

Chapter 1 : George Berkeley - Wikipedia

Berkeley's writings are among the clearest in the entire philosophical corpus; and despite the seeming "outrageousness" of some of his ideas, his perspective is a very challenging one for anyone seriously studying philosophy.

This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. January Learn how and when to remove this template message Berkeley was born at his family home, Dysart Castle , near Thomastown , County Kilkenny , Ireland, the eldest son of William Berkeley, a cadet of the noble family of Berkeley. Little is known of his mother. He remained at Trinity College after completion of his degree as a tutor and Greek lecturer. His earliest publication was on mathematics, but the first that brought him notice was his *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* , first published in 1709. In the essay, Berkeley examines visual distance, magnitude, position and problems of sight and touch. While this work raised much controversy at the time, its conclusions are now accepted as an established part of the theory of optics. The next publication to appear was the *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* in 1709, which had great success and gave him a lasting reputation, though few accepted his theory that nothing exists outside the mind. This was followed in by *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* , in which he propounded his system of philosophy, the leading principle of which is that the world, as represented by our senses, depends for its existence on being perceived. For this theory, the *Principles* gives the exposition and the *Dialogues* the defence. One of his main objectives was to combat the prevailing materialism of his time. The theory was largely received with ridicule, while even those such as Samuel Clarke and William Whiston , who did acknowledge his "extraordinary genius," were nevertheless convinced that his first principles were false. In the period between 1709 and 1714, he interspersed his academic endeavours with periods of extensive travel in Europe, including one of the most extensive Grand Tours of the length and breadth of Italy ever undertaken. In 1714, following her violent quarrel with Jonathan Swift , who had been her intimate friend for many years, Esther Vanhomrigh for whom Swift had created the nickname "Vanessa" named Berkeley her co-heir along with the barrister Robert Marshall ; her choice of legatees caused a good deal of surprise since she did not know either of them well, although Berkeley as a very young man had known her father. Swift said generously that he did not grudge Berkeley his inheritance, much of which vanished in a lawsuit in any event. A story that Berkeley and Marshall disregarded a condition of the inheritance that they must publish the correspondence between Swift and Vanessa is probably untrue. The funds, however, were not forthcoming, and in 1714 he left America and returned to London. He and Anne had four children who survived infancy: Henry, George, William and Julia, and at least two other children who died in infancy. The Foundling Hospital was founded by Royal Charter in 1719, and Berkeley is listed as one of its original governors. In 1724, he was appointed Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland, a position he was to hold until his death. Pine tar is an effective antiseptic and disinfectant when applied to cuts on the skin, but Berkeley argued for the use of pine tar as a broad panacea for diseases. With his wife and daughter Julia he went to Oxford to live with his son George and supervise his education. His affectionate disposition and genial manners made him much loved and held in warm regard by many of his contemporaries. Anne outlived her husband by many years, and died in 1753. Subjective idealism According to Berkeley there are only two kinds of things: Spirits are simple, active beings which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and perceived. As used by him, these concepts are difficult to translate into modern terminology. His concept of "spirit" is close to the concept of "conscious subject" or of "mind", and the concept of "idea" is close to the concept of "sensation" or "state of mind" or "conscious experience". Thus Berkeley denied the existence of matter as a metaphysical substance, but did not deny the existence of physical objects such as apples or mountains. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. In *Principles* 3, he wrote, using a combination of Latin and English, *esse is percipi* to be is to be perceived , most often if slightly inaccurately attributed to Berkeley as the pure Latin phrase *esse est percipi*.

In contrast to ideas, a spirit cannot be perceived. This is the solution that Berkeley offers to the problem of other minds. Finally, the order and purposefulness of the whole of our experience of the world and especially of nature overwhelms us into believing in the existence of an extremely powerful and intelligent spirit that causes that order. According to Berkeley, reflection on the attributes of that external spirit leads us to identify it with God. Thus a material thing such as an apple consists of a collection of ideas shape, color, taste, physical properties, etc. Theology[edit] A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediate cause of all our experiences. He did not evade the question of the external source of the diversity of the sense data at the disposal of the human individual. He strove simply to show that the causes of sensations could not be things, because what we called things, and considered without grounds to be something different from our sensations, were built up wholly from sensations. There must consequently be some other external source of the inexhaustible diversity of sensations. Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. Principles 29 As T. The fact that Berkeley returned to his major works throughout his life, issuing revised editions with only minor changes, also counts against any theory that attributes to him a significant volte-face. He takes heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a bucket of cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water, then put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water, one of your hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other that the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects both your hands perceive the water to be hot and cold, then the heat is not a quality of the water. While Locke used this argument to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley extends it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says that size is not a quality of an object because the size of the object depends on the distance between the observer and the object, or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to different observers, then size is not a quality of the object. Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument and then asks: That is, we do not see space directly or deduce its form logically using the laws of optics. Space for Berkeley is no more than a contingent expectation that visual and tactile sensations will follow one another in regular sequences that we come to expect through habit. Berkeley gives the following analogy regarding indirect distance perception: The question concerning the visibility of space was central to the Renaissance perspective tradition and its reliance on classical optics in the development of pictorial representations of spatial depth. This matter was debated by scholars since the 11th-century Arab polymath and mathematician Alhazen al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham affirmed in experimental contexts the visibility of space. He is frequently misquoted as believing in size-distance invariance "a view held by the Optic Writers. This idea is that we scale the image size according to distance in a geometrical manner. The error may have become commonplace because the eminent historian and psychologist E. What inclines men to this mistake beside the humour of making one see by geometry is, that the same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance, do also suggest magnitude I say they do not first suggest distance, and then leave it to the judgement to use that as a medium, whereby to collect the magnitude; but they have as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the distance; and suggest magnitude as independently of distance, as they do distance independently of magnitude. Philosophy of physics[edit] See also: Moreover, much of his philosophy is shaped fundamentally by his engagement with the science of his time. He held that those who posited "something unknown in a body of which they have no idea and which they call the principle of motion, are in fact simply stating that the principle of motion is unknown. On the other hand, if they resided in the category of "soul" or "incorporeal thing", they "do not properly belong to physics" as a matter. Berkeley thus concluded that forces lay beyond any kind of empirical observation and could not be a part of proper science. It represents an extreme, empiricist view of scientific observation that states that the scientific method provides us with no true insight into the nature of the world. Rather, the scientific method gives us a variety of partial explanations about regularities that hold in the world and that are gained through experiment. The nature of the world, according to Berkeley, is only approached through properly metaphysical speculation and

