

Chapter 1 : Fatima | Netflix

a) In the shadow of 'just wars': b) violence, politics, and humanitarian action / c) MÃ©decins sans frontiÃ©res ; edited by Fabrice Weissman ; translations from the French by Vincent Homolka, Roger Leverdier, and Fiona Terry ; English text edited by Fiona Terry.

One of the main purposes of her trip was to determine the role Algeria might play in a future military intervention. Algerian media reports remain divided, however, over whether military intervention is desirable, and several articles suggest that while Algiers has identified political processes it favors with respect to Mali, it has yet to decide on a desired end state from negotiations or military action. Algeria is often deeply skeptical of international intervention schemes. As a former colony of Franceâ€”born out of an eight-year war for independenceâ€”Algeria jealously guards its sovereignty. Between Washington and Paris? Longer, deeper articles from October focused on security and Mali. These were somewhat consistent in their emphasis on describing shared U. These reports tended to focus on differences in Algerian and French views of the heavily Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Eddine, with which Algeria has reportedly engaged in discussions and negotiations during the last several months another track of talks has been led by officials from Burkina Faso. It refuses, however, to be directly involved in this process which it considers highly risky. It briefly reflected on U. The article quoted U. One strand of Algerian press accounts presented the Clinton visit as an Algerian attempt to play Washington off of Paris as a means of conditioning international plans for an intervention in a way favorable to the Algerian position. In opposition-oriented sources, similar narratives emerged, although with a closer eye toward their domestic implications. For example, the French-language opposition paper *Le Matin* carried similar reports to those found in the *Tout Sur Algerie* article. What does Algiers see in Iyad Ag Ghaly? It implies that Algeria will likely play a role in an intervention but will probably seek to shape its scope according to its own interests and concerns. Algerian elite opinion appears divided as to the merits and viability of an intervention in Mali. While much of the reporting indicates perceptions of shared Algerian and U. It does not appear, however, that Algeria rejects military intervention in general. Instead, Algeria prefers a longer timeline for a potential intervention and sees this outcome less optimal than an alternative process. At the same time, media discussion shows that Algeria fears being drawn into an international military effort in Mali from which it cannot extract itself. Kal Ben Khalid is a Washington, D. The views expressed here are his alone. It has been particularly active in Timbuktu, and the Kidal region. The group is strongly comprised of a mix of Malian Arabs, Songhai, Arabs and others; it is rumored to have links to Gao-area merchant families and drug traffickers. Algeria and the Conflict in Mali Washington, D. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

DOWNLOAD PDF ALGERIA : THE UTILITY OF TERRORISM CHAWKI AMARI

Chapter 2 : In the Shadow of Just Wars : Medecins Sans Frontieres :

On March 4, , an appeals court in Jijel upheld the defamation conviction of Ali Chawki Amari, a columnist for the independent al-Watan daily, and Omar Belhouchet, its director, for accusing a.

Royce Chairman of the Subcommittee presiding. This hearing will now come to order. On this day, Americans will appropriately remember their fallen countrymen. Inevitably, the question will be asked: Yes, we are, but the unfortunate reality is that the Islamist terrorist threat to our country will endure, perhaps for decades. Recently, British authorities disrupted a plot to simultaneously explode up to 10 commercial airliners over the Atlantic Ocean en route to the United States. I was in Haifa during one of those attacks and I saw the damage. These rockets can only be fired indiscriminately and are used to terrorize civilians. I saw a hospital, Rambam, where there were over people injured by these rocket attacks. Prime Minister Olmert suggested to me that the press revelations of intelligence and security methods have hampered their counterterrorism efforts. Just as the terrorists have evolved, we as a Government and society must evolve too. Judge Richard Posner wrote last month: We should learn a few lessons from others who have extensive experience in dealing with terrorism on their soil. One way to do this would be to restart the debate over the creation of a domestic intelligence service without police powers, similar to the British MI5. Criminal prosecution and intelligence collection are vastly different tasks, and to date, several have given the FBI poor marks on intelligence collection. The challenge is grave. Complacency is another enemy we face, including here at home, where things as elementary as border security have been woefully neglected, as the Subcommittee heard in July field hearings. Given the large number of people around the world already sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, this will be a monumental effort. But with proliferating access to WMD knowledge and material, none more important. All means of national power must be harnessed for this effort. I will close by commenting on the tendency of some to ascribe most every terrorist threat to our Nation. Listening to some would have you believe that there would be no terrorism were it not for supposed shortcomings of Administration policy. Homeland and national security policy, while not perfect, deserves credit for this. I will now turn to the Ranking Member for any opening comments he may have. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. It is appropriate as we approach the fifth anniversary of September 11 that we look at the last 5 years and we look at the global war on terror. And I want to echo your comments that this is not a matter where a change in U. And yet that was the very time that Osama bin Laden plotted his attacks. He wishes the destruction of the Saudi Government, and that would only whet his appetite until the Iberian Peninsula was once again returned to Islamic rule, et cetera, et cetera. We cannot appease those who demand one bite of the apple. We would whet their appetite for more. We most focus on one thing and that is nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian state. Now, the Administration has an image in the world as being super aggressive. The decision not to just confront and threaten Saddam, but to invade Iraq, is the one thing that the Administration is known for, and this was an area where they were over aggressive. But with the exception of the invasion of Iraq, this Administration has done little or nothing among the many things it should have done. Now, we also did invade Afghanistan, but my friend Dennis Kucinich voted for that. It is hard to say the Administration was blazing trails of aggressiveness in its decision to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban. But it is in the area of dealing with Iran where we have been meekest and most ineffectual, and the centrifuges turn as we talk. He says we should bow down and surrender. Ahmadinejad, we already have. And as a result, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act may be extended by this Congress but will be ignored by this Administration. The Administration acquiesces in well over a billion dollars of concessionary World Bank loans. So I have to go back to my constituents, some of whom, as all of our constituents do, question whether we should have an assertive foreign policy or foreign aid or any involvement. Isolationism has always been a strain in America. And I have to admit to them that while I support foreign aid, a portion of our foreign aid money is going to Tehran, and the Administration let it happen. Of course, the money gets laundered at the World Bank before it actually goes to Tehran. Unlike

