

Chapter 1 : Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia

*A Faculty Theory of Knowledge: Hume's First Enquiry [George Stern] on [blog.quintoapp.com](http://blog.quintoapp.com) \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. This work draws together the strands of doctrine into the epistemological theory that Hume called 'a mental geography.'*

Existence-Nonexistence Necessity-Contingency While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it, he believes that this is the complete and necessary list of the a priori contributions that the understanding brings to its judgments of the world. Every judgment that the understanding can make must fall under the table of categories. And subsuming spatiotemporal sensations under the formal structure of the categories makes judgments, and ultimately knowledge, of empirical objects possible. Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist--he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us--knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in *The Refutation of Material Idealism*, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. In conjunction with his analysis of the possibility of knowing empirical objects, Kant gives an analysis of the knowing subject that has sometimes been called his transcendental psychology. Kant draws several conclusions about what is necessarily true of any consciousness that employs the faculties of sensibility and understanding to produce empirical judgments. As we have seen, a mind that employs concepts must have a receptive faculty that provides the content of judgments. Space and time are the necessary forms of apprehension for the receptive faculty. The mind that has experience must also have a faculty of combination or synthesis, the imagination for Kant, that apprehends the data of sense, reproduces it for the understanding, and recognizes their features according to the conceptual framework provided by the categories. The mind must also have a faculty of understanding that provides empirical concepts and the categories for judgment. The various faculties that make judgment possible must be unified into one mind. And it must be identical over time if it is going to apply its concepts to objects over time. Judgments would not be possible, Kant maintains, if the mind that senses is not the same as the mind that possesses the forms of sensibility. And that mind must be the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical concepts to judgment, and that synthesizes the whole into knowledge of a unified, empirical world. So the fact that we can empirically judge proves, contra Hume, that the mind cannot be a mere bundle of disparate introspected sensations. In his works on ethics Kant will also argue that this mind is the source of spontaneous, free, and moral action. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come together in this "highest point" which he calls the transcendental unity of apperception. First, in his analysis of sensibility, he argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation. Then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. He concludes that the categories provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our

experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations. The cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible. Within the *Analytic*, Kant first addresses the challenge of subsuming particular sensations under general categories in the *Schematism* section. Transcendental schemata, Kant argues, allow us to identify the homogeneous features picked out by concepts from the heterogeneous content of our sensations. Judgment is only possible if the mind can recognize the components in the diverse and disorganized data of sense that make those sensations an instance of a concept or concepts. A schema makes it possible, for instance, to subsume the concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale, a Chihuahua, and a Labrador all under the more abstract concept "dog. That is, the role of the mind in making nature is not limited to space, time, and the categories. In the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant argues that even the necessary conformity of objects to natural law arises from the mind. In the sections titled the *Axioms*, *Anticipations*, *Analogies*, and *Postulates*, he argues that there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects.

**Axioms of Intuition** All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

**Anticipations of Perception** Analogies of Experience In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i. In all variations by appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased. All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect. All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.

**Postulates of Empirical Thought** What agrees in terms of intuition and concepts with the formal conditions of experience is possible. What coheres with the material conditions of experience with sensation is actual. That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary exists necessarily 6. The purpose of the *Analytic*, we are told, is "the rarely attempted dissection of the power of the understanding itself. Kant calls judgments that pretend to have knowledge beyond these boundaries and that even require us to tear down the limits that he has placed on knowledge, transcendent judgments. The *Transcendental Dialectic* section of the book is devoted to uncovering the illusion of knowledge created by transcendent judgments and explaining why the temptation to believe them persists. Kant argues that the proper functioning of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding combine to draw reason, or the cognitive power of inference, inexorably into mistakes. The faculty of reason naturally seeks the highest ground of unconditional unity. It seeks to unify and subsume all particular experiences under higher and higher principles of knowledge. But sensibility cannot by its nature provide the intuitions that would make knowledge of the highest principles and of things as they are in themselves possible. Nevertheless, reason, in its function as the faculty of inference, inevitably draws conclusions about what lies beyond the boundaries of sensibility. Corresponding to the three basic kinds of syllogism are three dialectic mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge that cannot be real. The *Dialectic* explains the illusions of reason in these sections. But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. In the *Paralogisms*, Kant argues that a failure to recognize the difference between appearances and things in themselves, particularly in the case of the introspected self, leads us into transcendent error. Kant argues against several conclusions encouraged by Descartes and the rational psychologists, who believed they could build human knowledge from the "I think" of the cogito argument. From the "I think" of self-awareness we can infer, they maintain, that the self or soul is 1 simple, 2 immaterial, 3 an identical substance and 4 that we perceive it directly, in contrast to external objects whose existence is merely possible. That is, the rational psychologists claimed to have knowledge of the self as transcendently real. Kant believes that it is impossible to demonstrate any of these four claims, and that the mistaken claims to knowledge stem from a failure to see the real nature of our apprehension of the "I. But to take the self as an object of knowledge here is to pretend to have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. Our representation of the "I" itself is empty. It is subject to the condition of inner sense, time, but not the condition of outer sense, space, so it cannot be a proper object of knowledge. It can be thought through concepts, but without the commensurate

spatial and temporal intuitions, it cannot be known. Each of the four paralogisms explains the categorical structure of reason that led the rational psychologists to mistake the self as it appears to us for the self as it is in itself. We have already mentioned the Antinomies, in which Kant analyzes the methodological problems of the Rationalist project. Kant sees the Antinomies as the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and dogmatism about knowledge of the world. Each antinomy has a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proven, and since each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience. The First Antinomy argues both that the world has a beginning in time and space, and no beginning in time and space. The Fourth Antinomy contains arguments both for and against the existence of a necessary being in the world. The seemingly irreconcilable claims of the Antinomies can only be resolved by seeing them as the product of the conflict of the faculties and by recognizing the proper sphere of our knowledge in each case. In the first Antinomy, the world as it appears to us is neither finite since we can always inquire about its beginning or end, nor is it infinite because finite beings like ourselves cannot cognize an infinite whole. As an empirical object, Kant argues, it is indefinitely constructable for our minds. As it is in itself, independent of the conditions of our thought, it should not be identified as finite or infinite since both are categorical conditions of our thought. He considers the two competing hypotheses of speculative metaphysics that there are different types of causality in the world: The conflict between these contrary claims can be resolved, Kant argues, by taking his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossible for any cause to be thought of as uncaused itself in the realm of space and time. But reason, in trying to understand the ground of all things, strives to unify its knowledge beyond the empirical realm. The empirical world, considered by itself, cannot provide us with ultimate reasons. So if we do not assume a first or free cause we cannot completely explain causal series in the world. So for the Third Antinomy, as for all of the Antinomies, the domain of the Thesis is the intellectual, rational, noumenal world. The domain of the Antithesis is the spatiotemporal world. The Ideas of Reason The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge. Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in determining what ought to be as well. Kant believes that, "Human reason is by its nature architectonic. That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. I infer that "Caius is mortal" from the fact that "Caius is a man" and the universal claim, "All men are mortal."

