

Chapter 1 : [TMP] "Skirmish at Barba Del Puerco March " Topic

FOUR. Barba del Puerco January-July On 6 January, the Rifles crossed the River Coa, on Portugal's northern border. It was their first glimpse of the deeply incised gorge, its fast-flowing torrent, and the ancient arched bridge that crossed it, leading to the fortress of Almeida guarding the gateway to the north of the country.

They were the cadet line of the Craufurds of Auchenames represented the old line of the Craufurds of Loudoun. He was created a baronet in His eldest son became Sir James, the second baronet. Military prodigy[edit] Craufurd entered the army aged fifteen. He enlisted as an Ensign with the 25th Foot in , [2] serving four years as a subaltern. By aged nineteen he was already a company commander. He spent some time at Berlin in , studying the tactics of the army of Frederick the Great and translated into English the official Prussian treatise on the Art of War. As captain in the 75th regiment from , he first saw active service against Tippoo Sahib in , while serving under Lord Cornwallis. His distinguished service was praised earning seniority in Captaincies among the purchased commissions. Robert returned to England on leave to help his brother, Colonel Charles. At the time he often talked to family of retiring from the army altogether. It was also at this time that he developed a correspondence with the Secretary at War , William Windham. They became firm friends. From to , Craufurd by then a lieutenant-colonel sat in parliament for East Retford, but in he resigned to concentrate on soldiering. The Buenos Aires Expedition[edit] On 30 October , Craufurd was promoted to full colonel and put in command of his own regiment. He was ordered on an expedition to South America. In on the promise of another promotion to Brigadier-general he took ship to Rio de Janeiro. The British commander-in-chief General Whitelocke was based at Montevideo. The broad objective was the conquest of Chile. Craufurd departed from Falmouth docks on 12 November General Samuel Auchmuty and Admiral Murray were despatched to report back to the Pittite ministry, who wanted the capture of Buenos Ayres. They had already left London on 9 October. The flotilla arrived with 8, men on board on June 15, , when the armies were finally united at Buenos Ayres. Whitelocke refused to act, and was accused by Robert Craufurd of cowardice. He was supported in London by his brother Charles, who had a network of aristocratic contacts. Whitelocke would not countenance an attack on French General Liniers army. They enemy advanced into the town; Craufurd wrote he wanted to attack the ramparts, but was prevented by the superior officer. The French retreated, retrenched the streets and deployed heavy cannon. Writing in the biographer Alexander Craufurd states that General Craufurd, and apparently many other officers were "under the impression that Whitelocke was a traitor as well as a time and vacillating fool, but I have failed to find in the account of the court-martial any solid evidence in support of this impression". Moore had marched his forces by several routes to Salamanca. The two forces joined up at Mayorga on December 20, Intelligence revealed that, apart from the corps of Marshal Soult to his front, Napoleon was advancing at speed from Madrid. Moore was fearful that the army could be overwhelmed by much superior forces and their line of retreat to the sea, some miles more to port evacuation, could be cut off. On 24 December he order the retreat to Corunna. General Sir Edward Paget. His regiments were heavily engaged in the earlier part of the retreat. The Commissariat was delayed. There was no food. In freezing winter snow and fog they marched at double-quick pace fighting off much larger forces. On 31 December Moore ordered the army to divide. The two Flank Brigades of Craufurd with 1, men and Brigadier Charles Alten with 1, men were ordered along a southerly route via Orense to Vigo while the main column continued on the Corunna Road. Men died in the snow of hunger, others found food along the way. A week later at Orense they were starving, marching in rags. They reached the port on 12th but awaited for stragglers before embarking for England. War was his very element and toil and danger seemed to call forth only an increasing determination to surmount them â€¦ I shall never forget Craufurd if I live for a hundred years I think. He was in everything a soldier. On the 27th the Light Brigade marched to Navalmoral. Before dawn on the morning of the 28th Craufurd started his attempt to join Sir Arthur Wellesley before the French attacked him at Talavera. The march which followed is one almost unparalleled in military annals. In the full heat of Spanish summer and in full regimental kit, the soldiers suffered from a terrible thirst. Their march was driven on by the growling of the cannon in the distance and they left only a few weakly men at