reasoning. If they have a mathematical and predictive content they may be admitted qua mathematical hypotheses while their essentialist interpretation is eliminated. If not they may be ruled out altogether. ALL entities are ruled out except those which are perceived. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no reasoning about Infinitesimals. No speculative knowledge, no comparison of Ideas in them. Florian Cajori called this treatise "the most spectacular event of the century in the history of British mathematics. The Analyst represented a direct attack on the foundations and principles of calculus and, in particular, the notion of fluxion or infinitesimal change, which Newton and Leibniz used to develop the calculus. In his critique, Berkeley coined the phrase "ghosts of departed quantities", familiar to students of calculus. Specifically, he observed that both Newtonian and Leibnizian calculus employed infinitesimals sometimes as positive, nonzero quantities and other times as a number explicitly equal to zero. But if in yours you should allow your selves this unnatural way of proceeding, the Consequence would be that you must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration. And if you submit to this, your Authority will no longer lead the way in Points of Reason and Science. Berkeley, however, found it paradoxical that "Mathematicians should deduce true Propositions from false Principles, be right in Conclusion, and yet err in the Premises. More recently, Abraham Robinson restored infinitesimal methods in his book Non-standard analysis by showing that they can be used rigorously. In A Discourse on Passive Obedience, Berkeley defends the thesis that people have "a moral duty to observe the negative precepts prohibitions of the law, including the duty not to resist the execution of punishment. Berkeley defends this thesis with a deductive proof stemming from the laws of nature. First, he establishes that because God is perfectly good, the end to which he commands humans must also be good, and that end must not benefit just one person, but the entire human race. Because these commandsâ€”or lawsâ€”if practiced, would lead to the general fitness of humankind, it follows that they can be discovered by the right reasonâ€”for example, the law to never resist supreme power can be derived from reason because this law is "the only thing that stands between us and total disorder". Berkeley holds that even though sometimes, the consequences of an action in a specific situation might be bad, the general tendencies of that action benefits humanity. From this we can tell that the things that we are perceiving are truly real rather than it just being a dream. All knowledge comes from perception; what we perceive are ideas, not things in themselves; a thing in itself must be outside experience; so the world only consists of ideas and minds that perceive those ideas; a thing only exists so far as it perceives or is perceived. His empiricism can be defined by five propositions: Berkeley answers this by claiming that it is still being perceived and the consciousness that is doing the perceiving is God. This claim is the only thing holding up his argument which is "depending for our knowledge of the world, and of the existence of other minds, upon a God that would never deceive us.

Chapter 2 : Berkeley, Sir William (â€“)

The Berkeleys have seen a few portraits of the bishop, and have one hanging in their home, but this was the biggest, Sean Berkeley said. They found the suggestion of a family resemblance. "I think it's the chin," said Prue.

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Chapter 3 : Berkeley's Argument for Immaterialism | A.C. Grayling

Rene Descartes and George Berkeley on God Essay - Rene Descartes builds his epistemic views in his meditations. In Meditation 1, he set out to rid himself of the false knowledge which was the foundation for which he built his life.

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. As this passage illustrates, Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books, and apples. On the contrary, as was indicated above, he holds that only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid skepticism about their existence and nature. What such objects turn out to be, on his account, are bundles or collections of ideas. An apple is a combination of visual ideas including the sensible qualities of color and visual shape, tangible ideas, ideas of taste, smell, etc. He does make clear that there are two sides to the process of bundling ideas into objects: Thus, although there is no material world for Berkeley, there is a physical world, a world of ordinary objects. This world is mind-dependent, for it is composed of ideas, whose existence consists in being perceived. For ideas, and so for the physical world, *esse est percipi*. In addition to perceived things ideas, he posits perceivers, i. Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive. This suggests that Berkeley has replaced one kind of dualism, of mind and matter, with another kind of dualism, of mind and idea. He argues by elimination: What could cause my sensory ideas? Berkeley eliminates the first option with the following argument PHK Therefore, 3 Ideas are passive, that is, they possess no causal power. The hidden assumption here is that any causing the mind does must be done by willing and such willing must be accessible to consciousness. Berkeley is hardly alone in presupposing this model of the mental; Descartes, for example, makes a similar set of assumptions. This leaves us, then, with the third option: Berkeley thinks that when we consider the stunning complexity and systematicity of our sensory ideas, we must conclude that the spirit in question is wise and benevolent beyond measure, that, in short, he is God. Berkeley himself sees very well how necessary this is: Much of the Principles is structured as a series of objections and replies, and in the Three Dialogues, once Philonous has rendered Hylas a reluctant convert to idealism, he devotes the rest of the book to convincing him that this is a philosophy which coheres well with common sense, at least better than materialism ever did. Berkeley replies that the distinction between real things and chimeras retains its full force on his view. One way of making the distinction is suggested by his argument for the existence of God, examined above: Ideas which depend on our own finite human wills are not constituents of real things. Not being voluntary is thus a necessary condition for being a real thing, but it is clearly not sufficient, since hallucinations and dreams do not depend on our wills, but are nevertheless not real. Berkeley notes that the ideas that constitute real things exhibit a steadiness, vivacity, and distinctness that chimerical ideas do not. The most crucial feature that he points to, however, is order. They are thus regular and coherent, that is, they constitute a coherent real world. They allow him to respond to the following objection, put forward in PHK The like may be said of all the clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle, as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how upon our principles any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common

philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena. Thus, whenever we have ideas of a working watch, we will find that if we open it,[15] we will see have ideas of an appropriate internal mechanism. Likewise, when we have ideas of a living tulip, we will find that if we pull it apart, we will observe the usual internal structure of such plants, with the same transport tissues, reproductive parts, etc. A bit of background is needed here to see why this issue posed a special challenge for Berkeley. One traditional understanding of science, derived from Aristotle, held that it aims at identifying the causes of things. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar. But surely, one might object, it is a step backwards to abandon our scientific theories and simply note that God causes what happens in the physical world! What makes this advice legitimate is that he can reconstrue such talk as being about regularities in our ideas. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them, for that can be no other than the will of a spirit, but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of Nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see Sect. PHK Natural philosophers thus consider signs, rather than causes PHK , but their results are just as useful as they would be under a materialist system. Moreover, the regularities they discover provide the sort of explanation proper to science, by rendering the particular events they subsume unsurprising PHK The sort of explanation proper to science, then, is not causal explanation, but reduction to regularity. Interestingly, in the Principles Berkeley seems relatively unperturbed by this natural objection to idealism. He claims that there is no problem for anyone that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. PHK 3 So, when I say that my desk still exists after I leave my office, perhaps I just mean that I would perceive it if I were in my office, or, more broadly, that a finite mind would perceive the desk were it in the appropriate circumstances in my office, with the lights on, with eyes open, etc. This is to provide a sort of counterfactual analysis of the continued existence of unperceived objects. The truth of the counterfactuals in question is anchored in regularity: Unfortunately, this analysis has counterintuitive consequences when coupled with the esse est percipi doctrine McCracken , If to be is, as Berkeley insists, to be perceived, then the unperceived desk does not exist, despite the fact that it would be perceived and thus would exist if someone opened the office door. Consequently, on this view the desk would not endure uninterrupted but would pop in and out of existence, though it would do so quite predictably. One way to respond to this worry would be to dismiss it—what does it matter if the desk ceases to exist when unperceived, as long as it exists whenever we need it? Berkeley shows signs of this sort of attitude in Principles 45—46, where he tries to argue that his materialist opponents and scholastic predecessors are in much the same boat. In the Three Dialogues, Berkeley very clearly invokes God in this context. Interestingly, whereas in the Principles, as we have seen above, he argued that God must exist in order to cause our ideas of sense, in the Dialogues , —5 he argues that our ideas must exist in God when not perceived by us. Indeed, they must exist continuously, since standard Christian doctrine dictates that God is unchanging. Although this solves one problem for Berkeley, it creates several more. How can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing in itself invisible be like a colour; or a real thing which is not audible, be like a sound? And, even worse, God has ideas of all possible objects Pitcher , —2 , not just the ones which we would commonsensically wish to say exist. Such an account in terms of divine decrees or volitions looks promising: The tree continues to exist when unperceived just in case God has an appropriate volition or intention to cause a tree-idea in finite perceivers under the right circumstances. Furthermore, this solution has important textual support: In the Three Dialogues, Hylas challenges Philonous to account for the creation, given that all existence is mind-dependent, in his view, but everything must exist eternally in the mind of God.

Philonous responds as follows: May we not understand it [the creation] to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which he then established, and we now call the laws of Nature? You may call this a relative, or hypothetical existence if you please. As with the counterfactual analysis of continued existence, however, this account also fails under pressure from the *esse est percipi* principle: Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us. Fortunately, Kenneth Winkler has put forward an interpretation which goes a great distance towards resolving this difficulty. While the principle is never explicitly invoked or argued for by Berkeley, in a number of passages he does note the interdependence of will and understanding. Winkler plausibly suggests that Berkeley may have found this principle so obvious as to need no arguing. With it in place, we have a guarantee that anything willed by God, *e.* Of course, it remains true that God cannot have ideas that are, strictly speaking, the same as ours. This problem is closely related to another that confronts Berkeley: Can two people ever perceive the same thing? One way to dissolve this difficulty is to recall that objects are bundles of ideas. Either account might be applied in order to show either that God and I may perceive the same object, or that God and I may perceive, loosely speaking, the same thing. An *X* exists at time *t* if and only if God has an idea that corresponds to a volition that if a finite mind at *t* is in appropriate circumstances *e.* It also captures the fact that the bundling of ideas into objects is done by us. Here is another way to raise the worry that I have in mind: He does, however, have an account of error, as he shows us in the Dialogues: What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked? He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right.

Chapter 4 : Jamestown Interpretive Essays - Sir William Berkeley

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers of the early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors, particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talented metaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that reality consists exclusively of minds and their ideas.

Berkeley was a critic of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophical, scientific, mathematical, moral, political, and theological ideas and an important link in the development of general philosophy between the period of Descartes and Locke and that of Hume and Kant. Subsequently, particularly in London, Berkeley formed intellectual associations with such prominent figures as Clarke, Swift, Addison, Steele, and Pope. After a brief interlude in America, connected with his abortive attempt to found a college in Bermuda, he retired to the bishopric of Cloyne in 1729. He moved to Oxford in 1731. The main problem examined in this work is the factors that determine our ability to see things at a distance, the assumption being that the sense of vision itself is incapable of doing so. Rather, seeing distant objects requires the suggestions supplied by other senses, especially that of touch, as well as such other experiences as visual distortion caused by failure of eye accommodation. The body of the book consists, on the one hand, of a discussion of contemporary chemical theory and, on the other, of a critique of Newtonian principles of explanation, of space and time, and of the true interpretation of the concept of causation. The younger Lemery, etc. *Siris* thus involves an attempt to assimilate Newtonian concepts to the more complex phenomena of chemistry and animal physiology. This difficulty formed the starting point of many discussions of the foundations of mathematics that continued in England until the nineteenth century, and he himself initially participated in them through replies to objections made to *The Analyst*. In *De motu* this is applied with special emphasis to the Newtonian concepts of gravitational attraction, action and reaction, and motion in general. Sometimes he holds that theoretical concepts are simply reducible to individual laws of phenomena reductionism; at other times he emphasizes their place in the systematic constructions of these laws in overarching theories a forerunner of the modern instrumentalist position. Since they stand in an accusative relation to a perceiver, the ideas are held to be inactive; this is the doctrine of *esse percipi*. The logical counter part of the doctrine that no idea can act on any other idea is that no necessary connections exist between any such ideas. Berkeley does not so much deny unobservable entities; once again he is opposed only to treating them as genuine sources of transeunt causal action, since they are in reality no more than abstractions. This somewhat weakly seems to fit in with the conclusion drawn from the theory that distance and space cannot be determined visually. He also anticipated many of the ideas of twentieth-century philosophers of science. Oxford, 1732; Berkeley: Edinburgh, 1732; Berkeley: Works on Vision, C. The standard biography is A. Abbott, *Sight and Touch*: London, 1933, pp. Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception. A History of the Philosophy of Perception* London, 1969, pp. Berkeley and Malebranche Oxford, 1925; J. A. Reappraisal Manchester, 1925; Warnock, Berkeley London, 1969. Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 5 : Berkeley, George | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Life and Works. George Berkeley was born in or near Kilkenny, Ireland on 12 March He was raised in Dysart Castle. Although his father was English, Berkeley.

