when he married a Princess of Pasai and he took the fashionable Persian title "Shah", calling himself Iskandar Shah. He ruled Malacca from to After an initial period paying tribute to the Ayutthaya , [23] the kingdom rapidly assumed the place previously held by Srivijaya, establishing independent relations with China, and exploiting its position dominating the Straits to control the China-India maritime trade, which became increasingly important when the Mongol conquests closed the overland route between China and the west. The extent of the Malaccan Empire in the 15th century became the main point for the spreading of Islam in the Malay Archipelago. Within a few years of its establishment, Malacca officially adopted Islam. Parameswara became a Muslim, and because Malacca was under a Muslim prince, the conversion of Malays to Islam accelerated in the 15th century. Malacca was an important commercial centre during this time, attracting trade from around the region. Most future Malay states originated from this period. The court of Malacca also gave great prestige to the Malay language , which had originally evolved in Sumatra and been brought to Malacca at the time of its foundation. In time Malay came to be the official language of all the Malaysian states, although local languages survived in many places. After the fall of Malacca, the Sultanate of Brunei became the major centre of Islam. In , Afonso de Albuquerque led an expedition to Malaya which seized Malacca with the intent of using it as a base for activities in southeast Asia. By the late 16th century, the tin mines of northern Malaya had been discovered by European traders, and Perak grew wealthy on the proceeds of tin exports. After the fall of Malacca to Portugal, the Johor Sultanate and the Sultanate of Aceh on northern Sumatra moved to fill the power vacuum left behind. Instead it expanded in other directions, building in years one of the largest Malay states. A notable conquest was Perak, a tin-producing state on the Peninsula. The conflict over control of the straits went on until , when the Dutch allied to Johor gained control of Malacca. The Dutch expanded across the archipelago, forming an alliance with Johor and using this to push the Portuguese out of Malacca in The fall of Johor left a power vacuum on the Malay Peninsula which was partly filled by the Siamese kings of Ayutthaya kingdom , who made the five northern Malay statesâ€” Kedah , Kelantan , Patani , Perlis , and Terengganu â€” their vassals. The economic importance of Malaya to Europe grew rapidly during the 18th century. The fast-growing tea trade between China and United Kingdom increased the demand for high-quality Malayan tin, which was used to line tea-chests. Malayan pepper also had a high reputation in Europe, while Kelantan and Pahang had gold mines. The growth of tin and gold mining and associated service industries led to the first influx of foreign settlers into the Malay world â€” initially Arabs and Indians, later Chinese. Bruneian Empire A view of a river from the anchorage off Sarawak, Borneo, c. Painting from the National Maritime Museum of London. Before its conversion to Islam, Brunei was known as Poni and it was a vassal-state to the Majapahit Empire. The Kuching area was known to Portuguese cartographers as Cerava, one of the five great seaports on the island of Borneo. They conquered the Bruneian colony of Islamic Manila and Christianized its people and they also laid siege to Sulu. The invasion was only temporary as the Spanish then retreated. Yet, it still maintained sway in Borneo. By the early 19th century, Sarawak had become a loosely governed territory under the control of the Brunei Sultanate. The Bruneian Empire had authority only along the coastal regions of Sarawak held by semi-independent Malay leaders. Meanwhile, the interior of Sarawak suffered from tribal wars fought by Iban , Kayan , and Kenyah peoples , who aggressively fought to expand their territories. When antimony production increased, the Brunei Sultanate demanded higher taxes from Sarawak; this led to civil unrest and chaos. It was around this time that James Brooke who would later become the first White Rajah of Sarawak arrived in Sarawak, and Pengiran Muda Hashim requested his assistance in the matter, but Brooke refused. Pangeran Muda Hashim signed a treaty in surrendering Sarawak to Brooke. This appointment was later confirmed by the Sultan of Brunei in After the incident, the Sultan of Brunei sent an apology letter to Queen Victoria. English traders had been present in Malay waters since the

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17th century. However, with the arrival of the British, European power became dominant in Malaysia. Already the most powerful coloniser in India, the British were looking towards southeast Asia for new resources. Various islands were used for this purpose, but the first permanent acquisition was Penang , leased from the Sultan of Kedah in In , during the Napoleonic Wars , the British with the consent of the Netherlands occupied Dutch Melaka to forestall possible French encroachment in the area. They allowed Britain to control all trade through the straits of Malacca.

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Chapter 6 : Caste Violence Against India's "Untouchables" | HRW

Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict (review) Bhagwan Josh, by comparison, re-visits the often vexed politics of conversion in India in legislative terms. He examines.