every other Iranian, he is not subject to fingerprinting. We decide to use taxpayer dollars to subsidize the terrorism tour, the terrorism promotion tour of President Khatami. Yes, our tax dollars are paying for his security. Do we invite the number two or the number three or the number 5 official of al-Qaeda to tour our country? Today, during the Bush Administration, United States taxpayer dollars are used to provide safe harbor and protection for Khatami. So, you see, everything is balanced. We need an Administration that really places stopping Iran having nuclear weapons as its number one priority, not just in word but in deed. The problem with this Administration is that it has literally hundreds of first priorities. Oh, sure, getting Russian cooperation in the Security Council on the Iran issue is a number one priority. So we have a circumstance where we will not link in our discussions with Russia anything they care about with what we supposedly link as a first priority. Likewise, in dealing with China, we never link their currency manipulation and our willingness to turn a blind eye to it with their support for Iran and the Security Council. The result will be either no sanctions or ridiculously weak sanctions. We will not be able to turn to the Iranian people and point out to them that there is an economic cost and a world relationship cost to the policy of their government to keep the centrifuges turning. And the only bright spot for this Administration is that the Iranian nuclear test will not occur until after it leaves office. I think a foreign policy that refuses linkage in our discussions with Russia and China, and that admits Khatami for a tour of the United States for him to support terrorism, indicates that Mr. I understand that two of our witnesses have travel plans. I apologize for our late start because we had a series of votes on the Floor. Perhaps we should go to Mr. Peter Brookes and Mr. I will briefly introduce the two of you. If you summarize to 3 minutes, and then we could ask you some questions; and then, Dr. Phares, we will go to you and Mr. Sanderson, and we will be back on schedule. He was recently appointed by Congress as a member of the U. Among his previous positions he has served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and as a staff member on this very Committee. He is the lead author of War Footing: In addition to being a weekly columnist for the Washington Times, Mr. Gaffney has also contributed to a number of national publications. Gentlemen, we will start with Mr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor and privilege to be here with you today and be back in my old haunts when I served under Chairman Ben Gilman. I also want to commend you for this very timely hearing. Pull the microphone a little closer. I will just go ahead and summarize quickly, Mr. Chairman, so we can try to move along as quickly as possible. I remember where I was on September I chose a later flight, but I was out there on the taxiway. I disagree with many of those who say today that the threat is no longer with us. I think that that is exactly what those who wish to hurt us would like us to believe. I think we have made progress in fighting terrorism, but my view is that this long war is far from over. I am concerned about some recent events such as the stalemate in the war between Israel and Hezbollah and how it may have buoyed the political Islamists and Islamist extremists, and that is particularly troubling to me. Iran and Afghanistan also continue to be significant and highly symbolic challenges on the terror front. I think a premature withdrawal from either would only embolden Islamic radicals and terrorist extremists in their efforts, leading to more death and destruction for Americans and others. I think we are dealing with a protean or evolving enemy. A lot of these terrorists, as you know, are home grown. They are being radicalized by clerics over the Internet, by terrorist recruiters. Terrorist groups now not only include males, but there are women; there are even pregnant mothers, as we saw in the U. It makes it less predictable overall and more challenging to defeat. I do believe also that our first line of defense is good, actionable intelligence. That definitely includes the most vigorous collection and analysis of foreign and domestic terrorist-related information that our domestic laws and American values such as civil liberties will permit. International intelligence and law enforcement operations are a force multiplier in fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. Al-Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve and evolve their operational terrorist techniques and trade craft and are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their handiwork.

Chapter 3 : Algeria: Youth Aspire To e-Revolution – Eurasia Review

CHAWKI AMARI HAD long hoped to go behind bars. "I had tried to obtain permission to visit Algeria's prisons for an article, without success," the award-winning Algiers-based writer told Index. "I had tried to obtain permission to visit Algeria's prisons for an article, without success," the award-winning Algiers-based writer told Index.