References and Further Reading 1. He was raised in Dysart Castle. Although his father was English, Berkeley always considered himself Irish. In 1683, he entered Kilkenny College. He remained associated with Trinity College until 1687. In 1687 he competed for a College Fellowship which had become available and became a Junior Fellow on 9 June. After completing his doctorate, he became a Senior Fellow in 1691. As was common practice for British academics at the time, Berkeley was ordained as an Anglican priest in 1691. The works for which Berkeley is best known were written during his Trinity College period. In 1693, he published *Passive Obedience*, which focuses on moral and political philosophy. In 1697, he published *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. In 1703, he published *De Motu*. In addition, there is a set of notebooks, often called the *Philosophical Commentaries* PC, that covers the period during which he developed his idealism and immaterialism. These were personal notebooks, and he never intended to publish them. While Berkeley was associated with Trinity College until 1697, he was not continuously in residence. In 1697, he left for London, in part to arrange publication for the *Three Dialogues*. Since the articles were unsigned, disagreement remains regarding which articles Berkeley wrote. He was the chaplain to Lord Peterborough during his continental tour. Malebranche died in 1702. He was the chaperone of young St. George Ashe, son of the Trinity College provost, during his continental tour from 1702. It was during this tour that Berkeley later claimed to have lost the manuscript to the second part of the *Principles*. Works 2: He observed the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 1706 and sent a description of it to the Royal Society. Works 4: While in Lyon, France in 1706, Berkeley wrote *De Motu*, an essay on motion which reflects his scientific instrumentalism. It did not win. He was never a dean in residence. Between 1706 and 1711, Berkeley developed a plan to establish a seminary in Bermuda for the sons of colonists and Native Americans. He actively lobbied for his project. After marrying Anne Foster on August 1, 1711, he and his bride departed for America in September. He settled near Newport, Rhode Island, waiting for the promised grant. He bought a farm and built a house named Whitehall, which is still standing. He was an active cleric during his stay in Rhode Island. He wrote the bulk of *Alciphron*, his defense of Christianity against free-thinking, while in America. In early 1712, Edmund Gibson, the Bishop of London, informed Berkeley that Sir Robert Walpole had informed him that there was little likelihood that the promised grant would be paid. Berkeley returned to London in October. Before leaving America he divided his library between the Harvard and Yale libraries, and he gave his farm to Yale. It is considered partially responsible for his appointment as Bishop of Cloyne in January 1728. In February he resigned as Dean of Derry. He was consecrated Bishop of Cloyne in St. Berkeley was a good bishop. As bishop of an economically poor Anglican diocese in a predominantly Roman Catholic country, he was committed to the well-being of both Protestants and Catholics. He established a school to teach spinning, and he attempted to establish the manufacture of linen. His *Querist* concerns economic and social issues germane to Ireland. Among other things, it contains a proposal for monetary reform. His *Siris* prefaces his philosophical discussions with an account of the medicinal value of tar water. The relationship of *Siris* to his early philosophy continues to be a matter of scholarly discussion. Except for a trip to Dublin in 1729 to address the Irish House of Lords and a trip to Kilkenny in 1730 to visit family, he was continually in Cloyne until his retirement. In August 1731, Berkeley and his family left Cloyne for Oxford, ostensibly to oversee the education of his son George. While at Oxford, he arranged for the republication of his *Alciphron* and the publication of his *Miscellany*, a collection of essays on various subjects. He died on January 14, 1753, while his wife was reading him a sermon. In keeping with his will, his body was "kept five days above ground, This is an empirical account of the perception of distance, magnitude, and figure. The *New Theory of Vision* does not presuppose immaterialism, and, although Berkeley held that it was connected with his later works, the degree of connection is hotly contested among scholars. Berkeley rejects those accounts. So, what are the immediate ideas that mediate the perception of distance? A necessary connection is a relation such as that found among numbers in true arithmetic equations. A customary connection is a relation found in experience in which one

type of idea is found with or followed by another, but which one could imagine the situation to be otherwise. It is in this sense that ideas of touch and sight are merely customarily, and not necessarily, connected. Since one perceives distance by sight mediately through the correlation of visual ideas with nonvisual ideas, a person born blind and who came to see would have no notion of visual distance: Like most philosophers of the period, Berkeley seems to assume that touch provides immediate access to the world. The tower is taken to be of a determinate size and shape, but the visual appearance continually changes. How can that be? Berkeley claims that visual ideas are merely signs of tactile ideas. There is no resemblance between visual and tactile ideas. Their relationship is like that between words and their meanings. If one hears a noun, one thinks of an object it denotes. Similarly, if one sees an object, one thinks of a corresponding idea of touch, which Berkeley deems the secondary mediate object of sight. In both cases, there are no necessary connections between the ideas. His discussion of magnitude is analogous to his discussion of distance. Berkeley explores the relationships between the objects of sight and touch by introducing the notions of minimum visibles and tangibles, the smallest points one actually can perceive by sight and touch, points which must be taken to be indivisible. The apparent size of the visual object, its confusion or distinctness, and its faintness or vigor play roles in judging the size of the tangible object. All things being equal, if it appears large, it is taken to be large. If it be distinct and clear, I judge it greater. As in the case of distance, there are no necessary connections between the sensory elements of the visual and tangible object. Berkeley argues that the objects of sight and touch - indeed, the objects of each sensible modalities "are distinct and incommensurable. The tower that visually appears to be small and round from a distance is perceived to be large and square by touch. So, one complex tactual object corresponds to the indefinitely large number of visual objects. Since there are no necessary connections between the objects of sight and touch, the objects must be distinct. First, there are various points in the New Theory of Vision where Berkeley writes as if ideas of touch are or are of external objects cf. Since the Berkeley of the Principles and Dialogues contends that all ideas are mind-dependent and all physical objects are composed of ideas, some have questioned whether the position in the New Theory of Vision is consistent with the work that immediately follows. Some scholars suggest that either that the works on vision are scientific works which, as such, make no metaphysical commitments or that allusions to "external objects" are cases of speaking with the vulgar. Secondly, insofar as in his later works Berkeley claims that ordinary objects are composed of ideas, his discussion of the correlation of ideas of sight and touch tends to anticipate his later view by explaining how one "collects" the ideas of distinct senses to form one thing. Against Abstraction In the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley laments the doubt and uncertainty found in philosophical discussions Intro. He finds the source of skepticism in the theory of abstract ideas, which he criticizes. Berkeley begins by giving a general overview of the doctrine: It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by it self, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract ideas. Although theories of abstraction date back at least to Aristotle Metaphysics, Book K, Chapter 3, ab4 , were prevalent among the medievals cf. According to Locke, the doctrine of abstract ideas explains how knowledge can be communicated and how it can be increased. It explains how general terms obtain meaning Locke, 3. The connection between a general term and an abstract idea is arbitrary and conventional, and the relation between an abstract idea and the individual objects falling under it is a natural relation resemblance. On the face of it, his argument is weak. At most it shows that insofar as he cannot form the idea, and assuming that all humans have similar psychological abilities, there is some evidence that no humans can form abstract ideas of the sort Locke described. But there is a remark made in passing that suggests there is a much stronger argument implicit in the section. To be plain, I own my self able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of abstraction. The first type of