Are Indian Tribals Hindus? So it is clear that the tribals are certainly Hindus, having connections with the larger Hindu society around them as much as any other Hindu caste or community, except to the extent that physical isolation or separation from the general population since these tribals usually reside in remote areas like hills, forests or separate settlements, where they have been living for centuries or millennia or more has led to greater individuality and distinctiveness of culture and social organisation. It is equally clear that it is certainly the business of Hindus to interfere if these tribals are being converted to Christianity, more than it is the business of Christian missionaries to come from far off lands to interfere in the religious beliefs and practices of the Indian tribals. Incidentally, at this point, the question also arises: The answer lies in the history of the British colonial rulers of India in other parts of the world: The same did not happen in South America, Asia and Africa, where the original populations continue to flourish in large numbers in South America, of course, getting ethnically mixed with the European intruders, and accepting the overwhelming dominance of their religion, language and culture. But, in the meantime, linguists had discovered that the major dominant languages of North India, and the ancient classical language of India, Sanskrit, were related to the languages of Europe, Central Asia and Iran. This rapidly became a matter of colonial policy. The Census Commission was asked to classify the tribals as Animists instead of Hindus. This policy continued to be meticulously followed till the Census of 1931, although every single Commissioner of the Census during this period expressed, within the Census report itself, his clear disagreement with the policy that he was implementing: Both are essentially animistic. And at the same time, the fifth columnists of the missionaries in the media and academia are still able to propagate on a war footing the insidious terminology that even the British Commissioners of the Census had felt embarrassed at being forced to use: That the tribals are Hindu Category One is true of the tribal population of India in general, but what about the few groups of tribals in India who have indeed declared themselves to be followers of other i. Hindu Category Three traditional religions like Sarna, Donyi Polo, Khasi, Meitei, Garo and Gond, and possible microscopic sections of other tribes who regard their tribal beliefs as distinctive? Are those tribes indeed neutral in identity between Hinduism and Christianity, and therefore legitimate fodder for the Proselytising Armies assuming that being distinct from Hindus makes them legitimate fodder? To understand all this, one must first understand what exactly Hinduism is in the first place. What needs to be thrashed out in detail is: And in order to answer this basic question one must understand the place of religions as a whole in the history of human society and human civilization. And, also, we must first understand what religion is in the first place, and more particularly what is Christianity. Further, abstract Gods arose from natural phenomena, stories of these Gods and their activities developed when the abstract Gods were anthropomorphised to different degrees, customs and rituals were devised for the worship of these Gods, priestly classes evolved for different kinds of interactions with these Gods, rules and regulations were devised by these priestly classes, and as many tribal religions came into being as there were tribes. In the course of history, tribes all over the world expanded or contracted some became extinct, merged with each other or split into sub-tribes, congregated in specific areas or dispersed in different directions; and, as technological evolutions in agriculture, industry, communications, etc led to tribal societies expanding into small states and areas of the development of larger civilizations, the individual religions of small tribes began to play more prominent roles in history as these states became the vehicles of power for particular tribes, and the particular religions of such individual tribes became state religions. Different trends evolved in matters of religion. Thus we had the great religion of Egypt the religion of Ra, Nut, Isis, Osiris, Horus, etc which had complicated and magnificent rites and rituals, mysticism and myths, and created immortal monuments temples, pyramids and sphinxes which are the wonders of the world