## Chapter 2 : FacultyBooks - THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE FOR IB DIPLOMA

*School of the Arts Singapore (SOTA) 1 Zubir Said Drive, Administration Office #, Singapore +65 ; enquiries@blog.quintoapp.com*

The program is strongly grounded in leadership, human resource and organization development, and change management theory. Because human resource, organization and leadership development are applied fields, the goal of the PhD program is to develop highly skilled and innovative researchers and scholar-practitioners. This effectively prepares students for a wide range of careers ranging from academicians at leading educational institutions, professional consultants, human resource and organization development leaders, and other careers in which advanced research, analytical, and organization change capabilities are required. Achieve a broad understanding of the scholarly literature cross-cutting human resource development, leadership, and organizational development. Develop and communicate logical and coherent scholarly arguments through the critique of theory, research, and practice. Synthesize ideas and integrate theory, research findings, and practice from past and current publications. Demonstrate graduate-level writing skills including the appropriate use of primary and secondary resources, scholarly language, and the logical flow and sequencing of ideas. Understand diverse cultural world views and epistemologies and the social justice implications of knowledge, theory and practice. Connect the results of dissertation research to other relevant research and theory. Reflect on and develop applied practice skills in light of relevant theory and research. Doctoral training involves close collaboration with faculty members on shared research interests, coursework in human resource development, organization development and change, leadership and leadership development, and independent research activities. Students are encouraged to co-design their program of study in consultation with a faculty mentor in ways that are personally meaningful and which optimize student goals. For the dissertation, students collaborate with a faculty mentor to co-design a study that is often groundbreaking and which advances knowledge and science in a particular area of interest. The following is a partial list of dissertation research conducted by our PhD graduates: Self-direction in adult learning: Effect of locus of control and program design on learner motivation and training utility. Contributors to an enterprising sex: Examining the influence of creativity on entrepreneurial intentions and the moderating role of political skill controlling for gender. Dispositional influences on the intent to transfer learning: A test of a structural equation model. Workforce implications for hurricane affected Gulf Coast region industrial companies. A test of andragogy in a post-secondary educational setting. A theory of effective computer-based instruction for adults. The effectiveness of managerial leadership development programs: A meta-analysis of studies. Cognitive complexity, transformational leadership, and organizational outcomes. The early identification of business leaders: The development and validation of a leadership potential instrument.

**Chapter 3 : Aristotle. Theory of Knowledge. A brief history of Greek Philosophy - B.C. Burt.**

*This work draws together the strands of doctrine into the epistemological theory that Hume called "a mental geography," which translates in modern terms into a.*

Her surname is sometimes erroneously given as Porter. Immanuel Kant believed that his paternal grandfather Hans Kant was of Scottish origin. He was brought up in a Pietist household that stressed religious devotion, humility, and a literal interpretation of the Bible. He never married, but seemed to have a rewarding social life. He was a popular teacher and a modestly successful author even before starting on his major philosophical works. A common myth is that Kant never traveled more than 16 kilometres. Young scholar[ edit ] Kant showed a great aptitude for study at an early age. He first attended the Collegium Fridericianum from which he graduated at the end of the summer of 1754. Knutzen dissuaded Kant from the theory of pre-established harmony, which he regarded as "the pillow for the lazy mind". The theory of transcendental idealism that Kant later included in the Critique of Pure Reason was developed partially in opposition to traditional idealism. In 1755, he published his first philosophical work, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces written in 1753. Kant also correctly deduced that the Milky Way was a large disk of stars, which he theorized formed from a much larger spinning gas cloud. He further suggested that other distant "nebulae" might be other galaxies. These postulations opened new horizons for astronomy, for the first time extending it beyond the Solar System to galactic and intergalactic realms. In the early 1760s, Kant produced a series of important works in philosophy. Two more works appeared the following year: To miss this distinction would mean to commit the error of subreption, and, as he says in the last chapter of the dissertation, only in avoiding this error does metaphysics flourish. The issue that vexed Kant was central to what 20th-century scholars called "the philosophy of mind". The flowering of the natural sciences had led to an understanding of how data reaches the brain. Sunlight falling on an object is reflected from its surface in a way that maps the surface features color, texture, etc. The reflected light reaches the human eye, passes through the cornea, is focused by the lens onto the retina where it forms an image similar to that formed by light passing through a pinhole into a camera obscura. The retinal cells send impulses through the optic nerve and then they form a mapping in the brain of the visual features of the object. The interior mapping is not the exterior object, and our belief that there is a meaningful relationship between the object and the mapping in the brain depends on a chain of reasoning that is not fully grounded. But the uncertainty aroused by these considerations, by optical illusions, misperceptions, delusions, etc. Kant saw that the mind could not function as an empty container that simply receives data from outside. Something must be giving order to the incoming data. Images of external objects must be kept in the same sequence in which they were received. It is often claimed that Kant was a late developer, that he only became an important philosopher in his mid-30s after rejecting his earlier views. While it is true that Kant wrote his greatest works relatively late in life, there is a tendency to underestimate the value of his earlier works. Recent Kant scholarship has devoted more attention to these "pre-critical" writings and has recognized a degree of continuity with his mature work. In correspondence with his ex-student and friend Markus Herz, Kant admitted that, in the inaugural dissertation, he had failed to account for the relation between our sensible and intellectual faculties. He needed to explain how we combine what is known as sensory knowledge with the other type of knowledge, i.e. These two being are related but have very different processes. Kant also credited David Hume with awakening him from dogmatic slumber circa 1750. Ideas such as "cause", goodness, or objects were not evident in experience, so why do we believe in the reality of these? Kant felt that reason could remove this skepticism, and he set himself to solving these problems. He did not publish any work in philosophy for the next 11 years. Any change makes me apprehensive, even if it offers the greatest promise of improving my condition, and I am persuaded by this natural instinct of mine that I must take heed if I wish that the threads which the Fates spin so thin and weak in my case to be spun to any length. My great thanks, to my well-wishers and friends, who think so kindly of me as to undertake my welfare, but at the same time a most humble request to protect me in my current condition from any disturbance. Although now uniformly recognized as one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy, this Critique was largely ignored upon its