abstraction concerns integral parts. The head, arms, torso, and legs are integral parts of a body:

Page - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.

But he also, famously, argued in support of three further theses. He argued for idealism, the thesis that mind constitutes the ultimate reality. He argued that the existence of things consists in their being perceived. And he argued that the mind which is the substance of the world is a single infinite mind – in short, God. My chief purpose in what follows is to give an account of these arguments, their interactions, and the assumptions and methods underlying them. Doing so makes their strengths and weaknesses both conspicuous and perspicuous. One is epistemological scepticism, which says that we cannot know the true nature of things because familiarly certain perceptual relativities and psychological contingencies oblige us to distinguish appearance from reality in such a way that knowledge of the latter is at least problematic and at worst impossible. In opposing the first scepticism Berkeley took himself to be defending common sense and eradicating "causes of error and difficulty in the sciences. The attack on theological scepticism is effected on a metaphysical rather than doctrinal level in P and D. Doctrinal questions receive more attention in such later writings as Alciphron. But in one important respect Berkeley saw his views as a fundamental contribution to natural theology, in that he thought they constitute a powerful new proof of the existence of a God. Scepticism arises because "for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? The nub of the problem is that if we are acquainted only with our own perceptions, and never with the things which are supposed to lie beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of those things, or even be justified in asserting their existence? Matter or material substance is a technical concept in metaphysics, denoting a supposed corporeal basis underlying the qualities of things. Berkeley was especially troubled by the un-empiricist character of this view. If we are to be consistent in our empiricist principles, he asked, how can we tolerate the concept of something which by definition is empirically undetectable, lying hidden behind the perceptible qualities of things as their supposed basis or support? If the concept of matter cannot be defended, we must find a different account of experience and knowledge. Berkeley summarises his diagnosis of the source of scepticism, and signals the positive theory he has in response to it, in a pregnant remark in C: Nor does Berkeley hold that the world exists only because it is thought of by any one or more finite minds. In one sense of the term "realist", indeed, Berkeley is a realist, in holding that the existence of the physical world is independent of finite minds, individually or collectively. What he argues instead is that its existence is not independent of Mind. The argument is stated with admirable concision in P, its conclusion being the first sentence of P7: All the rest of P, D, and parts of his later writings, consist in expansion, clarification and defence of this thesis. The argument is as follows. Berkeley begins in Lockean fashion by offering an inventory: Ideas of sense – colours, shapes, and the rest – are "observed to accompany each other" in certain ways; "collections" of them "come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed one thing", for example an apple or tree P1. Besides these ideas there is "something which knows or perceives them"; this "perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself", and it is "entirely distinct" from the ideas it perceives P2. It is, says Berkeley, universally allowed that our thoughts, passions, and ideas of imagination do not "exist without the mind". But it is "no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together that is, whatever objects they compose cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them" P3. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible that they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them" P3. Berkeley knows that this claim is surprising, so he remarks that although people think that sensible objects like mountains and houses have an "absolute", that is, perception-independent, existence, reflection on the points just made show that this is a contradiction. P4 The source of the belief that things can exist apart from perception of them is the doctrine of "abstract ideas", which Berkeley attacks in his Introduction to P. Abstraction consists in

separating things which can only be separated in thought but not in reality, for example the colour and the extension of a surface; or which involves noting a feature common to many different things, and attending only to that feature and not its particular instantiations –” in this way we arrive at the "abstract idea" of, say, Redness, apart from any particular red object P Introduction Abstraction is a falsifying move; what prompts the "common opinion" about houses and mountains is that we abstract existence from perception, and so come to believe that things can exist unperceived. But because things are ideas, and because ideas only exist if perceived by minds, the notion of "absolute existence without the mind" i. So, says Berkeley, to say that things exist is to say that they are perceived, and therefore "so long as they are not perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit" P6. And from this the conclusion it follows that "there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives" P7. In sum argument is this: To exist they must be perceived; they cannot exist "without the mind. Berkeley distinguishes between "strict", "speculative" or "philosophical" ways of understanding matters, and ordinary or "vulgar" ways of doing so. When we "think with the wise" we find it necessary to give explanations at what I shall label "level 1" and "level 3. P37; , 3D, C Level 1 concerns the phenomenology of experience, consisting of the data of sensory awareness in the form of minima of colour, sound, and so for the other senses. Level 2 concerns the phenomena of experience –” the tables, trees, and so forth, that we see and touch in the normal course of perception. The phenomenological level call it level 1 is apparent to us only on a "strict and speculative" examination of experience. Level 2 phenomena are constituted by level 1 data –” not reductively, but mediated in a way revealed by a third, metaphysical, level of explanation level 3 , which describes the causal-intentional activity of mind ultimately: At level 3 the world is described as consisting of spirits minds and their ideas. Spirits are active, ideas inert. What we take at level 2 to be a case of natural causality –” the heat of a fire causing water in a kettle to boil –” is, strictly, a succession of individual ideas composed of level 1 data caused in us by God level 3 in such a way that the regularity and consistency of their relations establishes in us a custom of thinking in the familiar level 2 way. This application of the distinction of levels provides, moreover, the basis of the proto-Positivistic philosophy of science sketched by Berkeley later in P P It is a common mistake among commentators to describe Berkeley as a phenomenalist. The distinction of levels shows why they are wrong. Briefly, classical phenomenism is the view that physical objects are "logical" constructions out of actual and possible sense-data. The modal adverbs in that sentence serve to explain how the desk in my study exists when not currently being perceived, by showing that we take as true a counterfactual conditional stating that the desk could be perceived if any perceiver were suitably placed. That indeed defines what, on the phenomenalist view, it is for such objects to exist: An essential commitment of phenomenism, therefore, is that certain counterfactuals are to be taken as barely that is, non-reductively true; which says, in material mode, that the world contains irreducible possibilia. The esse est percipi principle requires that a thing must be perceived –” actually perceived –” in order to exist. The perceivability of my desk when it is not currently being perceived by a finite mind is therefore cashed in terms of its actually being perceived by an infinite mind. In phenomenism there are only levels 1 and 2. It is a familiar problem for phenomenism that level 2 cannot be reduced to level 1 without remainder, and that therefore level 1 can only be sufficient for level 2 if suitably supplemented. The supplement is acceptance of the bare truth of appropriate counterfactuals and thus an ontology of possibilia. This exacts a high price for the explanatory shortfall. But for Berkeley there is no such shortfall; his third level of explanation shows how level 1 constitutes level 2, and simultaneously gives us a simple account of counterfactuals by having their truth-conditions fully storable in indicative terms: Whether any of it is also necessary is of course a different and further matter. Illustrations of this occur in due place below. They are commitments to empiricism, to the epistemic character of modality, and, as we have already seen, to the vacuity of the notion of abstract ideas. It might be more accurate to describe the two first as commitments and the third as the conclusion of an argument; but because the two first are premisses of that argument, and because all three powerfully combine in the process of refuting scepticism and establishing spirit as the only possible substance, it is convenient to take them together. Berkeley is a rigorous empiricist; we are not entitled to assert, believe, or regard as meaningful, anything not justified by experience. The