Oropesa. In spite of covering about 45 miles in 26 hours, Craufurd arrived too late to participate in the battle. The bulk of the army was moved into northern Portugal. The cavalry force was also increased by two squadrons of the 16th Light Dragoons and, in early July, by the addition of three squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons. Robert Craufurd, though only a brigadier, and junior of his rank, had been chosen by Wellington to take charge of his outpost line because he was one of the very few officers then in the Peninsula in whose ability his Commander-in-Chief had perfect confidence. Only with Craufurd, Hill and Beresford, did he ever condescend to enter into explanation and state reasons. He could not forget that he was four years older than Beresford, five years older than Wellington, eight years older than Hill, yet but a junior brigadier-general in charge of a division. Though senior in the date of his first commission to nearly all the officers in the Peninsular Army. Craufurd was six years junior to Picton and one year junior to Hope. From March to July Craufurd accomplished the extraordinary feat of guarding a front of 40 miles against an active enemy of six-fold force, without suffering his line to be pierced, or allowing the French to gain any information whatever of the host in his rear. This was the result of system and science, not merely of vigilance and activity. Whilst there were four bridges, there were also some fifteen fords between Ciudad Rodrigo and the mouth of the Agueda, which were practicable in dry weather for all arms, and several of them could be used even after a day or two of rain. Special reports were made of the state of the fords every morning and the rapidity of its rises was particularly marked. As Napier remarked in his History, seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to its alarm posts, with baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance to the rear. They drove him down the defile and chased him back across the river with the loss of two officers and forty-five men killed and wounded. Right away, two 7th Division battalions were roughed up by French light cavalry. This compelled Wellington to send reinforcements to save it from annihilation. His body was carried out of action by his staff officer, Lieutenant Shaw of the 43rd, and, after lingering four days, he died. The nickname is supposed to refer to his habit of heavily cursing when losing his temper, his nature as a strict disciplinarian and even to his noticeably dark and heavy facial stubble.

Chapter 2 : Sitio histÃ3ricos de Los Arapiles

The skirmish of Barba del Puerco of March was a minor clash between part of Craufurd's line of outposts on the Portuguese border and part of the French army gathering in preparation for Massena's invasion of Portugal. In the spring of Craufurd's Light Division was watching the line of the Agueda River.

Nonetheless, thanks to all that lovely money rolling in to my Paypal account of late I was able to painlessly pick up a copy of the rules; and so it seemed appropriate to expand upon them. It has to be said firstly that the production values of the rulebook are as high, if not higher than any other set within their market; the book is hardbound pages and full colour throughout, lavishly illustrated and with both clear rules and a rich supporting text. Before getting to the particulars of the rules themselves it is worth saying that the style of writing of the book as a whole, is very personable and truly focused on the pleasure of the game rather than a lawyerish obsession with rule definitions or the button counters fanaticism for minutiae of historical detail. People who enjoy that sort of thing should look elsewhere; but those who want to enjoy reading their rule books and wish to return to the book for game inspiration more than for reference sheets and army lists will relish this book. If a wargamer would ever dare advertise themselves so blatantly, this is a coffee table book of glossy images of figures and games, entertaining side notes, informative text, oh and a pretty straightforward set of rules. So what of the rules; well it is in many cases fairly simple stuff, based as many people will be aware on Games Workshops old Warmaster system. That said it has developed in its own way and is not simply Warmaster with guns. The main principle of the rules is the command and control system, which can allow troops to conduct daring and ambitious moves within a turn, but only if the commander has both the rolls and the vision to back it up. In short it is order driven, but rather than writing orders in advance, the commanders must announce their orders to the opponent before attempting to carry them out. Limited experience shows this to work well amongst gentlemen players, but I have reservations about how a died in the wool WAAC gamer may treat such a system. For moving and shooting ranges are specified to not be down to the millimetre, which I approve of; but this can again be abused. Combat as well as shooting is conducted with the venerable D6, and is very simple; if a unit takes typically three casualties or more it starts to be in trouble. Larger units and special rules vary the effect and point at which this matters. So far it is all generic enough, but as mentioned, special rules give the historical flavour that is a must, and they fall broadly into the fixed and the optional. Some rules always apply, such as those for formations such as skirmishers or warband; or always apply in certain periods to all troop e. But here they are not prescribed to any one army, it is for the players to decide which apply to whom. Doing something like that of course could affect the balance of a game, and the authors are at great pains to stress game balance, use of scenarios rather than straight fights and a non dependence on points based army lists. Players of the game are expected to be able to assemble balanced or historical armies themselves rather than have the rules attempt to dictate one to them. Contrary to what many people have suggested, a points system is included, but players are not expected to rely upon it and it is not really for the purpose of competition games. They seem to achieve their goal of covering the period of the 18th and 19th centuries reasonably well; though to ensure they do so, knowledge and restraint have to also be applied by the players. All in all this seems to be a promising set of rules for the grown-up wargamer.