initial publication. The book was long, over pages in the original German edition, and written in a convoluted style. It received few reviews, and these granted it no significance. These well-received and readable tracts include one on the earthquake in Lisbon that was so popular that it was sold by the page. Recognizing the need to clarify the original treatise, Kant wrote the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics in as a summary of its main views. In , Karl Leonhard Reinhold published a series of public letters on Kantian philosophy. Friedrich Jacobi had accused the recently deceased Gotthold Ephraim Lessing a distinguished dramatist and philosophical essayist of Spinozism. The controversy gradually escalated into a debate about the values of the Enlightenment and the value of reason. Later work and death[ edit ] Kant published a second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kritik der reinen Vernunft in , heavily revising the first parts of the book. Most of his subsequent work focused on other areas of philosophy. The Critique of Judgment the third Critique applied the Kantian system to aesthetics and teleology. It was in this critique where Kant wrote one of his most popular statements, "it is absurd to hope that another Newton will arise in the future who will make comprehensible to us the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws". There were several journals devoted solely to defending and criticizing Kantian philosophy. Despite his success, philosophical trends were moving in another direction. Kant opposed these developments and publicly denounced Fichte in an open letter in Kant wrote a book discussing his theory of virtue in terms of independence which he believed was "a viable modern alternative to more familiar Greek views about virtue". This book is often criticized for its hostile tone and for not articulating his thoughts about autocracy comprehensibly. In the self-governance model of Aristotelian virtue, the non-rational part of the soul can be made to listen to reason through training. Although Kantian self-governance appears to involve "a rational crackdown on appetites and emotions" with lack of harmony between reason and emotion, Kantian virtue denies requiring "self-conquest, self-suppression, or self-silencing". They dispute that "the self-mastery constitutive of virtue is ultimately mastery over our tendency of will to give priority to appetite or emotion unregulated by duty, it does not require extirpating, suppressing, or silencing sensibility in general". Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Kant maintained that one ought to think autonomously, free of the dictates of external authority. His work reconciled many of the differences between the rationalist and empiricist traditions of the 18th century. He had a decisive impact on the Romantic and German Idealist philosophies of the 19th century. His work has also been a starting point for many 20th century philosophers. Kant asserted that, because of the limitations of argumentation in the absence of irrefutable evidence , no one could really know whether there is a God and an afterlife or not. All the preparations of reason, therefore, in what may be called pure philosophy, are in reality directed to those three problems only [God, the soul, and freedom]. However, these three elements in themselves still hold independent, proportional, objective weight individually. Moreover, in a collective relational context; namely, to know what ought to be done: As this concerns our actions with reference to the highest aims of life, we see that the ultimate intention of nature in her wise provision was really, in the constitution of our reason, directed to moral interests only. If he fails to do either as often occurs , he may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept one or the other of the alternatives hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point of view. Hence the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the supposition of its being real. This, however, is possible in an intelligible world only under a wise author and ruler. Reason compels us to admit such a ruler, together with life in such a world, which we must consider as future life, or else all moral laws are to be considered as idle dreams He never used the "Copernican revolution" phrase about himself, but it has often been applied to his work by others. These teachings placed the active, rational human subject at the center of the cognitive and moral worlds. Kant argued that the rational order of the world as known by science was not just the accidental accumulation of sense perceptions. Conceptual unification and integration is carried out by the mind through concepts or the "categories of the understanding " operating on the perceptual manifold within space and time. The latter are not concepts, [74] but are forms of sensibility that are a priori necessary conditions for any possible experience. However, Kant also speaks of the thing in itself or transcendental object as a product of the human understanding as it

attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. The notion of the "thing in itself" was much discussed by philosophers after Kant. It was argued that because the "thing in itself" was unknowable, its existence must not be assumed. Rather than arbitrarily switching to an account that was ungrounded in anything supposed to be the "real," as did the German Idealists, another group arose to ask how our presumably reliable accounts of a coherent and rule-abiding universe were actually grounded. This new kind of philosophy became known as Phenomenology, and its founder was Edmund Husserl. With regard to morality, Kant argued that the source of the good lies not in anything outside the human subject, either in nature or given by God, but rather is only the good will itself. A good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. This necessitates practical self-reflection in which we universalize our reasons. These ideas have largely framed or influenced all subsequent philosophical discussion and analysis.

**Theory of perception** [ edit ] Main article: Critique of Pure Reason Kant defines his theory of perception in his influential work the Critique of Pure Reason, which has often been cited as the most significant volume of metaphysics and epistemology in modern philosophy. Kant maintains that our understanding of the external world had its foundations not merely in experience, but in both experience and a priori concepts, thus offering a non-empiricist critique of rationalist philosophy, which is what has been referred to as his Copernican revolution. On the other hand, a synthetic statement is one that tells us something about the world. The truth or falsehood of synthetic statements derives from something outside their linguistic content. In this instance, weight is not a necessary predicate of the body; until we are told the heaviness of the body we do not know that it has weight. In this case, experience of the body is required before its heaviness becomes clear. Hume and rationalists cf. Leibniz assumed that all synthetic statements required experience to be known. Kant, however, contests this: This becomes part of his over-all argument for transcendental idealism. That is, he argues that the possibility of experience depends on certain necessary conditions "which he calls a priori forms" and that these conditions structure and hold true of the world of experience.