constraint is austerely applied: It might appear that Berkeley is less rigorous in his empiricism than Hume because he introduces the notion of "notions" to explain our knowledge of spirit other minds and God , which seems expressly to involve a non-sensuous epistemic source, and therefore to conflict with his notebook commitment to the strong principle nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu C But we should allow Berkeley at least as much latitude as Locke claims in countenancing intellectual sources of experience. But Berkeley argues that from the character of these ideas and their relations we grasp something further, viz. Parallel reasoning applies to finite spirits. In DeM Berkeley discusses the kind of experience that has self-awareness as its object; he calls it "reflexion" DeM But at P27 and elsewhere we learn that we have knowledge of spirit by its effects, and infer therefore that notions too are the objects of awareness: His chief form of argument is indeed a conceivability argument: In both cases the dependence on the empirical commitment is direct. Concepts lack content unless they are empirically derived; the thesis is forcefully stated in V where Berkeley asks whether it is possible for anyone "to frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible extension or figure exclusive of all colour: To "frame in the mind" is to conceive; the "strict sense" is the level 1 or phenomenological sense; concepts of extension and figure therefore derive their content wholly from their experiential source, namely, visual minima of "light and colour". It is that where Berkeley uses his habitual locution "without the mind" we do better to use "without reference to mind. In this connection realism is the claim that the entities in a given domain exist independently of knowledge or experience of them. The anti-realist denies this. One way of sketching why he denies it is offered by the idiom of relations. Thus recast, realism is the view that the relation between thought or experience and their objects is contingent or external, in the sense that description of neither relatum essentially involves reference to the other. So realism appears to offer a peculiarly hybrid relation: It is a short step for the anti-realist to argue that thought about perception of, theories of things is always and inescapably present in, and therefore conditions, any full account of the things thought about; the poorly-worded "Master Argument" in Berkeley, aimed at showing that one cannot conceive of an unconceived thing, is aimed at making just that elementary point P23, 1D The best example of such a view is afforded by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, in which descriptions of quantum phenomena are taken essentially to involve reference to observers and conditions of observation. Such a view does not constitute a claim that the phenomena are caused by observations of them; no more does anti-realism claim this in respect of the subject-matters in which it argues its case, for it is not a metaphysical but an epistemological thesis. This is why anti-realism is not idealism, for idealism is a metaphysical thesis about the constitution of reality namely: In expressing his view the anti-realist therefore does best to say: And this is the least that Berkeley means by "within the mind". Of course, it is clear that Berkeley is not only an anti-realist but also an idealist, and that the latter, metaphysical, thesis, depends crucially on his argument for the former, epistemological, thesis. But it is not hard to know which reading is intended at any point in his exposition. If we examine the phenomenology of consciousness level 1 we see that it consists of sensory data, notions, and compounds of either or both of these. Experience is generally orderly, giving rise to the familiar phenomena of level 2 "apples and trees, stones and books P1. We are also intimately acquainted with ourselves as the subjects of this experience, and not merely as passive recipients of it but causally active participants who will, imagine, and remember P2. Nothing of level 1 can be conceived without reference to the minds for which they exist as the contents of consciousness. But because the phenomena of level 2 are constituted by data of level 1, neither therefore can the phenomena of level 2 be conceived independently of the minds for which they are phenomena P3.

Chapter 7 : A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge - George Berkeley - Google Books

George Berkeley (/ ˈ b ɛ ˈ r k l i /; 12 March - 14 January) is known as Bishop Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne) was an Irish philosopher whose primary achievement was the advancement of a theory he called "immaterialism" (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by others).