Chapter 3 : Blockade of Almeida - Wikipedia

Barba del Puerco - March This follows on from my reference to General Ferey a week or two ago. John C was kind enough to send me some pics and a map for the action at Barba del Puerco, which was mentioned in the excerpt from George Simmons' memoirs.

He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 18th January, and appointed to command the 2nd Battalion 4th Foot, then stationed at Colchester with the 1st Battalion. Wellington anticipated this move and ordered General Sir William Erskine to extend his 5th Division northward as far as the Bridge of Barba del Puerco by sending the 4th Foot to the rocky defile which overhangs the bridge. The orders were sent out by 2 p. However, although he claimed to have sent the orders immediately to the 4th Foot at Val de Mula, it would appear that they were not received until around midnight. At about midnight, the garrison of men broke-out from Almeida in two columns through the pickets of the Portuguese and 2nd Foot. Lieutenant Colonel Bevan, who, having received his orders around midnight, had decided to wait the few hours until day-break before moving. However, on hearing the gunfire, Bevan ordered his Regiment to move off quickly towards the bridge. Despite losses, the main French force crossed the bridge and joined the French Corps on the heights above the river. Lieutenant Colonel Cockrane of the 36th with a detachment from his Regiment and the 4th, then rashly decided to rush the bridge and was beaten back with casualties. On hearing the news, Wellington was furious at both the failure to block the French breakout and the futile attempt to cross the bridge. The latter resulted in Wellington threatening to court martial any officer who was guilty of similar misconduct in the future Despatch to General Campbell 15th May Lieutenant Colonel Bevan felt that both he and his regiment had been unfairly criticised in the despatches and asked Wellington for a court of inquiry. On being refused, Bevan shot himself on 8th July His death was deeply lamented by his brother officers and his funeral, attended by all the officers in the Division, was held on 11th July at Portalegre where he was buried in the castle yard. The memorial stone reads: They are deeply engraven on the hearts of those who knew him and will ever live in their remembrance. Poor Bevan was censured by Lord Wellington, which circumstance preyed so much on his mind, knowing he had done his duty, that he blew his brains out. It was not until , that his eldest son, Charles found out the sad truth about his death from an uncle, Admiral James Richard Dacres, who wrote informing him that the 4th had received their orders too late and that neither Bevan nor his Regiment were at fault. The despatches of the Duke of Wellington, Volume 7. Lieutenant Colonel Gurwood, London, History of the War in the Peninsula, Volume 3. On a CD-rom, viewable through a computer.

Chapter 4 : Battle Honours 2nd batallion

The previous OOB for January doesn't give a brigade breakdown of the division. Nafziger FSAH Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo has the same composition for Ferey's brigade as Oman Sept. /March