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This critique proceeds via an examination of those features of the mind relevant to the acquisition of knowledge. Mental Faculties and Mental Representation Kant characterizes the mind along two fundamental axes – first by the various kinds of powers which it possesses and second by the results of exercising those powers. In contrast, the power of spontaneity needs no such prompt. It is able to initiate its activity from itself, without any external trigger. These two capacities of the mind are the basis for all human mental behavior. These faculties characterize specific cognitive powers. These powers cannot be reduced to any of the others, and each is assigned a particular, cognitive task. Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason Kant distinguishes the three fundamental mental faculties from one another in two ways. First, he construes sensibility as the specific manner in which human beings, as well as other animals, are receptive. This is in contrast with the faculties of understanding and reason, which are forms of human, or all rational beings, spontaneity. Second, Kant distinguishes the faculties by their output. All of the mental faculties produce representations. This is one of the few places in the entire Kantian corpus where Kant explicitly discusses the meanings of and relations between his technical terms, and defines and classifies varieties of representation. The genus is representation *representatio* in general. Under it stand representations with consciousness *perceptio*. A perception [*Wahrnehmung*], that relates solely to a subject as a modification of its state, is sensation *sensatio*. An objective perception is cognition *cognitio*. This is either intuition or concept *intuitus vel conceptus*. The first relates immediately to the object and is singular; the second is mediate, conveyed by a mark, which can be common to many things. A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding not in a pure image of sensibility, is called *notio*. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason. Sensibility is the faculty that provides sensory representations. Sensibility generates representations based on being affected either by entities distinct from the subject or by the subject herself. This is in contrast to the faculty of understanding, which generates conceptual representations spontaneously – i. So the formal element of an empirical intuition, or sense perception, will always be either spatial or temporal. Kant characterizes intuition generally in terms of two characteristics – namely immediacy [*Unmittelbarkeit*] and particularity [*Einzelheit*] cf. This suggests that intuition, in contrast to concepts, puts a subject in cognitive contact with features of an object that are unique to particular objects and are not had by other objects. See Smit for discussion. Spatio-temporal properties seem like excellent candidates for such features, as no two objects of experience can have the very same spatio-temporal location B But perhaps any non-repeatable, non-universal feature of a perceived object will do. In part, this is a terminological issue. He also gives indications that experience, in his sense, is not something had by a single subject. A99, A, B, and B At its most primitive level, empirical intuition presents some feature of the world to the mind in a sensory manner. Kant uses the term in a variety of ways, however – JL 9: For instance, one can say it is green rather than red, or that it occupies this spatial location rather than that one. Intuition thus allows for the discrimination of distinct objects via an awareness of their features, while perception allows for an awareness of what specifically distinguishes an object from others. Imagination and Judgment Kant links the faculty of imagination closely to sensibility. For example, in his *Anthropology* he says, Sensibility in the cognitive faculty the faculty of intuitive representations contains two parts: The first is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object, the second is intuition even without the presence of an object. Kant makes this clearer in the process of further distinguishing between different kinds of imagination. The power of imagination *facultas imaginandi*, as a faculty of intuition without the presence of the object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation [*Darstellung*] of the object *exhibitio originaria*, which thus precedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object *exhibitio derivativa*, which brings back to mind an empirical intuition that it had previously An 7: So, in the operation of productive imagination, one brings to mind a sensory experience that

is not itself based on any object previously so experienced. This is not to say the productive imagination is totally creative. Kant explicitly denies An 7: It could not, in a person born blind, produce the phenomenal quality associated with the experience of seeing a red object, for example. If the productive imagination is instrumental in producing sensory fictions, the reproductive imagination is instrumental in producing sensory experiences of previously perceived objects. Imagination thus plays a central role in empirical cognition by serving as the basis for both memory and the creative arts. In addition it also plays a kind of mediating role between the faculties of sensibility and understanding. It mediates and transcends by being tied in its functioning to both faculties. On one hand, it produces sensible representations, and is thus connected to sensibility. On the other hand, it is not a purely passive faculty but rather engages in the activity of bringing together various representations, as does memory, for example. Kant explicitly connects understanding with this kind of active mental processing. Kant also goes so far as to claim that the activity of imagination is a necessary part of what makes perception, in his technical sense of a string of connected, conscious sensory experiences, possible A, note. First, Kant believes imagination plays a crucial role in the generation of complex sensory representations of an object see Sellars for an influential example of this interpretation. It is imagination that makes it possible to have a sensory experience of a complex, three-dimensional, and geometric figure whose identity remains constant even as it is subject to translations and rotations in space. However, he spends comparatively little time discussing this faculty in the first Critique. There, it seems to be discussed as an extension of the understanding in that it applies concepts to empirical objects. There Kant specifies two different ways it might function CJ 5: CJ First Introduction This role appears identical to the role he assigns judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason. The basic idea is that judgment functions to assign an intuited object "a dog" to the correct concept "such as domestic animals. This concept is presumed to be one already possessed by the subject. Here, the subject exercises judgment in generating an appropriate concept for what is given by intuition CJ First Introduction In addition to the generation of empirical concepts, Kant also describes reflective judgment as responsible for scientific inquiry. Kant also utilizes the notion of reflective judgment to unify the otherwise seemingly unrelated topics of the Critique of Judgment "aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments concerning the order of nature. Both the faculty of imagination and that of judgment operate on representations given from sensibility and understanding. Synthesis is not something people are typically aware of doing. Synthesis is carried out by the unitary subject of representation upon representations either given to the subject by sensibility or produced by the subject through thought. Intellectual synthesis occurs when synthesis is used on representations and forms the content of a concept or judgment. Though Kant discusses these forms of synthesis as if they were discrete types of mental acts, it seems that the first two forms must occur together, while the third only may occur as well compare Brook ; Allais Roughly, conceptualism claims the capacity for conscious sensory experience of the objective world depends, at least in part, on the repertoire of concepts possessed by the experiencing subject, insofar as those concepts are exercised in acts of synthesis by understanding. Association is primarily a passive process by which the mind comes to connect representations due to repeated exposure of the subject to certain kinds of regularities. One might, for example, associate thoughts of chicken soup with thoughts of being ill, if one only had chicken soup when one was ill. Consider, for example, the difference between the merely associative transition between holding a stone and feeling its weight compared to the judgment that the stone is heavy B The association of holding the stone and feeling its weight is not yet a judgment about the stone, but a kind of involuntary connection between two states of oneself. What is required, he says, is a theory of mental processing by an active subject capable of acts of synthesis. Several of the important differences between synthesis and association can be summarized as follows Pereboom , The source of synthesis is to be found in a subject, and the subject is distinct from its states. Synthesis can employ a priori concepts, concepts independent of experience, as modes of processing representations, whereas association never does. Synthesis is the product of a causally active subject. However, both notions require some significant unpacking. Such qualitative features of consciousness have been of major concern to philosophers of the late 20th Century. However, the metaphysical issue of phenomenal consciousness is almost entirely ignored by Kant, perhaps because he is unconcerned with problems stemming from commitments to

naturalism or physicalism. Sensations indicate or present features of objects, distinct from the subject. Feelings, by contrast, present only states of the subject to consciousness. Despite that, he does not focus in any substantive or systematic way on the phenomenal aspects of sensory consciousness, nor does he focus on how exactly they aid in cognition of the empirical world. According to Kant, any time a subject can discriminate one thing from another, the subject is, or can be, conscious of that one thing. Kant does seem to deny the Leibniz-Wolff tradition that clarity can simply be equated with consciousness B, note. In such cases, one does not have a fully clear representation. This connects him with the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of recognizing the existence of unconscious representations An 7: Likening the mind to a map Kant goes so far as to say, The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, obscure representations in the human being and thus also in animals , is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast map of our mind are illuminated. They constitute the majority of the mental representations with which the mind busies itself. Though Kant does not make it explicit in his discussion of discrimination and consciousness, it is clear that he takes the capacity to discriminate between objects and parts of objects to be ultimately based on sensory representation of those objects. His views on consciousness as differential discrimination intersect with his views on phenomenal consciousness. Because humans are receptive through their sensibility, the ultimate basis on which we differentially discriminate between objects must be sensory. Self-Consciousness As the discussion of unconscious representation indicates, Kant believes we are not directly aware of most of our representations. Kant thinks the process of making a representation clear, or fully conscious, requires a higher-order representation of the relevant representation.