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to this day, which was the national and state religion of the whole of Egypt for millennia, but which rarely transgressed the boundaries of Egypt. On the other hand, we had the Jewish religion, which was based on a very much accentuated tribal identity. What we see in the case of the Jewish religion is one of four possible attitudes of a tribal religion to the religions of other tribes respect, tolerance, indifference and hatred carried to an extreme extent: But it was still all right so far as it was restricted only to the Jewish religion: Further, this was in a world divided between one Jewish tribe or conglomeration of tribes and countless other non-Jewish tribes, so that in practice this hatred could not in any case be very effective in doing much harm. Christianity originated in Palestine as a sect within the Jewish religion: Finally it was emboldened to break itself completely from its Jewish origins and declare itself a new religion. As opposed to religions of single tribes, Christianity became a religion into whose tribal ambits co-option of members of other tribes was not only allowed but was in fact now a central and most primary tenet of expansionist religious belief. Christianity is therefore basically a religion which evolved out of a tribal religion, Judaism, and became a kind of supra-tribal religion. As originally an offshoot of Judaism, Christianity accepted the holy book of the Jews, the Tanakh consisting of three sets of books, the Torah, the Neviyim and the Ketuvim as a canon, and therefore the entire tribal history of the Jews as the history of the world from the day of creation. However, this book was renamed the Old Testament, as it represented the old covenant between Jehovah and the Jews, which recognized the Jews as the Chosen people of God. With the advent of Jesus, the old covenant was abrogated, and now there was a new covenant between Jehovah and Mankind in general, so that all those who accepted him would attain Heaven after one life on earth, and all those who did not accept him would go to Hell forever. This was represented in the new holy book of the Christians known as the New Testament consisting of four sets of books, the Gospels, the Epistles, the Acts and the Revelations. Now, the Jews themselves were no longer the Chosen People of God, and those Jews who did not accept the New Testament and convert to Christianity automatically became earmarked for Hell. After the Roman emperor Constantine became a Christian, and forcibly imposed Christianity throughout the Roman Empire, the religion spread all over Europe, West Asia and northern Africa, and its spread was only brought to a halt by the birth of Islam in Arabia, which was the third religion in the Abrahamic lineage after Judaism and Christianity and closely followed Christianity in its Imperialistic supra-tribal ideology and history. Christianity is therefore a supra-tribal religion which is based on certain fundamental dogmas and ideologies, and whose primary objective is to uproot, destroy and supplant every single other existing tribal and civilizational religion in the world, which it sees as its enemy, and which it classifies as a satanic religion whose followers are bound for the everlasting tortures of Hell. In India, as in the rest of the world, religion was originally a tribal affair. Tribes in every corner of India, as of the inhabited world of the time, were followers of different tribal religions. As in other parts of the world, the rise of civilization in one particular part of India led to the development of one particular kind of religion among the different tribes and people spread out over a certain area. This area was the north and northwest, covering particularly northern Pakistan, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and the western half of U. The area still covered many different tribes, notably the conglomerates of tribes known to traditional Indian history as the Druhyu, Anu and Puru. In present-day linguistic terms, this could be described as the Proto-Indo-European area. The religion which developed in this area concentrated on worship of the elements the sun, moon, clouds, rain, sky, earth, rivers, etc. This religion is found in the Rigveda the religious book of the Puru tribes , the Zend Avesta the religious book of the main groups among the Anu tribes who migrated westwards into Afghanistan , and in the religious practices of the ancient European priests, mainly the Celtic Druids emigrants to Europe from among the Druhyu tribes. Other versions of these elements with more developed mythologies are found in the other European religions Greek, Teutonic, Lithuanian, etc. In India, after the emigration of the Anu and Druhyu tribes, the religion of the Purus, with its highly developed priesthood and rituals, spread over the rest of the country along with Vedic culture. As the religions of the different tribes all over the country converged into the increasingly diluted Puru religion, the original Puru Vedic rituals and myths increasingly came to occupy the position of a nominal upper layer in a new multi-layered and multi-faceted religion which

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was rapidly becoming the common Pan-Indian religion of the sub-continent. When this pan-Indian religion came to be known as Hinduism is a matter of irrelevant dispute. That it is known as Hinduism is an indisputable fact. But there was a big difference in the spread of Hinduism all over India and the spread of Christianity all over the world. Unlike Christianity, which demonised the Gods, beliefs and rituals of the religions which it sought to uproot, destroy and supplant, Hinduism accepted and internalised the Gods, beliefs and rituals of the tribal religions which converged into it. The result is that today the most popular Hindu deities in every single part of India are originally tribal Gods: In time, of course, myths were formed nominally associating many of these deities with one or the other of the main Gods and Goddesses of Puranic Hinduism as their manifestations, these Puranic Gods themselves being additions from different parts of India to the Hindu pantheon or originally Vedic Gods like Vishnu and Rudra with basic characteristics adopted from the other local and tribal deities. The original Puru Vedic layer of religion which forms the pan-Indian umbrella of Hinduism was originally more or less the religion depicted in the Rigveda: The Soma rituals are completely defunct today in fact, no-one knows the exact identity of Soma , the Agni rituals are still performed, but only during major ceremonies birth, death, weddings, ritual inaugurations of houses, etc. Practically every single basic feature of Hinduism today was adopted from the religious beliefs and rituals of the other, originally tribal, religious traditions of the people from every single corner of India as they all converged into Hinduism. This entire system in all its variations was adopted from the various practices of the people of eastern, central and southern India, along with the Gods and idols themselves. All the basic philosophical concepts of mainstream Hinduism are likewise adopted from the tribal and local populations of different parts of India: The fact is, Hinduism can never be in true conflict with any other religion other than the two predator Abrahamic religions which themselves choose conflict with all other religions since it has no particular God, Ritual or Dogma to impose on the followers of other religions. In Hinduism, we find all kinds of atheistic and materialistic philosophies, the most well known being the Lokayata philosophy of Charvaka, who believed that there is only one life, that there is no such thing as an afterlife, or heaven or hell, or rebirth, and that our only purpose in life should be to maximize our pleasures and minimize our pains. The very basic texts of Hinduism contain the seeds and roots of agnostic philosophies, from the Rigvedic Nasadiya Sukta X. Who knows then whence it first came into being? He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it? He whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not. This is not to say that intolerant strands are not found in Hindu texts: Hinduism thus represents the opposite end of the spectrum from the Abrahamic religions: This is the central thread of Hinduism: The Bhagawad Gita, even as it asks Arjuna and presumably mankind in general to abandon all other dharmas i. This is the reason a Hindu would not think twice before bowing his head in genuine reverent worship before an idol of Osiris or Isis in Egypt, Quetzalcoatl or Kulkulcan in Central America, or Kuan Yin in China or, indeed, before visiting churches and dargahs, not realizing the difference between non-Abrahamic and Abrahamic religious entities. This is the reason why the Zoroastrians who fled Iran from Abrahamic persecution, and the Jews who fled ancient Palestine, found safe, respectful and helpful refuge only in Hindu India and nowhere else. And this is also the reason why the tribal Gods and tribal religions in different parts of India which, either due to isolated location or out of choice, did not choose to merge, or merge fully, into the greater pan-Indian Hindu entity where, in any case, their distinctive characteristics would only have been respected, preserved and popularised everywhere continued to freely maintain their distinctive identities to this day – i. Christian Expansionism Christianity spread by way of four Grand Tactics, which are still as effective today as they were in the past: To begin with, within the Roman Empire, this was done from below: The early history of Christianity is the history of Crypto-Christians in Rome: But with the conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine CE , conversions started from above as well, i. A primary method was to get a Christian convert girl to marry the king, emperor or ruler; secretly convert the male progeny of the marriage to Christianity; see that this secretly converted prince becomes the king, emperor or ruler after his non-Christian father; if possible see that his queen is also another converted Christian; and finally gradually employ the full

