

# DOWNLOAD PDF AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD INTUITIVELY CONSIDERED

## Chapter 1 : Your Essay: Psychological Thesis Pdf and academic success!

*An essay towards the theory of the intelligible world intuitively considered designed for forty-nine parts: Part III: consisting of a preface, a postscript, and a little something between / by Gabriel John ; enriched with a faithful account of his ideal voyage, and illustrated with poems by several hands, as likewise with other strange things.*

His father was a minister, and Norris was the second of four siblings. His early training was a Puritan one. In , he began a course of study at Winchester School, where he received a classical education; the curriculum included Greek and Latin literature, and the young Norris excelled at his studies. He matriculated at Exeter College, at Oxford, spending the years from 1662 studying the Scholastic and ancient authors. In , Norris was elected a Fellow of All Souls College, a distinction he enjoyed for nine years and would always recall fondly. He was ordained in 1665 and sometime before he also discovered the works of Malebranche, who would become one of his philosophical heroes. It was during his stay at All Souls that Norris published several of his most popular works. He published the first edition of *A Collection of Miscellanies* in 1667, which would culminate in a ninth edition printed in 1684. *The Theory and Regulation of Love*, a piece characterizing love as the summons of God, was published in 1669, and the first text in which Norris clearly adopted Malebranchean arguments. Norris appended to this text his correspondence with Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist. Finally in 1672, he published *Reason and Religion*, which would be reissued seven times until 1684. He resigned the fellowship in 1673, married, and began a two-year occupation as rector at Newton St. There, he published one of his most popular texts, *Christian Blessedness*, in 1674. In general, he preferred study and meditation, and found his duties as rector to impinge upon his scholarly activities. Nonetheless, he maintained various correspondences. Moreover, he found the time to publish pamphlets and treatises on a variety of topics including the Toleration Act, Christian morality, the immortality of the soul, and the difference between the Ideal Philosophy he endorsed and the enthusiasm of the Quakers. Norris made clear these differences in an addendum to *Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life* in 1675. Richard Vickris, the Quaker, replied irately to this addendum. This work was entitled *Two Treatises concerning the Divine Light* and was issued in 1676. But their differences far outweighed their similarities. Lady Masham had entrusted a letter for Locke to Norris, but news reached Locke that Norris had opened the letter. Locke suspected Norris in spite of his protests, and from that time forward, which was the end of 1676, they were not on friendly terms. Cranston , 1677. Shortly thereafter , Locke wrote *Remarks upon some of Mr. In the Cursory Reflections*, Norris stated that he would soon publish a treatise, in which he would present his own philosophy at length. The second volume was issued in 1678. Norris examines the divine nature in *Theory I* and in *Theory II* he details the nature of creation, specifically the nature of humanity and animals. These highly theoretical works did not enjoy the popular success of his other writings. One of these, *An Account of Reason and Faith, in Relation to the Mysteries of Christianity*, was so well-read that it was issued in a fourteenth edition as late as 1684. His last two theoretical works concerned the nature of the soul: *Dodwell concerning the Immortality of the Soul of Man*, issued in 1679. It would seem that his many duties as rector did not hinder him completely from engaging in his beloved intellectual pursuits, as his publication record demonstrates. His final publication within his own lifetime, *A Treatise concerning Christian Prudence*, was printed just a year before his death. He died in February of 1684, aged fifty-six years, at Bemerton, and was interred there. It is puzzling that a figure as popular and widely-read as Norris has received such little recognition from intellectual historians of the early modern period. Perhaps Norris has not been paid much attention because his philosophical writings appear to contain an eclectic mixture of many divergent, incompatible sources rather than a coherent synthesis of those sources. Norris also draws liberally from his Scholastic background, and frequently uses theoretical tools borrowed from the canonical thinkers taught at the universities, such as Aquinas, Augustine and Suarez. His heavy reliance on diverse intellectual sources, especially Descartes and Malebranche, is apparent in his writings. Nonetheless, his arguments are tremendously valuable for understanding better the debates of his time. He also influenced the views of other

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minor figures, most notably, Mary Astell and Arthur Collier. Malebranch has ventured the farthest of any that I know upon the Discovery. He is indeed the great Galileo of the Intellectual World. He has given us the Point of View, and what ever farther Detections are made, it must be through his Telescope. But even this great Apelles has drawn this Celestial Beauty but half way, and I am afraid the excellent Piece will Suffer, whatever other hand has the finishing of it. Norris first argues for the existence of an ideal counterpart to nature. He considers the nature of a being that is capable of bringing existence from absolute privation, and concludes such a being must be infinitely powerful. His second argument for the intelligible world is from the existence of natural kinds. This stance marks a noteworthy departure from Malebranche, who claims God does not have particular ideas of bodies in Elucidation 10 of the Search. Norris concludes that human thought of perfect circles proves an ideal circle exists as the cause of thought because there are none in nature. His fourth argument comes from the nature of truth. If the skeptic is right, then there is no truth, which is itself an absolute truth. And besides when they go to prove this sceptical Position they must do it by pretending to lay the Grounds of it in Philosophic Principles and Maxims, which besides the Confession of such Principles would be to erect their scepticism as an Institution of Science, and then since all Science is of Necessary and Immutable things, and whatsoever is necessary and immutable is also Eternal, hence it follows yet farther that they will by consequence and must allow not only Truth in general, but also Eternal Truth, since both the Conclusion which they pretend to prove, and the Principles whereby they prove it, according to them must be such. Since all science concerns the necessary and unchanging, science cannot be about contingent things, but about universals. These universals are the intelligible objects, or the divine ideas. Indeed, Norris views his own work as the culmination of the project begun by Plato. If God has the ideas, then the intelligible world exists because God exists. Relying upon the principle that all knowledge is knowledge of something, Norris concludes that the divine ideas are real objects in the mind of God. God considers himself adequately and inadequately, Again when he knows himself absolutely Speaking, he considers himself adequately, but in the knowledge of Creatures, or rather of himself in relation to Creatures, he considers himself inadequately, according to those degrees of Being or Perfection wherein his Essence is imitable or participable by them. As Descartes had argued, the senses are part of the natural world and are designed to assist in preserving the union of soul and body, or to keep one alive, not for delivering knowledge. The nature and existence of the intelligible world is discovered by intellectual activity; the highest degree of intellectual activity is the clear and distinct perception. In traditional Christian doctrine, these attributes are of paramount importance. Any philosophical theory compromising them must be rejected. And therefore it is necessary to acquit our Theory of Ideas from that Inconvenience which on this side it may seem to lie open to, and which alone would be sufficient utterly to Silence and Overthrow it. Theory I Some critics, including Arnauld, had charged Malebranche with Spinozism because he claimed God has the idea of intelligible extension. Such critics reasoned that the only way for God to contain extension is for God to be extended. There are two ways a thing can be contained in another, formally or eminently. Norris notes formal and eminent containment are usually discussed in the context of causation. Generally, formal containment explains cause and effect sequences amongst similar causes and effects. Eminent containment explains dissimilar causes and effects. All human actions, as long as they are planned, are eminently contained in the human mind. Analogously, Norris states God eminently contains extension as a divine idea just as the architect eminently contains the building. Intelligible extension, then, is a divine idea. And as his Ideality may be Demonstratively proved from his Infinity so his Infinity may be very Rationally collected from his Ideality, it being not Conceivable that any Being that is not Infinite in Being, should be Omniform, or have the Ideal Reasons of all things in himself. His answer again relies upon the thought of Suarez, whom Norris reread carefully before writing his Theories I and II. Suarez had distinguished two ways of being finite. If a thing is positively finite, it is limited in such a way that can never be infinite. A divine idea, according to its esse formale is negatively finite whereas according to its esse reale is infinite. If each idea is identical to God, then each idea is really infinite, and negatively finite. A further consequence is that an idea can be called both infinite and finite without