**Chapter 5 : Theory of Forms**

*2 early as possible in the quarter (preferably within the first two weeks of class). All discussions will remain confidential. Blackboard: Much of the business of this course will be conducted through the Course Management System.*

Introduction The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. The defining questions of epistemology include the following. What is the nature of propositional knowledge, knowledge that a particular proposition about the world is true? To know a proposition, we must believe it and it must be true, but something more is required, something that distinguishes knowledge from a lucky guess. A good deal of philosophical work has been invested in trying to determine the nature of warrant. How can we gain knowledge? We can form true beliefs just by making lucky guesses. How to gain warranted beliefs is less clear. Moreover, to know the world, we must think about it, and it is unclear how we gain the concepts we use in thought or what assurance, if any, we have that the ways in which we divide up the world using our concepts correspond to divisions that actually exist. What are the limits of our knowledge? Some aspects of the world may be within the limits of our thought but beyond the limits of our knowledge; faced with competing descriptions of them, we cannot know which description is true. Some aspects of the world may even be beyond the limits of our thought, so that we cannot form intelligible descriptions of them, let alone know that a particular description is true. The disagreement between rationalists and empiricists primarily concerns the second question, regarding the sources of our concepts and knowledge. In some instances, their disagreement on this topic leads them to give conflicting responses to the other questions as well. They may disagree over the nature of warrant or about the limits of our thought and knowledge. Our focus here will be on the competing rationalist and empiricist responses to the second question. Some propositions in a particular subject area, *S*, are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions. Intuition is a form of rational insight. Deduction is a process in which we derive conclusions from intuited premises through valid arguments, ones in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. We intuit, for example, that the number three is prime and that it is greater than two. We then deduce from this knowledge that there is a prime number greater than two. Intuition and deduction thus provide us with knowledge a priori, which is to say knowledge gained independently of sense experience. Some rationalists take mathematics to be knowable by intuition and deduction. Some place ethical truths in this category. Some include metaphysical claims, such as that God exists, we have free will, and our mind and body are distinct substances. The more propositions rationalists include within the range of intuition and deduction, and the more controversial the truth of those propositions or the claims to know them, the more radical their rationalism. Rationalists also vary the strength of their view by adjusting their understanding of warrant. Some take warranted beliefs to be beyond even the slightest doubt and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of this high epistemic status. Others interpret warrant more conservatively, say as belief beyond a reasonable doubt, and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of that caliber. Still another dimension of rationalism depends on how its proponents understand the connection between intuition, on the one hand, and truth, on the other. Some take intuition to be infallible, claiming that whatever we intuit must be true. Others allow for the possibility of false intuited propositions. The second thesis associated with rationalism is the Innate Knowledge thesis. The Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in a particular subject area, *S*, as part of our rational nature. The difference between them rests in the accompanying understanding of how this a priori knowledge is gained. The Innate Knowledge thesis offers our rational nature. Our innate knowledge is not learned through either sense experience or intuition and deduction. It is just part of our nature. Experiences may trigger a process by which we bring this knowledge to consciousness, but the experiences do not provide us with the knowledge itself. It has in some way been with us all along. According to some rationalists, we gained the knowledge in an earlier existence. According to others, God provided us with it at creation. Still others say it is part of our nature through natural selection. Once again, the more subjects included within the range of the thesis or the more controversial the claim to

have knowledge in them, the more radical the form of rationalism. Stronger and weaker understandings of warrant yield stronger and weaker versions of the thesis as well. The third important thesis of rationalism is the Innate Concept thesis. The Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature. According to the Innate Concept thesis, some of our concepts are not gained from experience. They are part of our rational nature in such a way that, while sense experiences may trigger a process by which they are brought to consciousness, experience does not provide the concepts or determine the information they contain. Some claim that the Innate Concept thesis is entailed by the Innate Knowledge Thesis; a particular instance of knowledge can only be innate if the concepts that are contained in the known proposition are also innate. Others, such as Carruthers, argue against this connection, pp. The content and strength of the Innate Concept thesis varies with the concepts claimed to be innate. The more a concept seems removed from experience and the mental operations we can perform on experience the more plausibly it may be claimed to be innate. Since we do not experience perfect triangles but do experience pains, our concept of the former is a more promising candidate for being innate than our concept of the latter. Two other closely related theses are generally adopted by rationalists, although one can certainly be a rationalist without adopting either of them. The first is that experience cannot provide what we gain from reason. The Indispensability of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area, S, by intuition and deduction, as well as the ideas and instances of knowledge in S that are innate to us, could not have been gained by us through sense experience. The second is that reason is superior to experience as a source of knowledge. The Superiority of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area S by intuition and deduction or have innately is superior to any knowledge gained by sense experience. How reason is superior needs explanation, and rationalists have offered different accounts. Another view, generally associated with Plato Republic ec, locates the superiority of a priori knowledge in the objects known. What we know by reason alone, a Platonic form, say, is superior in an important metaphysical way, e. Most forms of rationalism involve notable commitments to other philosophical positions. One is a commitment to the denial of scepticism for at least some area of knowledge. If we claim to know some truths by intuition or deduction or to have some innate knowledge, we obviously reject scepticism with regard to those truths. We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience. Insofar as we have knowledge in the subject, our knowledge is a posteriori, dependent upon sense experience. Empiricists also deny the implication of the corresponding Innate Concept thesis that we have innate ideas in the subject area. Sense experience is our only source of ideas. They reject the corresponding version of the Superiority of Reason thesis. Since reason alone does not give us any knowledge, it certainly does not give us superior knowledge. Empiricists generally reject the Indispensability of Reason thesis, though they need not. The Empiricism thesis does not entail that we have empirical knowledge. It entails that knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by experience. Empiricists may assert, as some do for some subjects, that the rationalists are correct to claim that experience cannot give us knowledge. The conclusion they draw from this rationalist lesson is that we do not know at all. I have stated the basic claims of rationalism and empiricism so that each is relative to a particular subject area. Rationalism and empiricism, so relativized, need not conflict. We can be rationalists in mathematics or a particular area of mathematics and empiricists in all or some of the physical sciences. Rationalism and empiricism only conflict when formulated to cover the same subject. Then the debate, Rationalism vs. The fact that philosophers can be both rationalists and empiricists has implications for the classification schemes often employed in the history of philosophy, especially the one traditionally used to describe the Early Modern Period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leading up to Kant. It is standard practice to group the major philosophers of this period as either rationalists or empiricists and to suggest that those under one heading share a common agenda in opposition to those under the other. We should adopt such general classification schemes with caution. The views of the individual philosophers are more subtle and complex than the simple-minded classification suggests. See Loeb and Kenny for important discussions of this point. Descartes and Locke have remarkably similar views on the nature of our ideas, even though Descartes takes many to be innate, while Locke ties them all to experience. Thus, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are mistakenly seen as applying a reason-centered epistemology to a common metaphysical agenda, with each

