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Chapter 1 : New Social Policy Ideas in the Making: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe

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Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Bibliography Alfandari, Gilles, and Mark E. Alm, James, and Benno Torgler. Alm, James, and Sally Wallace. The Jamaican Individual Income Tax. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe. University of Pittsburgh Press. Lessons from Postcommunist Europe. How Capitalism Was Built: The Political Economy of Development. Baturo, Alexander, and Julia Gray. Keefer, and Patrich Walsh. Accessed July 30, How to Do It. Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. Governance and Power in Poland and Russia. Globalisation, Redistribution, and Tax Avoidance. Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries. Capacity and Consent, ed. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, " Bronchi, Carla, and Andrew Burns. Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice. University of North Carolina Press. Disentangling the Ties that Bind. A Global Report on the State of Society, ed. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Chapter 2 : The state of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe - Emerging Europe

This book adopts novel theoretical approaches to study the diverse welfare pathways that have evolved across Central and Eastern Europe since the end of communism. It highlights the role of explanatory factors such as micro-causal mechanisms, power politics, path departure, and elite strategies.

Some observers have pointed to the authoritarian nature of Fidesz and PiS, particularly in light of institutional changes both parties implemented once in power. Fidesz won the Hungarian elections with At the same time, the Fidesz government introduced a number of social measures aiming to improve the living standards of average citizens. The government resorted to taxing banks, retail sales networks, and energy and telecommunication companies while increasing family support and introducing a flat income tax. Despite international criticism, Fidesz won with Then, PiS won the parliamentary elections in October with Shortly after the government was formed a series of reforms were hastily introduced, including new media and counterterrorism laws, and controversial appointments at the Constitutional Court soon followed. A new law of December changed the set-up of the Constitutional Court and introduced a new two-thirds majority rule, which some observers argued made it de facto difficult for the court to act at all, thus weakening the checks-and-balances principle vital for democratic pluralism. In , a new instrument of child support was introduced and the medication refund scheme for senior citizens was activated in the second half of the year. A program of apartment construction destined for young families was launched as well. In order to finance these expenditures a new banking tax was established and new measures to reduce VAT fraud were introduced. It may be asked whether all of this is authoritarian populism or just a long overdue social redistribution? Opinions differ on this question, but there is consensus on one issue: Neoliberal capitalism was introduced in both countries at its historical peak of popularity in and was the main driver of the CEE transition from communism to market economies. On the one hand this generated the positive effects of economic growth and an increase of average living standards. On the other hand, the non-transparent privatization processes and lagging institutional reforms manifested specific governance pathologies in Hungary, Poland and other CEE countries. For instance, despite positive macroeconomic development, both young people and senior citizens in CEE have endured existential pressures for many years with governments unable, and partly unwilling, to strengthen the welfare systems and balance growing social inequality. Given these circumstances, the PiS came to power because many members of Polish society were expressing their desire for more profound political change. Similarly, in Fidesz took power in Hungary at a time when the country was mired in political and economic crisis, having fallen into its deepest recession in a decade. An agreement with the IMF was strongly criticized by Fidesz, which was making election campaign promises to end austerity and open a new beginning in economic policies. In both Poland and Hungary, the sentiment was broadly shared in society that numerous governments after used state agencies and enterprises for cronyism and politico-economic clientelism, draining financial resources from the state budget that otherwise could have been invested in higher education, research, health, and pension systems. Secret tape recordings that documented high levels of cynicism in the previous ruling parties in Hungary in and in Poland in precipitated scandals, public outrage, and political change in both countries. Must check this box to wrap! At the same time, foreign capital has not only been unable to substitute for many of these structural difficulties but has produced other problems, such as real estate bubbles and precarious mortgages. According to some critics, while international corporations, banks, and consultancies have mushroomed all across Poland and Hungary, CEE countries have become virtual assembly lines for foreign producers that do not maintain Research and Development departments in these nations and, in many cases, pay their taxes in other EU countries with a lower VAT tax. For instance, in Poland 70 percent of the entire tax burden is carried not by European or transnational enterprises, but by small and medium-sized firms of local origin. The investigation was intended to inquire whether new laws introduced by the PiS government are in accordance with the rule of law and the fundamental democratic