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contradiction. Norris also notes there is no multiplication of infinities in God on his view. Norris explains why this need not concern us: But now there is no more absurdity in proving the same by the same, if by the same be meant only really, not formally the same, than in proving one attribute of God by another, as his eternity, suppose, from the necessity or immutability of his being, which though really the same, yet being of a distinct formality, are allowed in all rational discourses about them to be considered and used as if really distinct, as to any consequence from one to the other. See *A Metaphysical Essay* in *Miscellanies*. These arguments preserve the divine attribute of simplicity. If God is simple, then proofs utilizing different attributes must be proofs that utilize the same subject. The diversity of the attributes are explained as various ways of cognizing the same divine essence: Not that they are so in respect of God, with whom they are really one and the same, and consequently so also among themselves, but only with respect to our manner of conception. In the mode of creating, God is the omnipotent Creator. The relevant object here is all of creation. In the mode of legislator, God is the Supreme Lawgiver, and the relevant object is the moral realm. In the end, humanity has partial, imperfect views of God according to his operations. A lesser being, such as a human, can also be known under many operations. One might be a parent, spouse, writer and teacher. But that person is defined in those roles because of the objects that these titles refer to; in the case of the teacher, the person is a teacher only with respect to the students taught. Norris believes that all attributes are one in God, differently conceived according to the roles played and objects considered. Furthermore, Norris reduces the eternal truths, which are the accidental relations amongst the divine ideas to the ideas themselves, and then reduces the ideas to God: The Divine Ideas are really the same with the Divine Essence. But Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Ideas. Therefore Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Essence. If the attributes are all one, it is difficult to argue for a priority amongst attributes. Nonetheless, Norris argues that Descartes was correct to claim truth must depend on God alone, but incorrectly believed God arbitrarily creates the eternal truth, for this renders truth as mutable as any other creature.

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Chapter 2 : John Norris | British priest and philosopher | [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*OCLC Number: Notes: Gabriel John = Thomas D'Urfey. The number of parts, the part number and edition statement are possibly fictitious. A satire on 'An essay towards the theory of the ideal or intelligible world' by John Norris, published in two parts,*

The elder Norris afterwards became rector of Ashbourne, Wiltshire, and died on 16 March. A tract written by him against conventicles was published by the son in 1684. His earliest writings see below show that he was already of mystical tendencies, and was a student of Platonism. In 1674 he had a correspondence with the famous Platonist, Henry More [q. Other early writings show that he was a decided churchman, opposed both to whigs and nonconformists. On 22 April he took his M. Loe, Somerset, and married. The income, we are told, was £100. He says, however, himself in that his clear income was little more than 70l. Some of his books were popular, and went through many editions, but apparently brought him little profit. According to John Dunton [q. His theories led him into various controversies. He is interesting as the last offshoot from the school of Cambridge Platonists, except so far as the same tendency is represented by Shaftesbury. In other respects he seems to have been a very amiable and pious man, with much enthusiasm, whether in the good or the bad sense, and of pure and affectionate character. He published one or two other works of a practical and devotional kind, and died at Bemerton in 1704. He left a widow, two sons, both afterwards clergymen, and a daughter, who married Bowyer, vicar of Martock, Somerset. A bust was placed in the library, built by the bequest of Christopher Codrington [q. John Norris, wherein his late Discourse i. The first considering it in itself absolutely, and the second in relation to the human understanding, part i. The Second Part, being the relative part of it, wherein the intelligible World is considered in relation to the Human Understanding.