In 1684, he gained a place in the household of Charles II. Those conflicts disenchanted him, and in the spring of 1685, he decided that he could no longer satisfy his ambitions at court. He flirted with the possibility of taking a diplomatic post in Istanbul, but he abandoned that idea in favor of becoming governor of Virginia. Friends and relatives eased the way for him to buy the office from the occupant, Sir Francis Wyatt, and in August 1685, Charles II commissioned him to replace Wyatt. From that point onward, Berkeley started a metamorphosis akin to that of other British colonists who removed to Virginia to find personal fulfilment. Berkeley erected Green Spring House on a tract of land west of the capital, where he experimented with alternatives to tobacco. Soon Berkeley produced flax, fruits, potash, rice, silk, and spirits which he exported through a commercial network that joined Green Spring to markets in North America, the West Indies, Great Britain, and Holland. His interest in the Indian trade and land improvement fed his desire to develop Jamestown as an urban center for the colony and to explore land beyond the Virginia frontiers. Although he married in 1686, the name of his first wife and the length of their marriage are unknown. Berkeley developed a deep affection for Virginia and he tirelessly championed the colony. For him, prosperity was linked to a diversified economy, free trade, a close-knit colonial society, and autonomy from London. Such a colony, to his way of thinking, would advance England and also benefit him personally. Sir William assumed office as Britain lurched towards civil war. Revealing a flair for politics, he allied with leading colonials, whom he showered with offices and land. In 1689, the governor spoke out against the possible revival of the Virginia Company of London. After Opechancanough led a second attack against the colony in April of 1689, Berkeley travelled to England to purchase arms for the colonists to use in the Third Anglo-Indian War. After Charles II was beheaded in 1689, Berkeley kept the colony loyal to the Stuarts. He held the Puritans at arms length until Parliament dispatched military forces to subdue Virginia in 1690. He retired to Green Spring, where he remained until January 1691, when the unexpected death of Governor Samuel Mathews Junior led to his recall. Berkeley now resurrected his economic schemes for Virginia, which had been disrupted by the parliamentary takeover. To that end, he went to England in 1691 in search of royal sanction and financial support for his plans. Ordered back to his government, Berkeley set sail for Virginia in September 1691, resolutely committed to diversify the colonial economy, but in his own way. That determination was one in a series of missteps that finally ruined him. Diversification was a bust, primarily because few other colonists possessed his assets or his conviction. Ultimately, he failed to persuade the doubtful to emulate him, and their resistance to his leadership mounted in proportion to the increase in taxes that supported the effort. Diversification was a dead issue by the late 1690s. Berkeley succeeded in negotiating a reduction tobacco production with the government of Maryland. However, Lord Baltimore, the proprietor of that province, negated the agreement, and the crown turned against the proposal too. Royal indifference and the patronage of power friends at court shielded him, but by the 1690s, death or retirement removed most of his supporters. Although Charles II and his younger councillors had no investment in Berkeley, they chose not to remove him until Nathaniel Bacon gave them a reason. Shutting out the Dutch lessened the value of tobacco, whereas the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars and harmed Virginia in ways Berkeley was incapable of preventing. As governor, he could minimize skirmishes between the natives and the colonists, but he could not eliminate them from happening, and they eventually turned into all out warfare in 1697. Renewal of proprietary grants along the Northern Neck threw certain land titles into question and caused Berkeley to launch a hugely expensive attempt to buy out the proprietors. Old age caught up with Berkeley. Deafness and physical decline blunted his instincts, and he came to depend increasingly on an ever smaller coterie of intimates. Of these, none was more influential than his second wife, Frances Culpeper Stephens Berkeley, whom he wed in 1692. Then too, his style of leadership contributed to political dissonance as he became less inclined to check the misrule of his subordinates. The path to the revolt wound back to July 1697, when a party of Doeg Indians attacked an

outlying plantation in Stafford County. Seemingly this incident was no different from similar episodes that had sporadically bubbled up for more than thirty years. This one proved the exception because it set loose a pattern of attack and counterattack that threatened all out war. Slow to act, Berkeley completely misread the situation, and by the spring of , his authority was seriously undermined. An additional threat to his leadership occurred in April of that year. In a fury, Berkeley tried to capture his impulsive kinsman, but Bacon got away. Now Sir William grasped the weakness of his position, and he took steps to regain control. He declared Bacon a rebel, dissolved the General Assembly, and promised to remedy any complaints the voters had with him. The General Assembly opened on 5 June Bacon was elected a burgess by the landowners in Henrico County, but when he tried to claim his seat he was captured and hauled before the governor, who pardoned him and allowed him to return to his plantation upriver. Thus, Bacon missed most of the legislative session, during which the members planned to fight to the natives and remedied various voter complaints. As the meeting neared its end, business, Bacon unexpectedly led five hundred armed men into Jamestown and compelled the frightened legislators to appoint him general before he marched away in search of the Indians. Berkeley proclaimed his enemy a rebel once more, but few planters flocked to his standard and he was forced to flee to safety across Chesapeake Bay after Bacon doubled back on him. In an effort to consolidate his control over the colony, Bacon publicly denounced Berkeley and played for popular support even as he dispatched a squadron of men and vessels to drive Sir William from his stronghold on the Eastern Shore. Then he and his troops went to engage the Indians; they stumbled on the Pamunkies, a band of defenseless tributaries, whom they effortlessly routed. Flush with his "triumph" against the Indians, Bacon chased Berkeley out of Jamestown and burned the metropolis to the ground. Once reports of the revolt reached London, the crown sent 1, redcoats, ships, and a commission to crush Bacon and to inquire into the reasons for the tumult. Colonel Herbert Jeffreys, one of the commissioners, had orders to replace Berkeley. There was nothing for the troops to do because Berkeley had regained the upper hand. The rebellion ended before they arrived in January Jeffreys and his fellow commissioners soon quarrelled with Berkeley, who refused to give up the government. Finally, on 5 May , he yielded, and he crossed the ocean one last time. The Treaty of Middle Plantation, the formal peace treaty between the Indians and the colonists, was signed on 29 May , after Berkeley returned to England. Broken in body and spirit, Berkeley reached his destination with but a single desire, to clear his name. He never got the chance. Death claimed him on 9 July , and he was buried half a world away from the place that had become his home. To go to the site, set your browser on www.

Chapter 8 : International Berkeley Society: Bookshop

As chancellor, Dirks' tenure focused on improving the undergraduate experience through the creation of the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate Education, enhancing advising and student support, renovating campuswide instructional and learning facilities, and improving extracurricular and residential life.