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values of the EU. Thus did Poland become the second CEE country after Hungary that raises fears of an authoritarian backslide in the region. Moreover, the constitutional crisis in Poland, which raised worries about the concentration of power, is not dissimilar to developments in Hungary. In Poland there is a free press, if entirely private and largely international, substantially free TV and radio outlets with the exception of state media that remain up for grabs after each and every election, and no limitations on civil liberties. In conclusion, the question remains whether the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary are prepared to cross the red line of democracy in order to stay in power, as has occurred in Russia and Turkey. Until now, Poland has enjoyed a vibrant civil society that has challenged the government on several occasions. This is less the case in Hungary where both the civil society and opposition parties cannot offer a real political alternative to Fidesz. The next big democratic tests in these countries are the Hungarian and Polish elections, which will be carefully watched. While Fidesz is likely to win again, the result is far from certain for PiS.

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Chapter 3 : Social Media and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe : Pawel Surowiec :

*Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe [Alfio Cerami, Pieter Vanhuysse] on blog.quintoapp.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This book adopts novel theoretical approaches to study the diverse welfare pathways that have been evolving across Central and Eastern Europe.*

Today, solid majorities of adults across much of the region say they believe in God, and most identify with a religion. Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism are the most prevalent religious affiliations, much as they were more than years ago in the twilight years of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. In many Central and Eastern European countries, religion and national identity are closely entwined. Relatively few Orthodox or Catholic adults in Central and Eastern Europe say they regularly attend worship services, pray often or consider religion central to their lives. Around the world, different ways of being religious. Believing. Do they believe in a higher power? Do they pray and perform rituals? Do they feel part of a congregation, spiritual community or religious group? Research suggests that many people around the world engage with religion in at least one of these ways, but not necessarily all three. Nonetheless, the comeback of religion in a region once dominated by atheist regimes is striking – particularly in some historically Orthodox countries, where levels of religious affiliation have risen substantially in recent decades. Whether the return to religion in Orthodox-majority countries began before the fall of the Berlin Wall in remains an open question. In Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, far more people said they were religiously unaffiliated in than describe themselves that way in the new survey. In all three countries, the share of the population that identifies with Orthodox Christianity is up significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In part, this may be because much of the population in countries such as Poland and Hungary retained a Catholic identity during the communist era, leaving less of a religious vacuum to be filled when the USSR fell. To the extent that there has been measurable religious change in recent decades in Central and Eastern European countries with large Catholic populations, it has been in the direction of greater secularization. The Orthodox countries in the region are further toward the east, and many were part of the Soviet Union. This political divide is seen in responses to two separate survey questions: How religious do you think your country was in the s and s when all but Greece among the surveyed countries were ruled by communist regimes , and how religious is it today? With few exceptions, in former Soviet republics the more common view is that those countries are more religious now than a few decades ago. There is more variation in the answers to these questions in countries that were beyond the borders of the former USSR. In contrast with most of the former Soviet republics, respondents in Poland, Romania and Greece say their countries have become considerably less religious in recent decades. But these perceptions do not tell the entire story. Despite declining shares in some countries, Catholics in Central and Eastern Europe generally are more religiously observant than Orthodox Christians in the region, at least by conventional measures. In addition, Catholics in Central and Eastern Europe are much more likely than Orthodox Christians to say they engage in religious practices such as taking communion and fasting during Lent. Catholics also are somewhat more likely than Orthodox Christians to say they frequently share their views on God with others, and to say they read or listen to scripture outside of religious services. These nationalist sentiments are especially common among members of the majority religious group in each country. But, in some cases, even members of religious minority groups take this position. Many of the predominantly Orthodox countries surveyed have centuries-old national churches, such as the Greek Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church and Armenian Apostolic Church, and there is popular support for these institutions to play a large role in public life. The political – and sometimes religious – map of Central and Eastern Europe has been redrawn numerous times over the centuries. Russia, whether as a synonym for the czarist empire or the USSR, has played a pivotal role in defining the political and cultural boundaries of the region. Most see Russia as an important buffer against the influence of the West, and many say Russia has a special