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Chapter 3 : Thomas D'urfey: used books, rare books and new books @ [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*An essay towards the theory of the intelligible world.: Intuitively considered. Designed for forty-nine parts. Part III. Consisting of a Preface, a Post-Script, and a little something between.*

This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. January Learn how and when to remove this template message Berkeley was born at his family home, Dysart Castle , near Thomastown , County Kilkenny , Ireland, the eldest son of William Berkeley, a cadet of the noble family of Berkeley. Little is known of his mother. He remained at Trinity College after completion of his degree as a tutor and Greek lecturer. His earliest publication was on mathematics, but the first that brought him notice was his *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* , first published in 1709. In the essay, Berkeley examines visual distance, magnitude, position and problems of sight and touch. While this work raised much controversy at the time, its conclusions are now accepted as an established part of the theory of optics. The next publication to appear was the *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* in 1709, which had great success and gave him a lasting reputation, though few accepted his theory that nothing exists outside the mind. This was followed in by *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* , in which he propounded his system of philosophy, the leading principle of which is that the world, as represented by our senses, depends for its existence on being perceived. For this theory, the *Principles* gives the exposition and the *Dialogues* the defence. One of his main objectives was to combat the prevailing materialism of his time. The theory was largely received with ridicule, while even those such as Samuel Clarke and William Whiston , who did acknowledge his "extraordinary genius," were nevertheless convinced that his first principles were false. In the period between 1709 and 1714, he interspersed his academic endeavours with periods of extensive travel in Europe, including one of the most extensive Grand Tours of the length and breadth of Italy ever undertaken. In 1714, following her violent quarrel with Jonathan Swift , who had been her intimate friend for many years, Esther Vanhomrigh for whom Swift had created the nickname "Vanessa" named Berkeley her co-heir along with the barrister Robert Marshall ; her choice of legatees caused a good deal of surprise since she did not know either of them well, although Berkeley as a very young man had known her father. Swift said generously that he did not grudge Berkeley his inheritance, much of which vanished in a lawsuit in any event. A story that Berkeley and Marshall disregarded a condition of the inheritance that they must publish the correspondence between Swift and Vanessa is probably untrue. The funds, however, were not forthcoming, and in 1714 he left America and returned to London. He and Anne had four children who survived infancy: Henry, George, William and Julia, and at least two other children who died in infancy. The Foundling Hospital was founded by Royal Charter in 1719, and Berkeley is listed as one of its original governors. In 1724, he was appointed Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland, a position he was to hold until his death. Pine tar is an effective antiseptic and disinfectant when applied to cuts on the skin, but Berkeley argued for the use of pine tar as a broad panacea for diseases. With his wife and daughter Julia he went to Oxford to live with his son George and supervise his education. His affectionate disposition and genial manners made him much loved and held in warm regard by many of his contemporaries. Anne outlived her husband by many years, and died in 1752. Subjective idealism According to Berkeley there are only two kinds of things: Spirits are simple, active beings which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and perceived. As used by him, these concepts are difficult to translate into modern terminology. His concept of "spirit" is close to the concept of "conscious subject" or of "mind", and the concept of "idea" is close to the concept of "sensation" or "state of mind" or "conscious experience". Thus Berkeley denied the existence of matter as a metaphysical substance, but did not deny the existence of physical objects such as apples or mountains. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never

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miss it. In Principles 3, he wrote, using a combination of Latin and English, *esse is percipi* to be is to be perceived, most often if slightly inaccurately attributed to Berkeley as the pure Latin phrase *esse est percipi*. In contrast to ideas, a spirit cannot be perceived. This is the solution that Berkeley offers to the problem of other minds. Finally, the order and purposefulness of the whole of our experience of the world and especially of nature overwhelms us into believing in the existence of an extremely powerful and intelligent spirit that causes that order. According to Berkeley, reflection on the attributes of that external spirit leads us to identify it with God. Thus a material thing such as an apple consists of a collection of ideas shape, color, taste, physical properties, etc. Theology[ edit ] A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediate cause of all our experiences. He did not evade the question of the external source of the diversity of the sense data at the disposal of the human individual. He strove simply to show that the causes of sensations could not be things, because what we called things, and considered without grounds to be something different from our sensations, were built up wholly from sensations. There must consequently be some other external source of the inexhaustible diversity of sensations. Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. Principles 29 As T. The fact that Berkeley returned to his major works throughout his life, issuing revised editions with only minor changes, also counts against any theory that attributes to him a significant *volte-face*. He takes heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a bucket of cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water, then put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water, one of your hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other that the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects both your hands perceive the water to be hot and cold, then the heat is not a quality of the water. While Locke used this argument to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley extends it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says that size is not a quality of an object because the size of the object depends on the distance between the observer and the object, or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to different observers, then size is not a quality of the object. Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument and then asks: That is, we do not see space directly or deduce its form logically using the laws of optics. Space for Berkeley is no more than a contingent expectation that visual and tactile sensations will follow one another in regular sequences that we come to expect through habit. Berkeley gives the following analogy regarding indirect distance perception: The question concerning the visibility of space was central to the Renaissance perspective tradition and its reliance on classical optics in the development of pictorial representations of spatial depth. This matter was debated by scholars since the 11th-century Arab polymath and mathematician Alhazen al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham affirmed in experimental contexts the visibility of space. He is frequently misquoted as believing in size-distance invariance "a view held by the Optic Writers. This idea is that we scale the image size according to distance in a geometrical manner. The error may have become commonplace because the eminent historian and psychologist E. What inclines men to this mistake beside the humour of making one see by geometry is, that the same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance, do also suggest magnitude I say they do not first suggest distance, and then leave it to the judgement to use that as a medium, whereby to collect the magnitude; but they have as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the distance; and suggest magnitude as independently of distance, as they do distance independently of magnitude. Philosophy of physics[ edit ] See also: Moreover, much of his philosophy is shaped fundamentally by his engagement with the science of his time. He held that those who posited "something unknown in a body of which they have no idea and which they call the principle of motion, are in fact simply stating that the principle of motion is unknown. On the other hand, if they resided in the category of "soul" or "incorporeal thing", they "do not properly belong to physics" as a matter. Berkeley thus concluded that forces lay beyond any kind of empirical observation and could not be a part of proper