Ready to fight back? Sign up for Take Action Now and get three actions in your inbox every week. You can read our Privacy Policy here. Thank you for signing up. For more from The Nation, check out our latest issue. Support Progressive Journalism The Nation is reader supported: Travel With The Nation Be the first to hear about Nation Travels destinations, and explore the world with kindred spirits. Sign up for our Wine Club today. Did you know you can support The Nation by drinking wine? This piece was originally posted at IntlLawGrrls on January 15, He later died of his injuries. These were met with brutality by the security forces, a grim reality that simply provoked more protest. Unarmed demonstrators were regularly teargassed. As many as people were shot or beaten to death. But the protesters marched on. This largely peaceful, democratic revolution on the side of the opposition at least was not led by or inspired by the fundamentalist movements that have tried to claim the oppositional space in many Arab and North African contexts in recent years. It was instead, by all accounts, a largely secular appeal for real political reform and for social justice. This is what Noam Chomsky has called the threat of a good example. One dictator brought down by popular revolt – no dictator is safe now. Hope is a powerful, incandescent force. Hope in the political realm has been a rare commodity of late in this part of the world. But, just as the power of hope should not be underestimated, neither should the danger of hopes unfulfilled. It is unclear exactly what the future holds for Tunisia now. The government must respond to the grievances that first provoked these events – creating jobs, meeting human needs, fostering equality of all kinds, enabling freedom of expression and association, institutionalizing real social democracy – rather than simply engaging in window dressing that preserves the Tunisian system with a different figurehead. The international community, and the US government, should support this process. However, the immediate catalyst was likely the sharp increase in the price of staples like cooking oil and sugar at the beginning of the year. Some have suggested that the initial disturbances may have been provoked – perhaps by private interests that control the sugar and oil markets and were unhappy over government regulatory action in this arena. It is hard to say. However, even if this were the case, legitimate popular anger clearly took over from there. Some – only some – of the recent protests turned violent with young rioters throwing stones at police and passing cars, burning tires and looting shops. In fact, the Algerian government now uses the state of emergency to justify the banning of public gatherings of all kinds. For example, when I visited Algiers in late November to attend a meeting on a proposed draft law on violence against women, the meeting was declared officially non-authorized the day before it was to take place in the central Hotel Safir. Hence, it was held quietly instead in a small room at a more remote location, with many participants unable to attend. And it remains to be seen what the impact of the winds blowing from Tunisia now will be. To submit a correction for our consideration, click here. For Reprints and Permissions, click here.

Chapter 4 : North African People Power | The Nation

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While political violence is down considerably since the mids, the country confronted a new wave of bombings claimed by the al Qaeda Organization of the Islamic Maghreb. On November 12, , parliament approved, without debate, and by a vote of in favor, 21 against, and 8 abstentions, a constitutional amendment ending presidential term limits. This allows Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third five-year term in the spring of Freedom of Expression and Assembly The broadcast media are state-controlled and air almost no critical coverage of, or dissent on, government policies, but they do provide live telecasts of parliamentary sessions. Privately-owned newspapers enjoy a considerably freer scope, but repressive press laws, dependence on revenues from public-sector advertising, and other factors limit their freedom to criticize the government, the military, and the powerful. The press law imposes prison terms along with fines for defamation and for insulting government officials and state institutions. On March 4, , an appeals court in Jijel upheld the defamation conviction of Ali Chawki Amari, a columnist for the independent al-Watan daily, and Omar Belhouchet, its director, for accusing a governor of buying his mistress a car with public funds. In June the government stripped the Agence France-Presse bureau chief and an Algiers-based Reuters correspondent of their press credentials, accusing the former of overstating the number of casualties caused by a terrorist bombing that month, and the latter of reporting a bombing that never happened. As of November, the Reuters correspondent was still without credentials and thus unable to report for any foreign media. Pan-Arab television stations are popular among Algerian viewers. However, since the government has banned the most popular, Al Jazeera, from operating a news bureau inside the country. The court sentenced the Kubba-based lawyer to six months in prison and a fine. Sidhoum remained free pending an appeal hearing, which at this writing had not taken place. Authorities used state of emergency powers to ban most public demonstrations and many gatherings. On October 5, authorities prevented a panel discussion in Algiers from taking place, organized by the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights on the riots that shook major Algerian cities in October The law provides prison terms for proselytizing by non-Muslims and forbids them from gathering to worship except in state-approved locations. Authorities have refused numerous applications submitted by Protestant Christian groups to use buildings for worship, putting their members at risk of prosecution for worship in unauthorized places. On January 30, , in Maghnia, a court sentenced priest Pierre Wallez to one year in prison for ministering to clandestine sub-Saharan immigrants in an "unauthorized" location, a sentence that an appeals court later reduced to a two-month term, suspended. In September a court in Biskra sentenced six Muslim men to four years in prison and a fine for eating during the fasting hours of Ramadan, under article bis 2 of the penal code, which criminalizes acts that are offensive to Islam. An appeals court overturned the verdict. Impunity for Past Abuses Over , Algerians died during the political strife of the s. Thousands more were "disappeared" by security forces or abducted by armed groups fighting the government and have never been located, dead or alive. Perpetrators of atrocities during this era continue to enjoy impunity. The legal framework for that impunity is the Law on Peace and National Reconciliation, which provides an amnesty to security force members for the actions they took in the name of combating terrorism, and to armed group members not implicated in the most heinous acts. The law promises compensation for families of "disappeared" persons but at the same time makes it a crime to denigrate state institutions or security forces for the way they conducted themselves during the period of political strife. Authorities have repeatedly harassed associations representing families of the "disappeared" who protest state policies by continuing to demand justice for the perpetrators or at least that the state provide information about the fate of their missing relatives. For example, a Constantine court on March 26, , convicted Louisa Saker, Rabah Boulagheb, and Sofiane Mehamlia, all relatives of "disappeared," for their role in a demonstration related to