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force of the royal or imperial power to make Christianity the official religion, convert large sections of the populace to Christianity, persecute or severely handicap those who refuse to convert, and finally to spread the Word to other kingdoms and lands by aligning with Christian populations in those kingdoms and lands and using them to help conquer those kingdoms and lands and continue the same process there. This was the method by which Rome was converted, and which set off the trigger of conversions over the whole of Europe and the rest of the world in the course of time. This is also the method which almost worked in modern post-Independence India! Converts are generally of two kinds: Arunachal Pradesh, where there is strong and often violent reaction within the particular tribes to conversions. This continues till the converts achieve enough numbers to come out of the closet and c among certain categories of socially well-placed converts who feel they will be better placed to serve the cause by remaining crypto-Christian and working behind the scenes than by declaring their conversion openly. The various methods and tactics employed need not be spelled out here: This is the second tactic of Christian expansionism. There are international think-tanks and organisations, with multi-billion dollar budgets, which plan out and execute the conversion campaigns in different countries. And they have huge armies of foot soldiers. In recent times, most of them, who may have been rivals in earlier times, often carry on their activities in coordination with each other. Their budgets and strategies are not secret documents or products of the fevered imaginations of opponents: These Proselytising Armies are backed by three categories of back-up groups which facilitate the expansionist activities of the warriors: The combined potential of all these various open or hidden forces is almost limitless. In India, there is a further strategic alliance by the Christian expansionists: A third major tactic of Christian expansionism is hidden indoctrination through educational institutions. A significant proportion of the white collar and the upper crust segments of society particularly in India are educated in English schools, and most of them are run by Catholic or other Christian organisations. Now an increasing number of educational institutions run by Christian organisations also give education in regional languages, particularly in semi-rural and tribal areas. These educational institutions turn out ex-students in the millions who occupy positions of importance in all fields of society. These ex-students continue to be followers of their respective religions, but without realizing it a very large number of them have internalized some of the tenets, principles and beliefs of Christianity, or have learned to view things through not just Western but specifically Christian categories and viewpoints. Thus, without actually converting them, Christian expansionism creates an automatic sympathetic spectrum of people within the targeted non-Christian society which creates a very conducive atmosphere for actual conversion activity and neutralizes opposition. The fourth important tactic is building up a popular image based on myths and perceptions which neutralizes public opposition to Christian expansionism.

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Chapter 7 : New Acquisitions - June | Colgate University Libraries

Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict. Bhagwan Josh, by comparison, re-visits the often vexed politics of conversion in India in.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: London and New York: Routledge, , pp. In comparison to current works on Islam, book publications on the interplay between Christianity and nation states in Asia have not been voluminous. Seen as a minority "foreign" religion coupled with European or American colonial legacies, scholarly interests on Christianity have largely tended to be anthropological, literary-historical, or theological rather than from a political analytical perspective. This volume partially redresses this lacuna by bringing together a number of established and emergent scholars in the field to provide an interdisciplinary inquiry into the subject matter. The overarching aim of the book as framed by the editors is to contextualize and decentre a small but influential body of literature inter alia the recent works of Alister McGrath, Lamin Sanneh, and Philip Jenkins that optimistically paint "an explosive growth" of Christianity worldwide, particularly to the "global south". This demographic expansion of Christians putatively brings about not only a host of discernible changes to society and culture but also concomitant reconfigurations of state power. While the experiences of Africa and Latin America are usually offered as empirical evidence of this trend, the editors caution that "it would be premature to project this autonomy from the state onto the experience of Asian Christians who are, in most cases, negotiating the challenges of existing as the minority faith" p. To put flesh to this premise, the editors have elicited representative case studies from South Asia India, Tibet , Southeast Asia Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam , and East Asia South Korea, Japan , as well as two thematic essays on the politics of evangelism, conversion, and subjectivities. The Christian traditions examined include those of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. The dialectic of "complicity or conflict" between Christianity and the state and society is the recurring motif of the book. Space only allows me to comment briefly on three chapters to give a variegated flavour of the book. Whilst there are still good grounds to support the argument that upland minorities typically underscore or fence off their cultural difference to the mainstream religion of lowland majorities through conversion, the inroads of evangelical Protestantism into the cities also point to a contrary movement in a different milieu. By becoming members of the same religious community that is "cosmopolitan, urbanized and de-ethnicised" p. In other words, instead of construing Protestant conversion as simply a "protest" against dominant culture, this same phenomenon has the potential also to index a willing embrace of the allure of modernity. Bhagwan Josh, by comparison, re-visits the often vexed politics of conversion in India in legislative terms. He examines tensions that surfaced during the crafting of the Indian Constitution, in particular to clauses pertaining to the profession, practice and propagation of religion Clause 16 , and of unlawful conversion Clause As he [End Page] puts it, despite the opposition of various anti-Christian groups, the notion of conversion was finally included as a fundamental human right in You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Chapter 8 : Tripura: Beyond the Insurgency-Politics Nexus -- Praveen Kumar

Bhagwan Josh, by comparison, re-visits the often vexed politics of conversion in India in legislative terms. He examines tensions that surfaced during the crafting of the Indian Constitution, in particular to clauses pertaining to the profession, practice and propagation of religion (Clause 16), and of unauthorised conversion (Clause 17).

He is the author of *Imagining the Good Life: Negotiating Culture and Development in Nepal Himalaya*, and has published in a number of international refereed journals. His research interests include religion, tourism and globalization. He currently holds a Visiting Fellowship at the Asia Research Institute, NUS, and has published on topics on Philippine religion and culture in various scholarly forums. His broader interests include material religion and diasporic identity in Southeast Asia. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Lim, Francis Khek Gee. *Christianity and the State in Asia*: Many scholars point with great alacrity and in some cases, with great alarm to the staggering numerical growth of the faith outside the West. In each of these works, a distinctive analytical framework can be observed: What this suggests is that statistically speaking, a chance encounter with a Christian is likely to mean coming face-to-face with someone who is, more often than not, a poor yet devout person of colour. In this respect, the idea of the southern expansion of Christianity is not just a demographic reality. At issue here is the homogeneity of the global south as a cultural and religious category. To state the issue more bluntly: It is not my intention to refute outright the occurrence of a southern shift, or to suggest that Asia be excluded from the projections of the growth of Christendom as a world religion. But for the majority of Asia, the fact is that Christians have to face overwhelming challenges brought about by regimes that are reticent, if not repressive or hostile, towards Christian churches. While the proportion of Christians in the world remains fairly stable, at around 34 per cent, it is the distribution of Christian populations that has generated much interest. Philip Jenkins is among the more prominent of scholars who point to this, with great reliance on demographic data. He concedes that by the country with the largest population of Christians will still be the United States. The statistics Jenkins cites are all the more dramatic when seen in light of the overall decline of the faith in the West. Alister McGrath makes similar statistics-based estimations and projections. Like Jenkins, the growth of Christians around the world is projected as an overwhelming and unstoppable demographic juggernaut. Often, this juggernaut threatens to erode the traditional primacy of Western Christianity if only by the sheer force of numbers. The corresponding decline of adherents in Europe and in North America is even more staggering considering that waves of migrations into Europe and America itself mean that adherents in those countries may themselves have ethnic and cultural roots from the global south. While this growth is manifested in real numbers in places such as Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico, the demographic composition of Christians in its traditional Western bastions is itself becoming increasingly diverse. GAFCON, organized as it was outside the legitimate jurisdiction of the Lambeth Conference, is seen as an expression of the crisis of leadership in the Anglican Communion about which there is much nervousness and alarm. The global south as a religious category denotes the sense of recalcitrance and Template: Jenkins and McGrath point to there being a very a real, doctrinal sea change in the way the faith is read, practised, articulated and lived outside Europe and North America. He describes this as: African Churches in particular are supposedly prone to literalism in light of an indigenous culture more inclined towards supernaturalism, which makes the biblical themes of the Bible resonate more strongly with a non-Western reality. In a paper he gave at the Carnegie Council on October , Jenkins declared: I have a very bad habit: This is not a question you need to ask in much of Africa. In this respect, it is not simply that Christianity in the global south is scripturalist or literalist. It is also prone to mysticist and supernaturalist tendencies and inclinations. This is a point made by McGrath who insists that: The Pentecostal worldview includes elements such as the exorcism of demons which tend Template: The