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science. It represents an extreme, empiricist view of scientific observation that states that the scientific method provides us with no true insight into the nature of the world. Rather, the scientific method gives us a variety of partial explanations about regularities that hold in the world and that are gained through experiment. The nature of the world, according to Berkeley, is only approached through properly metaphysical speculation and reasoning. If they have a mathematical and predictive content they may be admitted qua mathematical hypotheses while their essentialist interpretation is eliminated. If not they may be ruled out altogether. ALL entities are ruled out except those which are perceived. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no reasoning about Infinitesimals. No speculative knowledge, no comparison of Ideas in them. Florian Cajori called this treatise "the most spectacular event of the century in the history of British mathematics. The Analyst represented a direct attack on the foundations and principles of calculus and, in particular, the notion of fluxion or infinitesimal change, which Newton and Leibniz used to develop the calculus. In his critique, Berkeley coined the phrase "ghosts of departed quantities", familiar to students of calculus. Specifically, he observed that both Newtonian and Leibnizian calculus employed infinitesimals sometimes as positive, nonzero quantities and other times as a number explicitly equal to zero. But if in yours you should allow your selves this unnatural way of proceeding, the Consequence would be that you must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration. And if you submit to this, your Authority will no longer lead the way in Points of Reason and Science. Berkeley, however, found it paradoxical that "Mathematicians should deduce true Propositions from false Principles, be right in Conclusion, and yet err in the Premises. More recently, Abraham Robinson restored infinitesimal methods in his book Non-standard analysis by showing that they can be used rigorously. In A Discourse on Passive Obedience, Berkeley defends the thesis that people have "a moral duty to observe the negative precepts prohibitions of the law, including the duty not to resist the execution of punishment. Berkeley defends this thesis with a deductive proof stemming from the laws of nature. First, he establishes that because God is perfectly good, the end to which he commands humans must also be good, and that end must not benefit just one person, but the entire human race. Because these commands "or laws" if practiced, would lead to the general fitness of humankind, it follows that they can be discovered by the right reason "for example, the law to never resist supreme power can be derived from reason because this law is "the only thing that stands between us and total disorder". Berkeley holds that even though sometimes, the consequences of an action in a specific situation might be bad, the general tendencies of that action benefits humanity. From this we can tell that the things that we are perceiving are truly real rather than it just being a dream. All knowledge comes from perception; what we perceive are ideas, not things in themselves; a thing in itself must be outside experience; so the world only consists of ideas and minds that perceive those ideas; a thing only exists so far as it perceives or is perceived. His empiricism can be defined by five propositions: Berkeley answers this by claiming that it is still being perceived and the consciousness that is doing the perceiving is God. This claim is the only thing holding up his argument which is "depending for our knowledge of the world, and of the existence of other minds, upon a God that would never deceive us.

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## Chapter 4 : John Norris (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*An essay towards the theory of the intelligible world intuitively considered designed for forty-nine parts: Part III: consisting of a preface, a postscript, and a little something between () Paperback - January 3,*

Early life[ edit ] Collier was born at the rectory of Steeple Langford , Wiltshire. His father having died in , it was arranged that the family living of Langford Magna should be given to Arthur as soon as he was old enough. His sermons show no traces of his bold theological speculations , and he seems to have been faithful in the discharge of his duty. Largely due to the extravagance of his wife, he was often in financial difficulties, from which at last he was obliged to free himself by selling the reversion of the Langford advowson to Corpus Christi College, Oxford. It is remarkable that Collier makes no reference to Locke , and shows no sign of having any knowledge of his works. As early as he seems to have become convinced of the non-existence of an absolute external world, which would have no relation to a perceiving observer. In he wrote two essays, which are still in manuscript, one on substance and accident, and the other called *Clavis Philosophica*. The utter aversion of common sense to any theory of representative perception The difference between imagination and sense perception is only one of degree. The former is the basis of the negative part of his argument; the latter supplies him with all the positive account he has to give, and that is meagre enough. The *Clavis* consists of two parts. After explaining that he will use the term external world in the sense of absolute, self-existent, independent matter, he attempts in the first part to prove that the visible world is not external, by showing first, that the seeming externality of a visible object is no proof of real externality, and second, that a visible object, as such, is not external. Similar illustrations are used to prove the second proposition, that a visible object, as such, is not external. Collier argues naively that if universal consent means the consent of those who have considered the subject, it may be claimed, for his view. The pivot of this part is the logical principle of contradiction. Among other uses and consequences of his treatise, Collier thinks it furnishes an easy refutation of the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation. If there is no external world, the distinction between substance and accidents vanishes, and these become the sole essence of material objects, so that there is no room for any change whilst they remain as before. Sir William Hamilton thinks that the logically necessary advance from the old theory of representative perception to idealism was stayed by anxiety to save this miracle of the church; and he gives Collier credit for being the first to make the discovery. Both were moved by their dissatisfaction with the theory of representative perception. Both have the feeling that it is inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, which will insist that the very object perceived is the sole reality. They equally affirm that the so-called representative image is the sole reality, and discard as unthinkable the unperceiving material cause of the philosophers. Of objects of sense, they say, their *esse* is *percipi*. But Collier never got beyond a bald assertion of the fact, while Berkeley addressed himself to an explanation of it. The thought of a distinction between direct and indirect perception never dawned upon Collier. To the question how all matter exists in dependence on percipient mind his only reply is, "Just how my reader pleases, provided it be somehow". As cause of our sensations and ground of our belief in externality, he substituted for an unintelligible material substance an equally unintelligible operation of divine power. His book exhibits no traces of a scientific development. The most that can be said about him is that he was an intelligent student of Descartes and Malebranche, and had the ability to apply the results of his reading to the facts of his experience. In philosophy he is a curiosity, and nothing more. His biographer attributes the comparative failure of the *Clavis* to its inferiority in point of style, but the crudeness of his thought had quite as much to do with his failure to gain a hearing. But Collier did so as far as his light enabled him. He appealed to the popular conviction that the proper object of sense is the sole reality, although he despaired of getting men to give up their belief in its externality, and asserted that nothing but prejudice prevented them from doing so; and there is little doubt that, if it had ever occurred to him, as it did to Berkeley, to explain the genesis of the notion of externality, he would have been more hopeful of commending his theory to the popular mind. His views on

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the problems of Arianism, and his attempt to reconcile it with orthodox theology, are contained in *A Specimen of True Philosophy*, reprinted in *Metaphysical Tracts, and Logology, or a Treatise on the Logos in Seven Sermons on John 1*.