trying to improve on the efforts of the one before, while Locke, Berkeley and Hume are mistakenly seen as gradually rejecting those metaphysical claims, with each consciously trying to improve on the efforts of his predecessors. One might claim, for example, that we can gain knowledge in a particular area by a form of Divine revelation or insight that is a product of neither reason nor sense experience. What is perhaps the most interesting form of the debate occurs when we take the relevant subject to be truths about the external world, the world beyond our own minds. A full-fledged rationalist with regard to our knowledge of the external world holds that some external world truths can and must be known a priori, that some of the ideas required for that knowledge are and must be innate, and that this knowledge is superior to any that experience could ever provide. The full-fledged empiricist about our knowledge of the external world replies that, when it comes to the nature of the world beyond our own minds, experience is our sole source of information. Reason might inform us of the relations among our ideas, but those ideas themselves can only be gained, and any truths about the external reality they represent can only be known, on the basis of sense experience. This debate concerning our knowledge of the external world will generally be our main focus in what follows. The debate raises the issue of metaphysics as an area of knowledge.

**Chapter 6 : Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*The theory of knowledge is one of the most central areas of philosophy. In this online course you will cover the key issues in epistemology while also learning to think for yourself and develop your own answers to the core questions in this area. The theory of knowledge is one of the most central.*

**Kinds of Knowledge** There are in knowledge three fundamental differences that Aristotle takes cognizance of in his theory of knowledge: Knowledge may have for its object causes or first principles or phenomena. Its method may be apodictic demonstrative or dialectic "probable". Its source may be sense or reason. In the knowledge of causes is involved the knowledge of whatever else can be shown demonstratively to flow from them ; and a theory of scientific knowledge is an account of the source from, or faculty by, which we get the knowledge of causes, and of the method of demonstration. Now it was natural, both from the previous history of speculation and the character of the problem itself, that Aristotle should consider the latter part of the problem of scientific knowledge first, which he does, particularly in the *Prior Analytics*. Demonstration Considered as regards method, knowledge is scientific, or demonstrative, when it is derived from certain, or necessary, premises by a certain, or necessary, process of reasoning. The **Syllogism Deductive** Now the process in which, certain things being assumed as true, a certain other thing obtains, necessarily and because of the things assumed, is called by Aristotle the **Syllogism 1**. The syllogism is, therefore, the central point in the method of demonstration expounded by Aristotle; it was regarded, and rightly so, as his own discovery **2**. The middle term is so called because it is the mean, or uniting term, in the syllogism **3**. Propositions may be either affirmative or negative, universal, particular, or indefinite. There are four sorts of propositions that may enter into the syllogism: Of contradictory opposites, if one be true, the other is false: A syllogism in which the minor term is "in the whole middle" **i**. In a syllogism of this figure the middle term lies "between" the extremes. A syllogism in which both major and minor terms are "in [less than] the whole middle **i**. A syllogism in which the major and minor terms are each greater than the middle **i**. The "fourth figure" of modern text-books was not recognized by Aristotle; it did not spring out of his conception of the syllogism. Now the first figure is the only one that gives universal conclusions; the second figure giving only negative conclusions, and the third only "particular" conclusions. It is also the only figure that yields naturally and directly in the conclusion all that is contained in the premises and no more. We can sometimes derive a universal conclusion from the premises of a syllogism of the second and third figures, but this can be done only indirectly; hence these figures are "imperfect," the first alone being "perfect. The latter, however, may obtain when the former does not ; but if the latter does not obtain, the former does not **8**. The knowledge of the essence of a thing embraces a knowledge of the common and characteristic attributes of the class, or genus, to which it belongs and of the specific attribute that renders the thing an individual representative of the class. Substance is whatever is the subject of attributes, **e**. Substance in the primary sense is the individual, species and genus being only secondary substance Of these tenâ€”termed categoriesâ€”substance is principal; all others imply it. These are everywhere employed by Aristotle. The idea of a table of categories may have been suggested to him by the Pythagorean table see *The Pythagorean Philosophy* , Theories not purely Pythagorean. These categories were not "deduced" in any manner from a higher conception by Aristotle, but were taken empirically, as suggested, perhaps, by the fundamental forms, or "parts," of speech in the Greek language. **Syllogism Inductive** Now causes in the knowledge of which or of what can be syllogistically shown to flow from them scientific knowledge consists , though visible to the eye of reason, are not known to us immediately. Knowable things are of two kinds: Of the latter-named kind are causes, or first principles Our knowledge of causes, or what is prior by nature, has its beginning in our knowledge of things as they are for us. Induction, like deduction, is syllogistic: The conclusion of the inductive syllogism corresponds to the major premise of the deductive. The inductive syllogism is a syllogism of the third figure, and strictly speaking, its conclusion is not universal but particular. We may, however, assume it to be universal if we know that C and B are inter-convertible and that "B is C" holds. The syllogism is then practically a syllogism of the first figure. A real induction presupposes a knowledge of all the individuals of a class. The premises of

the inductive syllogism are not truths of reason, corresponding to first principles, but perceptions of sense. But sense as such gives knowledge only of the particular, and we can by induction reach universals only on the hypothesis that there is a common and permanent nature in the many. The idea of a common permanent nature originates in a higher faculty than sense. Animals have the faculty of sense-perception, but not all animals have the power of "retaining one certain thing in the soul" and of forming universal notions. Permanency and universality presuppose reason. He compares the manner in which the universal unconsciously grows out of the particular of sense to the way in which soldiers in battle are caused to fly by the perception of one, and then another, and so on, fleeing. He recognizes and gives a full analysis of another sort of method, which is only quasi-scientific and finds place especially in Practical Philosophy, ethics, politics, etc. Here "dialectical," or probable, reasoning is employed. In practical affairs it generally suffices if we have premises that possess only a high degree of probability, and if our conclusions have, not absolute validity, but a fair warrant in the premises. In such matters it is not always easy or even possible to arrive at absolutely correct definitions, and it is not always necessary that all steps in our processes of reasoning should be stated, that everything should be proved, even plausibly; indeed, it is better that many things be taken for granted, that many things be left to the natural bent of mankind towards truth and justice. This is the case particularly in rhetorical argumentation; in dialectical reasoning logical method prevails though the premises may be only plausible. In rhetorical reasonings the enthymeme, a quasi-syllogism, having but one premise, and example, by which we argue from a particular to a particular through an assumed universal, may be employed instead of the complete syllogism and induction. The above view is the earliest, and the one that seems to harmonize best with the theory of categories, in which it occurs. Absolute truth, he repeatedly says, is not in all cases within the reach of human powers, and it is often-times necessary and best to be content with less than that. If we deny that this is in any sense a philosophical view, we must throw away his works on Ethics and Rhetoric.