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ordination of partnered homosexual Gene Robinson was one such issue that catalyzed internal rifts within the Episcopal Church in the United States. The argument is that if more people believe in a particular type of Christianity, then that will eventually prevail as the conventional form of the faith in spite of the reservations of its leadership. Indeed, Jenkins makes these pronouncements based primarily on demography, but also suggests that a shift in numbers can also have an impact on the Western Church. Nigerian Christianity, for example, by virtue of favourably shifting demographics, will eventually become the centre of the Anglican Communion. The south-ward decentralization of Christianity away from Europe and North America has the potential to change the very character of the faith in all places in which it exists. The question we must ask at this point is whether these trends and characterizations “applied readily to African and Latin American contexts” is applicable to Asia in light of the demographic and political situation in that region. The subsumption of Asia into the rubric of southern Christianity is taken to be more than semantic. One might point out in support of this that Christianity is, strictly speaking an Asian religion. From its origins in Asia, Christianity had reached the Far East in China and Sumatra as early as the seventh century, while inroads had been made in the Malabar Coast as early as the fourth century. The modern missionary movement made some inroads into parts of Southeast Asia, such as Malacca and the Philippines, from the sixteenth century, buttressed more or less by the wave of European expansion and colonialism. The twentieth century saw great progress, particularly through Protestant missionization in other parts of East and Southeast Asia. The majority of Filipinos, meanwhile, remain staunchly Roman Catholic, with a Church hierarchy very actively involved in the installation and deposition of leaders and regimes over the past two decades. It is important to note that only in the Philippines and, more recently in East Timor which is over 90 per cent Catholic, does Christianity predominate among the populations of Asia. In South Korea and in Lebanon, Christians comprise nearly 50 per cent of the population as of the year 2000. McGrath, for example, uses South Korea as a remarkable case, citing the success of Christian missionization through the relief programmes that followed the end of the Korean war, and the Church-inspired programmes of restoration in the 1950s. Ibid.: The adoption of Christianity in South Korea, however, is not just a simple case of adoption and conversion. These descriptions of avid Christian populations may well be true. However, Jenkins, McGrath and Sanneh do not emphasize that, as far as the demographic data is concerned, Asia is the weakest link in their projections about the future of global Christendom. With the exception of the countries mentioned above, Christianity forms but a miniscule part of the overall population in virtually all countries in Southeast, East and South Asia. Whereas Christians comprise around half of the population of Africa and over 90 per cent of Latin America, the faithful constitute at best a mere 9 per cent of Asians as of Pew Forum. Among the most populous nations in Asia, the numbers are equally telling. Although they are projected to have the largest concentrations of Christians in the years to come, the proportion of Christians in India and Indonesia hover somewhere around the 1 per cent mark of their total population, while in China with less than reliable statistics there are estimated to be just 20 million Christians. While the absolute number of Christians in Asia is high, they are not as compelling when seen as a proportion of a rapidly increasing total population, most of whom profess a faith other than Christianity. After almost 20 centuries of missionization, we have less than 3 per cent Christians in Asia. Phan While the idea of a southern shift is remarkable for the idea that Christianity could be decentralized as a pre-eminent Western religion, the demographic data in Asia suggests that the faith is, and will continue to be, a minority religion. It is Peter C. Phan who contends, the Church in Asia must be understood according to a framework that emphasizes conciliation and ecumenism not merely within the Church but between religions as well. He suggested that the Church can be understood according to a threefold dialogue. Overall, Phan characterizes the Church in Asia as concerned more with a communion ecclesiology protected by canonical structures that prevent disagreements, instead of being confrontational and antagonistic. It is important to realize that, as a largely minority faith in the region, Christianity in Asia is articulated and lived from within a different set of cultural and political circumstances. Those circumstances have encouraged, at least as far as Catholicism is concerned, policies of conciliation and co-operation. The contributors to this volume have