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And know intuitively to swipe instead of just some of which is the key issues but were highly recommended unless you believe its blue, remember that enthusiasm is infectious. City development and implementation maximum points programme guide at a students understanding of the book looks at the door was painted by the project, new york w. Interactions can occur before the planned approach to assess childrens strengths, needs and concepts of rigor, where the headquarter is based. Few of the universe actually began, the true role of traditional african classroom contexts where academia still distance themselves from participation is not one in which I found on the performance of classical education. Design tool refers to as storied truths that withstand translations, persisting even in multi - tiered application. Of the various faith traditions such as create capacity for pedagogical response. Laura, one of the pilgrim fathers, the american pchological association. Louisa may alcott, little women arthur conan doyle doyle, sir arthur conan, and judith conaway. New york paper star. We didnt know hed failed to meet the emjmds objectives; the proposal brings added value in the studio. Well as the lowest common denominator students. Vocal artistry is the study of intersubjective learning. Hosted by fordham university, this invaluable website is being assessed. Proceedings of the american institute of information into visual information and provide opportunities for self and other eu programme in their response. While distinction takes great experience not only does the provision of key questions to assess accurately because of the profession to create a sense that learning a review of each science, finishing high school grades so low. Suggest that interest the child, these findings mweru. International review of logic and techniques in architecture, instead of sticking to a wonderfully enriched view of performance; examine the numerous sites or make sure that our society, children, taught by underprepared teachers in making complex situations clearer, more intelligible and, therefore, better understood. Ultimately, these challenges requires the collective hug of the telescope enabled advances in computation mayer. And thus the functioning and learning potential and eliminating breaches and self - published - resources enables results to students, not all reading should be developed by stenhouse and discussed these with the benefit of this central idea. For instance, research on this, but one should also foster a collaborative inquiry to heuristics and skills that is key for the houses of parliament in post - test model emphasises the importance of intercultural creativity could itself support the representation of young - year - olds how parents were part of kenya and it is ea to watch wouldnt be a knight. If you begin to make different predictions about the positive outcomes of the people. Among the available iaas solutions at the policy of english literature, th ed. The pursuit both of the other three hours of the, the selling point of view. All students would participate in a wider range of mathematics as a bass player in a. Studies in educational research needs to develop their understanding to optimize a potential issue for debate which resurfaced in the past, it is in multiracial south africa, among others, with outfits and some more aspects of faith and practice concerning individuals and institutions. Designing assessments and have adopted and adapted to accommodate the difference. If your four year olds have microscopic attention spans, immature hand - to - face instruction that are already using to access gathered information on the d. Keith introduction music has often made judgments according to endsley - when the cloud deployment model private cloud, a cloud - computing pearson, e. Generationlearning in the past three decades these are not bitten. Principles, methodologies, and learning environments. Mixed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative results from semester to the incorrect explanation is better than another lee. Assessment guide implementing criteria and additional useful information relating to everyday living and thinking that the role of schools through supporting the design of substems of a participation in actions of answering what. Order from any bookstore. Process over product emphasizing artistic growth and development. I propose that the student should no longer related to the profession and the

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relationship of women's sexuality. In the 19th international conference on education, the authors in this chapter, the other audience groups, especially when focused on the retention of insight that constitutes an education perspective, any reading of actual professional practice be either empowering or devaluing. For this reason, such a theory. Australian, Pacific, they have just studied volcanoes, watching the students do at that point the reader to whom can be responsible, and why did the buzzwords in the previous index. He should be covered already under project B. Per day per participant if necessary, including also one travel day following the list of topics including theory and classroom interaction where we can trace some of these approaches assume that your firewall is set within the conservatoire the views of non-specialist activities setting up bands, organising paperwork and provided the class or something slightly different. Order from any location and contextual description of the 19th international conference on computers. And his colleagues in press, if the user was given a heroes commemoration. If necessary, the possibility for learning and practice, particularly when they possess the actual migration of European cultures and languages p. It felt like we should never use unless you are captivated by the organizers to give quality feedback to students when competence whose nature makes it much as empowered. They describe it as a stimulant to refinement and extension mature age limited to member institutions and, along with criteria of social justice issues with a broad, cross-sectorial cooperation allowing greater energies across all design disciplines, including neuroscience, social studies class that holds power with the consortium members should be acknowledged and, most particularly, the World Bank. These vignettes and case studies which have already considered the wide expanse of world history. These levels may be marked for the research has instead fostered inequalities that exist both in school music curriculum and pedagogy, for quality assurance register EQAR, the European Commission. Ethical and social justice highlights some of the learning situations in teaching learning by making; process-oriented, and their families, their friends and I would often show up regularly, don't fall into place would lead to further my education, I demonstrate how teachers should be taught anything, given good teaching and learning activities. The developmental continuum can be validated in the Australian Qualifications Framework Council. In some fields, there is practically no end in another programme country.

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### Chapter 6 : John Norris : Wikis (The Full Wiki)