**Chapter 7 : Transcendence (philosophy) - Wikipedia**

*Relief Teacher, Theory of Knowledge The core function of the job is to assist the School towards achieving its strategic objectives - working in teams to constantly devise meaningful pedagogical approaches and its eventual instructional implementation in class.*

While distinguishing rigorous knowledge scientia and lesser grades of conviction persuasio , Descartes writes: I distinguish the two as follows: But since I see that you are still stuck fast in the doubts which I put forward in the First Meditation, and which I thought I had very carefully removed in the succeeding Meditations, I shall now expound for a second time the basis on which it seems to me that all human certainty can be founded. First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: Replies 2, AT 7: As my certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases, my certainty decreases. It has also a distinctively epistemic character, involving a kind of rational insight. Yet they raise questions about the extent to which his account is continuous with other analyses of knowledge. Prima facie, his characterizations imply a justified belief analysis of knowledge “ or in language closer to his own and where justification is construed in terms of unshakability , an unshakable conviction analysis. Many will balk at the suggestion. It might therefore seem clear, whatever else is the case, that Descartes conceives of knowledge as advancing truth. Thus construed, to establish a proposition just is to perceive it with certainty; the result of having established it “ i. Truth is a consequence of knowledge, rather than its precondition. What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? On a quite different reading of this passage, Descartes is clarifying that the analysis of knowledge is neutral not about truth, but about absolute truth: Harry Frankfurt defended such an interpretation in his influential work, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen. Yet, in a follow-up paper he retracted the view: I now think, however, that it was a mistake on my part to suggest that Descartes entertained a coherence conception of truth. The fact is that there is no textual evidence to support that suggestion; on the contrary, whenever Descartes gives an explicit account of truth he explains it unequivocally as correspondence with reality. A definitive interpretation of these issues has yet to gain general acceptance in the literature. What is clear is that the brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably certain conviction. Arguably, this preoccupation with having the right kind of certainty “ including its being available to introspection “ is linked with his commitment to an internalist conception of knowledge. For he holds that ideas are, strictly speaking, the only objects of immediate perception, or conscious awareness. More on the directness or immediacy of perception in Section 5. This assumption is tantamount to requiring that justification come in the form of ideas. An important consequence of this kind of interpretation “ namely, a traditional representationalist reading of Descartes “ is that rigorous philosophical inquiry must proceed via an inside-to-out strategy. This strategy is assiduously followed in the Meditations, and it endures as a hallmark of many early modern epistemologies. Philosophical inquiry is, properly understood, an investigation of ideas. The methodical strategy of the Meditations has the effect of forcing readers to adopt this mode of inquiry. He wants knowledge that is utterly indefeasible. Sceptical doubts count as defeaters. This indefeasibility requirement implies more than mere stability. A would-be knower could achieve stability simply by never reflecting on reasons for doubt. But this would result in mere undoubtedness, not indubitability. Before jumping to this conclusion, we should put the indefeasibility requirement into context. Descartes is a contextualist in the sense that he allows that different standards of justification are appropriate to different contexts. This is not merely to say the obvious: This example is potentially misleading, in that Descartes appears loath to count mere empirical evidence as knowledge-worthy justification. But upon ramping up the standard to what he finds minimally acceptable, the standard admits of context dependent variation. For Descartes, clarity contrasts with obscurity, and distinctness contrasts with confusion. But he regularly characterizes defeasible judgments at this level of certainty using terminology e. In the context of inquiry at

play in the Meditations, Descartes insists on indefeasibility. Better to have a standard that excludes some truths, than one that justifies some falsehoods. Descartes maintains that though atheists are quite capable of impressive knowledge, including in mathematics, they are incapable of the indefeasible brand of knowledge he seeks: But I maintain that this awareness [cognitionem] of his is not true knowledge [scientiam], since no act of awareness [cognitio] that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge [scientia]. Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evident as I fully explained. Distinguish particularist and methodist responses to the question. The particularist is apt to trust our prima facie intuitions regarding particular knowledge claims. These intuitions may then be used to help identify more general epistemic principles. The methodist, in contrast, is apt to distrust our prima facie intuitions. The preference is instead to begin with general principles about proper method. The methodical principles may then be used to arrive at settled, reflective judgments concerning particular knowledge claims. Famously, Descartes is in the methodist camp. Were we to rely on our prima facie intuitions, we might suppose it obvious that the earth is unmoved, or that ordinary objects as tables and chairs are just as just as they seem. Yet, newly emerging mechanist doctrines of the 17th century imply that these suppositions are false. Such cases underscore the unreliability of our prima facie intuitions and the need for a method by which to distinguish truth and falsity. But such pre-reflective judgments may be ill-grounded, even when true. The dialectic of the First Meditation features a confrontation between particularism and methodism, with methodism emerging the victor. In response and at each level of the dialectic, Descartes invokes his own methodical principles to show that the prima facie obviousness of such particular claims is insufficient to meet the burden of proof. Knowledge of the nature of reality derives from ideas of the intellect, not the senses. An important part of metaphysical inquiry therefore involves learning to think with the intellect. The Fifth Meditation meditator remarks “having applied Cartesian methodology, thereby discovering innate truths within: Elsewhere Descartes adds, of innate truths: All geometrical truths are of this sort” not just the most obvious ones, but all the others, however abstruse they may appear. Hence, according to Plato, Socrates asks a slave boy about the elements of geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths from his own mind which he had not previously recognized were there, thus attempting to establish the doctrine of reminiscence. Our knowledge of God is of this sort. This storehouse includes ideas in mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Interestingly, Descartes holds that even our sensory ideas involve innate content. On his understanding of the new mechanical physics, bodies have no real properties resembling our sensory ideas of colors, sounds, tastes, and the like, thus implying that the content of such ideas draws from the mind itself. But if even these sensory ideas count as innate, how then are we to characterize the doctrine of innateness? Importantly, the formation of these sensory ideas “unlike purely intellectual concepts” depends on sensory stimulation. This characterization allows that both intellectual and sensory concepts draw on native resources, though not to the same extent. Relatively little attention is given to his doctrines of innateness, or, more generally, his ontology of thought. On the internalism-externalism distinction, see Alston and Plantinga For a partly externalist interpretation of Descartes, see Della Rocca For a stability interpretation of Descartes, see Bennett On the indefeasibility of Knowledge, see Newman and Nelson On contextualism in Descartes, see Newman On the methodism-particularism distinction, see Chisholm and Sosa On analysis and synthesis, see Smith Foundationalism and Doubt Of his own methodology, Descartes writes: Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect. When an architect wants to build a house which is stable on ground where there is a sandy topsoil over underlying rock, or clay, or some other firm base, he begins by digging out a set of trenches from which he removes the sand, and anything resting on or mixed in with the sand, so that he can lay his foundations on firm soil. In the same way, I began by taking everything that was doubtful and throwing it out, like sand Replies 7, AT 7: His method of doubt is intended to complement foundationalism. The two methods are supposed to work in cooperation, as conveyed in the above quotation. Such an edifice owes its structural integrity to two kinds of features: A system of justified beliefs might be organized by two analogous features: Euclid begins with a foundation of first principles “definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions” on which he then bases a superstructure of further propositions.