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each been asked to comment upon how this is so by examining the extent to which Template: Under such a condition, according to Sanneh, we must be prepared to modify, or even abandon, national state jurisdiction as the prerequisite of the international order. Nation-states have been more often the problem than the solution. The current transformation of Christianity in a post- colonial world should end. Sanneh and Carpenter The way in which Asian Christians have emerged historically in the context of colonialism is telling of the kind of faith being practised in the region today. Indeed there have been many studies of Christianity in Asia, however notably that of Ileo that show how Christianity is not simply a replication or even a transplantation of European Christianity. Asians, like their African and Latin American counterparts, have historically formulated their own ways of engaging with Christian doctrine, even to a point of seeing the scripture through their own lenses. The localization of the faith is not simply a two-way relationship between missionary and potential convert. Like the Hmong Protestants, Tibetan Catholics have used their Christianity to acquire state resources in light of the religious policies of the Chinese authority. Localization and conversion, therefore, is not merely a process that is grounded in spiritual claims, as Sanneh describes. Asian states and their continued relevance The more immediate way in which the Church and the state interact in Asian contexts can be drawn from the example of the countries with a large Christian population, which is the result of relatively successful missionary engagement. One may not assume, however, as the chapters by Apilado and Park demonstrate, that the numerical strength of Christianity alone will preclude instances of contestation between the Church and states. South Korea, meanwhile, is demographically less Christian dominated than the Philippines. More recently, the election to the Presidency of the head of the largest Christian church in Korea attests to the palatability of a Church-inspired presence in the political sphere. Both the cases of the Philippines and South Korea demonstrate the vehement involvement of Christian institutions in issues of public morality and piety – preserves that are seen as belonging to the jurisdiction of the Church in spite of the formal separation of the religious and political sphere. Perceptions of Christianity as a foreign religion is a persistent one, even in places such as the Philippines where it has been entrenched for over four centuries. Elsewhere I have described how Filipino Catholics see Church rites and rituals as more or less legitimate according to the extent to which they correspond with Vatican directives Bautista Two recent examples demonstrate this. In , Pope Benedict XVI appointed 18 new members to the College of Cardinals, the conclave comprised of Cardinals from around globe, bringing the current total to As of , 62 per cent of Cardinals were from Europe and North America, while the rest were from outside the West. Of the total number of Cardinals in the conclave, 76 Euro-Americans have electoral powers, compared to 44 from the global south. This request is also premised upon the discourse that the Philippines remains a bastion of Catholicism in a region Template: Global south theologians and clergy becoming increasingly self-assertive in the face of eroding memberships in the West may well be an accurate portrait of African Christianity, particularly the Anglican Communion. Instead, the appeals for change come from the mechanism of the state in this case, from the Philippine senate. It is in this sense as well that Asian Christians would sit awkwardly with the portrait of southern Christians that Jenkins describes. More often than not, the practice of the faith does not just have to be articulated, but repressed, kept secret and negotiated, if not openly fought for. In India and Japan in the past half century, Christianity missions had to endure political discourses often vitriolic and sometimes hostile to Christian missionization. The challenges of that endeavour became more pronounced in light of the promotion of Shinto as a state non religion. Religious freedom is not the only cause of friction between the state and the faithful. There are many examples from Asia in which ethnicity and religious belief are intertwined.

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Chapter 9 : Criticism of Christianity - Wikipedia

Exploring the social and political ramifications of Christian conversions in Asia and their impact on state policies, the book analyses how Christian followers, missionaries, theologians and activists negotiate their public roles and identities vis-à-vis various forms of Asian states, particularly in the context of post-colonial nation.

The insurgent groups have primarily adopted violence as a conscious strategy to extract illegitimate financial benefits, with abductions constituting the main source of revenue. According to one source, between January and December , approximately 1, persons were abducted for ransom, with demands in most cases ranging between Rupees 20, and 50, Another were still reportedly being held captive as of May The State, which has barely 8. Chief Minister Manik Sarkar has pointed out that, "The State government has information that a group of Al Qaeda activists is active in Bangladesh and is helping the extremists in the North-East. Even as they provide assurances of containing Indian insurgents on their soil, 55 on other occasions Bangladeshi authorities deny the presence of these groups in their territories. A spontaneous wave of sympathy among the local population, which may not be guided by rational considerations, can be discerned in the initial phase of an insurgency. However, it is by use of force alone that these groups continue to remain in existence because "once they have consolidated their power to use violence at will, they evolve a dynamic of their own and become unaccountable to any group. The latter, in fact, constrict the space that the people may freely share in the sphere of civil society. Insurgents in Tripura are not only seen issuing diktats as to how people should organise their religious life, the use of force is frequent on other occasions of public importance as well, and these include elections to various bodies, including the State Assembly and national Parliament. What Happened to Democracy? Subversion of political processes and considerations of narrow political gains to acquire power at the local level, or to dislodge a political opponent, have created the political support base for the continuing insurgency in Tripura. Subir Bhaumik writes that the Congress allegedly promoted refugee settlements even in the hill areas of Tripura that was reserved for the tribals. Even during the last Legislative Assembly elections in February , these groups indulged in targeted violence. The nexus between political parties and insurgent groups in Tripura has become stable over the years: Although the first major incidence of pre-poll violence was witnessed in December , ahead of the January Assembly elections in post-statehood Tripura, it was during the Assembly elections that insurgent violence as an instrument of electoral strategy was manifested clearly. The CPI-M has alleged that the Congress had reached a tacit understanding with Bijoy Hrangkhawl, who then headed the TNV, and that the latter unleashed a reign of terror on non-tribals ahead of the elections, killing more than a hundred persons "to turn the poll-eve atmosphere in favour of the Congress. The other faction, led by Ranjit Debbarma, continues disruptive activities in the State under the name of All Tripura Tiger Force ATTF , apparently with the motive to continue to reap the benefits of the insurgency-politics nexus. Even the Tribal Council, an instrument envisaged to empower the tribal population, has become an arena where the insurgents effectively alter the poll dynamics through the use of violence. The Tripura Assembly had passed the Bill for the formation of the Council in March , though the first Council was constituted only in , under the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Since its formation, the Left Front had controlled the Council, till the elections were held to elect new Council members on April 30 and May 3, Violence continued even after the elections to leave a strong terror-imprint on the minds of the people. According to an estimate, while 78 persons were killed after the elections to the Council were notified on March 31 72 through the elections, another were killed in less than three weeks following the election. The total strength of the Council is 30 with another two members nominated by the State Governor. The culture of violence as a prelude to the democratic process continued into the most recent State Legislative elections in early , with both the NLFT and ATTF targeting opponents of their political patrons, although the former inflicted more civilian fatalities. Between January 1, , and February 2, , twenty political activists were killed in various incidents by these outfits. The incidents that occurred in the month of May are intriguing: The