the issue. The court convicted Saker of participation in an unauthorized demonstration, while Boulagheb and Mehamlia were convicted in absentia of that charge in addition to charges of violence, theft, and undermining the authority of public officials. Their appeals trial was in progress as of November. Torture, Incommunicado Detention, and the Death Penalty Algeria amended its penal code in to make torture an explicit crime. Nevertheless, Amnesty International "continues to regularly receive reports of incommunicado detention of suspects in unofficial places of detention and torture by the DRS [Department for Information and Security]. Despite pronouncing hundreds of death sentences in recent years, Algeria has observed a de facto moratorium on carrying out the death penalty since Terrorism and Counterterrorism From January to September at least people were reported killed in more than 21 bombings claimed mostly by the al Qaida Organization of the Islamic Maghreb. The largest of them, a car bomb outside a police academy in Issers on August 19, reportedly killed 44 people and injured On December 11, , two bombs exploded a few minutes apart in Algiers, one targeting the United Nations office and the other going off in front of the Constitutional Council. The blasts killed 41 and injured over , according to news agencies. The Algerian government said the bombs killed Security forces, presumably the DRS, immediately took into custody two Algerians whom the United States transferred from Guantanamo Bay in July , held them incommunicado for 12 days, and charged them with membership in a terrorist organization and use of false travel documents. The court then granted their pretrial release. A court filed the same charges against, and then granted pretrial release to, two other Algerians whom the United States sent from Guantanamo in August. The penal code definition of terrorism is so broad that it can be used to prosecute the nonviolent exercise of civil liberties. The definition includes, for example, "any action that targets state security The Polisario Front allows camp residents to criticize its management of day-to-day issues, but marginalizes those who openly challenge its rule or general political orientation. There were, however, no confirmed reports that the Polisario had detained anyone for political reasons during or the first half of In refugees were largely free to leave the camps if they wished, via Mauritania. Key International Actors Despite serving on the UN Human Rights Council in , Algeria continued during its non-compliance with longstanding requests for country visits by the UN special rapporteurs on torture; on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism; and on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions. The United States provides almost no financial aid to oil-rich Algeria but the two countries have grown closer, notably as allies in counterterrorism.

Chapter 5 : Refworld | World Report - Algeria

ALGIERS "At the height of Algeria's civil war in the s, Chawki Amari never slept in the same apartment two nights in a row. Like many journalists, he was caught between Islamic militants.

For example, authorities make frequent claims that terrorism is "residual" and have accused the press of blowing it out of proportion. But this is the area where press censorship is most strict. Government restrictions on expression in Algeria violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Algeria has ratified. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The Covenant allows certain restrictions on this right, including for the protection of national security or of public order Article 19 3 b. Derogations are also permitted in the event of "a public emergency which threatensthe life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed The Government of Algeria exercised the option provided in Article 4 3 for taking derogations by informing the United Nations Secretary-General of the imposition of the state of emergency see above. These actions go well beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" to protect "the life of the nation. Dozens of private dailies and weeklies and political party organs were launched. Radio, television, and the main news agency Algerie Presse Service, or APS remained in state hands, but they broadened their coverage to include hitherto taboo subjects, such as demands for Berber cultural and linguistic rights, and provided access to politicians critical of the authorities, including the leaders of the FIS. The print press continues to tackle some issues generally untouched in other parts of the region. Since however, press freedom has been steadily eroded by government pressures, censorship, and financial constraints, as well as by the violence against journalists that is generally attributed to Islamist groups. The erosion has been most dramatic at Algerian television and radio, which have reverted to being government mouthpieces see below. No discussion of press freedom is possible without considering the assassination campaign that has cost the lives of some fifty-nine journalists and media workers since Although individual killings have rarely been followed by claims of responsibility or court trials that identified the culprits, it is clear from publicly issued threats and occasional claims of responsibility that armed Islamist groups, and particularly the GIA, are responsible for many, if not most, of these assassinations. Statements attributed to Islamist groups have railed against a pro-government bias in the media. In fact, the journalists and others who have been slain do not share any particular political affiliation; some were secularist but critical of the government, while others had Islamist sympathies. The campaign of violence against journalists has clearly affected the ability of the press to inform the public. In addition to the members of the profession who have been killed, many have fled to other countries, fearing for their lives; others have dropped out of the profession. Those who continue to work take precautions such as sleeping in different locations, avoiding daily routines that might facilitate the work of an assassin, and skipping on-site reporting that they might otherwise undertake. All of this has taken a heavy toll on the ability of media to inform their readers. The government has exercised vigorous censorship of the independent press through various means, ranging from banning newspapers and jailing reporters to exerting financial pressures on the private print media, which in accounted for 77 percent of the total print press volume and 83 percent of sales. The press code provides the basis for significant restrictions on the press. It allows for the prosecution of journalists, editors and publishers for dissemination of "harmful" information. Article 86 provides five-to-ten-year prison sentences and fines for deliberately publishing or spreading "false or misleading information capable of harming national order or state security. The incitement by means of any information media to crimes or misdemeanors against state security or national unity, when the incitement produces these consequences, shall subject the director of the publication and the author of the offending article to penal sanctions as accomplices to the crimes and misdemeanors that are committed. If the provocation produces no consequences, the director and the author