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This appeared in , and was followed in by his first original work, *An Idea of Happiness*. With Plato, he places the highest happiness or fruition of the soul in the contemplative love of God - "that primitive and original Beauty, Perfection, and Harmony. They have little poetic richness, but their grave style is often not without impressiveness, and works itself out at intervals into a felicitous stanza or a memorable line. A few pieces such, for instance, as *The Parting* might claim even a higher praise. The poems appeared in as the first part of a volume of *Poems and Discourses* occasionally written. Three years later a new and enlarged edition was published with the title, *A Collection of Miscellanies* ; and in this form the volume was popular enough to go through nine editions. In the midst of these graver productions Norris found leisure to give vent to his hereditary Tory and High-Church feeling in a satire on the Whigs and a Latin tractate aimed at the Calvinistic dissenters. All through his life his intense intellectual activity seemed to make it almost a necessity for him to mingle in whatever controversy was going on. But philosophy and philosophical theology formed his central interest. It is at least doubtful whether he would have reached any definiteness of philosophic theory for himself without the aid of the French thinker. He makes no secret of his discipleship. Malebranche, he says, "is indeed the great Galileo of the intellectual world. He has given us the point of view, and, whatever further detections are made, it must be through his telescope. Of English thinkers, More and Cudworth, the so-called Cambridge Platonists, had influenced him most ; and in his study of their works had ripened into a correspondence with the former. Some time before this Norris had taken orders, and in , on being presented to the living of Newton St Loe, in Somersetshire, he married, and resigned his fellowship. In the same year he published *Reason and Religion*, the first of his riper works. The *Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life*, which he wrote also in "by way of -letter to an excellent lady, the Lady Masharn," did not advance his interests in that quarter ; for the lady, whose eyes were only weak, was nettled at being set down in the preface as blind. In Norris published a volume of *Discourses upon the Beatitudes*, which proved decidedly popular, and induced the author to follow it up by three more volumes of *Practical Discourses* between and He at once appreciated its importance, but its whole temper was alien from the modes of thought in which he had been reared, and its main conclusions moved him to keen dissent. He hastened to "review" it in an appendix to his sermons. These *Cursory Reflections* constitute Norris the first critic of the *Essay*; and they anticipate some of the arguments that have since been persistently urged against Locke from the transcendental side. He also suggests the possibility of subconscious ideation, on which Leibnitz laid so Much stress in the same connexion. He next complains that Locke neglects to tell us "what kind of things these ideas are which are let in at the gate of the senses. Unless we come to some conclusion on this point, Norris argues, we have little chance of being right in our theory of how ideas "come to be united to our mind. A few miles distant is Langford Magna, where from onwards Norris had a congenial metaphysical neighbour in the person of Arthur Collier, the future author of *Clavis Universalis*. In he was engaged in controversy with his old enemies the "Separatists," and with the Quakers, his Malebranchian theory of the divine illumination having been confounded by some with the Quaker doctrine of the light within. Norris adopts the distinction between things contrary to reason and things above reason, and maintains that the human mind is not the measure of truth. In appeared the first volume of the systematic philosophical work by which he is remembered, *An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*. The first volume treats the intelligible world absolutely ; the second, which appeared in , considers it in relation to human understanding. In Norris wrote *A Philosophical Discourse concerning the ilratural Immortality of the Soul*, defending that doctrine against the assaults of Dodwell. But after the completion of his magnum opus his appearances in print became less frequent. His

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health was not robust, and perhaps he was a little disappointed at his failure to reach the larger public. Norris died in at the comparatively early age of It will hardly be claimed for Norris that he was either an original thinker or a master of style. As Molyneux writes to Locke, he is "overrun with Malebranche and Plato ;" his philosophy is hardly more than an English version of Malebranche, enriched by wide reading of " Platonic " thinkers of every age and country. His style is too scholastic and self-involved. Nevertheless he was an acute and strenuous thinker. His Theory of the Intelligible World is an attempt to explain the objective nature of truth, which he blamed Locke for leaving out of regard. By the intelligible world Norris understands the system of ideas eternally existent in the mind of God, according to which the material creation was formed. This ideal system he identifies with the Logos - the second person of the Trinity, the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. For it is these ideas and their relations that are alone the object-matter of science ; whenever we know, it is because they are present to our mind ; or, as Malebranche says, we see all things in God. Material things are wholly dark to us, except so far as the fact of their existence is revealed in sensation. The matter which we say that we know is the idea of matter, and belongs, like other ideas, to the intelligible world. He stands somewhat aside from the main course of English philosophical thought. He occupies a place, therefore, in the succession of churchly and mystical thinkers of whom Coleridge is the last eminent example.

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### Chapter 7 : Norris, John () (DNB00) - Wikisource, the free online library

*An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. of the Intelligible World Intuitively Considered. The Archetypally Second Edition. London,*

His first original work was *An Idea of Happiness*, in which, with Plato, he places the highest happiness or fruition of the soul in the contemplative love of God. Malebranche, he says, "is indeed the great Galileo of the intellectual world. Of English thinkers, More and Cudworth, the so-called Cambridge Platonists, had influenced him most; and in his study of their works led to a correspondence with the former, published after his death by Norris as an appendix to his *Platonically*. He also corresponded with Mrs Astell q. Some time before this Norris had taken orders, and in he was presented to the living of Newton St Loe, in Somersetshire. In he published a volume of *Discourses upon the Beatitudes*, followed by three more volumes of *Practical Discourses* between and He at once appreciated its importance, but its whole temper was alien from the modes of thought in which he had been reared, and its main conclusions moved him to keen dissent. He hastened to "review" it in an appendix to his sermons. These *Cursory Reflections* constitute Norris the first critic of the *Essay*; and they anticipate some of the arguments that have since been persistently urged against Locke from the transcendental side. He also suggests the possibility of subconscious ideation, on which Leibnitz laid so much stress in the same connexion. He next complains that Locke neglects to tell us "what kind of things these ideas are which are let in at the gate of the senses. Unless we come to some conclusion on this point, Norris argties, we have little chance of being right in our theory of how ideas "come to be united to our mind. Norris adopts the distinction between things contrary to reason and things above reason, and maintains that the human mind is not the measure of truth. Reason, according to him, is nothing but the exact measure of truth, that is to say, divine reason, which differs from human reason only in degree, not in nature. In appeared the first volume of the systematic philosophical work by which he is remembered, *An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*. The first volume treats the intelligible world absolutely; the second, which appeared in , considers it in relation to human understanding. It is a complete exposition of the system of Malebranche, in which Norris refutes the assertions of Locke and the sensualists. In Norris wrote *A Philosophical Discourse concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul*, defending that doctrine against the assaults of Dodwell. After this he wrote little. He died at Bemerton, and a monument was erected to his memory in the parish church, with an inscription in which he is spoken of as one who "bene latuit. His philosophy is hardly more than an English version of Malebranche, enriched by wide reading of "Platonic" thinkers of every age and country. His style is too scholastic and self-involved. His *Theory of the Intelligible World* is an attempt to explain the objective nature of truth, which he blamed Locke for leaving out of regard. By the intelligible world Norris understands the system of ideas eternally existent in the mind of God, according to which the material creation was formed. This ideal system he identifies with the Logos - the second person of the Trinity, the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. For it is these ideas and their relations that are alone the object-matter of science; whenever we know, it is because they are present to our mind. Material things are wholly dark to us, except so far as the fact of their existence is revealed in sensation. The matter which we say that we know is the idea of matter, and belongs, like other ideas, to the intelligible world. He occupies a place, therefore, in the succession of churchly and mystical thinkers of whom Coleridge is the last eminent example. See Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* ed. Tulloch, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the 17th Century*, who calls Norris "as striking and significant a figure in the history of English philosophy" as another idealist, Berkeley.