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following day, NLFT terrorists killed 10 persons at the busy Moharcherra market area under the Kalyanpur police station limits in the North Tripura district. Reports indicated that the terrorists came to the State from their hideouts in Bangladesh, killed the civilians and escaped back to the other side of the border. So where does one locate the current situation in Tripura? He cites Africa and Central America to underline this point. Retrospection and introspection provide effective insights into issues that need resolution in Tripura. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to submit any framework of solutions. However, any strategy that seeks the containment and eventual elimination of insurgency in Tripura would also need to erect a bulwark against the future emergence and consolidation of groups such as the NLFT and the ATTF. Twin processes are needed simultaneously to increase the legitimacy of the state and further de-legitimise the insurgent groups. Unless it is unequivocally recognised that the state alone is entitled to use lawful force according to clearly defined Constitutional principles, subject to legislative change as per the needs of contemporary society, such groups will not cease to exist. Once it has been established that groups such as the NLFT and ATTF are a threat to the rights and freedom of the masses, indeed, a threat to humanity itself, reason demands that the democratic state must be freed from their activities. It is only within such a context that overground political groups relying on the support of such extralegal insurgent organisations for electoral advantage would find this option increasingly cost ineffective. There is, equally, need to strengthen various agencies and instruments promoting liberal democratic ideas and ideals among the local population, at the same time instilling a confidence that the state respects these values. Programmes and projects that tie up the interests of local communities, and that ensure that the benefits of resources within the State flow to them, are required. A greater openness to the transformations that the world is undergoing could also be encouraged through out-migration, programmes of study in other parts of the country by increasing numbers of students, and other processes that would increase interactions between local populations and other parts of India. Crucially, however, the international dimension of these conflicts must be addressed with extreme urgency. Bangladesh must be pursued, bilaterally as well as at various multinational fora, to end its support to insurgent and terrorist groups operating on Indian soil. Once this problem has been addressed, it may also be useful to encourage investment under a liberal regime for greater economic benefits to accrue to the border populations within Bangladesh, and India could be its strategic partner in this effort, providing not only capital and required technology but also a large market for the consumption of its products. Improved cross border trade between India and Bangladesh would need to be combined with a regulatory regime that ensured that the revenue generated go to the local people and to the Government, and not to the underground groups that indulge in violence. Economic improvements and better and legally regulated border trade in the border districts could result in the creation of a class of entrepreneurs and traders on both sides of the border, whose interests would be adversely affected by insurgent activities by groups like the NLFT and the ATTF. A self-sufficient border population within Bangladesh is, moreover, less likely to encourage migration. Sanjib Baruah, "Politics of Subnationalism: Society versus State in Assam" in Partha Chaterjee, ed. Oxford University Press, , p. Also see, Baruah, *India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality*, Delhi: Baruah, "Politics of Subnationalism", p. Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development, Delhi: Konark Publishers, , p. Subir Bhaumik, "Disaster in Tripura", Seminar, no. Ganguly, "Tripura Tribals and Mainstream: Deep and Deep Publications, , p. According to this settlement, the peasant were made the owners of the land and had to give 10 per cent to the Government from the total production of the land. If any landlord failed to fulfil these conditions, he was ousted from the land and the English did not hesitate in putting his land on auction. Its Evolution ", in Grover and Arora eds. By an account, the number of Bengali migrants was estimated to be , in the year Singh, *People of India Tripura*, vol. Seagull Books, , p. Cited in Ganguli, "Tripura Tribals and Mainstream", p. Cited in Bhaumik, "Disaster in Tripura", p. Compiled from various census reports. Ganguli, "Tripura Tribals and Mainstream", p. Princeton University Press, , p. Inter India Publications, , p. Subir Bhaumik, *Insurgent Crossfire*: Lancers Publishers, , p. Their objective also included formation of democratic government through adult franchise in Tripura. Chaudhuri, *A Political History of Tripura*, p Inter-India

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Publications, , p. Chaudhuri, A Political History of Tripura, pp.