shall be punished by imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 10, to , dinars, or one of the two. The Penal Code has also been used to prosecute journalists for defaming state institutions and agencies. Article 96 provides that anyone who disseminates, with an intent to persuade others, material "that may harm the national interest" is subject to a prison term of up to three years and a fine of up to 36, Algerian dinars approximately U. Article provides that anyone who wilfully causes grave offense to employees of the government in terms of the performance of their duties, shall be subject to a prison sentence and a fine. Article provides punishments for giving grave offense to state institutions, and Article for acts or words that "aim to discredit judicial decisions and that may harm the authority and independence of the judiciary. The state of emergency decrees provide for punishments for the publication or distribution of documents that attack symbols of the state, or "obstruct" the authorities. They define "terrorism" and "subversion" to include, among other things, acts "directed at state security, territorial integrity, the stability and normal functioning of institutions," whose purpose is to "impede the functioning of public institutions or harming the life or property of their agents, or impeding the application of laws or regulations. In March , the government issued a circular to the press instructing editors-in-chief to publish security-related information only if it was obtained from the official APS news agency. In February the interior ministry established "reading committees" at the print media to censor news reports that do not conform to the instructions. As a result of the security-related censorship, newspapers print almost nothing about losses sustained by security forces or reports implicating the regular security forces or paramilitary forces, in attacks on civilians or other human rights abuses. They are permitted to cover killings and massacres of civilians attributed by authorities to armed Islamist extremists, although the press has at different times been instructed either to play up or play down this sort of news and has been prevented from conducting independent investigations into massacres and reporting on its findings. During a spate of rural massacres in January, many of which were covered in the local press, Interior Minister Mustafa Benmansour accused journalists of "exaggerating the number of victims or even inventing acts of terrorism," and threatened unspecified sanctions against media that "play the game of terrorist propaganda. However, in April, papers resumed detailed stories of the carnage attributed to the armed groups, featuring quotes from survivors, the names of victims and their families, and photos of bodies in shrouds and damaged homes. Salima Ghezali has said that the newspaper she edits, La Nation, refuses to cover security incidents because it believes that government restrictions on coverage make objective reporting impossible. Belhadj Abdel Razek, director of the office of public liberties at the Interior Ministry, minimized the extent of state interference in the press. We try not to control the press. In addition, four or five private papers have sometimes, in defiance of the restrictions, coordinated the publication on a given day of the same, independently obtained report, making it politically more difficult for the authorities to seize all the papers for the day, according to several Algerian journalists working for private newspapers. According to these journalists and other observers, when official coverage of a security-related incident is allowed, such as an attack attributed to Islamists, reporters for the Algerian media are generally escorted as a group by armed members of the security forces, who generally remain present during interviews with survivors or eyewitnesses. Sometimes the forces allow some journalists to take pictures, conduct interviews with family members, but journalists are never free to go on their own," a journalist working for an Algerian daily and who asked to remain anonymous told us. While most attacks by armed groups in rural areas have been attributed by authorities to Islamist groups, the "self-defense" militia are suspected in some of them, many Algerians told us. However, even if these areas were open to reporters who wished to investigate, state censorship would prevent the dissemination of any findings that implicated the military-backed militia or regular security forces. Foreign journalists must obtain visas to visit Algeria, which are sometimes refused. Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times was denied a visa during the early months of , although she was granted one in May, during the election campaign. Those who are allowed in are assigned security force escorts by the foreign press center attached to the foreign ministry, ostensibly for their own protection. Authorities reject attempts by journalists to waive this escort. Resident foreign journalists are allowed to move free of escorts, but their coverage of security-related incidents, such as the recent rural