There were so many deaths in battle or from wounds or sickness, but in the middle of it, Colonel Bevan took his own life over a matter of honour. Bevan served in the 28th foot in Egypt, Copenhagen, Walcheren and then in the Peninsula. The orders were sent out by 2 p. Lieutenant-Colonel Bevan, having received his orders around midnight, had decided to wait the few hours until day-break before moving. However, on hearing the gunfire, Bevan ordered his regiment to move off quickly towards the bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane of the 36th with a detachment from his regiment and the 4th decided to rush the bridge and was beaten back with casualties. Lord Wellington Lord Wellington was furious at both the failure to block the French breakout and the futile attempt to cross the bridge. Wellington refused this and subsequent requests. He was buried in the castle yard at Portalegre and his funeral was attended by all divisional officers. His memorial stone reads: They are deeply engraven on the hearts of those who knew him and will ever live in their remembrance. Historians differ on the exact sequence of events, but there is some consensus that General Erskine, who was dining with Sir Brent Spencer that evening, received the orders and put them in his pocket, forgetting about them until around midnight. Realising the severity of his error he then excused himself to Wellington by claiming that the 4th had set out late and then lost their way. Poor Bevan was censured by Lord Wellington, which circumstance preyed so much on his mind, knowing he had done his duty, that he blew his brains out. Wellington was well aware of the problems of Sir William Erskine as a divisional commander. His temporary command of the elite Light Division had been disastrous, he was very near-sighted and apparently had mental health problems as well as being arrogant and unwilling to listen to advice. In he killed himself by jumping out of a window in Lisbon. Although the commander-in-chief would have liked to ignore politics and fight his war, it was not always possible. For the same reason, he was probably reluctant to publicly censure Erskine for his likely blunder in the Almeida affair. But it is also very possible that Wellington genuinely believed that Bevan had made a mistake by not setting out for the bridge during the night. It should be remembered that Wellington did not take any measures against Bevan or the fourth. He was not court-martialled or disciplined in any way. It is very probable that Wellington simply failed to take into account the effect of one of his not infrequent public criticisms of his officers on a man as sensitive as Charles Bevan. Bevan was known to suffer from periods of melancholy, probably what would today be recognised as clinical depression. Bevan, sadly, was unable to do so. There is now a memorial to Charles Bevan in the English cemetery in Elvas, a beautiful little place which we visited last year. It is impossible not to feel sad at the waste of a man who was liked and respected by his fellow officers and loved by his wife and children. In a different time, under a different commander, Bevan might have done better. Service under Wellington, it seemed, required a thicker skin than poor Bevan possessed. Some claim that Wellington deliberately scapegoated Bevan to avoid the political consequences of telling the truth about Erskine. Bevan had been told and simply needed to get over it and move on. Rory Muir, in his excellent biography of Wellington , points out that it probably made no sense for Wellington to re-open the unfortunate affair with an enquiry. There was a war to fight and decisions to be made and there was no time for agonising and recriminations. What may be true, is that Wellington could have explained his decision not to allow an enquiry to Bevan rather than brusquely refusing without discussion. That, certainly, is Wellington at his most autocratic but it was not personal to Bevan and most of his officers managed to survive it. Poor Charles Bevan, with his periods of depression, simply could not. The suicide of Charles Bevan is an integral part of the story of An Uncommon Campaign, the third book in the Peninsular War Saga although we do not meet Bevan personally. Knowing more about the condition today, it is easier to understand what happened to Bevan. For me, the story is a reminder of the realities of war in any age. We look at the army, marching across the plains and mountain ranges of Portugal, Spain and France, as a unit but, to the officers and men fighting in it their stories were unique. There was no understanding or acceptance of post traumatic stress disorder, shock or depression. In the age of the wars against Napoleon no allowances were

made for the physical and emotional effect of years of campaigning.

Chapter 5 : King's Own Royal Regiment Museum

Originally published: London: Faber, Includes bibliographical references and index In an exhilarating work of narrative history, Mark Urban traces the story of the 95th Rifles, the toughest and deadliest sharpshooters in Wellington's army List of illustrations -- Preface -- 1.

Chapter 6 : Robert Craufurd - Wikipedia

De estas escaramuzas la mas destacada fu  la acontecida a principios de , conocida por la historiograf a como Combate de Barba del Puerco. Vista a rea de Puerto Seguro (Barba del Puerco) A mediados de febrero de los brit nicos hab an situado un peque o destacamento para proteger el mencionado puente.

Chapter 7 : The Peninsular War ()

List of Illustrations, ix Preface, xi 1 Departures: May , 1 2 Talavera: July-August , 10 3 Guadiana: August-December , 24 4 Barba del Puerco: January-July 0, 40 5 The Coa: July , 55 6 Wounded: July-August , 66 7 Busaco: September , 74 8 The Corporal's Stripes: September February , 84 9 Pombal: March-April.

Chapter 8 : Table of contents for Library of Congress control number

After the Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro on 2nd May, , the French Commander Messena ordered the besieged garrison at Almeida under General Brennier to break out to the north-west and rejoin the French forces via the bridge at Barba del Puerco over the river Agueda.

Chapter 9 : Too Much Lead: April

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Bevan, of the 4th or King's Own Regiment and the Bridge at Barba del Puerco Born in , Charles Bevan was commissioned into the 28th Foot with whom he served in Egypt, at Copenhagen, Walcheren and in the Peninsula.