obligation to protect not only ethnic Russians, but also Orthodox Christians in other countries. In many ways, then, the return of religion since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union has played out differently in the predominantly Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe than it has among the heavily Catholic or mixed-religious populations further to the West. In the Orthodox countries, there has been an upsurge of religious identity, but levels of religious practice are comparatively low. And Orthodox identity is tightly bound up with national identity, feelings of pride and cultural superiority, support for linkages between national churches and governments, and views of Russia as a bulwark against the West. Meanwhile, in such historically Catholic countries as Poland, Hungary, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, there has not been a marked rise in religious identification since the fall of the USSR; on the contrary, the share of adults in these countries who identify as Catholic has declined. The link between religious identity and national identity is present across the region but somewhat weaker in the Catholic-majority countries. And politically, the Catholic countries tend to look West rather than East: What is a median? On some questions throughout this report, median percentages are reported to help readers see overall patterns. The median is the middle number in a list of figures sorted in ascending or descending order. In a survey of 18 countries, the median result is the average of the ninth and 10th on a list of country-level findings ranked in order. For example, in 13 countries, the number of Orthodox Christians surveyed is large enough to be analyzed and broken out separately. The regional median for Orthodox Christians is the seventh-highest result when the findings solely among Orthodox respondents in those 13 countries are listed from highest to lowest. These are among the key findings of the Pew Research Center survey, which was conducted from June to July through face-to-face interviews in 17 languages with more than 25,000 adults ages 18 and older in 18 countries. The study, funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation, is part of a larger effort by Pew Research Center to understand religious change and its impact on societies around the world. While there is no consensus over the exact boundaries of Central and Eastern Europe, the new survey spans a vast area running eastward from the Czech Republic and Poland to Russia, Georgia and Armenia, and southward from the Baltic States to the Balkans and Greece. Over the centuries, nationhood, politics and religion have converged and diverged in the region as empires have risen and crumbled and independence has been lost and regained. Most of the countries surveyed were once ruled by communist regimes, either aligned or not aligned with Moscow. In this respect, Greece offers a useful point of comparison with other Orthodox-majority countries in the region. It is both of the West and of the East. For example, Greeks report relatively low levels of religious practice, while expressing strong feelings of cultural superiority and national pride — similar to respondents in other Orthodox-majority countries surveyed. But Greeks also differ: For instance, they are more supportive of democracy and less socially conservative than neighbors in majority-Orthodox countries. Central and Eastern Europe includes a few Muslim-majority countries. Pew Research Center previously surveyed them as part of a study of Muslims around the world. For more on these countries, see the related sidebar. The survey does not include several Christian-majority countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Macedonia, Montenegro and Cyprus, which have Orthodox majorities, and Slovakia and Slovenia, which are predominantly Catholic. Protestants are a smaller presence in the region, though in some countries they are sizable minorities. In Estonia and Latvia, for example, roughly one-in-five adults identify as Lutheran. Some of these polls also have asked about belief in God and frequency of church attendance. While most of these surveys cover Russia, data showing trends over time in other Orthodox countries since the 1990s are scarce. And because of major differences in question wording, as well as widely differing methodological approaches to sampling minority populations, the surveys arrive at varying estimates of the size of different religious groups, including Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Muslims and people with no religious affiliation. Some of the more recent surveys suggest that this Orthodox revival has slowed or leveled off in the last decade or so. At the same time, surveys indicate that the shares of adults engaging in religious practices have remained largely stable since the fall of the Soviet Union. In Catholic-majority countries, church attendance rates may even have declined, according to some surveys. Overall, people in Central and Eastern Europe are somewhat less likely to say they