massacres, is tightly controlled by military security or government-backed militia who have accompanied reporters to the scene of the incident and have remained nearby during interviews with witnesses or survivors. Visiting foreign reporters have complained that the "protection" hampers their freedom of movement and often intimidates people they wish to interview. Peter Strandberg, a journalist for several European newspapers, said that when he traveled in April to Tizi-Ouzou, a provincial capital east of Algiers, he was accompanied by some twenty-five military personnel in army vehicles, six of them in plainclothes. They accompanied him, over his objections, into a coffeehouse, a textile factory, a mosque and a school. The plainclothes escorts later asked some of the people Strandberg spoke to for an account of their conversation, Strandberg said. He complained about the interference to the press center but got no reply. So as soon as the press denounces the economic and political mafia," they face trouble. La Tribune, a French-language daily, was suspended for six months and its publisher and editor given one-year suspended sentences in September for a satirical cartoon that "profaned" the Algerian flag. After a month in preventive detention, the cartoonist, Chawki Amari, was given a suspended three-year sentence for desecrating a national emblem by his cartoon printed on July 2. It showed two men walking underneath flags draped across a street. When the paper resumed publication, Amari and editor-in-chief Baya Gacemi quit their posts. Since its resumption, Ms. Gacemi said La Tribune has moderated its criticism of the authorities. A journalist recently detained without charge or trial told us of his experience. I was paralyzed with fear. They searched my room and dragged me out to a car and pushed me inside, lowering my head to the ground. Yousfi said he was kept for fifteen days in numerous detention centers that he could not identify, since he had been blindfolded when he was transferred. When they brought me in court, the prosecutor looked confused and said he had no charge against me. The judge acquitted me immediately. I demanded compensation, but the judge told me I should just be relieved that I am free. He had been arrested in connection with a report he had filed on the internal APS wire disclosing the place where Ali Belhadj, the second in command of the FIS, was held. The internal APS wire goes to the President and government ministers. Benaamane disappeared February 27, , and his whereabouts were unknown until El-Watan reported almost two months later that he had been arrested. The fate of at least three other journalists who have "disappeared" over the last three years remains unknown. He had been jailed twice before since His wife, Safia, stated that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from his home in el-Harrache by men they believed to belong to the security forces. His family has been unable to obtain information on his whereabouts, but Amnesty International reported that, according to information it had received, he was being held in the Chateaneuf military security center in Algiers. In , the interior ministry banned weeklies and dailies on at least six occasions. Journalists at the paper attributed the censorship to the coverage of government counterinsurgency operations. At least four Arabic-language dailies and weeklies were suspended by the authorities between and and have not reappeared since. They include Assah Afa, a satirical weekly suspended and accused in August of being a de facto FIS "mouthpiece" and Djazair el-Yom, suspended twice in and again in These include La Nation and its Arabic-language sister weekly, al-Hourria, private papers that favored the National Contract see above and wrote critically of the presidential elections. Neither has been able to resume publication since December , when the Algiers Printing Press SIA refused to print the papers until they paid their debts. Its owner was charged with "endangering state security," following an interview with a FIS leader Abdelkader Omar in August No official reasons were given for the suspensions. In one instance, the issue carried a large report on human rights in Algeria co-published with Le Monde Diplomatique in March In another instance the issue of Al-Hourria featured a review of a book on human rights in Algeria. The sole private press, Sodipresse, was closed down in April, less than three months after its launching. One owner, Saad Lounas, was arrested on April 10, and sentenced to thirty months in prison on April 28 for allegedly writing a check with insufficient funds to the public-sector Algiers Printing Press SIA. Lounas has appealed his sentence. He is also editor of an Arabic-language daily El-Oumma, which has not been published since the closure of Sodipresse. El-Oumma and the Arabic-language weekly Ech-Chorouk, which was also printed by Sodipresse, both favor a political dialogue with Islamists. Khadija

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Dahnani, a graduate in Islamic theology who wrote political and economic stories critical of the government, was killed near her home in December. Hamaoui Mokrane, marketing director at Ech-Chorouk, was killed in October by gunmen who fired at his car. The government said security forces later shot dead his killers. An appeals court upheld the ruling at the end of April, but two weeks later the paper was still not in print. So for the moment we are still suspended. The illiteracy rate is estimated to be 43 percent.

Chapter 6 : In the shadow of 'just wars' : violence, politics, and humanitarian action - JH Libraries

Essays written by scholars, journalists and humanitarian relief workers look at humanitarian crises of the past five years for their successes and failures, and suggest that humanitarian action has often failed to live up to its ideals.