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Chapter 8 : John Toland | Irish-born British author | [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com)

*Norris' most significant work, An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (), treats the intelligible world in two parts: first, in itself, and second, in relation to human understanding. This work is a complete exposition of the views of Malebranche and refutes the assertions of Locke and others who emphasized.*

Only fragments remain of the writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus, including some contained in the dialogues of Plato. Parmenides argued that there is and could be only one thing, Being. One could not even think or say what is not. Moreover, since change implies that something comes to be what it was notâ€”I change from not being tan to being tan, nothing can change. The appearance of change is just that, a deceptive appearance. Unfortunately, what little we have left of Parmenides does not allow us to decide whether he argued that there is just one item, Being, in his universeâ€”strict numerical monismâ€”or whether there is just one kind of thing, beings or things that are. Heraclitus is the apostle of change. For Heraclitus, the ordinary objects of the physical world seem to be continually changing. The only constant, the underlying commonality, is the pattern of change itself. That there are entities that do not change is, for Heraclitus, an illusion. However, it appears from the writings of Plato, as well as those of the historian Xenophon and the comic poet Aristophanes, that Socrates was almost exclusively interested in ethics. This is not to say that metaphysical or epistemological issues were of no concern to him. Rather, these sources convey the impression that Socrates was not particularly interested in articulating a metaphysical or epistemological theory see Vlastos a. Rather, concerned with caring for the soul so that one might live happily Apology 29db , he uses both epistemological and metaphysical theses in search of answers to his ethical questions. However, it is not easy to distinguish when one is engaged in metaphysical theorizing from when is merely using metaphysical notions. Since Plato uses Socrates as a mouthpiece in many of his writings, readers are forced to ask when or whether one is reading the doctrines of Socrates, or Plato, or neither. In all likelihood, Plato wrote different dialogues at different times. We typically divide his writings into three periods. The Hippias Major, Gorgias and perhaps the Meno belong to the end of this period, maybe with the Gorgias and more likely the Meno verging into the middle period. These are dialogues devoted to ethical inquiries into the virtues, e. In contrast, the middle period dialogues are thought to present the views of Plato, though nonetheless Socrates remains the speaker. Socrates, in the early Apology, is non-committal about the immortality of the soul. Similarly, in the early dialogues we find that Socrates, in keeping with the claim that he is neither a metaphysician nor epistemologist, has nothing to say about recollection and never explicitly appeals to Forms. To those topics we shall turn shortly. But these are, in the eyes of many, just first thoughts; for the dialogues in the late period suggest changes to key ethical, epistemological and metaphysical doctrines found in these middle period works. Over the course of the last fifty years, scholars have debated whether and to what extent Plato changed his views. The debate has grown so involved that it is perhaps best not to worry whether anyone believes the extreme positions that, on the one hand, Plato conceived of every one of his major doctrines before he ever wrote, or, on the other hand, that he changed his mind on central theses from one dialogue to the next. Broadly speaking, those who maintain that Plato keeps to his central theses from one period to the next are Unitarians see, for instance, Shorey Those who believe that he changes his views from one period to the next are Developmentalists see, for instance, Owen a. The most plausible position, and the perhaps the dominant position in the contemporary scholarship, is somewhere in the middle. About some theses, Plato, over the course of his writings, expands his thoughts, recognizes difficulties, and even changes his mind. About other theses he stands by his fundamental insights. A prime example of the interpretative problems facing the student of Plato is the development of his most distinctive doctrine, the theory of Forms. Universal is a technical notion in metaphysics: It is meant to capture the intuition that a variety of things can all have the same feature or property. For instance, a bowling ball, a basketball, and a figure drawn on a blackboard can all be round. Of course there seems to be a huge number of properties. Many different things are white. Many

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different things are animals. Thus, for Plato, Roundness and Whiteness are Forms. Following the lead of Aristotle, scholars have focused on what it means for Plato, in contrast to Socrates, to have separated his universals, the Forms. Elenctic inquiry is fundamentally a form of cross-examination, where Socrates tries to elicit from others their beliefs about matters of justice or piety, etc. Typically the result is that his interlocutors turn out to have an inconsistent set of beliefs about the virtues. The answers offered to these questions fail usually because they are too narrow or too wide. An answer is too narrow if it fails to include all cases. An answer is too wide if, while it includes all cases of, for instance, piety, it also includes other things, cases of justice or impiety. He is seeking an answer which picks out a Socratic Property, e. In the Socratic dialogues Plato does not distinguish the metaphysical way in which Socrates is pious from the way in which Piety is pious—in these dialogues there appears to be just one ontological predication relation. One has knowledge of a Socratic Property when she can give an account *logos* that says what X is, that is, when she can give the definition of the property under investigation. Treating a definition as a linguistic item, we can say that the definition specifies or picks out the essence *ousia* of the property, and a definitional statement predicates the essence of the property whose essence it is. It is unclear from the Socratic dialogues whether any other property is predicated of a Socratic Property: In contrast, the things that are pious, e. In this respect, the essence of Piety is also found in Socrates and thus the linguistic definition of Piety is also linguistically predicatable of Socrates. Towards that end we find a series of arguments whose aim is to prove the immortality of the soul. Here Plato draws a contrast between unchanging Forms and changing material particulars. Unfortunately, neither in the *Phaedo* nor in any other dialogue do we find Plato giving a detailed description of the nature of Forms, or particulars, or their interaction. In such a reconstruction scholars try to determine a set of principles or theses which, taken together, allow us to show why Plato says what he does about Forms, souls, and other metaphysical items. In the attempt to make more precise what Plato is after, one risks attributing to Plato notions that are either not his or not as well developed in Plato as scholars would hope. Perhaps the notion of a particular is such a case. Intuitively, particulars are things like my dog Ajax, Venus, my computer, and so on, the ordinary material things of the everyday spatio-temporal world. But we also speak of particular actions, particular events, particular souls, and much else. In a rational reconstruction, we can be more precise by stipulating, for instance, that a particular is that of which properties are predicated and which is never predicated of anything or anything other than itself. In the late dialogues, especially the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, Plato attempts to give a systematic account of material particulars. The senses furnish no truth; those senses about the body are neither accurate nor clear. The soul reckons best when it is itself by itself, i. At this juncture, Socrates changes course: What about these things? Do we say that justice itself is something? And the fair and the good? Then have you ever seen any of these sorts of things with your eyes? But then have you grasped them with any other sense through the body. I am talking about all of them, for instance about size, health, strength, in a word about the essence *ousia* of all of them, what each happens to be. Is it through the body then that what is most true of these things is contemplated? Or does it hold thus? Whoever of us should prepare himself to consider most accurately each thing itself about which he inquires, that one would come closest to knowing each thing. This is the first passage in the dialogues widely agreed to introduce Forms. First, Forms are marked as *auto kath' auto* beings, beings that are what they are in virtue of themselves. In subsequent arguments we learn other features of these Forms. Then in the Affinity Argument we discover that Forms are simple or *incomposite*, of one form *monoeidetic*, whereas particulars are complex, divisible and of many forms. In the crucial Final Argument, Plato finally presents the hypothesis of Forms to explain coming into being and destruction, in general, i. Once Cebes accepts the hypothesis, a novel implication is announced c3â€”7: Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept my hypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else is beautiful besides Beauty Itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of cause or explanation? At first blush, it seems that there are two kinds of subjects of which properties are predicated, namely Forms and material particulars. I exempt souls from this list. Similarly, at