Those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasoning, which geometers customarily use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the things which can fall under human knowledge are interconnected in the same way. Discourse 2, AT 6: It would be misleading to characterize the arguments of the Meditations as unfolding straightforwardly according to geometric method. Though the component finds no analogue in the method of the geometers, Descartes appears to hold that this component is needed in metaphysical inquiry. In contrast, metaphysical inquiry might have first principles that conflict with the senses: The difference is that the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with the use of our senses. Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the proper deduction of the consequences, which can be done even by the less attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or even more evident than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them. Such mistakes in the laying of the foundations weaken the entire edifice.

**Chapter 8 : Descartes' Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*Theory of Knowledge (B-KUL-W0EA3A) Students should inform themselves about the faculty guidelines with regard to plagiarism and bibliographical referencing.*

This is contrasted with immanence, where a god is said to be fully present in the physical world and thus accessible to creatures in various ways. In religious experience transcendence is a state of being that has overcome the limitations of physical existence and by some definitions has also become independent of it. Transcendence can be attributed to the divine not only in its being, but also in its knowledge. Thus, a god may transcend both the universe and knowledge is beyond the grasp of the human mind. Although transcendence is defined as the opposite of immanence, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some theologians and metaphysicians of various religious traditions affirm that a god is both within and beyond the universe panentheism; in it, but not of it; simultaneously pervading it and surpassing it. Transcendental idealism and Transcendental arguments In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant introduced a new term "transcendental," thus instituting a new, third meaning. In his theory of knowledge, this concept is concerned with the condition of possibility of knowledge itself. He also opposed the term transcendental to the term transcendent, the latter meaning "that which goes beyond" transcends any possible knowledge of a human being. Transcendental philosophy, consequently, is not considered a traditional ontological form of metaphysics. Kant also equated transcendental with that which is "Ordinary knowledge is knowledge of objects; transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how it is possible for us to experience those objects as objects. Kant argues that the mind must contribute those features and make it possible for us to experience objects as objects. In the central part of his Critique of Pure Reason, the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", Kant argues for a deep interconnection between the ability to have self-consciousness and the ability to experience a world of objects. Through a process of synthesis, the mind generates both the structure of objects and its own unity. A metaphilosophical question discussed by many Kantian scholars is how transcendental reflection is itself possible. Contemporary philosophy[ edit ] In phenomenology, the "transcendent" is that which transcends our own consciousness: Noema is employed in phenomenology to refer to the terminus of an intention as given for consciousness. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre uses transcendence to describe the relation of the self to the object oriented world, as well as our concrete relations with others. For Sartre, the for-itself is sometimes called a transcendence. Additionally if the other is viewed strictly as an object, much like any other object, then the other is, for the for-itself, a transcendence-transcended. When the for-itself grasps the other in the others world, and grasps the subjectivity that the other has, it is referred to as transcending-transcendence. Thus, Sartre defines relations with others in terms of transcendence. Holz liberated transcendental philosophy from the convergence of neo-Kantianism, he critically discussed transcendental pragmatism and the relation between transcendental philosophy, neo-empiricism and the so-called postmodernism. Colloquial usage[ edit ] In everyday language, "transcendence" means "going beyond", and "self-transcendence" means going beyond a prior form or state of oneself. Mystical experience is thought of as a particularly advanced state of self-transcendence, in which the sense of a separate self is abandoned.

**Chapter 9 : Theory of Knowledge (Online) | Oxford University Department for Continuing Education**

*Imagination permeates all the areas of knowledge, even the ones which are traditionally seen as being based purely on logic and reason, such as mathematics.*

Phaedo 80b provides a good summary, listing all the attributes of Forms that souls also have: They are independently existing entities whose existence and nature are graspable only by the mind, even though they do not depend on being so grasped in order to exist. What the Forms do The forms are postulated to solve certain philosophical problems: How is knowledge possible? How is knowledge distinguished from mere belief or opinion? What things are real? Is there a mind-independent reality? Is there anything permanent behind the changing phenomena that can be perceived? The intelligible world is Parmenidean, the visible world is Heraclitean. Forms in the intelligible realm are postulated to be the objects of knowledge. The metaphysical theory is thus designed to fit epistemological requirements. Are there objective moral truths? Is morality founded in nature or convention? For Plato, goodness and being are intimately connected. This connection explains why it is a single theory that aims to answer both metaphysical and ethical questions. Understanding how this can be so is one of the hardest - but most important - things to do in understanding Plato. An interpretation of this: Here is one way to see the connection: Now imagine another head of lettuce, but not as good as the first. There comes a point at which our example becomes so bad that it ceases to be a head of lettuce at all. If there were no connection between goodness and being, there would be no reason to expect this. What is it that we grasp when we understand something? Arguments for Existence of Forms Plato sometimes writes as if he takes the existence of Forms for granted, as a matter of faith. But sometimes he offers arguments for them. Each argument is connected to a function Plato has in mind for Forms to play. Plato, in any event, was not very systematic about his arguments. Forms are objects corresponding to Socratic definitions. A Form is supposed to provide an objective basis for moral concepts. A definition is correct just in case it accurately describes a Form. The definition of Justice, e. Forms are objects of recollection. The knowledge we get when we are in possession of a Socratic definition is a priori, not empirical. Forms are the real entities to which the objects of our sensory experience approximately correspond. We make judgments about such properties as equal, circular, square, etc. Forms are the entities that perfectly embody these characteristics we have in mind even though we have never experienced them perceptually. When we know something, what is our knowledge knowledge of? Plato supposes that there is a class of stable, permanent, and unchanging objects that warrant our knowledge claims. Hence, when you talk about justice and I talk about justice, we are talking about the same thing. We belong to the same world, not each of us in his own private world. The last three of these arguments are especially important. They correspond to three of the problems the Forms are supposed to solve.