Defamation is used as a bludgeon against free expression, practiced by the rich and powerful against the small and powerless. This is the way defamation laws are abused in Thailand and elsewhere. Repeal defamation law NOW! Like many journalists, he was caught between Islamic militants who threatened to take his life and a military-backed government that threatened to take his freedom. In May, a court sentenced him to two months in prison for defamation, his first prison sentence in more than a decade. The government eventually ushered in a tense peace and even a fragile national reconciliation. But the political structure remains under tight control, with little opportunity for people to register dissent. Media freedom has proved a good barometer for the fragile space between the state and the Islamists, and dozens of people from different backgrounds indicated in conversations in recent days that this space is shrinking. The surge in threats against journalists has coincided with popular discontent over a proposal to allow President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third term in . Journalists in Algeria still have more freedom than their counterparts in most Arab countries, thanks to the constitutional changes that in paved the way for parliamentary elections in December . And many journalists depended on the government for protection in the s and increasingly do so today, if on a lesser scale. Nobody can be certain of the origin of the recent threats and no journalists have been killed since the s, when more than 70 were killed and many more fled the country, according to the Algerian chapter of the International Federation of Journalists. In that era, car bombs exploded nearly every week, intellectuals and women not conforming to Islamic traditions received death threats and as many as , people were killed. But after six suicide bombings this year – the most recent two on Dec. Mouloud Hamrouche, a former prime minister who had warned against canceling the second round of parliamentary elections in January , said in an interview: Hamrouche noted that nationwide riots in October led the government to call the elections in the first place. Let them face the challenge of governance. I am persuaded they will fail. Today, the Islamic Salvation Front, the party that was expected to win the second round in January , remains outlawed, and the turnout in tightly regulated elections often barely exceeds one-third. Sporadic threats to national newspapers over the past six months, by fax and mail, have been signed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, said the three senior newspaper editors who discussed the threats and who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they had not informed their own staff members. On June 10, Anis Rahmani, an outspoken national security analyst, received an e-mail message in which Islamic militants threatened to kidnap him and a female colleague at El Chourouk, of which he was then the editor. Rahmani of working for Algerian intelligence. A month later, the security services told Mr. Rahmani that evidence had emerged that a Qaeda-related group was planning to assassinate him. Several journalists said they had also felt state control tighten. Amari, the commentator and cartoonist, is appealing the two-month prison sentence and a fine for accusing a state governor of corruption. Fattani said he had been taken to court times since . Last month, the United Nations Human Rights Committee said that it was concerned that the Algerian government continued to intimidate journalists and that it suspected that the government had secret detention centers for terrorist suspects. We are war correspondents, but we are war correspondents in our own country.

DOWNLOAD PDF ALGERIA : THE UTILITY OF TERRORISM CHAWKI AMARI

Chapter 7 : Algeria: Threats to press freedom-NY Times | FACT - Freedom Against Censorship Thailand

ALGIERS "At the height of the civil war in the s, Chawki Amari never slept in the same apartment two nights in a row. Like many journalists, he was caught between Islamic militants who.

Artikel bewerten In this text international experts and members of the MSF analyse the way issues surrounding the role of aid organizations in "just" wars have crystallized over the five years spanning the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. While military intervention in Iraq was being planned, humanitarian organizations were offered US government funds to join the Coalition and operate under the umbrella of "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Indeed many aid agencies cooperated eagerly, subordinating their specific aims to the greater goal of "peace, democracy and human rights". Few Afghans or Sierra Leoneans regret the interventions. However, the inconvenient victims of these triumphs, those from the "wrong" side, are quickly forgotten. These are individuals whom humanitarian organizations have the duty to save, yet in doing so they must remain independent of the warring parties, and refrain from joining in the "struggle against evil" or any other political agenda. Then there are places where the pretence of providing assistance allows donor governments to disguise their backing of local political powers. Lastly there are those whose sacrifice is politically irrelevant in the wider scope of international relations. In circumstances such as these, what little international aid is available collides head-on with the mutual desire of the adversaries to wage "total" war that may lead to the extermination of entire populations. In this book, international experts and members of the MSF analyse the way these issues have crystallized over the five years spanning the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. The authors make the case for a renewed commitment to an old idea: Fabrice Weissman, research director of the MSF Foundation, is the author of many works on humanitarian aid and the political economy of conflict. Victims of no importance - Marc Le Pape; Colombia: Violence versus politics - Michel Agier; Algeria: Feeding totalitarianism - Fiona Terry; Angola: Woe to the vanquished - Christine Messiant; Sudan: Who benefits from humanitarian aid? Peace at any price - Fabrice Weissman; Liberia: The logic of orchestrated chaos - Jean-Herve Jezequel; Afghanistan: The end of an era?

Chapter 8 : 07 | December | | Algerian Review

A brief opinion piece by well-known commentator Chawki Amari from the same day described Algeria as being pressured to allow its airspace to be used for an intervention but "unofficially, it [Algeria] is playing the benefits of America against those of France."[27] *The piece criticized the Algerian government for not being clearer with its.*

UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Events of As the Algerian economy benefited from the worldwide surge in oil prices, Algerians continued to suffer restrictions on civil liberties, under a state of emergency imposed in , and the government continued impunity for past and present abuses. While political violence is down considerably since the mids, the country confronted a new wave of bombings claimed by the al Qaeda Organization of the Islamic Maghreb. On November 12, , parliament approved, without debate, and by a vote of in favor, 21 against, and 8 abstentions, a constitutional amendment ending presidential term limits. This allows Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third five-year term in the spring of Freedom of Expression and Assembly The broadcast media are state-controlled and air almost no critical coverage of, or dissent on, government policies, but they do provide live telecasts of parliamentary sessions. Privately-owned newspapers enjoy a considerably freer scope, but repressive press laws, dependence on revenues from public-sector advertising, and other factors limit their freedom to criticize the government, the military, and the powerful. The press law imposes prison terms along with fines for defamation and for insulting government officials and state institutions. On March 4, , an appeals court in Jijel upheld the defamation conviction of Ali Chawki Amari, a columnist for the independent al-Watan daily, and Omar Belhouchet, its director, for accusing a governor of buying his mistress a car with public funds. In June the government stripped the Agence France-Presse bureau chief and an Algiers-based Reuters correspondent of their press credentials, accusing the former of overstating the number of casualties caused by a terrorist bombing that month, and the latter of reporting a bombing that never happened. As of November, the Reuters correspondent was still without credentials and thus unable to report for any foreign media. Pan-Arab television stations are popular among Algerian viewers. However, since the government has banned the most popular, Al Jazeera, from operating a news bureau inside the country. The court sentenced the Kubba-based lawyer to six months in prison and a fine. Sidhoum remained free pending an appeal hearing, which at this writing had not taken place. Authorities used state of emergency powers to ban most public demonstrations and many gatherings. On October 5, authorities prevented a panel discussion in Algiers from taking place, organized by the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights on the riots that shook major Algerian cities in October The law provides prison terms for proselytizing by non-Muslims and forbids them from gathering to worship except in state-approved locations. Authorities have refused numerous applications submitted by Protestant Christian groups to use buildings for worship, putting their members at risk of prosecution for worship in unauthorized places. On January 30, , in Maghnia, a court sentenced priest Pierre Wallez to one year in prison for ministering to clandestine sub-Saharan immigrants in an "unauthorized" location, a sentence that an appeals court later reduced to a two-month term, suspended. In September a court in Biskra sentenced six Muslim men to four years in prison and a fine for eating during the fasting hours of Ramadan, under article bis 2 of the penal code, which criminalizes acts that are offensive to Islam. An appeals court overturned the verdict. Impunity for Past Abuses Over , Algerians died during the political strife of the s. Thousands more were "disappeared" by security forces or abducted by armed groups fighting the government and have never been located, dead or alive. Perpetrators of atrocities during this era continue to enjoy impunity. The legal framework for that impunity is the Law on Peace and National Reconciliation, which provides an amnesty to security force members for the actions they took in the name of combating terrorism, and to armed group members not implicated in the most heinous acts. The law promises compensation for families of "disappeared" persons but at the same time makes it a crime to denigrate state institutions or security forces for the way they conducted themselves during the period of political strife. Authorities have

repeatedly harassed associations representing families of the "disappeared" who protest state policies by continuing to demand justice for the perpetrators or at least that the state provide information about the fate of their missing relatives. For example, a Constantine court on March 26, , convicted Louisa Saker, Rabah Boulagheb, and Sofiane Mehamlia, all relatives of "disappeared," for their role in a demonstration related to the issue. The court convicted Saker of participation in an unauthorized demonstration, while Boulagheb and Mehamlia were convicted in absentia of that charge in addition to charges of violence, theft, and undermining the authority of public officials. Their appeals trial was in progress as of November. Torture, Incommunicado Detention, and the Death Penalty Algeria amended its penal code in to make torture an explicit crime. Nevertheless, Amnesty International "continues to regularly receive reports of incommunicado detention of suspects in unofficial places of detention and torture by the DRS [Department for Information and Security]. Despite pronouncing hundreds of death sentences in recent years, Algeria has observed a de facto moratorium on carrying out the death penalty since Terrorism and Counterterrorism From January to September at least people were reported killed in more than 21 bombings claimed mostly by the al Qaida Organization of the Islamic Maghreb. The largest of them, a car bomb outside a police academy in Issers on August 19, reportedly killed 44 people and injured On December 11, , two bombs exploded a few minutes apart in Algiers, one targeting the United Nations office and the other going off in front of the Constitutional Council. The blasts killed 41 and injured over , according to news agencies. The Algerian government said the bombs killed Security forces, presumably the DRS, immediately took into custody two Algerians whom the United States transferred from Guantanamo Bay in July , held them incommunicado for 12 days, and charged them with membership in a terrorist organization and use of false travel documents. The court then granted their pretrial release. A court filed the same charges against, and then granted pretrial release to, two other Algerians whom the United States sent from Guantanamo in August. The penal code definition of terrorism is so broad that it can be used to prosecute the nonviolent exercise of civil liberties. The definition includes, for example, "any action that targets state security The Polisario Front allows camp residents to criticize its management of day-to-day issues, but marginalizes those who openly challenge its rule or general political orientation. There were, however, no confirmed reports that the Polisario had detained anyone for political reasons during or the first half of In refugees were largely free to leave the camps if they wished, via Mauritania. Key International Actors Despite serving on the UN Human Rights Council in , Algeria continued during its non-compliance with longstanding requests for country visits by the UN special rapporteurs on torture; on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism; and on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions. The United States provides almost no financial aid to oil-rich Algeria but the two countries have grown closer, notably as allies in counterterrorism.

Chapter 9 : World Report Algeria | Human Rights Watch

Separately, on May 27 Omar Belhouchet, editor of the daily El Watan, and columnist Chawki Amari were sentenced for libel to two months in jail and fined 1 million dinars (US\$14,) each for comments published in El Watan in June