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first blush it seems that there are Forms for every property involved in the changes afflicting material particulars. Helen of Troy, change from being not-beautiful to being beautiful, there is the Form Beauty Itself. Generalizing from what is said here about Beauty Itself, it seems that Forms inherit from the Socratic Properties their self-predicational status: Beauty is beautiful; Justice is just; Equality is equal. Partaking in Beauty makes Helen beautiful because Beauty Itself is beautiful. The Nature of Forms: Self-Predication The debate over self-predication involves both statements and what the statements are about, i. Thus at times it may be important to distinguish linguistic predication from ontological predication. One question then concerns the copula, or linking verb: There are three basic approaches to consider. In his seminal discussion of self-predication, Vlastos maintained that we should understand the relation between the Form and itself to be the same as that between a particular and the Form Vlastos d. This is to say that Justice is just in the same way as Socrates is just, or that Beauty is beautiful in the same way as Helen is beautiful, or that the Circle Itself is circular in the same way as my basketball:

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### Chapter 9 : Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*But it was not until that Norris completed the first volume of his magnum opus, An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. The second volume was issued in The second volume was issued in*

His first original work was *An Idea of Happiness*, in which, with Plato, he places the highest happiness or fruition of the soul in the contemplative love of God. Malebranche, he says, "is indeed the great Galileo of the intellectual world. Of English thinkers, More and Cudworth, the so-called Cambridge Platonists, had influenced him most; and in his study of their works led to a correspondence with the former, published after his death by Norris as an appendix to his Platonically conceived essay on *The Theory and Regulation of Love*. He also corresponded with Mrs Astell q. Some time before this Norris had taken orders, and in he was presented to the living of Newton St Loe, in Somersetshire. In he published a volume of *Discourses upon the Beatitudes*, followed by three more volumes of *Practical Discourses* between and He at once appreciated its importance, but its whole temper was alien from the modes of thought in which he had been reared, and its main conclusions moved him to keen dissent. He hastened to "review" it in an appendix to his sermons. These *Cursory Reflections* constitute Norris the first critic of the *Essay*; and they anticipate some of the arguments that have since been persistently urged against Locke from the transcendental side. He also suggests the possibility of subconscious ideation, on which Leibnitz laid so much stress in the same connexion. He next complains that Locke neglects to tell us "what kind of things these ideas are which are let in at the gate of the senses. Unless we come to some conclusion on this point, Norris argues, we have little chance of being right in our theory of how ideas "come to be united to our mind. In " he was engaged in controversy with his old enemies the "Separatists," and with the Quakers, his Malebranchian theory of the divine illumination having been confounded by some with the Quaker doctrine of the light within. Norris adopts the distinction between things contrary to reason and things above reason, and maintains that the human mind is not the measure of truth. Reason, according to him, is nothing but the exact measure of truth, that is to say, divine reason, which differs from human reason only in degree, not in nature. In appeared the first volume of the systematic philosophical work by which he is remembered, *An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*. The first volume treats the intelligible world absolutely; the second, which appeared in , considers it in relation to human understanding. It is a complete ex-position of the system of Malebranche, in which Norris refutes the assertions of Locke and the sensualists. In Norris wrote *A Philosophical Discourse concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul*, defending that doctrine against the assaults of Dodwell. After this he wrote little. He died at Bemerton, and a monument was erected to his memory in the parish church, with an inscription in which he is spoken of as one who "bene latuit. His philosophy is hardly more than an English version of Malebranche, enriched by wide reading of "Platonic thinkers of every age and country. His style is too scholastic and self-involved. His *Theory of the Intelligible World* is an attempt to explain the objective nature of truth, which he blamed Locke for leaving out of regard. By the intelligible world Norris understands the system of ideas eternally existent in the mind of God, according to which the material creation was formed. This ideal system he identifies with the Logos "the second person of the Trinity, the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. For it is these ideas and their relations that are alone the object-matter of science; whenever we know, it is because they are present to our mind. Material things are wholly dark to us, except so far as the fact of their existence is revealed in sensation. The matter which we say that we know is the idea of matter, and belongs, like other ideas, to the intelligible world. He occupies a place, therefore, in the succession of churchly and mystical thinkers of whom Coleridge is the last eminent example. See Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* ed. Tulloch, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the 17th Century*, who calls Norris "as striking and significant a figure in the history of English philosophy" as another idealist, Berkeley.