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believe in God than adults previously surveyed in Africa and Latin America, among whom belief is almost universal. Still, across this region – with its unique history of state-supported atheism and separation of religion from public life – it is striking that the vast majority of adults express belief in God. Across the countries surveyed, Catholics tend to express higher levels of belief in heaven and hell than do Orthodox Christians. Belief in fate is. Even among people who do not identify with a religion, substantial shares say they believe in fate and the soul. Given that other countries in Central and Eastern Europe emerged from communist rule with much higher levels of religious affiliation, this raises the question: For clues, scholars have looked to the past, identifying a pattern of Czech distaste for the pressures emanating from religious and secular authorities. This goes back as far as , when followers of Jan Hus, a priest in Bohemia now part of the Czech Republic , separated from the Roman Catholic Church after Hus was burned at the stake for heresy. While the region would become overwhelmingly Catholic, historians argue that the repression of this period reverberates to the present day in the collective Czech memory, casting the Catholic Church as an overly privileged partner of foreign occupiers. Openness to religion briefly spiked after the fall of communism, though evidence suggests this may have been mostly a political statement against the communist regime, and since the early s, the share of Czechs who say they have a religious affiliation has declined. By comparison, more than half of U. People in the region are much more likely to take part in other religious practices, such as having icons or other holy figures in their homes or wearing religious symbols such as a cross. And very high shares of both Catholics and Orthodox Christians in virtually every country surveyed say they have been baptized. For more on religious practices, see Chapter 2. Conservative views on sexuality and gender Opposition to homosexuality throughout the region In the U. While this pattern is also seen within individual countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the most religious countries in the region by conventional measures such as overall rates of church attendance are not necessarily the most socially conservative. This pattern, in which Orthodox countries are more socially conservative even though they may be less religious, is seen throughout the region. Young adults somewhat more liberal on homosexuality, same-sex marriage Across the region, younger people that is, adults under 35 are less opposed to homosexuality and more inclined than their elders to favor legal gay marriage. But even among younger people, the prevailing view is that homosexuality is morally wrong, and relatively few young adults except in the Czech Republic favor gay marriage. In some countries, there is little or no difference between the views of younger and older adults on these issues. Many in Orthodox countries associate women with traditional roles People in Orthodox-majority countries are more likely than those elsewhere in the region to hold traditional views of gender roles – such as women having a social responsibility to bear children and wives being obligated to obey their husbands. Along these same lines, roughly four-in-ten or more adults in most Orthodox-majority countries say that when unemployment is high, men should have more rights to a job. Substantial shares of Orthodox Christians – even outside Russia – see the patriarch of Moscow currently Kirill as the highest authority in the Orthodox Church, including roughly half or more not only in Estonia and Latvia, where about three-in-four Orthodox Christians identify as ethnic Russians, but also in Belarus and Moldova, where the vast majority of Orthodox Christians are not ethnic Russians. In countries such as Armenia, Serbia and Ukraine, many people regard the national patriarchs as the main religious authorities. But even in these three nations, roughly one-in-six or more Orthodox Christians say the patriarch of Moscow is the highest authority in Orthodoxy – despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Orthodox Christians in these countries do not self-identify as ethnic Russians or with the Russian Orthodox Church. Should Russia protect Orthodox Christians outside its borders? In addition to having the largest Orthodox Christian population in the world more than million , Russia plays central cultural and geopolitical roles in the region. In all but one Orthodox-majority country surveyed, most adults agree with the notion that Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians outside its borders. The lone exception is Ukraine, which lost effective control over Crimea to Russia in and is still engaged in a conflict with pro-Russian separatists in the eastern part of the country. For a more detailed explanation of ethnic and religious divides in Ukraine, see the sidebar later in this chapter. Ethnic Russians say Russia has an obligation

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to protect them The survey also asked respondents whether Russia has an obligation to protect ethnic Russians living outside its borders. And in all three of these countries, clear majorities of ethnic Russians agree that Russia has a responsibility to protect them. Ukraine divided between east and west The survey results highlight an east-west divide within Ukraine.

Chapter 4 : Neo-Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe | global-e

I analyze two trends of major social and political significance in Central and Eastern Europe between and the apparent political inconsequentiality of rising unemployment and the causes.

Chapter 5 : Project MUSE - Tax Politics in Eastern Europe

By explaining the path of extrication from state socialism, this book clarifies the patterns of the welfare state's transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, at the national and EU level.

Chapter 6 : Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe | Pew Research Center

This article examines the economic and social transformation occurring in post-communist societies, with a particular focus given to the emergence of new social risks (NSRs) and the subsequent welfare state responses. It argues that Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by broader.

Chapter 7 : Power, Order, and the Politics of Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe - CORE

Power, Order, and the Politics of Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe By Pieter Vanhuysse Topics: comparative welfare states, political power, social cleavages, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, ethnicity, pensions.