Early Years Berkeley was born in at Hanworth Manor, the home of his maternal grandparents, in Middlesex County, England, the fourth of five sons and sixth of seven children of Sir Maurice Berkeley and Elizabeth Killigrew Berkeley. His father owned large properties near his home in Bruton, Somersetshire, as well as in Gloucestershire and London, and sat in Parliament on several occasions before his death in 1633. William Berkeley rose to maturity secure in every benefit of his privileged station. He completed his schooling with two or three years of legal studies at the Middle Temple and a two-year European tour. When he returned to England, Berkeley sought a career at the court of Charles I. Berkeley joined a circle of poets and playwrights surrounding Queen Henrietta Maria and wrote at least five plays, including *The Lost Lady*, which was performed for the king and queen. Berkeley gravitated politically toward the moderate royalists. Charles I bestowed rewards on him, including a monopoly on the sale of ice and snow, a reversion of the post of treasurer of the Court of Common Pleas, and several pensions. With England drifting into civil war, Berkeley found his situation in the spring of 1644 unpromising. His relative Sir Thomas Roe suggested a diplomatic posting to Constantinople. About to leave for Turkey, Berkeley seized another opportunity, the Virginia governorship. Charles complied and on August 9, 1644, named Berkeley governor and captain general of the colony. First Governorship Plantation Like many other immigrants who prospered, Berkeley had a competitive edge when he arrived in 1644. Berkeley quickly began accumulating acreage, including a tract known as Green Spring, three miles northwest of Jamestown. After he acquired Green Spring as a country retreat in 1645, he conducted numerous agricultural trials there searching for substitutes for tobacco. His experiments yielded swift returns. Within five years Berkeley was exporting rice, spirits, fruit, silk, flax, and potash through an extensive network of English, Dutch, West Indian, and colonial merchants. In 1649 he married, but the identity of his wife has never been determined. The king ordered him to build Jamestown into a thriving city, which he attempted with only modest results. He achieved more success by encouraging Edward Bland to scout what is now western North Carolina, and he himself explored the Albemarle Sound region. As governor he could have monopolized the Indian trade, but he preferred to bolster the activities of experienced traders and share in their profits at little expense to himself. Berkeley inherited a troubled colony in troubled times. Sizing up colonial politics, Berkeley determined to win the allegiance of leading planters by making common cause with them in opposition to proposals to revive the Virginia Company. He favored planters with offices and ample lands, even those with Puritan leanings or those who challenged his leadership. His willingness to share power enabled the General Assembly to grow into a miniature parliament, abetted a decentralization of authority from province to county, and all but guaranteed the emerging elite an unlimited right of local rule. On two occasions Berkeley could have moved from Virginia but chose to stay. Like his brother Sir John Berkeley he could have pressed Charles for a field command, but instead he hurried back to America. A second opportunity arose in 1649, when he gave Virginia up to the Parliamentarians. The treaty of surrender called for Berkeley to dispose of his property and leave the colony, but he connived with his Puritan successors, convincing them to ignore the agreement and let him live in retirement at Green Spring. Second Governorship Colonial Virginia During the next eight years Berkeley enlarged his house, continued his crop trials, and strengthened his commercial ties abroad. Berkeley went back to England in 1652 to mount his campaign for royal support. His brothers and friends assured him of a ready hearing at court, as did his seat on the newly created Council for Foreign Plantations. Berkeley lobbied publicly and privately for almost a year, and he wrote and published *Discourse and View of Virginia*, which put forth his prescriptions for improving Virginia. He achieved something less than he intended. The king affirmed the concept of diversification but refused to offer any financial support. In the first of a series of misjudgments and misfortunes that eventually destroyed him, his program of diversification failed. Their doubts intensified as they bore the expense of the increased taxes

that underwrote the effort. Diversification was largely abandoned late in the s, although Berkeley held to his convictions. He negotiated a so-called "stint" on tobacco cultivation, but Lord Baltimore vetoed it, and the Crown eventually withdrew its tentative endorsement of the proposal. Berkeley neither accepted nor acceded to Stuart imperialism, choosing instead to ignore it as much as possible. He appreciated none of the underpinnings of Restoration colonial policy. Meanwhile, his friends at court lost their influence with the king. By the s their departure left him few defenders at Whitehall. Charles II and his younger advisers owed him nothing and thought of him as something of a nuisance, if they thought of him at all. The governor had not foreseen the loss of the Dutch trade, war with the Netherlands, the deterioration of peace with the Indians, or the revival of the Northern Neck proprietary. The loss of foreign markets affected tobacco prices, whereas the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars "â€"; "â€" jeopardized the welfare of Virginia in ways Berkeley was unable to forestall. He could slow, but not stop, the frontier skirmishes that at last broke into open warfare in The renewed grant to the Arlington-Culpeper interests threw Northern Neck land titles into question and caused Berkeley to mount an expensive effort to buy out the proprietors. Berkeley Always a haughty man, Berkeley became more peevish as he aged and as the burdens of government weighed more heavily on him. Poor health dulled his faculties, making him rely on a diminishing circle of intimates, especially his second wife, Frances Culpeper Stephens Berkeley , whom he married sometime between May 19 and June 21, His method of governance failed to assure political harmony, his favorites did not form a cohesive group, and he was slow to punish their misrule. Virginians who stood outside the reach of his bounty or who experienced his wrath increasingly questioned his leadership, though none dared cross him until disagreements over Indian policy drove young Nathaniel Bacon into rebellion. The incursion appeared little different from similar incidents that had been part of frontier existence since the conclusion of the Anglo-Powhatan War of "â€" A quick show of force had quelled past troubles, but in the retaliation set off a series of strokes and counterstrokes that fanned the fears of frontier colonists. Berkeley failed to discern the gravity of the situation and let control slip from his fingers. He tried to reclaim his authority, first by proclaiming Bacon a rebel and suspending him from the Council, then by dissolving the General Assembly and calling for the first general election of burgesses in fourteen years. Berkeley also circulated a remonstrance explaining his reasons for his dealings with Bacon and vowing to redress whatever grievances the voters had. Two days before the new assembly convened, he asked his superiors in London to replace him with a "more Vigorous Governor. Bacon was absent for the bulk of the session, during which the burgesses and councillors laid plans for taking the fight to the natives and addressed a variety of grievances. Berkeley sent his wife to London to defend his administration, while he engaged in a contest with Bacon that became a duel to the death over who would control Virginia. With Bacon occupied in the search for someone to fight, Berkeley again proclaimed his enemy a rebel and tried to catch him. The governor got little support and fled to the Eastern Shore when Bacon doubled back on him and tried to establish his own command of the colony. He issued several public pronouncements denouncing Berkeley and playing for popular support. More pointedly, he sent a small fleet across Chesapeake Bay.

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George Berkeley's work, "The analyst," is a criticism of the calculus, in both its Newtonian and Leibnizian formulations, arguing that the foundations of the calculus are incoherent and the reasoning employed in it is inconsistent.